

CHHATRAPATI RAJARAM AND THE MARATHA STATE

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By

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INTRODUCTION

In his Riyasat, the well-known historian of the Maratha History the late Raobahadur G.S. Sardesai says, "The history of Maharashtra for 18 years following the execution of Sambhaji is so much full of activities that it is no easy task to analyse them and come to certain conclusions. Moreover the scarcity of the source-material has made the work of writing the history of this period more difficult."¹ It is, on account of these difficulties, it seems, the above-mentioned period continues to be the most neglected part of the Maratha History; and much of it remains to be explored and analysed. With this intention in mind, an humble attempt is made here to accept the challenge of the difficult task to construct the story of the period of 11 years following Sambhaji's death in Maharashtra.

At the outset, the story of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Rajaram period is rendered in detail. In order to have a complete picture of the 26 year Maratha War of Independence the summary of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the reigns of Sambhaji and Tarabai is also given in the first and the third chapters. The fourth chapter deals with the Marathas' relations with the foreigners such as the English, the French and the Portuguese. The subsequent

1. SR, pp. 21-22

two chapters discuss the Maratha Administration, the Maratha Military System and the Maratha Warfare. In the next chapter some glimpses of the socio-economic conditions of the people of the Maratha State in the last quarter of the 17th century are presented. Next follows a chapter in which the entire life of Rajaram is discussed and his achievements as a general, an administrator and a diplomat are evaluated. The subsequent chapter contains the observations on the Rajaram period and a thorough analysis of the Mughal-Maratha conflict in the Deccan. In the end, the sources in the various languages are discussed and evaluated. In short, the whole Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Rajaram period, all the aspects of the Maratha State in the period under consideration and personality and the achievements of Rajaram as king have been discussed and estimated in the present work.

Almost all the sources in Marathi, Persian, English and Portuguese published upto 1977 have been ransacked and synthesized for the first time for reconstructing the story of Rajaram and the Maratha State under him. On the basis of the source material in the above-mentioned languages many events and subjects are fully described and critically examined. To name a few : 1. The Maratha political strategy in 1669, 2. the fall of Raigad, 3. the flight of Rajaram to Jinji, 4. the exploits of Santaji and Dhanaji, 5. the siege of Jinji, 6. Santaji's murder, 7. the escape of Rajaram and his family from Jinji and his subsequent activities in Maharashtra, 8. the succession of Shivaji II to the Maratha throne, 9. the formation of Rajaram's ministry, 10. the Maratha naval

activities, 11. the revival of the watan-system and feudalism etc. Moreover, so many new facts are brought to light in the present work. For instance : 1. Raigad was surrendered to the Mughals after some negotiations and not on account of the treachery of Suryaji Pisal as is generally held. 2. Janakibai, queen of Rajaram, did not die in the reign of Sambhaji as has hitherto been stated in history, but was captured along with Yesubai and Shahu and outlived her husband. 3. Tarabai and Rajasbai, the other two queens of Rajaram clandestinely travelled to Jinji not in 1694 as has been maintained by the historians of the Maratha History but in 1691. 4. When Rajaram died, his son Shivaji II, and not Raja Karna, succeeded him immediately.

At many places the wrong dates, remarks and conclusions of the historians such as the late Riyasatkar G.S. Sardesai, Sir Jadunath Sarkar and Shri V.S. Bendrey have been corrected. This has been done on the basis of the evidences found in the source material and not with even an iota of intention of showing any disregard to the great service they have rendered to the cause of history.

The War of Independence of the Marathas started with the coming of the Emperor Aurangzeb to the Deccan in 1681 and ended with his death at Ahmednagar in 1707. This 26 year war was the life and death struggle for the Marathas. The invasion of the Mughals under the leadership of the mighty Emperor was a menacing threat to the Maratha State. However, it turned into a great national calamity when the Maratha king Sambhaji was captured and killed. The Maratha

State which was so wisely and labourously founded by Shivaji the Great appeared for a while to have been vanished and all seemed to have been lost to the enemy. Here ended the first phase of the war and began the second one.

This second phase of the war, the Rajaram period of 11 years, was the most critical one of the Maratha History. In its beginning, the Marathas were completely routed and demoralized. The condition of the Marathas was virtually perilous : their king was captured and executed; their new king was forced to flee to the distant fort of Jinji in Karnatak; their capital along with their queen and prince was captured and their important forts and regions were rapidly conquered, thereby destroying the hard-earned freedom of their beloved land. Under the pressure of such circumstances, any other race would have been crushed and vanished politically. But the indomitable martial spirit of the Marathas and the inspiration derived from the teachings and deeds of the founder of the Maratha State enabled them to triumph over the adversary. Within, less than a year the Marathas are found defeating the enemy forces and freeing their forts and regions from the clutches of the enemy. They soon realized themselves that they were not to be defeated and crushed down but were to be victorious ultimately. Their struggle did not end immediately. Nor were they under the illusion that it would end in a short period. But now they had regained the confidence in their ability to continue the warfare for years to come. They continued to fight under the leadership of their king Rajaram and his officers like Ramchandrapant,

Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji, Dhanaji, Parashurampant and others. Their big armed forces roved from the Narbada to the Caveri. They defeated, captured and fined many renowned Mughal generals. The regions of Khandesh, Gujrat, Malva, Golconda and Karnataka were attacked and plundered. They even attacked the imperial camps thereby overawing their officers and inhabitants. Thus, the Rajaram period of the Maratha History is more significant than the Sambhaji period or the Tarabai period, Because it witnessed a collapse of the Maratha State as well as its revival from its ashes. More so, because it also witnessed a wonderful spontaneous out-break of the popular revolt against the mighty aggression of the Mughal Emperor.

There are instances of wars of independence in the World History. The American, the Spanish and the Vietnamese Wars of Independence are notable of them. In all these wars there is a discernible common principle of history : those who strive hard to subjugate others and destroy their freedom are eventually going to be defeated disgracefully and those who fight the life and death struggle for survival of their country and freedom are going to be victorious in the end. This was very much true with the Marathas fighting with the Mughal Emperor. The Emperor fought the war but could not win it because his was the imperialistic war. The Marathas fought and won the war because theirs was the War of Independence.

The Rajaram period which constitutes the vital part of the War of Independence is, thus, a very critical period

of the Maratha History. Equally important is the fact that it was also a period of transition. Many old principles and policies were abandoned and new ones adopted in order to meet the challenge of the Mughal aggression which, in turn, shaped the future of the Maratha History. The present work is an attempt at studying not only the life of the Maratha king Rajaram but also all the aspects of the Maratha State in his reign which was forced to pass through the gravest crisis in its history.

Chapter One

First Phase of the War

Successional Struggle

Shivaji the Great died unexpectedly before he could give any thought to the problem of succession. At that time Sambhaji, his elder son, was at the fort of Panhala. He was in charge of the region of Panhala, Prabhavali and Dabhol. Janardhanpant Hanmante and Mahaloji Ghorpade were posted by Shivaji at Panhala to assist Sambhaji in his administration. Discarding the claim of Sambhaji to the throne, Rajaram, the younger son of Shivaji, was installed as a Chhatrapati by performing the manohakarohan ceremony (April 21, 1680). Parties to this move were Soyarabai, the queen of Shivaji, Annaji Datto, the sachiv, Moropant Pingle, the peshwa, Pralhad Niraji, the nyayadhish, Balaji Awaji, the chitnis and many other prominent officers of the Maratha State. The news of Shivaji's death and the supersession of Sambhaji's right to the throne could no longer be a guarded secret. Sambhaji learned it soon and as a precaution he immediately asked the state officials to render their allegiance to him. He fortified his position at Panhala by collecting an army and storing the food grains.

Annaji Datto, Moropant Pingle and Pralhad Niraji proceeded to Panhala to capture Sambhaji. However, Hambirrao Mohite, the senapati of the Marathas, camping near Karad, foiled their designs by apprehending them. The army, the

deciding force in the successional struggle, joined Sambhaji (May/June, 1680). Immediately, he set out with a big force of 20,000 to subdue Raigad, the capital of the Marathas, where he met with little resistance and could easily enter it (June 18, 1680). Subsequently, he performed the manchakarohan ceremony. Forgetting the treachery, it is noteworthy, he not only gave a good treatment to Rajaram and Soyarabai, but also reinstated the disloyal ministers. This may be treated as the most opportune step on his part.

Reign of the Mughal-Maratha Conflict

The conflict between the Marathas and the Mughals had not abated at that time of Shivaji's death. Aurangzeb, the Mughal Emperor, had posted his elder son Muazzam alias Shah Alam in the Deccan while his forces were busy in fighting the Rajputs in the north. Soon, he ordered Prince Muazzam to return to the north from the Deccan. Bahadur Khan, a renowned Mughal general, was appointed in his place. However, the Khan could not make any headway due to the heavy rainfall. After rainy season in 1680, Sambhaji sent his forces to raid the Mughal territories. One of the forces was led by Hambirrao Mohite, who after looting Dharangaon came like the lightning upon Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh. (November-December). For three days the Marathas looted and burned the eighteen suburbs of the city. Bahadur Khan tried to intercept them. But they escaped with rich booty to their homeland.

Meanwhile, at the orders of the Emperor, his younger son, Akbar, was leading the Mughal forces against the Rajputs. Prince Akbar soon realized the futility of his father's attempt to subdue the Rajputs. Hence he told him to end the war and seek their co-operation. But his words were not heeded. Consequently, he joined the Rajputs and openly revolted against his father by declaring himself as the "Emperor of India." However, when he had to face his father in the battlefield the latter played a trick on the Rajputs, who eventually abandoned their ally. As a result of this, Prince Akbar, with his unfailing supporter Durgadas Rathod, had to flee to the Deccan with a view to seeking a shelter in Maharashtra (January 1681). He crossed the Nerbada in May. Bahadur Khan learned about his arrival and started pursuing him. The Prince narrowly escaped and could descend into Konkan, where he was duly received by the officials of Sambhaji. He was provided with residence at Pali, 25 miles north of Raigad, where Sambhaji met him in November, 1681.

The Emperor at once sent his son Azam Shah to pursue the rebel, and himself set out from Ajmere in September, 1681 and reached Burhanpur in November, 1681. Later on, he moved to Aurangabad (March 22, 1682). On his way to Burhanpur, he had already sent Chin Qalich Khan (later on Nizam-ul-mulk) to the Deccan and from Burhanpur he despatched Hasan Ali Khan on the expedition of Konkan.

Conspiracy against Sambhaji

Meanwhile, in the month of June or July 1681, a

conspiracy to poison Sambhaji to death and to install Rajaram on the throne had been hatched. The conspirators were Annaji Datto, Hiroji Farjand, Balaji Awaji, Somaji Datto, Pralhad Niraji, Keshav Pandit and the queen Soyarabai. They tried to win over Prince Akbar and sought his aid. But the Prince disclosed the conspiracy to Sambhaji and thus proved his loyalty to him. Consequently, in August Sambhaji put to death Annaji Datto, Balaji Awaji, Somaji Datto, Hiroji Farjand and many others. The English from Bombay record the rumour on October 27, 1681 that Soyarabai was poisoned to death at the instance of Sambhaji.¹ It was unfortunate that the persons of the stature of Annaji and Balaji should have turned traitors to Sambhaji, who had so generously forgiven them once for their treachery.

Maratha-Siddi Conflict

The Siddis, the staunch enemy of the Marathas, used to make constant incursions on the coastal regions of the Maratha State. Even during his reign, Shivaji had to persistently fight with them. While building up the Maratha navy, one of the objects of Shivaji was the capture of the sea-fort of Janjira and the annihilation of the power of the Siddis. However, he could not realize the object owing to, first, the impregnability of the fort and also his pre-occupation with more important matters; and, secondly, to the protection lent by the English of Bombay to the Siddis.

1. CSM, p.190.

It is not necessary to consider here the details of the skirmishes between the Siddis and the Marathas in the period of Sambhaji. The expedition of Sambhaji in the beginning of 1682 is an important one. In December 1681, the Siddis resorted to arson in the region from Panvel to Chaul in north Konkan. In retaliation, Sambhaji accompanied by Prince Akbar, marched on Janjira and was about to subjugate the Siddis, but the news of the arrival of Hasan Ali Khan in north Konkan compelled him to leave the siege to the care of Dadaji Raghunath Prabhu. Later on, the Marathas abandoned the siege and retreated.

Campaign of the Emperor

From Burhanpur the Emperor had despatched Hasan Ali Khan on the expedition into Konkan in November, 1681. His job was to subjugate the region from Junnar to Kalyan in the north Konkan, which was defenceless, due to the expedition of Sambhaji against the Siddis. The Maratha forces tried to intercept the Khan, while descending into Konkan via the Naneghat. The opposition of the Marathas was in vain. The Khan could advance and captured Kalyan (January, 1682). However, no sooner did the Khan leave the region than the Marathas captured Kalyan.

The Emperor reached Aurangabad on March 22, 1682. He sent Azam Shah and Dillir Khan to Ahmadnagar and Shahabuddin Khan alias Gazi-ud-din Firuz Jang and Rao Dalpat Bundela to Nasik. In April, Shahabuddin besieged the fort of Ramsej but failed. He was replaced by Bahadur Khan who too met the same

fate. Consequently, the Emperor had to give up the siege of Ramsej. (October, 1682). Infuriated by his failure so far to liquidate the Maratha State, the Emperor resolved to launch an extensive operation against the Marathas. He tried in vain to seek the co-operation of the Adilshah to invade the Maratha territories from the south.

From Aurangabad, the Emperor despatched Ruhullah Khan and Prince Muizzuddin in May and September 1682, respectively, to defend the Ahmadnagar region; while, in June, Prince Azam was sent towards Bijapur to cow down that state and inhibit it from befriending the Maratha bands. Shahabuddin Khan was posted to Junnar from Nasik; while Ramnasta Khan was directed to invade Konkan (June). Ramnasta Khan captured Kalyan in November-December. Sambhaji sent Rupaji Bhosale, Kesopant and Nilkantha Moreshwar to repel the Khan; but they were defeated by him. Later on, the Marathas compelled the Mughals to vacate Kalyan in April, 1683 while the Mughals were beating the retreat Sambhaji attacked from the rear, killed many and captured a large number of horses. It may be observed that in spite of the imperial resources at his disposal, the Emperor could not achieve any spectacular gains during 1681 to 1683.

Maratha-Portuguese Conflict

The Portuguese had helped the Mughals in their campaign in north Konkan. Hence, Sambhaji was enraged against them. In retaliation, he burnt down Tarapur and other villages from

Daman to Bassein (April, 1683). His peshwa, Nilkantha Moreshwar, besieged Chaul in July. Though the Marathas pressed very hard the besieged, they could not capture the place. In order to divert the Maratha forces from north Konkan, Francisco de Tavora, the Viceroy of Goa, set on an expedition against Fonda on October 27, 1683 with 800 white and 8000 kanarese troops. He reached in the vicinity of Fonda on November 1, and started firing from a hill near the fort. Though he could succeed in causing a breach in the wall of the fort, his forces failed to enter it as they were repulsed with losses. Meanwhile, Sambhaji left north Konkan for Fonda and arrived in its vicinity. His arrival frightened the Portuguese into retreat, abandoning the siege with many odds and troubles. The Viceroy, however, could somehow escape with his life.

Thereafter Sambhaji marched towards Goa and captured the districts of Bardesh and Salsette. He then took Kumbharjuve and Santo Estevao with its castle. The Viceroy sent Manucci, (the famous Italian traveller and historian) to Sambhaji for negotiations. Sambhaji demanded the chauth from Goa which was refused by the Viceroy. Though Sambhaji was in a position to capture the whole of Goa, he had to discontinue his negotiations and leave the place on November 26, 1683, owing to the news of the arrival of Prince Muzzam to the rescue of the Portuguese. He had to entrust the work of negotiations to his minister Kavi Kalash, who finally signed the treaty on February 4, 1684 .

Emperor's Grand Strategy

Early in April 1683, the Emperor recalled his generals from the expeditions against Sambhaji and Prince Akbar. Later on, he held a council of war at Aurangabad and placed before it the grand strategy of attacking the Marathas from all the directions simultaneously. Accordingly, he opened an offensive against the Marathas in the middle of September. He sent Prince Muazzam with a big army on the expedition of south Konkan, while Shahabuddin Khan marched to retake Kalyan and north Konkan. Prince Azam was posted to Nasik, from where he had to watch the route leading to Baglana and Khandesh. The Emperor himself marched from Aurangabad and reached Ahmadnagar in November. Bahadur Khan was sent to watch the borders of the states of Golkonda and Bijapur in order to check the aid the Marathas might receive from them.

Prince Muazzam started on the south Konkan expedition with an army of 20,000. On his way, Hasan Ali Khan joined him. In the vicinity of Belgaum, he captured many posts and forts despite the Maratha opposition. He posted Hasan Ali Khan on the top of the ghat to guard the line of communication. The Marathas tried to intercept the Mughals in the ghat by attacking their vanguards. At the news of the arrival of the Mughal forces in the rear, Sambhaji abandoned his aforesaid expedition against the Portuguese and turned towards them. A severe battle was fought, in which both the sides sustained considerable casualties. In the end, the Marathas were routed. Thereafter, Prince Muazzam demanded a huge amount from the Portuguese for having saved them from the

Maratha aggression. Since the Portuguese rejected the demand, he ordered the plunder of their town, Bardesh. From Goa borders, the Prince marched northwards to Vengurla and Malvan, which were devastated by his army (January, 1684). As per the plan of the Emperor, he was to join at Mahad the army of Shahabuddin Khan from the north. But he could not do so because of a number of difficulties. Severe famine starved his men and his army was considerably reduced. Food and forage became scarce. The situation changed from bad to worse. Two-thirds of his men perished of an epidemic, within a week. The casualties of horses and elephants were numberless. The Emperor came to know the catastrophe and immediately despatched Ruhullah Khan to his rescue. Later on, the Prince ascended the pass and moved into the Karnatak plains. Thus, the great expedition of the Prince was a great failure.

The expedition of Shahabuddin Khan in north Konkan achieved nothing except the burning of Nizampur in December, 1683. From Aurangabad, the Emperor continued to despatch the armies against the raiding Marathas. Serbuland Khan, Ruhullah Khan, Bahramand Khan and other commanders were roving and pursuing the Marathas throughout the year. In January 1684, Bahramand Khan went to disperse the Marathas in the vicinity of Mungi Paithan, while in February, Prince Azam and his son Prince Bidar Bakht were sent to Bahadurgad. Later on, Bahramand Khan and Shahabuddin Khan were posted at Nasik and Poona, respectively. The Mughals had also established their posts in the parganas of Supe, Baramati and Indapur. After

the rainy season the Mughal campaign was started in September 1684 by sending Shahabuddin Khan to capture Raigad. Afterwards, many watandars and Maratha commanders were induced to desert the side of the Maratha State. In October, Sambhaji had to take stern measures to suppress the treacherous feud of some of his officers by imprisoning Manaji More, Gangadhar-pant and Rahuji Somnath. Their disloyal actions, coupled with a number of previous similar cases, made Sambhaji to rely more and more on Kavi Kalash, in whom he sought trust and friendship. Since then, Kavi Kalash remained his loyal adviser in all matters upto their fatal end.

Adilshahi and Qutbshahi Vanquished

Sambhaji was equally alert enough in counteracting the moves of the Emperor and in defending his regions. It seems that his generalship frustrated the Mughal designs. Hence, the Emperor had to give up, for the time being, his campaign against the Marathas and turn towards the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi to conquer them.

While he was busy with the Marathas, the Emperor could not give serious thought to subjugating the Adilshahi. However, he had established a number of outposts in the Bijapur territory during 1682-1684, in order to check the aid of the Adilshah to Sambhaji. In April, 1685 Bijapur was besieged by Ruhullah Khan, Qasim Khan and Bahadur Khan. Even the Emperor reached Sholapur in order to be in touch with the conduct of his siege. Later on, in June, Prince Azam assumed the supreme command of the siege. The Adilshah valiantly defended the

fort. In his effort he was assisted by Sambhaji. As the fort was not captured, the Emperor himself went there in July to press the siege vigorously. Eventually, the Adilshah surrendered himself to the Emperor on September 12, 1686. It should be noted that while the operation of Bijapur was in full swing the Marathas were haunting the regions of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur. Earlier in October 1685, Hyderabad was taken by Prince Muazzam and the Qutbshah had to flee to the fort of Golconda. The Prince returned to the Emperor with heavy tribute in June 1686. The dissolution of the Adilshahi made the Emperor the master of the territory, south and south-east of Maharashtra. He posted officers to collect revenue and maintain peace in the conquered regions. Qasim Khan was appointed as the faujdar of Karnatak, while Ruhullah Khan was made the subhedar of Bijapur. At that time the Maratha generals Hambirrao Mohite, Rupaji Bhosale and others engaged the Mughals on the southern and eastern borders of the Maratha State. Before setting out on the expedition to Golconda in January 1687, the Emperor despatched Prince Azam to Nasik. Soon, the forts of Salher and Ramsej in Baglana were won with bribe. Early in the year, Yadgiri and Torgal were captured by Shahabuddin Khan and Qasim Khan, respectively. By November, the Mughals could conquer about 20 forts of the Marathas.

From February 1687, to September 1687, the Mughals were busy with the siege of Golconda. On September 21, 1687 Golconda was treacherously taken by the Mughals. Soon the imperial order to seize the southern region of Golconda was issued.

Qasim Khan took Pilgonda in September and soon Bangalore was also captured. In November 1687, a powerful Berad chief, Pam Naik, was subdued and his kingdom was confiscated.

The Emperor left Golconda on January 25, 1688 and reached Bijapur on March 15, 1688. Shahabuddin Khan was sent to take the regions of Karnool and Adhoni. The Khan captured Adhoni by bribe. Early in the year Prince Azam was despatched against the Marathas. He marched towards the south and took the fort of Belgaum and returned to Bijapur for rainy season. Through out this period (1687-1688) Sambhaji was busy and active. However, he suffered a great set-back in the death of Hambirrao Mohite, his senapati, who died fighting Rustum Khan alias Sarja Khan near Wai (December 1687).

The subjugation of the states of Bijapur and Golconda by the Mughals helped them to mount more pressure on the Marathas. Early in January 1688 Matabar Khan took many forts in Baglana. After the rainy season the Emperor despatched Prince Azam to north Konkan and to reinforce the Prince he himself encamped at Akluj. Shaikh Nizam, a brave Mughal commander, was posted at the Panhala-Kolhapur region. He established the Mughal post at Kolhapur and was also trying to besiege Panhala.

Capture and Execution of Sambhaji

The Mughal forces could not establish their sway over Konkan. However, they had established their posts at Chakan, Poona, Shirval, Wai, Supe, Baramati, Indapur and Kolhapur.

Despite this, the strength of the Marathas lay in their well-equipped forts such as Panhala, Vishalgad, Purandar, Sinhgad, Raigad, Torana, Pratapgad, Rajgad and others, which were still in the possession of the Marathas. The English from Bombay record in their letter of January 1, 1688 that cannons were set on the bastions of the forts at the news of the imminent arrival of the Mughals who had no courage enough to march against Sambhaji.²

In October-November the Shirkes, the near relatives of Sambhaji, revolted and defeated Kavi Kalash who had to seek shelter at Vishalgad. Upon learning this, Sambhaji immediately marched against the Shirkes and routed them. Afterwards Sambhaji returned to Vishalgad. Thereafter, he imprisoned Pralhad Niraji and a few other ministers at the instance of Kavi Kalash. While in the Panhala-Vishalgad region, Sambhaji learned that the Mughal forces were marching towards Raigad. So he and Kavi Kalash left Vishalgad for Raigad. They sojourned at Sangameshwar on their way. Shaikh Nizam, who had been kept informed of their activities by his spies, negotiated the difficult ranges of the Sahyadri and took them by surprise. In a subsequent skirmish, Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash were defeated and taken captives (February 1, 1689). Shaikh Nizam could achieve this success by taking recourse to the forced marches in addition to his military

2. Ibid., p.577

skill. It seems that Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash were completely in the dark about the movements of Shaikh Nizam's army. The Mughal commander returned to the imperial camp with the captives with such a speed that the Maratha contingents at Malkapur, Panhala and Vishalgad could not pursue him.

Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash were first paraded on the camels in the guise of the convicts in Iran and with caps of a clown. The parade was accompanied by the blowing of horns and the beating of drums, meant only to humiliate them. Then, they were taken to the Emperor on February 15, 1689. On the very night Sambhaji's eyes and tongue of Kavi Kalash were pulled out. Afterwards, they were subjected to inhuman tortures and subsequently, decapitated on March 11, 1689. As though this cruelty was not sufficient, the bodies of both Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash were stuffed with straw and exhibited in the towns of the Deccan to the accompaniment of the beating of drums of victory.

The Emperor always repented that he did not put Shivaji to death when imprisoned at Agra. This time, he became wiser and decided not to repeat the same mistake. As a result of this, he discarded the advice of his courtiers to spare the life of Sambhaji, on the condition that the latter would surrender all the forts and treasure of the Maratha State. But the Emperor was intoxicated with the victory and reason did not prevail upon him.

For an ordinary Maratha, the Emperor's ugly exhibition

of power was a national insult : he was stunned and his blood boiled with the thought of vendetta. Once again a high sense of swarajya and the undying marshal spirit began to seize him. This alone toughened him to face the mighty Mughal Emperor for the next seventeen years.

Sambhaji's Greatness

The reign of Sambhaji from 1680 to 1689 is the first phase of the War of Independence of the Marathas. This War of Independence vigorously started with the coming of the Emperor Aurangzeb to the Deccan in 1681 and ended with his death in 1707. This period of 26 years is a glorious and remarkable part of the Maratha History. It is a romantic and inspiring event in the history of India too. Sambhaji, the young and brave king, was destined to lead the Marathas against the Mughal Emperor. From the very beginning of his political career, Sambhaji had to face numerous crisis and catastrophes. Though he was the rightful claimant to the throne, his claim was treacherously ignored and his step-brother, Rajaram, was proclaimed as a Chhatrapati by the sarkarkuns and his step-mother Soyarabai. It is really a magnanimity of his heart that he so generously forgave the offenders. However, the illfated opponents did not learn the lesson and tried to poison the person of Sambhaji. Consequently, the traitors met with the cruel fate for which the historians need not blame Sambhaji.

Meanwhile, the rebel Prince Akbar had come and sought the shelter in Maharashtra. By welcoming this 'imperial' guest Sambhaji had challenged the imperial prestige and might.

The bold and chivalrous act of the Maratha king infuriated the Emperor who personally marched with huge force to the Deccan to punish the rebels : Prince Akbar and his host.

Thus, Sambhaji had to exert his potency and might to check and extirpate the domestic and external dangers. The safety of the Maratha State was further endangered by the inimical activities of the Siddis and Portuguese. The English, though posing themselves neutral, were sympathising and sheltering the Siddis.

In the beginning of his campaign, the Emperor was overconfident, as he felt that he could vanquish the Maratha State within a record period. However, the months and years passed with no avail. Except the capture of few posts and forts in Maharashtra, he could not accomplish any significant victory. His armed forces met spirited and tough resistance and at times disastrous calamities in the Maratha land. The very fact that the Emperor had to turn to the conquest of the States of Bijapur and Golconda, reveals that he had lost his first vigour to subjugate the Maratha State. It is highly creditable to Sambhaji and his gallant Marathas that they successfully faced the Mughal invasion. But as a result of the conquests of Bijapur and Golconda, the two major checks on the Mughal activities in the Deccan vanished and the Emperor could forcefully penetrate his armies from all sides into the Maratha land. Nevertheless, the Marathas fought them with greater valour and resistance. It is only after the capture and execution of Sambhaji the posts and

forts began to fall rapidly into the Mughal hands and by the end of the year 1689 the Maratha State was almost destroyed. However, it should be noted that Sambhaji had defended his land till his death.

Sambhaji's greatness lies in safeguarding the Maratha State for nine years from internal and external dangers and in not surrendering the enemy when he was captured and tortured. It is true that he had some vices but it should not impair his whole personality as a King. Bajirao the Great also enjoyed the pleasure of wine and woman. Nevertheless, he is considered as a greatest fighting peshwa of the Marathas. The evaluation of his achievements is not made on the basis of those drawbacks only. It seems that Sambhaji did not fail in his prime duty of protecting the independence of the Marathas. On the contrary he, with his limited resources and power, gave a tough fight with the mighty Emperor of India and eventually laid his life for the Maratha independence.

Chapter Two

Second Phase of the War

Part- I

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra : 1689

1) Manoharkarohan of Rajaram

Mahaloji Ghorpade, his son Santaji and Khando Ballal had accompanied Sambhaji, when the latter was attacked by the Mughals at Sangameshwar. In the fight Mahaloji was killed. Realising that the further resistance was hopeless, Santaji and Khando Ballal escaped and fled to Raigad. ¹ It appears that the news of the capture of Sambhaji was first brought to Raigad by them. Changoji Katkar, the killedar and Yesaji Kank, the old Mavla captain were at Raigad. At the fort, Yesubai, the queen of Sambhaji, was the only elderly and responsible person from the royal family. ²

Shahu, the son of Sambhaji, was seven years old. Rajaram was nineteen, but unfortunately he had no sufficient training in administration. Naturally, at that time responsibility of the state affairs fell upon Yesubai. The Marathas were utterly confused and were in no position to secure the release of Sambhaj from the Mughals. In such adverse circumstances, Yesubai quite

1. CGM, p.6; CSM, p.607

2. It may be mentioned that Sakwarbai, the queen of Shivaji, was also at Raigad. But she does not seem to have any interest in the affairs of the State.

heroically boosted up the morale of the Marathas. It is indeed noteworthy that she did not suffer from narrow considerations. This is evident from her lead in performing the manchakarohan ceremony for Rajaram instead of performing it for her son. (February 9, 1689) Thus she did not create a rift on the issue of succession to the throne either in the royal family or indirectly in the Maratha State.³

2) Zulfiqar Khan on the expedition of Raigad

The Emperor had sent Prince Azam to capture the Maratha forts in north Konkan (December, 1689). The Prince and later on the Mughal Commander, Gaziuddin Khan, had tried to capture Raigad, the capital of the Marathas; but both failed to achieve any success. Now a renowned general, Itiqad Khan (who was later on known as Zulfiqar Khan), the son of Asad Khan the Wazir, was ordered by the Emperor to capture Raigad. On his way, Zulfiqar Khan met Prince Azam and stayed with him for three days.⁴ Thereafter, he descended the ghat and proceeded to Raigad via Mahad. When he reached Mahad, the Mughal army looted the posts (thanas) and villages in the region. At the camp of Gangoli, the Khan was attacked by the Marathas, who continued their onslaughts on his army till he reached the foot of Raigad.⁵

3. Though the Jedhe chronology mentions the major part played by Changoji Katkar and Yesaji Kank in performing the manchakarohan ceremony for Rajaram, the subsequent history clearly shows that it was Yesubai who was mainly responsible for the performance of the ceremony. (SCP-JS, pp.34-35)

4. FA, pp.32-33

5. KS, pp.69-70

As the Khan reached the foot of the fort with his cavalry, the garrison started artillery fire at him causing many casualties in his army. Infuriated by this, he set a hamlet on fire, at the foot of the fort and encamped in its vicinity. On receiving this news Hambirrao Mohite, a Maratha commander,⁶ came from Satara to the scene. His object was to cut off the supply line of the Mughals. In a pitched battle both the sides suffered heavy losses. Because of the numerical strength of the Mughals Hambirrao had to retreat.⁷

Soon, the Khan laid siege to Raigad. (March 25, 1689)⁸ However, it may be pointed out that a complete siege round the fort cannot be laid owing to the natural position of the fort. Raigad belongs to the main range of the Sahyadri. Its height from the sea-level is 2851 feet and from the foot 2250 feet. The top of the fort stretches $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles between the east and west and its breadth is about a mile. From a sizable distance the fort is almost encompassed by a chain of forts : Lingana in the north-east, Torna to the east, Kangora, Chambhargad and Songad to the south, Talegad to the north-west, and Ghosalgad

6. He had the title of sarlaskar and during the reigns of Rajaram and Tarabai, it appears, that he was one of the foremost Maratha commanders. In both the Persian and Marathi sources there are some references to his movements and gallantry.

(KS, p.69)

7. FA, p.33

8. SCP-JS, p.35

to the north.⁹ Almost in all directions there are very stiff cliffs cut like walls, and they are on the moderate calculation more than thousand feet high. Similarly the ranges around the fort are as high as the fort itself. Narrow deep valleys separate the fort from the neighbouring ranges. As a result the fort looks like an island among the high ranges. On the northern side in between the fort and the range there is a narrow tract of about a mile running from east to west, in which it would be impossible for an enemy to encamp; because the camp of an enemy would easily come within the range of an artillery fire. However, an enemy can encamp at the places like Paohad and blockade the reinforcements to the fort. Yet such a thing is difficult unless the neighbouring forts and posts in its vicinity are taken first by an enemy.

3) United Front of the Marathas

Sambhaji was tortured to death on March 11, 1689.¹⁰ He could tide over the Mughal aggression. At times he had to retreat because of the powerful war-machine of the Mughals. However, he had disillusioned the Emperor who was under the impression that he could easily liquidate the Maratha State. After the crucifixion of Sambhaji, the need of the hour was how to countenance the then existing difficulties and not to ponder over what had happened during the regime of Sambhaji. At this time the important Maratha officials and commanders were Pralhad Niraji, Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Nilo Moreswar,

9. RJ, pp.3 & 12; RD, p.19

10. SCP-JS, p.35

Janardanpant Hanmante, Rahuji Somnath, Khando Ballal, Santaji Ghorpade, Dhanaji Jadhav, Mansing More, Hambirrao Mohite sarlaskar, Rupaji Bhosale, Bahirji Ghorpade, Maloji Ghorpade, Vithoji Chavan, Harji Mahadik and Keso Trimal. The last two were in Karnatak. Most of the abovementioned persons assembled at Raigad and were haunted by the difficult problem of the Maghal aggression.

During the life-time of Sambhaji the protagonists of Rajaram strove to install Rajaram on the throne, but they failed. At this juncture, they could have imprisoned Shahu and Yesubai and materialized their design of making Rajaram a Chhatrapati of the Marathas. But they did not have to resort to such a course of action, since Yesubai herself quite selflessly came forward with a proposal of installing Rajaram as Chhatrapati. No doubt, Shahu was the heir-apparent. He could have been installed on the throne and Yesubai could have acted as regent. But wisely enough Yesubai did not resort to this, because, she did not wish to split the Maratha political front on the successional issue in the State.

Thus, the problem of succession to the throne was automatically pushed into back-ground. Even the high officials do not seem to have been inspired by the prospects of a higher rise under the Chhatrapati of their choice. Because holding high offices in the State which was about to be swallowed by the Mughals would not have been a bed of roses. They would have been simply the captains of a sinking ship. Under such circumstances even if either party pushed its own claim to the

throne the dangers within and without the Maratha State would have possibly shattered its designs. Consequently, the Maratha State would have been destroyed and there would be nothing left for the Marathas to fight for. Thus, the Mughal aggression brought the Marathas together in a selfless and united adventure to save their State.

4) Wise Counsel of Yesubai

Malhar Ramrao states that the Maratha officials sought the advice of Yesubai at Raigad as to the future course of action. The advice given by her clearly indicates her statesmanship and selflessness. Her counsel was :

1. that she and Shahu would remain at Raigad.
2. that though Shahu was heir-apparent, in the then existing circumstances, it would have been advisable and desirable for Rajaram to be at the helm of the affairs of the State.
3. that Rajaram along with the officials and commanders should leave Raigad. His departure would serve two purposes : first, in case of the fall of the fort, the whole of the royal family would not fall in the hands of the enemy; secondly, it would be easier for Rajaram to fight the enemy by being outside the fort than being inside it.
4. that if the Marathas were overpowered by the Mughals in Maharashtra Rajaram should go to Karnatak, make Jinji his capital, and regain the power of the Marathas.¹¹

11. RC-MR, p.30

In view of the natural position of Raigad, Yesubai's choice to remain at the fort was quite opportune. By installing Rajaram as Chhatrapati, she set an example of high sacrifice. This naturally facilitated emotional integration among the Marathas and stamped out a possible dissention.

5) Flight of Rajaram

As agreed upon, Rajaram along with his queens, left Raigad on April 5, 1689.¹² He was also accompanied by the officials and commanders like Pralhad Niraji, Dhanaji, Santaji and others.¹³ Rajaram reached Pratapgad via Jawali. His flight did not remain a secret. Soon Zulfiqar Khan learned about it, but failed to seize the gravity of the situation. He dispatched Fateh Jang Khan to pursue Rajaram instead of undertaking the task by himself. Even the Emperor blamed the Khan for his laxity. The Khan writes to his father about his inability, "It was reported to him (the Khan) that Rajaram would come back. In view of this, the elders counselled that it would be advisable on his part not to pursue him himself."¹⁴ The wishful thinking of the Khan, that Rajaram would come back, is indeed ludicrous. The real reason of the Khan's shirking the pursuit may be attributed to the difficult roads, thick forest and hilly region of Jawali. So the Khan remained satisfied with the despatch of his subordinate to pursue Rajaram.

12. SCP-JS, p.35

13. RC-MR, p.32

14. KS, pp.70-71

On learning of the flight of Rajaram, the Mughals began to take measures in order to capture him. They wrote to local chieftains like Khem Savant and the aliens like the Portuguese, asking them to arrest Rajaram, if he happened to travel through their regions. The Portuguese Viceroy in his reply to them assured that in the light of the friendship of the Portuguese with the Emperor, he would post necessary guards on the probable routes of Rajaram.¹⁵

From Pratapgad, Rajaram wrote letters of encouragement to the Maratha killedars and commanders to defend the forts and regions in their charge. He dispatched some of his renowned commanders to recapture the forts from the Mughals. At the same time some of the commanders were ordered to come to Pratapgad with their forces.¹⁶ While the Maratha preparations to meet the challenge of the Mughal invasion were going on, Muajuddin, the grandson of the Emperor, had laid a siege to Panhala, (C. March-April, 1689).¹⁷ But he failed to capture the fort; and it seems, he raised the siege and went away.

While at Pratapgad, Rajaram sent to Raigad Girjoji Yadav, one of his favourites and confidants, to bring gold and other valuables. Girjoji was further instructed by him to bring Jankibai (the queen of Rajaram) and Shahu to Pratapgad. Girjoji managed to reach Raigad through the Mughal siege and told

15. SSI, pp. 20-21; TKK, p.54.

16. MM-SP, p.24; AS, p.78

17. TKK, pp. 51-52

Changoji Katkar, the killedar of Raigad, of his mission. The killedar handed over gold and other valuables but was opposed to let Jankibai and Shahu to leave Raigad.¹⁸ Rajaram seems to have second thoughts about the stay of Shahu at Raigad, in view of the insecure position there. However, Changoji Katkar, Yesubai and others adhered to the common decision taken earlier.

On June 18, 1689, an important battle which had gone unnoticed so far in the history of the Marathas, was fought between Rajaram and the Mughals. Lodhi Khan, the deshmukh of Tudil, Ambaji Chandrarao¹⁹ who had fled to the Siddis and one Hirojirao Darekar sought the help of Kakar Khan²⁰ and assembled at Par, a village at the foot of Pratapgad. Learning this, Rajaram descended from the fort and attacked the enemy. A stiff battle was fought in which Rajaram's mahout charged the enemy with an elephant. However, Hirojirao Darekar cut the trunk of the elephant and Rajaram had to retreat. In utter confusion Rajaram lost his shikke-katvar²¹ which was later on found by Jawaji Parate. In this battle Rajaram was accompanied by his officials and army captains such as Pilaji Gole, Humajirao Yerunkar and Jawaji.²² Soon, it became

18. Ibid., pp.195 & 472

19. Related to the Chandrarao More family of Javali (?)

20. A Mughal commander

21. A comprehensive term for the insignia or emblems of royalty (MED, p.787)

22. AS, pp.83 & 113; RR, Yr. 11, ISS. 121, pp.7-8

increasingly insecure to stay any longer at Pratapgad; hence Rajaram had to leave the fort and proceed to Vasota (C. August 10). The lieutenants of Zulfiqar Khan pursued him in vain. One of them, Bakshi Bahramand Khan left for the imperial camp in the midst of the pursuit.²³ From Vasota, Rajaram came down to Satara and subsequently went to Sajjangad (Parali) for the darshan of the samadhi of Ramdas. There he was blessed by Kalyan, the disciple of Ramdas.²⁴ From Sajjangad, he came to Panhala by the end of August 1689.

6) Gallant deeds of Dhanaji and Santaji

While the Mughal forces were speedily capturing forts and regions in Maharashtra, Dhanaji and Santaji, did their best to boost up the morale of the Marathas, by their gallant deeds on the battle-fields. Dhanaji rallied his forces and fought five battles with the Mughal forces in the Mahadeo hill region. He defeated the Mughals and captured their five pieces of guns. Later on, he came down to Panhala where he was honoured by Rajaram. Malhar Ramrao says that Rajaram conferred upon Dhanaji the title of Jaisingrao.²⁵ (September, 1689).

While Dhanaji was fighting the enemy forces in the Mahadeo hills, Santaji fell like lightning upon the army of Zulfiqar Khan, besieging Raigad. In a severe battle that ensued, he

23. KS, p.71

24. PR, p.235

25. RC-MR, pp. 34 & 36

caused heavy damage to the Mughal camp. Here he attacked the tents of the imperial army and carried away their golden pinnacles. He also captured five elephants from the camp. It seems that it was the intention of Santaji to raise the siege by such a surprise attack; but he could not succeed. So, he retreated to Panhala, where he offered his spoils of war to Rajaram. Santaji was also highly honoured and rewarded.²⁶

7) Rajaram's Escape to Jinji

Despite the gallant resistance, the Marathas could not repel the mighty Mughals; their resources went thinner and thinner gradually. The real power of the Marathas laid in the forts. But even they were besieged and taken one after another by the Mughals. Under such an unfavourable situation, Rajaram could not execute his former plan of keeping himself moving from fort to fort and fighting the enemy. He was pursued and besieged, whenever he went. Even his stay at Panhala had been reported to the Emperor, who had sent his forces to besiege the fort and capture him (Rajaram). Had Rajaram remained at a well-fortified place in Maharashtra for^a long time, the Emperor would have moved the heaven and earth to capture him. So according to the plan agreed upon at Raigad and as per the counsel of Pralhad Niraji and other ministers, Rajaram decided to leave for Jinji in Karnatak. This move was to serve many purposes : first and foremost, it would foil the design of the Emperor to destroy the very family of the Chhatrapati; secondly, the

26. Ibid., pp. 34-35; FY, p.361

Emperor would be required to fight the Marathas on two fronts, namely Maharashtra and Karnatak. With the capture of many forts and posts in Maharashtra, the Mughal army was scattered in order to man them. On the other hand, the Maratha forces would retreat and then combine themselves into two or three big armies under the generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji. They would move with the lightning speed from Nasik to Jinji, devastating the country with sword and fire. They would also resort to the guerilla warfare. Lastly, it was thought that Rajaram would give an organized front with the help of his cousin, Shahaji of Tanjore, and other Hindu Naiks in Karnatak.

Rajaram entrusted the administration in Maharashtra to Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan. The region of Korigad²⁷ was assigned to Shankaraji Narayan and the rest of the Maratha land was given in charge of Ramchandrapant. Santaji, Dhanaji and other commanders were asked to function under the direction of Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan.²⁸

It seems that the Mughals had already scented the Maratha strategy. Bahadur Khan, the Mughal killedar of Belgaum wrote to the Portuguese, stating that Rajaram was planning to escape to Karnatak for the acquisition of the treasure; hence his land-routes and sea-routes be watched. The Viceroy, in his reply, on September 3, 1689, pointed out that he had already set up the guards at the two routes and their number was being doubled then.²⁹

27. 40 miles west of Poona

28. RC-Sarg-IV, Vs. 11-12; RSP, p.176

29. TKK, pp. 55-56.

In spite of the Mughal vigilance on his movements, Rajaram left Panhala for Jinji on the night of September 26, 1689.³⁰ Malhar Ramrao writes that Rajaram and his party travelled in the guise of lingayat wanis;³¹ while Keshav Pandit says that their clothes were in keeping with the dress of the travellers. They were riding on the horses.³² While leaving Panhala, the party consisted of the following : Mansing More, Pralhad Niraji, Krishnaji Anant, Nilo Moreshwar, Bahiro Moreshwar, Uddhav, Khando Ballal, Chitragupta Kayastha, Baji Kadam, Khandoji Kadam, Nilkantha Krishna and others.³³

30. SCP-JS, p.35; According to G.S. Sardesai, Rajaram went to Rangana from Panhala and proceeded further to Karnatak from that place. Sardesai seems to have based his statement on the information from the bakhar of Malhar Ramrao. It is obvious from the Jedhe chronology and the Rajaram Charitan that Rajaram did not go to Rangana while on his way to Karnatak.

31. RC-MR, p.36

32. RC, Sarg IV, Vs. 15 & 25

33. Ibid., Vs. 17-23; The names of Khandoji Yesaji Dabhade, Narsinha Panditacharya, Timaji Raghunath Hanmante and Kanhoji Angre are mentioned as having accompanied Rajaram in other sources - BISM-Q, Yr. 31, Iss. 2-3, p.3; BISM-VI, Shak 1837, p.155; SL, p.203.

The besiegers of Panhala had almost no knowledge of Rajaram's escape from the fort. In the first instance, he proceeded to the east and reached the Krishna at the time of sunrise and crossed it.³⁴ Rajaram seems to have deliberately preferred the east route to the south route instead, in order to avoid the immediate pursuit of the Mughals. Had the Mughals immediately learnt about his flight, they would have, according to their judgement, certainly chased him towards the south. This is what his father did when he escaped from Agra. Shivaji the Great first proceeded to the north instead of to the south in order to outwit the enemy.

If we accept the statement of Keshav Pandit that Rajaram crossed the Krishna river next morning at sunrise, then he should have crossed it near Ntisinhwadi, a famous shrine of Datta. A look at the map of south India would reveal that Rajaram had to recross the Krishna somewhere in order to reach Jinji in Karnatak. Though Keshav Pandit is silent on Rajaram's recrossing the Krishna, it may be presumed that he must have done it somewhere near Kudachi or Amapur in the north-west of present Karnatak State. Soon, he reached Gokak and thence to Saundatti,³⁵ a famous shrine of Goddess Yalamma (Renuka). He had to cross the Ghatprabha at Gokak and the Malprabha near Saundatti. His further route of journey seems to be Saundatti--Navalgund -- Annigeri -- Lakshmeshwar -- Haveri -- Hirekerur -- Shimoga. While Rajaram was passing through the region of

34. RC, Sarg IV, Vs. 24, 30, 33-34

35. RC-MR, p.36

Lakshmeshwar, the local Mughal officials learnt of his flight and started chasing him. This time, says Keshav Pandit, Bahirji Ghorpade and his brother Maloji Ghorpade rushed to the rescue of their king. With their help Rajaram crossed the Varada river, but, soon, realized that his way was being blocked by the enemy. Santaji Jagtap and Rupaji Bhosale, the two Maratha gallant spearmen, engaged the enemy and protected Rajaram from their onslaughts. Thereafter, he asked Santaji Jagtap to guard the rear and took Rupaji along with him.³⁶ It appears from this fight that at that time a small force did accompany Rajaram.³⁷ It would be wrong to contend that that force escorted Rajaram right from Panhala. It joined Rajaram's party on its way at different places. For example, during the travel, Hambirrao Mohite, the sarlashkar and Mansing More returned to Maharashtra, while Bahirji Ghorpade joined Rajaram before he crossed the Varada.³⁸ Hence, it appears that Rajaram's journey to Jinji was well-thoughtout and properly planned. Where and who should join and leave Rajaram seems to be arranged sufficiently beforehand.

Rajaram now entered the territory of the Bidnur State. He had already made an appeal to Channama, the queen of Bidnur,

36. RC, pp. 69-71

37. According to Saki Mustaid Khan 300 notable and renowned sardars accompanied Rajaram when he entered the State of Bidnur (MA-SP, p.44)

38. TKK, p.473

to help him to go through her State, undetected by the enemy. The queen sought the counsel of her officials and arrived at a decision that it would be against the rajdharma to hand over to the enemy the one who had helplessly sought shelter in her state. She made up her mind to help the Maratha king at the risk of her state, being taken by the Mughal Emperor. It seems that the queen thought Aurangzeb's invasion of the Deccan as a common danger to the Hindu religion and Hindu states. This brought her in league with Rajaram who was the son of Shivaji, the champion of Hinduism in the Deccan. With secret help of the queen, Rajaram safely passed through her territories and reached Shimoga, on the bank of the Tunga river. The Mughals, who had attacked Rajaram on the bank of the Varada, were still in his pursuit. Soon, they learned that Rajaram had taken shelter with Channama. So they admonished her that he be surrendered to them. She promptly replied that he had come to her state, but had already left it; and that while going through her state he had left behind some of his clothes and ornaments. She sent them to the Mughals. ³⁹

39. SCV, I, pp.65-66

Later on, when the Emperor came to know that Channama allowed Rajaram to pass through her territory, he got infuriated and sent Prince Azam to invade her state. The renowned commanders like Jannisar Khan, Matlab Khan and Sarja Khan were reported to have marched against her. Obviously, the devastation of her state by the Mughals was inevitable. But Santaji Ghorpade rushed to the rescue of Channama and defeated the

(Contd...)

Meanwhile, the Emperor had already received the reports that Rajaram had fled from Panhala towards Karnatak. He had issued orders to all thanedars and commanders on the probable routes of Rajaram, asking them to capture him, while escaping to his destination.⁴⁰ Sayyid Abdul Khan Barha, the subhedar of Bijapur, was then busy in taking the forts in the Bijapur region. He now received urgent imperial orders to go immediately in the pursuit of Rajaram. The Khan postponed his siege-works and set out on the expedition along with his force. With forced marches for 3 days and 3 nights, he confronted Rajaram at Shimoga on the Tunga river.⁴¹

F.N. 39 Contd...

abovementioned Mughal commanders. The queen, too, valiantly fought the enemy who had entered her state. The Bidnur state could not be conquered and hence the Mughals had to remain satisfied with the collection of a nominal fine from the queen. (SCV, I, pp.66-67; MA-SP, pp.44-45).

40. HA, V, p.41

41. MA-SP, pp.43-44.

Hitherto, the exact place at the Tunga river, where Rajaram had halted on his way to Jinji, was not known. But from the records of the Yadav family, it is evident that it was Shimoga. (TKK, p.473). The Bhadra river meets the Tunga about 8 miles north-east of Shimoga.

It was night when Sayyid Abdul Khan encircled the party of Rajaram. In a skirmish, Rupaji Bhosale engaged the enemy and gave Rajaram an opportunity to escape away. Here, Bahirji Ghorpade ran to his rescue. He took Rajaram on his shoulders and manœuvred his way out through the encirclement of the enemy. It was, indeed, an hair-breadth escape.⁴²

Soon, the Maratha party was overpowered by the Mughals and Rupaji Bhosale along with his 80 companions was taken captive. In the first instance, the Mughals felt that Rajaram also was caught alive and they reported to the Emperor accordingly. The Emperor forthwith dispatched Hamiduddin Khan to fetch Rajaram to the imperial court. But, soon, it was realized that Rajaram had already fooled the Mughals and escaped to the further south. As a result of this, the Emperor got very much annoyed with Sayyid Abdul Khan and ordered that the captives be jailed in the fort of Bijapur.⁴³

Upto Shimoga, Rajaram's party had journeyed the distance on horse; thenceforth, they proceeded towards Bangalore on foot

42. RC, pp.71-73. Saki Mustaid Khan says that in the thick of fighting Rajaram abandoned his weapons, clothes, turban, and footwares and fled away in such a way that he was not noticed by anybody (MA-SP, p.44)

43. Later on, most of the prisoners jumped over the walls of the jail and ran away. Some of them, of course, were crippled in their attempt and, therefore, were recaptured. They were taken to the Emperor and subsequently put to death.

(MA-SP, pp.44-45; TD, p.100)

under the disguise of pilgrims, mendicants, businessmen and beggars.⁴⁴ The army detachments of the Mughals had been scattered over the vast plateau of Karnatak and they all were on the alert. It was no easy a task to travel undetected through such a territory. Besides, the Mughals had spread up the spy network throughout the territory upto Bangalore. However, the Mughal spies failed to detect the Maratha party which successfully reached Bangalore⁴⁵ (170 m.s.e. of Shimoga). While proceeding towards Bangalore they had to cross two more major rivers : the Vedavati and the Arkavati.

Thus, without being noticed by the enemy, Rajaram reached Bangalore and made a halt there. Soon, he came into an unforeseen trouble. Some local people noticed Rajaram's feet being washed by his servants. They suspected that though he was dressed as an ordinary man, he must be a high dignitary. Immediately, they reported this matter to the thanedar. On the other hand, Rajaram and his party sensed that they were suspected by the local people. So, Khando Ballal counselled Rajaram that he should leave the place with a few men by a different route, and that the former would stay on there with two or four persons to face the impending danger. Accordingly, Rajaram and others left the place. Soon, Khando Ballal and his associates were arrested by the thanedar and flogged inhumanly. They were compelled to take unwieldy stores on their heads and their mouths were jammed with ash. Despite

44. TTK, p.216; RC, p.74

45. RC, p.75

these unbearable sufferings, they consistently and stubbornly maintained that they were the pilgrims and going on to the pilgrimage of Rameshwar. Even when these persons were beaten severally in isolation, they gave the same information. This could convince, at long last, the thanedar that they were real pilgrims and hence, he released them after 4 or 5 days.⁴⁶

From Bangalore, Rajaram went to Ambur⁴⁷ on the bank of the Palar river. Ambur was the Maratha possession. Rajaram stayed there in some temple and despatched Bahirji Ghorpade to Baji Kakade to inform him of his arrival. Baji Kakade was a Maratha commander, encamping near Ambur. Baji came to Ambur and accorded a due reception to the Maratha king. With his help, Rajaram proceeded towards Vellore⁴⁸ which was also in the possession of the Marathas. From Ambur, Rajaram could go straightway to Jinji. However, Jinji was in possession of Ambikabai, sister of Rajaram and widow of Harji Raje Mahadik. Rajaram, it seems, was not sure whether she would welcome him in Jinji. Hence, he first preferred to go to Vellore instead of to Jinji. He reached Vellore on October 28, 1689.⁴⁹ There, he stayed for some days. During that stay, he must have studied the situation and sent his emissaries to Jinji. Ambikabai who had usurped the power at Jinji, was not willing

46. RC-MR, pp.38-39; SL, p.218; PR, p.320

47. 65 miles east of Bangalore

48. 25 miles north-east of Ambur.

49. RC, pp.75-77; SCP-JS, p.35

to hand it over to her brother. She tried to oppose Rajaram, but, soon, found it futile and surrendered the fort to him. In November 1689, Martin writes in his diary : "Rajaram and his party of four Brahmans, disguised as yogis passing through many risks of being recognised and undergoing much fatigue — the journey being always done on foot during a march of more than 200 leagues -- arrived at Vellore, a fort dependent of Jinji, where the Prince was recognised and received as sovereign. Some opposition was offered (at first) by the widow of Haraji, the sister of Ramraja, whose husband had died the month before. But her party was not strong enough She had to retire to the fort and was obliged to give up a portion of the immense riches that her husband and herself had amassed, during their governorship. Rajaram was recognized publicly by the chief Brahmans and the military officers, who followed him to Jinji, where he has established his court."⁵⁰

From the abovementioned note of Martin, it appears that Ambikabai advanced from Jinji with her force to oppose Rajaram. But the chief Brahmin officials and commanders in Karnatak seem to have sided with Rajaram; and hence, she had to retire to the fort of Jinji and open its gates for him. Rajaram seems to have reached Jinji in the first week of November 1689.

8) Expeditions of Ramchandrapant,
Santaji and Dhanaji

While Rajaram was on his way to Jinji Ramchandrapant planned an expedition in consultation with his able assistant Parashuram Trimbak at Vishalgad, which was then under the siege of the Mughals. Keshav Pandit gives an account of the expedition as follows : "Ramchandrapant dispatched Santaji and Dhanaji to attack Shaikh Nizam and himself went to Mahimatgad⁵¹ with an army. From that place he proceeded to Sangameshwar⁵² a Mughal thana and defeated a powerful Mughal commander. Afterwards, he moved to Shringarpur⁵³ and imprisoned the rebels (perhaps the local watandars who had joined the Mughals). His next target was Gunwantgad.⁵⁴ He compelled its garrison to flee and consequently captured the fort. Soon, Sundargad⁵⁵ came into his possession. Thereupon, he conquered the king (perhaps the local chief like a deshmukh) of Patan and sojourned at Vasantgad.⁵⁶ There he was joined by the cavalry and artillery commanders who were trained under Shivaji. The Pant honoured them and assigned them the proper duties. Lastly, he decided to conquer one Sinha, a Mughal officer."⁵⁷

51. 18 miles north of Vishalgad.

52. 25 miles north-east of Ratnagiri.

53. 15 miles east of Sangameshwar

54. 10 miles south-west of Patan

55. 3 miles west of Patan

56. 8 miles north-west of Karad

57. RC, Sarg II, Vs. 14-22, 24-29, 33-38

"Another expedition was spearheaded by Santaji and Dhanaji. They attacked Shaikh Nizam and routed him. His horses, elephants and treasury were captured and he had to flee to Kolhapur to save his life."⁵⁸

Iswardas Nagar gives a different version of the defeat of Shaikh Nizam : The Marathas were scattered in the Kolhapur region. Khan Jaman (Shaikh Nizam) marched upon them. The Marathas were in large number and gave a pitched battle. 700 Maratha and 400 Mughal soldiers were killed. Khan Jaman and his son, Khane Alam, were seriously wounded by spear and sword. However, the Marathas could not hold their ground against the Mughals and had to flee. On learning this, the Emperor sent reinforcement under Mahmud Taki Khan. Khan Jaman was rewarded and Sebastian, a physician, was sent to treat him and his son.⁵⁹

By these expeditions Ramchandrapant freed the mountainous land between Vishalgad and Vasantgad. Thus, he and other generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji proved themselves worthy of the confidence reposed in them by Rajaram, while leaving Maharashtra for Karnatak.

Meanwhile, the Emperor sent Ruhullah Khan to Panhala who tried to bribe the garrison but with no success. Then the Khan went to the Rahimatpur - Satara region to put down the Marathas who had made their head against the Mughals. But shortly, he was summoned to the court and was replaced by Shaikh Nizam.⁶⁰

58. Ibid., Vs. 30-32.

59. FA, p.35

60. TD, pp. 100-101

The napoleonic efforts of Ramchandrapant, Santaji, Dhanaji and others could not tide over the mighty invasion of the Mughals who were far more superior to the Marathas in number and equipment. Wherever the Mughal forces penetrated, the deshmukhas, deshpandes and other watandars submitted themselves to them owing to the fear of losing their watans. Many posts and forts fell one by one and the rest of them were under the siege. It is already seen how Rajaram's flight from Maharashtra to Karnatak was fraught with hardships and dangers. At the Tungabhadra he was assailed unexpectedly by Sayyid Abdul Khan. Fortunately, he could manage to escape but many of his companions were captured. To the delight of the Emperor, he was informed that Rajaram was taken a prisoner. The Emperor immediately entrusted the job of fetching the captive to Hamiduddin Khan. But subsequently, he learnt that the information was only a make believe.⁶¹ However, the news of Rajaram's capture must have demoralised the garrison at Raigad and perhaps constrained it to surrender the fort to the Mughals. (November 3, 1689)⁶²

9) Fall of Raigad

There was certainly a limit to the morale of the garrison of Raigad. Since the arrest of Sambhaji, it was haunted by the calamities but the rumoured capture of Rajaram, on his way to Jinji, was the climax of catastrophes. In such extremely adverse circumstances, it was obvious that sooner or later, the

61. MA-SP, p.44

62. SCP-JS, p.35

fort would have to be surrendered and Yesubai and others would meet with their doom. The only alternative left to Yesubai and others was to arrive at an honorable compromise and surrender themselves voluntarily to the Mughals.

Malhar Ramrao gives the account of this historical event as follows : For ten months the fort was valiantly defended (In fact the fort was besieged for seven months)⁶³ but for the want of outside reinforcement, the garrison became helpless. At this juncture, the Khan sent a message that the fort be delivered. After much hesitation and reluctance, Yesubai agreed to this proposal through the mediation of the Begam : the daughter of the Emperor (Zinatunnisa). And the Khan too swore by the Quran the safety and the maintenance of self-respect of the royal family.⁶⁴

It may be pointed out here that there is no any other source available regarding the conduct of the negotiations between the Khan and Yesubai except the one above. Malhar Ramrao clearly says that the garrison fought the Mughals to its best capacity without any avail. The Persian sources are silent on the mediation by the Begam. However, the way in which she later on said to have treated Shahu and Yesubai may perhaps be indicative of her mediation in the negotiations. There is also a possibility that the Khan swore by the Quran because of the support of the Begam who enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor. Further, it is obvious that the Emperor must have given his previous consent to such negotiations.

63. SCP-JS, p.35

64. SC-MR, p.27

10) Legend of Suryaji Pisal

In this context, it is imperative to analyse the legend of the treacherous role played by Suryaji Pisal. Even today there is a general impression in Maharashtra that Suryaji was in collusion with Zulfiqar Khan and was responsible for the fall of Raigad. Surprisingly, even the historian G.S. Sardesai does not disbelieve the legend.⁶⁵

There are many sources which indicate that Raigad was surrendered to the Khan after negotiations. According to Iswardas Nagar, the fort was besieged by the Khan who closed all the approaches to it. After raising the damdamas, (raised platforms) he started artillery fire from over them. The garrison was reduced to a bad plight and there was no alternative left to it except to surrender the fort. Consequently, the killedar initiated the negotiations for a compromise with the Khan. After securing an assurance, the royal family and others left the fort and came down to the camp of the Mughals.⁶⁶

Bhimsen Sexena maintains that the siege by the Khan made the garrison absolutely helpless.⁶⁷ The most authentic

65. According to Sardesai Suryaji Pisal was posted for the defence of the fort. The Khan won him over by a promise to grant him the deshmukhi of Wai. Suryaji opened the gates of the fort and let the Mughals enter it. (SR, p.20)

66. FA, pp. 33-34

67. TD, p.100

document like the Jedhe chronology mentions that in the last week of October, the negotiations resulted into a pact and on November 3, 1689, the fort was surrendered to the Khan.⁶⁸

If Raigad is surrendered after the negotiations, the attribution of its fall to Suryaji is meaningless. Nevertheless, why Suryaji was associated with the fall of Raigad may be discussed here. Suryaji was involved in the fall of Raigad, but the actual part played by him is not conclusively proved so far for want of the systematic marshalling of the available sources.

Suryaji was a patil of the village Ozarde in the pargana of Wai. He had nothing to do with the deshmukhi of Wai. While at Ozarde, he received a notice from Raigad pressing him to pay the government revenue. Unable to pay it, he defected to the Mughals.⁶⁹ Later on, he was asked by the Emperor to join the expedition under Zulfiqar Khan against Raigad.⁷⁰ Thus, it should be borne in mind that Suryaji had joined the Mughals before the siege of the fort began.

In this context, the sources indicating the association of Suryaji with the fall of Raigad may be discussed here. First, we have a firman of the Emperor, granting Suryaji the deshmukhi

68. SCP-JS, p.35; Saki Mustaid Khan gives the date of the incident as October 10, 1689 (MA-SP, p.45). This date, accepted by Jadunath Sarkar (HA, p.22), seems to be wrong.

69. SL, p.196

70. MIS, III, p.55

of Wai at the request of the Khan. This firman is given two months after the fall of the fort, in which there is a mention that Suryaji had made 'certain provisions' to take the fort.⁷¹ Secondly, Dattaji Pisal, the legal deshmukh of Wai paragana, states in a mahajar⁷² of 1702, "On the occasion of the victory at Raigad, you (Suryaji) took a lot of trouble and did the job for the Emperor."⁷³ Thirdly, Chhatrapati Shahu had given a sanad to Dattaji Pisal, on March 12, 1709, in which there is a significant mention of the role played by Suryaji. In the sanad it is stated that Suryaji joined the Mughals owing to the mounting pressure to pay off the dues of the Maratha government. At the time of the expedition of Raigad, he led some navalas and took position in the trenches against the fort. Later on, he mediated in the negotiations and secured the fort for the Khan.⁷⁴

Being the patil of Ozarde and being in the Mughal army, Suryaji should have been familiar with the people at Raigad. During the siege, he seems to have curried the favour of the Khan. As a result of this, at the time of the negotiations, the Khan seems to have chosen him for mediation as he was a local person. So it is clear that Suryaji defected to the Mughals before the siege of Raigad and was not posted for the defence of the fort as is generally presumed. On the other hand, he fought with

71. AFS, I, p.93

72. A written statement of a suit or case and of the award upon it (MED, p.636)

73. MIS, III, pp. 54-55

74. SL, p.196

the Marathas on the side of the Mughals. This automatically discards the allegation that he delivered the fort to the Khan by treachery.

Suryaji's association with the Mughals is certainly a matter of high treason, but his was not an exceptional case. It should be noted that in the period of the War of Independence, especially after the death of Sambhaji, many watandars defected to the Mughals, Suryaji being one of them.

11) Yesubai and Shahu in the Mughal Captivity

Along with Yesubai and Shahu, Sakawarbai, Sambhaji's mistresses and his illegitimate sons, Mansing and Madansing, were taken captive. Sixteen members of Prince Akbar's entourage who were staying with the garrison and the members of the family of Abdul Kadar Khan, who were the captives of the Marathas, were also taken into custody by the Khan.⁷⁵

The Khan destroyed the throne of Shivaji and took away its gold plates. Besides, the government treasury and other valuables came into his possession.⁷⁶ The news of this victory was first broken to the Emperor by Asad Khan, the father of Zulfiqar Khan. The Mughal army started beating the drums of victory. The Emperor was congratulated and presented with the nazaranas by his officials.⁷⁷

75. FA, pp.34-35

76. SC-MR, p.27

77. MA-SP, p.45

Zulfiqar Khan along with the captives appeared before the Emperor on November 23, 1689. The Emperor honoured him by elevating his position. The mansab⁷⁸ of 3,000 and the title of 'Zulfiqar Khan Bahadur' was conferred upon him.⁷⁹ The Emperor ordered that Yesubai, Shahu, Sakawarbai and others should be provided with tents in open space of Gulalbar - a royal residence. They were granted a privy purse for their expenses. Shahu was given the title of Raja and was made the mansabdar of 7,000.⁸⁰ Special officers were appointed to cater to his needs, i.e. the administration of his saramjan⁸¹ and his education.⁸² The illegitimate sons of Sambhaji were also given the manasabs according to their status.⁸³

78. A rank or command in the Muhammadan cavalry (MED, p.631)

79. MA-SP, p.45; The grand-father of the Khan was a renowned general in Iran. He had the title of Zulfiqar Khan. The same title was conferred upon the Khan with an addition of that of the Bahadur (TD, p.101).

80. MA-SP, p.46.

81. Villages and lands granted in inam to a person from whom the maintaining of forts or troops for the public service is required or upon whom a horse, a palanquin, or other honorable gift has been conferred (MED, p.829).

82. FA, p.34

83. MA-SP, p.46

The Maratha sardars who were with the royal family such as Kheloji, Ramaji, Janoji and others were also given saramians and mansabs.⁸⁴ Jotyaji Kesarkar, a patil of Punjal village in prant Kolhapur, was appointed to look after Shahu. Shahu owed his earlier training to him. It is this gentleman who used to convey the grievances of Yesubai and others to the Begam or to the Emperor.⁸⁵ The good treatment received from the Mughals by Yesubai and Shahu may not necessarily be attributed to the so called love of the Begam with Sambhaji. It may be contended that the Begam might have helped Yesubai and Shahu just on humanitarian grounds or the utter helplessness of them might have evoked her womanish sense of sympathy.

After the fall of Raigad, Raja Sursing was appointed its killedar and Khairat Khan and Fateh Jang Khan were posted with their contingents at Wadi and Pachad at the foot of the fort, respectively.⁸⁶

12) Capture of Panhala and Other Forts

The Mughals under Prince Azam had laid a siege to the fort of Panhala.⁸⁷ Sarjerao Ghatge, a Maratha commander, was the killedar of the fort. He defended the fort quite valiantly. But the news of the fall of Raigad might have disheartened the

84. FA, p.34

85. SC-MR, p.28

86. AS, p. 87

87. MIS, XV, p.17

garrison which was soon constrained to sell the fort to the Mughals, sometime in December, 1689. Sarjerao Ghatge accepted the Mughal service.⁸⁸

Malhar Ramrao's version of the capture of Panhala is somewhat different. He writes, "After the fall of Raigad, Aurangzeb sent Sarja Khan to Panhala. The Khan did his best to capture the fort, but failed, owing to the brilliant defence by the killedar Ghatge. Later on, Aurangzeb himself came to Panhala and besieged it. The garrison of the fort could not be reinforced by Ramchandrapant. Santaji remained inactive. Hence, the Pant advised Ghatge to surrender the fort, in order to save the garrison from total destruction. Accordingly, the fort was handed over to the Mughals."⁸⁹ It should be noted that the Emperor had not come in person to besiege Panhala. The statement that Santaji did not reinforce the garrison should not be taken seriously, as it might have been made in the light of Santaji's conflict with Rajaram in later years.

The Jedhe chronology and English records imply that in 1689 almost all the forts of the Marathas were captured by the Mughals.⁹⁰ Records are not available for all the forts, captured by the Mughals in 1689. But the victories of a Mughal commander like Matabar Khan throw ample light on the rapid fall of the Maratha forts in Maharashtra, immediately after the

88. RC-MR, pp. 40-41; HA, V, p.25

89. RC-MR, pp.40-41

90. SCP-JS, p.35; CSM, p.645

capture of Sambhaji in February 1689.

Matabar Khan, an enterprising Mughal thanedar of Nasik, had rallied a considerable force of hilly-infantry and brought many local chieftains to the imperial side. Even before the capture of Sambhaji, he was successful in capturing Patta, one of the famous forts of the Marathas in the Nasik region (January 11, 1688). Soon, he besieged and captured the forts of Kulang, Undhakawani, Harish, Tringalwadi, Madangad and Mardant in the same region. Early in 1689, he achieved a crowning success in securing the lofty hill-fort of Trimbak, by bribing its killedar with Rs.80,000 in cash and kind and offering a high mansab in the imperial service.⁹¹ (January 8, 1689)

Even before the capture of Sambhaji, Matabar Khan, with his force, had descended into north Konkan. In March 1689, the Emperor ordered the Khan to advance against the fort of Mahuli (18 m.n.e. of Kalyan) and take it. The Khan rallied his forces and started for Mahuli. While moving towards Mahuli, he had to fight a Maratha party, holding a pass near Khardi (9 m.n.e. of Mahuli) (April 17). The Marathas fled away after fighting the enemy for three hours. But, when the Khan reached the foot of Mahuli, he soon realized that his force and resources were too small to invest a big fort like Mahuli. Hence he retreated to Kalyan and besieged a nearing fort, namely Dugadi. Meanwhile, he was secretly trying to bribe the Maratha officials of Mahuli, including Dwarkoji the killedar of the fort, by offering them

91. HA, V, pp. 119-120

the high ranks in the Mughal army. Soon, these Maratha officials received the imperial firman, granting their requests; and subsequently they handed over the fort to Matabar Khan. (July-August 1689). Meanwhile, the Khan was busy in capturing other forts in the region. He captured the fort of Prabal, by a surprise midnight attack. A force of 900 hilly infantry, led by Raghuji and Kakaji, skilfully scaled the walls of the fort and surprised the garrison. The Marathas fought gallantly, but eventually capitulated in dawn (July 17). The capture of Prabal was soon followed by the fall of the forts of Karnala, Mukutgad, Malanggad, Chanderi, Khatuda, Manikgad, Sankia and Dugadi, all in north Konkan. With the conquest of these forts, the Mughal sway was established over the region from Jawhar southwards to the latitude of Bombay (1689).⁹²

Thus the forts and posts of the Marathas could not withstand the victorious Mughal forces and they seem to have speedily passed into the possession of the enemy, without much resistance. With the capture and execution of Sambhaji and the subsequent happenings in Maharashtra, the Maratha officials certainly had lost the morale to defend their land. True, some Maratha officials fell a prey to bribes and promise of high rank in the imperial army. But other Maratha officials were too demoralized to resist the invaders. This must have been the real cause of the fast disappearance of the Maratha government in most of the regions of the Maratha State. But, there still seem to have remained some important forts with the

92. Ibid., pp. 121-123

Marathas, such as Vishalgad, Raigana, Gagangad, Vasantgad, Satara, Parali, Kolaba, Padmadurg, Kalyangad and Wardhangad,⁹³ But for the possession of these forts, the Maratha officials such as Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji and Dhanaji might not have been able to organise the armed opposition to the enemy in 1689-90. However, except these patches in Maharashtra, the whole of the Maratha State was lost to the Mughals.

Manucci, Martin and Bendrey

It may not be out of place to examine here the various versions about the Maratha Politics in 1689 in Maharashtra, rendered by contemporary foreigners such as Manucci and Martin and its make-believe story constructed in the present times by Mr. V.S. Bendrey, a well known historian of the Maratha History.

Manucci writes, "It seemed as if the death of Sambhagee was bound to secure Aurangzeb's lordship over all the lands of Hindustan down to sea. But the Commanders of valourous Shivagee determined to continue the campaign and uphold the cause of Rama Rajah, younger brother of the deceased. Therefore they took him out of prison and made him their Prince."

"This determination caused revolution in the principality, for the mother (wife) of Sambhagee, who had sons by her husband, claimed the Government during the minority of those sons. She asserted that the crown belonged to them, but the

93. SCS, VI, pp.69-70; FA, p.43; CRM, p.23.

commanders turned a deaf ear and sided with Rama Rajah In this way the princess was forced to have recourse to the Mughul, to whom she delivered herself up and her sons, along with over twenty forts in this way taking the nerve out of her competitors."⁹⁴

Martin writes in his diary, "April 1689 - The (Maratha) Governor General of the Province of Jinji had news of the elevation of Ramaraja, the second son of Shivaji, to the sovereignty setting aside a son of Shambhuji whom that prince had left behind him. The Brahmans by whom he (Sambhaji)... had been betrayed took part in this elevation, in fear that if they raised the son of the dead Raja to the throne, he would, when he came to age, avenge them the death of his father. However, that young prince (Shahu) also has a party of supporters."⁹⁵

At the outset, it should be noted that both Mamucci and Martin were 600 miles away in Madras Karnatak, from the political scene of Maharashtra. The reports that they used to receive were not always authentic but at times mere gossips, relayed over the vast stretch of territory. A close scrutiny of the above cited accounts, would reveal that they had their basis in the hearsay evidence only. It is more true of Mamucci than of Martin; the former not knowing even the exact relation of Yesubai to Sambhaji. Mamucci in his own style goes on narrating a very interesting story of Yesubai's death. According to him, the Mughals had invested the fort of Panhala (1689),

94. SM, II, p.312

95. MM-JS, pp. 234-235

but with no avail. The Maratha officials played a trick and sent a message to Aurangzeb that they were willing to hand over the fort, provided their Princess (Yesubai) came along with her sons to the foot of the fort. Accordingly, the Emperor sent the Princess and her son (except the eldest son) to Panhala where soon began 'a great festival and much rejoicing.' Mamooi says, "On the third day they (the Marathas) mixed up so much poison with the food that before the forth day dawned the Princess, her sons and many of the Aurangzeb's officers were dead."⁹⁶

How could such an account be trusted for constructing the history of the political activities of the Marathas in the early period of Rajaram's reign i.e. the year 1689? As regards Martin's account, it may be contended that his notes regarding the Jinji court and the Mughal-Maratha activities in Karnatak may be considered as an authentic source, since Jinji was not far away from Pondicherry. Nevertheless, his note regarding 'the elevation of Rama-raja' seems to have been based on rumours relayed from Maharashtra to Karnatak. Such rumours were quite natural in view of the past risings and conspiracies of the Maratha officials against Sambhaji, especially the successional struggle in his early reign. Even the Mughal historian, Saki Mustaid Khan, records in his history that Rajaram along with his queens fled from Raigad for personal well-being, leaving behind the family of his brother.⁹⁷

96. SM, II, pp.313-314

97. MA-SP, p.43

The events of 1689, especially the flight of Rajaram to Jinji and the capture of Raigad along with Yesubai and Shahu, must have caused so many rumours and gossips in the Deccan. Moreover, Yesubai and Shahu, when made captive of the Mughals, must have outwardly displayed an inimical feeling towards Rajaram. Not only that but they should possibly have narrated Rajaram's so called deception and selfishness. Thus, it should be considered as their diplomatic stand in the Mughal darbar than a real story of the Maratha Politics of 1689.

Surprisingly enough, Mr. V.S. Bendrey, a modern historian, falls in line with Manucci and Martin, so much so, that he has labelled the Maratha diplomacy of 1689 as a treacherous conspiracy of some high Brahmin officials of the State. According to him, the highest Maratha officials like Pralhad Niraji, Ramchandrapant and others hatched a conspiracy in league with the Mughal Emperor. As a result of this Sambhaji was captured and put to death. Pralhad Niraji must have been the chief leader of the conspirators and traitors to the State. The conspirators had a secret understanding (or an agreement) with the Emperor that after the death of Sambhaji, they would install Shahu, his minor son, on the throne as a tributary chief and thus bring the Mughal-Maratha war to an end. But after the capture of Sambhaji they changed their mind as they feared that Shahu, when come of an age, would take revenge on them. So they set Rajaram free and installed him as Chhatrapati. To run the administration in the name of Rajaram, while Sambhaji was in imprisonment and alive, was certainly an act of revolt of these

treacherous officials of the State. Moreover, it was a breach of their agreement with the Emperor, who being disgusted, sent Zulfiqar Khan to besiege Raigad and capture Rajaram. Rajaram had no knowledge of the plots of these conspirators who fled with him from Raigad to Pratapgad. It is not true that he left Raigad on the advice of Yesubai. He was completely misled by the conspirators. Now, as the conspirators did not keep their word, given to the Emperor, the latter ordered his sardars to confiscate the hindavi swarajya. The conspirators fled away along with Rajaram to Jinji, leaving behind the swarajya to be conquered by the enemy. It is not only because of the pressure of the Mughal aggression but also the objects of executing the conspiracy and establishing an administrative machinery, the conspirators escaped to Karnatak. Meanwhile, the enemy had laid sieges to Raigad and Panhala. Santaji, who was favourite of Ramchandrapant, did not bother to go to the help of the besieged. He once attacked the besiegers of Raigad just casually. But, being eager to join the conspirators, he went away to meet Ramchandrapant. It was the Pant who, as part of the conspiracy against Yesubai, did not send any reinforcement to the garrison of Raigad. Naturally, Yesubai, being helpless, surrendered to the enemy. She along with Shahu was taken captive to the imperial camp where the Emperor conferred a title of Raja on Shahu, instead of on Rajaram and thereby created a means for the Marathas to bring about a revolution in the Maratha State.⁹⁸

98. CRM, pp.29, 30, 31, 52, 60, 62, & 261

Now, let us examine the abovementioned statements of Bendrey. It is a fact that Sambhaji had relied more and more on Kavi Kalash; consequently the latter had become the sole adviser to the former. This had naturally led to the acute rivalry between Kavi Kalash and the rest of the ministers of Sambhaji. The Jedhe chronology says that in October-November, 1688, Sambhaji, acting on the advice of Kavi Kalash, put Pralhad Niraji and other high officials under arrest.⁹⁹ In this context, the phrase 'acting on the advice of Kavi Kalash' is very important and indicative of the rivalry between Kavi Kalash and Pralhad Niraji. The Jedhe chronology does not mention the cause of the arrest. It might not necessarily be a conspiracy of dethroning Sambhaji. Had it been so, Sambhaji would certainly have put Pralhad Niraji to death, as he did in the case of Annaji Datto and Balaji Awaji.

Supposing that it was a conspiracy against Sambhaji, the so-called conspirators must not have thought of installing Shahu as king. But Bendrey says that the conspirators had entered into a secret agreement with Aurangzeb, according to which they were to make Shahu a tributary king of the Marathas and to end the war in the Deccan. It should be explicitly stated that there is not a single authentic document to prove the charge that Pralhad Niraji and Ramchandrapant had made a secret agreement with the Emperor Aurangzeb. It is a mere figment of imagination and has no basis in facts.

Bendrey's contention that the conspirators changed their earlier plan of installing Shahu on the throne, owing to the

fear that he would take revenge on them, could not be, logically speaking, accepted. Because, shrewd as they were, they would not have earlier agreed with the Emperor to install Shahu. Because, for them Rajaram would have been a more agreeable candidate. Now, supposing that they brought about a change in their original plan, why then did they spare Yesubai and Shahu? As 'treacherous conspirators' they were, it was not difficult for them to imprison them or put them to death. But they had not perpetrated either of the ignoble acts.

Bendrey's another statement that Rajaram was innocent of the conspiracy and that he was misled by the conspirators, is quite surprising. Had there really been a conspiracy to install Rajaram as king and forsake Yesubai and Shahu, Rajaram, a youth of 19, must have its knowledge and must be considered a party to it. In that case, Rajaram could not be exonerated on the ground of his innocence. At Raigad, he was not expected to remain ignorant of the Maratha Politics. He must have participated in the diplomatic deliberations of the high officials of the State at the fort.

But what transpired at Raigad was not the conspiracy but a strategy of the Maratha leaders, including Yesubai, Pralhad Niraji, Ramchandrpant, Santaji and Dhanaji, to tide over the dangerous situation caused by the capture of Sambhaji. It is already discussed in the preceding pages how the unprecedented circumstances had compelled both the parties at Raigad to forget the mutual rivalries and build up a united front of the Marathas against the enemy and how Yesubai herself had taken


lead in installing Rajaram as Chhatrapati of the State. In view of this fact, Bendrey's subsequent statements lose all their credibility. He has charged Ramchandrapant with a criminal negligence of duty in not sending reinforcements to the garrison of Raigad. However, he has not proved his grave charge against the Pant who, it seems, had no ill-feeling towards Yesubai and Shahu. The later history reveals that the Pant had a soft corner for Shahu and in the heart of his heart considered him as a legal heir to the Maratha throne.¹⁰⁰

In view of the above discussion, Bendrey's statement regarding Rajaram's escape to Karnatak appears to be both unfounded and erroneous. His last statement regarding Aurangzeb's conferring of the title of Raja on Shahu, carries little meaning. It is superfluous to mention that the title of Raja was only an honorary one and did not carry any regal power.

Thus, if Bendrey's thesis is to be accepted, the whole freedom struggle of the Marathas in Rajaram's reign is put in a wrong perspective. His contentions regarding the Maratha Politics of 1689, especially after the capture of Sambhaji, sear the very soul of the heroic struggle of the Maratha people and their leaders against the Mughals.

It should be remembered that Rajaram fought out the Mughals and saved the Maratha State, with the help of Pralhad Niraji, Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji, Dhanaji, Nemaji Shinde and scores of other Maratha leaders. It is they

100. MT, pp.95-96



who continuously and tirelessly waged war and defended their land from the Mughal aggression. Some of them had received highest honours at the hands of their master, Rajaram. For example, Pralhad Niraji was appointed the pratinidhi, Ramchandra-pant the amatya and Shankaraji Narayan the sachiv. In addition to that, the latter two received the highest titles of hukumatpanah and rajajna respectively. Rajaram had delegated to them all his administrative powers in Maharashtra, while the former was in Karnatak.

Did all this mean that Rajaram was honouring the conspirators? Did all this mean that he had reposed his full confidence in the traitors of the State? If so, how could Rajaram as a leader of the Maratha people, remain above the board?

The fact is that with the capture of Sambhaji and the subsequent selfless and magnanimous move of Yesubai to install Rajaram on the throne, all the rivalries of successional struggle had receded and died out. It seems that Rajaram did never feel jealous of Shahu. On the contrary, he was all love for him and Yesubai. In one of his historically important letters he had explicitly expressed his feeling towards Shahu in captivity. He says, "A time would come, when, by grace of God, Shahu would return to our land. He is our chief and a rightful claimant to the state. Whatever I do is for him only. In future all people shall have to look to him as their master and they shall obey him. This is the will of God."¹⁰¹

101. MIS, XV, p.296

In the light of the above discussion, it would be clear that the Maratha politics following the capture of Sambhaji was not characterised by any conspiracy, nor was it a treachery of Pralhad Niraji and Ramchandrapant; but it was their wise strategy and diplomacy.

Part - II

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Karnatak : 1689-1691

1) Maratha Rule in Karnatak : 1681-1689

Before dealing with the history of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in Karnatak, it is necessary to see the then existant boundaries of Karnatak. In those days, Karnatak did not necessarily mean the land of the Kannada-speaking people. It also included most of the regions of the present Tamilnadu State and the southern and eastern regions of the present Andhra Pradesh. The most of the territory of the Adilshahi State, approximately from Bijapur to Mysore, constituted the western Karnatak. The eastern Karnatak was approximately the land between the Krishna in Andhra Pradesh and the Kaveri in Tamilnadu. The river Palar, flowing eastward through Tamilnadu roughly divided this eastern Karnatak into two parts : Bijapuri Karnatak (north of the Palar) and Hyderabadadi Karnatak (south of the Palar). These two parts of the eastern Karnatak were further subdivided into balaghats (uplands) and payinghats (plains). Thus, there were four subdivisions of the eastern Karnatak: (1) Bijapuri balaghat, (2) Bijapuri payinghat, (3) Hyderabadadi balaghat and (4) Hyderabadadi payinghat. Bijapuri balaghat comprised

the regions of Sera and Bangalore and their dependent zamindaris. Bijapuri pavinghat lay west and south of the Palar and extended upto Tanjore in the south. The regions between Nandyal and Chittoor constituted Hyderabad balaghat and the eastern coastal regions from Guntur to Sadras (near the mouth of the Palar) formed Hyderabad navinghat. The regions of Vellore, Jinji and Tanjore came under Bijapuri pavinghat.¹

The Adilshah had conquered some regions in Bijapuri pavinghat in the middle of the 17th century; but not consolidated his conquests. Even though some forts and their environs were in the possession of the Adilshahi government, it was too weak to exercise its authority over the local chieftains. They were practically independent, though in theory they were the servants of the Adilshah. This state of affairs was further complicated when Shivaji the Great invaded the Karnatak territories and carved out there a new kingdom for the Marathas. In his campaign, he subjugated the Bijapuri pavinghat regions from the Palar to the Coleroon in the south. In his return march, he conquered Kolar, Hoskote, Bangalore, Balapur and Sera in Bijapur balaghat. Raghunath Narayan Hanmante was appointed as a viceroy of the regions of Bijapur pavinghat and Jinji was made its capital. Under Raghunath Narayan sub-ordinate governors were appointed at Kunimedu and Porto Novo.²

1. HA, V, pp.42-43;

National Atlas of India; Tourist Atlas of India;
The Oxford School Atlas.

2. HA, V, pp. 43-44

Raghunath Narayan fell a prey to the wrath of Sambhaji soon after the latter succeeded to the throne. He was dismissed and arrested early in January, 1681. Sambhaji sent Harji Raje Mahadik, his brother-in-law, to Jinji to administer the Karnatak regions with the assistance of Shamji Naik Punde. Harji Raje and Shamji Punde reached Karnatak sometime in March, 1681 and took over the government. After the interval of five months, Shamji Punde was put behind the bars, owing to the suspicion of his collaboration with Annaji Datto and others. Henceforth Harji Raje began to rule practically as an independent ruler.

The Bijapur fell in September, 1686 and the fall of the Golconda was imminent. It was obvious that the Mughal forces would come down and subjugate the depending territories of the abovementioned two states in Karnatak. Fearing this danger, Sambhaji despatched Keso Trimal Pingale in October for the protection of the Maratha possessions in Karnatak. Keso Trimal was given the command of 12,000 horse and was secretly instructed to arrest Harji Raje.

The Emperor surmised that the massive march of the Marathas to Karnatak would result into the capture of the Bijapur territories in Karnatak. After the fall of the Bijapur state, the Bijapuri Karnatak became the legal possession of the Mughal Empire. So the Emperor despatched Qasim Khan, a renowned Mughal general, to check the Maratha activities and to take possession of the region. The Khan first attacked and captured Bangalore, in July, 1687. In September, he took the fort of Penukunda (55 m.n. of Bangalore) by bribery; Penukunda

was once the capital of the fallen Vijayanagar Kingdom.

Keso Trimal was very much impatient for the viceroyalty of the Karnatak. In the exigencies of the time, the secret order of the arrest of Harji Raje leaked out. Alert as he was, Harji Raje took precautionary measures in fortifying his position at Jinji and in tightening his grip over the local army. Keso Trimal realized the futility of open hostility with Harji Raje. Therefore, he ostensibly began to obey his orders. Then, he marched into Mysore state, along with the contingent of Harji Raje, to collect the tributes from the local chieftains and to check the Mughal activities. However, he returned to the environs of Jinji without achieving anything spectacular in November 1687.

Even before the fall of the Goloonda in September 1687, the Emperor had despatched his army to take possession of the Hyderabad Karnatak. After the fall of the Qutbshahi, he absorbed its officials such as Muhammad Ibrahim and Muhammad Ali Beg in his service and retained them at their respective posts. However, he did not feel secure in keeping the newly conquered territories with the former state officials. As a result of this, he replaced them by his trusted officials such as Ruhullah Khan and Qasim Khan (January 1688).

At this juncture, Keso Trimal openly asked Harji Raje to hand over the fort of Jinji as per the orders of the Chhatrapati. Harji Raje did not bother to conform to his demand. On the other hand, he despatched his corps under Gopal Pandit and Vitthal Pildeo to plunder and conquer the Goloonda territories, north of the Palar river. The forts

and posts in the region were inadequately manned by the Mughals. They fell an easy prey to the sweeping invasion of the Marathas. On December 24, 1687, Arcot was captured and its governor was killed along with most of his soldiers by the Marathas. Later on, they came down upon Conjeveram on January 11, 1688 and plundered the city. Keso Trimal, too, captured Chittapet and Kaveripak and established his camp at Conjeveram. Thus, the Maratha forces ransacked the whole of the region.

When the news of the assaults of the Marathas reached the Emperor, he immediately ordered Ismail Khan Maka, Yachapa Naik, Rustum Khan and Muhammad Sadiq, the former Golconda commanders, to rush with their forces to recapture the lost territory. These commanders reached Conjeveram on February 25, 1688, with 4000 horse and 7000 foot. Upon the approach of the Mughal forces, the Marathas left the city and went beyond Uttranalore, plundering as they liked. The vanguards of the Mughals pursued them and fought them at Wandiwash with no avail. The Mughals encamped at Wandiwash and the Marathas camped at Chittapet, south of Wandiwash. Both the armies were stationed face to face at their respective camps for a year. In the meantime they indulged themselves in pillaging the country around.

When the news of the capture of Sambhaji in February 1689 reached Karnatak, Harji Raje arrested Keso Trimal and his assistants on March 9.³ In May, the Mughal forces had

come to the neighbourhood of Jinji and were trying to lay siege to the fort. In a letter to the chief of Porto Novo, the English from Fort St. George record that the Mughal forces were numerous, and that they had succeeded in taking several forts of the Marathas and were likely to conquer all.⁴ At the end of June, the Marathas and Mughals fought with some casualties on both sides. However, no army could achieve a decisive victory. Hence, both the Marathas and Mughals retired to their camps.⁵ In July, once more there was fighting between the Marathas and Mughals. This time the Mughals were compelled to retreat to a place of their safety.⁶

The conditions in Karnatak were already unstable and the Mughal aggression aggravated them. The Marathas were trying to fight the Mughals out. Nevertheless, they, at times, had to retreat. Both the armies had considerably devastated the whole of the territory. In 1686, the people had suffered untold miseries, owing to a very bad famine and now they had to face the Mughal aggression. The agricultural products, especially cotton and handicraft industries, had almost come to a standstill, on account of the movements of troops, their indulgence in loot and the thefts committed by the goondas. This had naturally an adverse effect upon the

4. LFG, 1689, p.34

5. MM-JS, p.235

6. Ibid.

trade of the westerners on the eastern coast of India. The English had to close their factory at Porto Novo in July.⁷

In about July-August, 1689, it was rumoured in Karnatak that Harji Raje would defect to the Mughals.⁸ Nevertheless, it was soon realized that the rumour was nothing but kite-flying. On the contrary, he had intensified his efforts to protect the Maratha possessions in Karnatak. The English write on August 15, 1689, "... the report of Harja Raja's going over to the Mogull's party proves to be false and beleives he would not be guilty of so bad an act, but rather gathers strength for its better defence and the Moors are not over forward to come against him..."⁹

2) Rajaram's Administration and his Financial Difficulties :

Realizing the danger of the Mughal aggression, Harji Raje set free Keso Trimal on August 19, 1689, in order to put up a united and concerted resistance to the Mughals.¹⁰ But death snatched away Harji after the illness of 8 or 10 days (September 29, 1689).¹¹ Upon his death, his wife, Ambikabai,¹²

7. DC, 1689, p.65; LFG, 1689, p.40

8. DC, 1689, p.66

9. Ibid., p.69

10. SCP-JS, p.35

11. Ibid., MM-JS, p.235

12. Even during the life time of Harji Raje, Ambikabai was known as an influential woman. To curry her favour, the English used to send presents to her without being noticed by the Mughals (LFG, 1689, p.41)

assumed the powers at Jinji in the name of her son.¹³ Soon, Rajaram along with his party reached Vellore. (October 28, 1689).¹⁴ In the beginning Ambikabai offered opposition, but soon she had to surrender to him. Subsequently, she handed over the administration of Jinji to him. The chief Brahmins and sardars in Karnatak acknowledged him as their king.¹⁵

At the time of the death of Harji Raje, the administration of the Maratha State in Karnatak was very much lax. There was no coordination between the military and civil administrations, on account of the conflict between Harji and Keso Trimal. As Rajaram had not sufficient administrative experience, he appointed Pralhad Niraji as his chief counsellor, in order to tone up the administration. Pralhad Niraji was well-versed in administration and had taken a lot of troubles for Rajaram during his recent flight to Jinji.¹⁶ After the death of Harji Raje, the status of Keso Trimal also became automatically elevated and he came to occupy there an important position in the administration. Rajaram quite wisely put behind the bars,

13. HA, V, p.52

14. SCP-JS, p.35

15. MM-JS, p.236

16. Even a foreigner like Martin has recorded that when Rajaram used to be fatigued during the flight, he was carried on the back by Pralhad Niraji (Ibid., p.236).

a son of Harji Raje, thereby preventing his probable defection to the Mughals. Similarly, he reinstated the experienced officials like Sunder Balaji and started strengthening the posts in Karnatak. ¹⁷

Though Jinji and the neighbouring territory came into the possession of Rajaram, he was extremely short of funds. Without money army cannot be maintained and administration cannot be carried out. How Rajaram was haunted by the financial difficulties at Jinji is evident from Martin's diary. Martin writes : "The Brahman whom we have posted at Jinji returned to Pondicherry on 1st January ... reported that there was a public pillage in Jinji, the troops had not been paid and, therefore, they took by force the merchandise and provisions from the booths and forced the well-to-do people to pay them contributions as in an enemy country." ¹⁸

Rajaram and other ministers such as Pralhad Niraji had to find out new ways of securing money in order to raise the funds. Harji Raje, during his life-time, had collected immense fortune. ¹⁹ Rajaram procured three lakh pagodas ²⁰ from the wife of Harji and one lakh pagodas from Santaji Bhosale (a natural son of Shahaji Raje). He summoned the state employees

17. DC, 1689, pp.93 & 95; MM-JS, p.236

18. MM-JS, p.237

19. Ibid., p.236

20. Pagoda : a gold coin.

and prevailed upon them to present the accounts.²¹ This measure is very well corroborated in the diary of Martin. He writes, "... Then he (Pralhad Niraji) turned to amassing money establishing a sort of chamber of justice, where the Brahmans and the other officials of the preceding government were cited and obliged to pay. Then he turned to the merchants and generally to all those from whom he believed, he could get something on the report of informers and the pretext of the arrival of Rajaram in the kingdom and the duty of all his subjects to pay him a visit with presents proportionate to the rank or wealth of person visiting."²²

The Marathas seem to have frequently borrowed money from the English, the French and other traders and demanded nazaranas too from them. Early in December, 1689, Keso Trimal, the subhedar of Jinji, asked for 3,000 pagodas as an advance or loan from the English, the French and the Portuguese factories each. Even the rich merchants were subjected to lend the money to the Maratha government.²³ In addition to the loan of 3,000 pagodas, a fine of 5,000 pagodas was demanded for the buildings and fortification of each European company.²⁴ The Marathas also demanded from the English Governor of Madras 100 barrels of gun-powder and 2500 weights of small shot. The Governor did not comply with the demand, as he did not want to

21. DC, 1689, p.95

22. MM-JS, p.237

23. HA, V, p.53, DC, 1689, p.96

24. HA, V, p.53, DC, 1690, p.1

to offend the Mughals. ²⁵

Later on, in 1690, Rajaram twice visited the coastal region. Some time in March 1690, he went to the sea and took a bath therein on 14th of the month, on account of a lunar eclipse. At this time, the English, the French and other factories as well as other indigenous traders were asked to give nazaranas to him. ²⁶ In July, he again came to this region. On or about 6, he reached Thevenapatam. There he was offered the nazarana of 2,000 pagodas by the Dutch-chief. Then, he left for Porto Novo. There, too, the Portuguese traders offered him nazaranas according to their capacity. ²⁷ Thus, Rajaram seems to have raised the funds by way of extracting presents and borrowing loans from the native as well as foreign traders in the coastal region of Karnatak.

3) Revolt of the Hindu Naiks under Rajaram

With the arrival of Rajaram, the politics in Karnatak took a new turn altogether. There was a general feeling in Karnatak that it was the Marathas alone, who had the capability to successfully resist the Mughals, intruding into Karnatak after capturing the Bijapur and Golconda. At the outset, Rajaram proclaimed that he would like to bring together all the Hindu chieftains and retake the territories of Bijapur and Golconda lost to the Mughals. The English from Fort St. George

25. HA, V, p.54; DC, 1690, p.1

26. MM-JS, p.238; DC, 1690, pp.20 & 24

27. MM-JS, pp. 238-239

write, "... his (Rajaram's) design of coming hither being reported to divert the Mogull's army from thence and join with the several Gentue Naigues (Hindu Naiks) and raise a considerable army to retake the Golconda & Vizapore kingdoms, which there is great possibility of both places being at present very weakly guarded..." ²⁸

The Emperor Aurangzeb heartily desired to propagate Islam along with the conquest of territories. It was in his reign that the Hindus were again subjected to the insulting tax like Jezia. The Hindus were degraded by being branded as kafir (infidel). Their temples were razed to the ground and on their sites the mosques were raised. The freedom of religion of the Hindus vanished. As a result of this, the Hindus in Karnatak realised the impending onslaught on their religion and society. They began to consider the question of facing this danger. The religious persecution was only to be stopped when the political encroachment was checked. In view of this fact, the Hindu naiks and generals of the former states of Bijapur and Golconda in Karnatak felt that they must unite in order to save their petty jagirs and religion. The unity of purpose united them and the Marathas under Rajaram provided them a leadership.

The English, in their report of the political situation in India, give a graphic description of the political situation prevailing in the Deccan. They write, "(The Mughal Emperor's)

barbarious policy instead of depressing the spirit or animosity of the Hindoos, produced the opposite effect, for continuing their allegiance to the family of Shivagee, they declared for the Ram Rajah, or second son of this great chief, who assumed the administration of the Hindoo interests, and with the remains of Sambhagee's army, took up a position in a strong fortress of Jinji, the vicinity of the place to Madras gave that Presidency an opportunity to receive authentic information respecting this apparently last struggle of the Hindoos against Aurangzeb. Whether the Moghul army, which attempted to reduce Ram Rajah in Jinji, were composed, in part of levies from the countries which the Moghul had recently conquered or were the remains of the army with which he had subdued Vizapore and Golcondah, is uncertain; but the fact was that this army, instead of prosecuting the Moghal conquests revolted in great number and joined the standard of the Ram Rajah whom they proclaimed King of India, under the title of Gentoo King. By this event, Aurangzeb was in danger of losing the fruits of his victories in the Deccan, for the Ram Rajah was preparing to invade the kingdom of Golcondah at the time when the army of the Prince Acbar was menacing the interior Moghol provinces from Persia and Candahar." 29

The story of Lachmi Naik told by Martin in his diary is a specific example of an effort done by the Hindus in Karnatak to resist the Moghal aggression. It may be given in Martin's words only. He writes in his diary, "The Hindus

of the Karnatak were alarmed by the news that the Mughal Emperor had sent orders to demolish all the temples there. In the army of the Emperor there is one Lachmi Nayak, a Hindu Lord who had entered his service and who commanded in it a corps of infantry and another of cavalry of that (Hindu) nation. When entering the Mughal army, he had been promised their pagodas ³⁰ would not be injured. When he heard the news of the arrival of this order, he wrote to the poligar ³¹ to keep his troops ready and raise more for opposing this demolition if it came to be executed." (October 1689). "The Muslims, having set about to destroy a temple ... the Hindus rose up to oppose it. The two nations fought ... and the Moors were forced to put off the demolition to another time." (November, 1689).

"Bandar Lachmi Nayak after openly declaring against the Mughal, approached Jinji with 3,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry to meet Rajaram who on the advice of his Brahmans refused to meet him, suspecting it to be a ruse of the Mughals." (January, 1690).

"Bandar Lachmi Nayak after 8 to 10 days stay outside Jinji, came to an agreement with Rajaram ... to unite and fight their common enemy. They have visited each other. The

30. Hindu Temples.

31. A revolted Ryot, setting himself up as a chieftain, living in woods and employing himself in levying contributions. (MED, p.515)

troops of Lachmi Nayak have effected a junction with those of Jinji forming a total of 12 to 15 thousand cavalry and many thousands of musketeers. Under his command this army has advanced into the Karnatak. The Moors who were garrisoning many small places on the frontier have quitted them, one party of their officers taking refuge in Madras." (February, 1690).

"Bandar Lachmi Nayak having advanced with the Hindu army eight or ten days march into the Karnatak, has been defeated in a battle by the Mughal army and forced to retire under the guns. The Muslim cavalry that he brought with himself has left him and many of his (own) troops are deserting him. He has appealed to Jinji for money. Consternation ranges in Jinji where they have neither money nor troops to send to his aid." (May 1690) ³²

This 'Bandar Lachmi Nayak' may be identified with Yachappa Naik who is referred to in the succeeding pages. The activities of Lachmi Naik remarkably corroborate with those of Yachappa Naik with slight variations :

The Emperor absorbed the sardars of the Bijapur and Golconda in his service and appointed them to take the possession of the territories of these states. Nevertheless, on second thoughts, the Emperor felt it risky to make their appointments. As a result of this, Muhammad Sadiq, an important sardar, was removed from the office. Consequently, he became a rebel. ³³ Yachappa Naik and Ismail Khan Maka, the

32. MM-JS, pp.235-238

33. DC, 1690, p.5

commanders of the late Golconda State, had also accepted the service in the Mughal army. They soon realized that the promises given by the Emperor at the time of entering his service were all hallow. Even there was no guarantee of their employment. They knew that if they alone rebelled against the Emperor, they would be immediately put down, hence they entered into a league with Rajaram through his peshwa, Nilkantha Moreswar and joined him at Chenapatam with 4,000 horse (December 21, 1689). ³⁴

Meanwhile Rajaram had made military preparation sufficiently. Many Hindu naiks and poligars in Karnatak had joined him with their forces. There is a mention in a Marathi document that Rajaram had rallied an army of 40,000 horse and 1,25,000 foot. Out of this army, Rajaram sent an army of 15,000 horse and 25,000 foot under Keso Trimal to Maharashtra. He also sent a treasury of one lakh hons along with the army. (March 1690). ³⁵ With the help of this army, the Marathas achieved great victories in Maharashtra in the year 1690.

The Mughal army, dispatched by the Emperor to Karnatak to take the possession of the Bijapur and Golconda territories, had not only failed in its objects, but also could not defend itself against the onslaughts of the Marathas, who were reinforced by the poligars and recalcitrant Mughal commanders in Karnatak. The Marathas were so dominant that they captured many forts and imprisoned many Mughal commanders like Askar

34. SCP-JS, p.35

35. MIS, XV, pp.376-378

Ali Beg, the governor of Hyderabad Karnatak (January 1690).³⁶ We find Muhammad Ali Beg, a 'Nabob of the Mogull's forces from Punamalle', begging for a shelter in Fort St. George in April 1690. The English in their 'Diary and Consultation Book' write, "... (his) request of coming to reside in this place for 10 or 15 days till the troubles of the countrey are little over or the arrival of Jolfantier Cawne (Zulfiqar Khan) at Conjevorom, when he shall leave the place. Whereupon it was thought fit and agreed to grant him therein but that his coming in be as private as possibly" (April 17, 1690).³⁷ Thus, the Marathas continued to dominate the political scene in Karnatak till the arrival of Zulfiqar Khan (May-June 1690).

4) Arrival of Zulfiqar Khan in Karnatak

After the fall of Raigad, the Emperor sent Zulfiqar Khan to Jinji in November 1689. He was under the impression that it would not be difficult for the Khan, who had already captured Raigad and the royal family, to seize Rajaram; and thereby destroy the Maratha power. At the end of November, Zulfiqar Khan left the imperial camp and reached the Karnatak plains via Raichur, Karnul, Nandiyal, Cuddapah and Garamkonda. (c. May-June 1690). On his way to Jinji he took many forts and posts and established the line of communication from the imperial camp to his base in Karnatak.³⁸

36. CRM, p.125

37. DC, 1690, p.27

38. HA, V, p.57

Rajaram had anticipated that the Emperor would certainly send the army to capture him. As a precautionary measure, Rajaram had deployed his army on the frontiers of Karnatak under the command of Yachappa Naik, Ismail Khan Maka and Trimbakrao. However, the Maratha forces proved too weak to attain their object. They were badly defeated by the Mughal army under Zulfiqar Khan. Hence they had to retreat to Jinji. ³⁹ (June-July 1690).

5) Siege of Jinji, its First Phase : 1690-91

Before dealing with the history of the siege of Jinji, it would be necessary to know the topographical position and the fortifications of the fort. Jinji is in the south Arcot region, 80 miles south-west of Madras. From its central position, it could control the vast Karnatak region from Arcot to Trichinopoly, and from the eastern ghats to the eastern coast. It comprises three hills : Rajgiri on the west, Krishnagiri on the north and Chandrayandurg on the south. Out of these three, Rajgiri is the highest and strongest. The hills are stiff and rocky and are made almost invincible, by strong fortifications on all sides. The fortifications consist of line above line of stone-walls. The strong bastions on the walls stand as guards of the fortress. These three hills, fortified in such a way, are again connected together with strong bulwork about 60 feet thick. The eighty feet wide ditch outside the bulwork provides further safety to

the garrison. The fort has three gates. The Pondicherry gate on the eastern side is the principal one. The other two are the Trinomali and Shaitandari gates. All this has, thus, made Jinji a big fort, having three citadels within it. Approximately, it spreads over a triangle of three miles.⁴⁰

It is already seen that Rajaram had sent his force under Yachappa Naik and Ismail Khan Maka to arrest the descent of the Mughal army, headed by Zulfiqar Khan. The Maratha forces could not stand the mighty Mughal army and hence, had to retreat. This created a sort of unstable and fearful atmosphere in the region of Jinji. Martin writes, "All the province has been filled with consternation at the return to Jinji of the broken remnant of the Hindu army, closely pursued by the Mughal troops who laid siege to that capital."⁴¹ The local people deserted their habitations and fled to the distant places and European factories in order to save their lives. The population of Pondicherry, the French factory, doubled itself, due to the terror of the Mughals.⁴²

The Khan, along with his army, arrived in the environs of Jinji on August 27, 1690. Rajaram felt it dangerous to stay in the fort. So, he left it for a haven, further south of Jinji.⁴³ Meanwhile Rajaram had appealed to the

40. HA, V, pp.58-59

41. MM-JS, p.239

42. Ibid., HG, p.288

43. SCP-JS, p.35

Naiks of Tanjore, Madura and Mysore to come to his help in order to face the Mughal invasion unitedly. But none, except Shahaji of Tanjore, dared befriend Rajaram in the hour of crisis.⁴⁴

It was not an easy task for any army to besiege the vast and difficult fort like Jinji. The siege-work would need heavy artillery and a vast quantity of gun-powder. And the Khan was lacking the same. His first job, therefore, was to secure them. In the middle of September, he asked the English of Madras to furnish 200 maunds of gun-powder and 500 soldiers. The demand was soon increased to 500 maunds of gunpowder, 500 gunshots, 500 soldiers and 30 artillery-men. The English owed the rent of the place of the factory to the Mughals. So had they not helped the Mughals, there would have been every possibility of incurring the wrath of the latter. The Mughals would, naturally, suspect that the English had sided with the Marathas. Hence, keeping their

44. MM-JS, pp.239-240

Martin in his diary says, "Rajaram could easily have repulsed the army of Zulfiqar Khan, if he had secured the alliance of all the Hindu petty princes of the south, who should have been interested in his cause, for the fall of Jinji would certainly have exposed their states to Mughal domination. But their animosity was so deep that all the entreaties of Rajaram and his minister proved futile. The Raja of Tanjore alone sent help in men and money to Jinji, during the whole period of the war." (RFM, p.43).

eye on the future of their trade, they provided the Mughals with 200 maunds of gunpowder and 300 artillery-shots. ⁴⁵ In November 1690, the French were asked to supply with gun-powder and artillerists. By paying handsome salary, the Khan had raised a column of a hundred European soldiers under him. ⁴⁶ Rajaram had also tried his level best to win the friendship of the English, reminding them of his kaul to their factory at fort St. David. ⁴⁷

The army of the Khan comprised 12,000 to 15,000 smart cavalry, about 15,000 Rajput musketeers, vast number of local army and the pendharis of whom the Khan himself was the leader. At this time the Marathas had 6,000 to 7,000 cavalry of which 2,000 was sent by the Raja of Tanjore. ⁴⁸ The infantry number of the Marathas is not available.

The war started in October, 1690. The artillery duel is described by Martin : "... the works (trenches) have been advanced, the batteries have been erected and there was a great firing of guns from both sides. As it is only one day's journey by road from Pondicherry to Jinji, we can listen to the noise, and it is easy, unless the wind is contrary, to count all the discharges of cannons on each side," ⁴⁹

45. HA, V, p.60; HG, p.286; DC, 1690, pp.80 & 84

46. HA, V, p.60

47. HG, p. 287

48. MM-JS, p.240

49. Ibid.,

On November 23, 1690, the Maratha commanders : Nemaji Shinde, Mankoji Pandhare and Nagoji Mane deserted the Mughals and joined the Marathas with 2,000 horse at Jinji. By this act, the Mughal side was considerably weakened and that of the Marathas was substantially strengthened. These Maratha commanders were posted to the defence of the side of Chakra-kulam.⁵⁰ Rajaram returned from the south to the fort in February 1691,⁵¹ and the morale of the Marathas was suddenly boosted up.

In March 1691, the besiegers received the reinforcement of 1500 horses and 2,000 Rajputs. Ample provision and funds were also sent to them.⁵² The day by day the Mughals before Jinji were getting assertive, strong and over-powering. The English of Fort St. David write to the English of Fort St. George : "Mogull's forces in Chengie (Jinji) to be Considerably supplied with men and provisions in so much the natives of those parts are very apprehensive that Mogull's power being so great (that) Chingie will not be able to withstand them ..."⁵³ (April 25, 1691) In November 1690, the Emperor had despatched his wazir Asad Khan to the regions of Karnul and Cuddapah to establish the Mughal sway there and secure the rear of Zulfiqar Khan's army before Jinji. The

50. Chakrakulam is a tank, lying between Chandrayandurg and Rajgiri (HA, V, p.61)

51. MM-JS, p.240; SCP-JS, pp.35-36

52. MM-JS, p.240

53. DC, 1691, p.21

Khan had captured many important forts like Nandiyal, and was, at this time, encamping with his army at Cuddapah. Meanwhile Zulfiqar Khan had besieged Jinji for eight long months without any avail. The Emperor realized that the Khan alone could not subjugate the place like Jinji. Therefore, he directed Asad Khan to advance to Jinji to join his son and effect the speedy fall of the fort.⁵⁴ Similar orders were also given to Prince Kam Baksha, who had been despatched to subdue the Berads of Wakinkheda. The work of besieging Wakinkheda was entrusted to Muhullah Khan.⁵⁵ Saki Mustaid Khan gives a very interesting story as to how Asad Khan hesitated to obey the orders and how he was ridiculed by the Emperor.⁵⁶

54. HA, V, p.32 ; MA-JS, p.212

55. MA-JS, pp.205 & 214; HA, V, p.62

56. MA-SP, p.52 : However, the version of Saki Mustaid Khan about the dispatch of Asad Khan to Jinji is quite different. According to him, the Marathas attacked the succour coming to Zulfiqar Khan's camp and an acute shortage of food-grains followed. As a result of this, the Khan had to retreat twelve kos from his base before Jinji. When the Emperor learned the state of the Khan's army, he dispatched Asad Khan to relieve Zulfiqar Khan (MA-SP, p.51). G.S. Sardesai also writes that the Khan raised the siege in May 1691 and retreated to Wandiwash (SR, p.9).

However, it should be noted the Khan had not abandoned his siege and was encamping before the fort till July, 1691.

Meanwhile, the siege of Jinji continued as before in May 1691. Martin writes, "The siege of Jinji continues. Some smart actions have been fought, such as sorties by the besieged and other encounters between the two parties." 57

In June 1691, two to three combats were fought between the Mughals and the Marathas, taking heavy casualties on both sides. The Mughals used to receive convoys and other succour, regularly. 58

In July, the Mughals operated the siege leisurely. The Marathas felt the shortage of money and could not pay the salary of their men as Shahaji of Tanjore stopped the succour. However, Rajaram's fervent appeal to Shahaji for saving the Maratha State bore fruit. Shahaji agreed to lend the hand of support. 59

Asad Khan and Kambaksha, had not yet arrived. So, instead of remaining inactive, Zulfiqar Khan planned an expedition to exact the tributes from the neighbouring kingdoms. The Khan asked Ali Mardan Khan, the foujdar of Kanchi, to join him. (August 1691). Both the Khans marched against Tanjore and Trichanopoly and collected tributes from their chiefs. They fought many battles on their way. 60 It seems that

57. MM-JS, p.240

58. Ibid., p.241

59. Ibid.,

60. TD, pp. 103-104, DC, 1691, p.41

they returned to the base-camp before Jinji in October 1691.

By this time, the news that Asad Khan and Kambaksha were coming to Jinji was escalating like a wild-fire in the Jinji region. The people and raiks were getting scared at the arrival of the reports of the coming Mughal army.⁶¹

Kambaksha met Asad Khan at Cuddapah on October 4, 1691.⁶² They started moving towards Jinji. When they were at Sudam, some 120 miles away from Jinji, they sent Rao Dalpat Bundela with funds and reinforcement to the army before Jinji. Rao Dalpat's force consisted of Gopalsing Chandrawat, Maloji Khopade, Siddi Salam Khan and Yeshwantrao Dalvi. On his way to Jinji, Rao Dalpat was joined by Ali Mardon Khan. They reached Jinji via Wandiwash and Desur. (November, 1691). There was an acute shortage of food-grains in the Mughal camp before Jinji. The Mughals were greatly relieved and refreshed with the coming of the succour.⁶³

61. MM-JS, p.241 : The English had the news of the Mughal army in June 1691 that Asad Khan and Kambaksha were coming to the rescue of Zulfiqar Khan. They, in a letter of July 26, 1691, say that it would be disadvantageous and disastrous for the English factors on the eastern coast, if they hesitated to send nazaranas to the Prince and Prime-minister. (DC, 1691, pp. 26 & 26)

62. MA-JS, p.207

63. TD, pp. 108-109

Zulfiqar Khan posted Rao Dalpat at the right flank of his army. Bhimsen Saxena records a subsequent fight between the Mughals led by Rao Dalpat and the Marathas, who boldly charged the enemy. ⁶⁴

About November, Zulfiqar Khan demanded from Rajaram the possession of Jinji. The Khan was ready to hand over Vellore, instead. The Khan, further, warned Rajaram that he would not be in position and authority for such a bargain after the arrival of the Prince. Of course, Rajaram did not comply with the suggestions of the Khan. He was quite confident of defending the fort, in spite of many difficulties and embarrassments. The truth perhaps lies in Martin's remark : "The greatest hope of the Raja is his secret understanding with Zulfiqar who does not really wish to capture Jinji." ⁶⁵ This remark has a basis in the then prevailing rumours of the Khan's secret intrigues with Rajaram.

No sooner did the Mughals overcome the adversity of the starvation, than they were to face the natural calamity. The heavy rains in November caused a great deal of damage to the camp and material; men and transport animals were carried away by the over-flowing tanks in the vicinity of Jinji. ⁶⁶

While journeying, Kambaksha started alienating Asad Khan. The young Prince was inexperienced and short-sighted.

64. TD, p.109

65. MM-JS, p.241

66. Ibid., p.242

He spent his days on the way in sporting and hunting. As he was all the time riding a horse, Asad Khan too had to ride on horse back in accordance with the court-manners. The old man had to sustain all these travails and sufferings, which soon gave place to hatred and enmity between the two grandees.⁶⁷

Zulfiqar Khan advanced some distance to welcome the Prince and his father. In a darbar that followed, Sayyid Lashkar Khan, a renowned commander, felt affronted, as he was not given the proper seat and, hence, he left it in fury. Some ill-wishers told the Prince that Zulfiqar Khan and his father were responsible for the mischief. At the same time, in return, the Khans were misguided that the Prince had purposefully insulted Sayyid Lashkar Khan.⁶⁸ Thus, an atmosphere of hatred and suspicion developed before these high dignitaries reached the scene of the battlefield before Jinji (December 16, 1691).

By the end of the year, Zulfiqar Khan captured the Maratha thana of Trinomaly, 23 miles west of Jinji. For this achievement the Khan was promoted to some higher status by the Emperor.⁶⁹

67. MA-JS, pp.214-215

68. MA-SP, p.54; MA-JS, p.215

69. Saki Mustaid Khan notes, "On Saturday, the 16th January, 1692, Zulfiqar Khan Bahadur was rewarded for the capture of fort Trinomali by being promoted to the rank of 4-hazari" (MA-JS, p.208).

The Marathas also started fortifying their position. Shahaji sent a huge sum to Rajaram who spent it all on the defence of Jinji (December, 1691). ⁷⁰

Thus ended the first phase of the siege of Jinji. At first, both the Emperor and Zulfiqar Khan felt that it was an easy task for them to capture Jinji. But, soon they realized its impregnability. Hence, Zulfiqar Khan had to wait for further reinforcement under his father and Prince Kambaksha. But the prospects of the besieging army did not brighten up as they brought dissension along with huge army. Their schismatic behaviour, naturally, affected the fortunes of the Mughals in the Deccan and at Jinji in particular.

Part- III

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra :

1690-1691

It is already seen that in 1689 the Mughals captured almost all the forts except the forts like Vishalgad, Gagangad, Vasantgad, Satara and a few others in the Sahyadris. These strong forts safeguarded the broken remnants of the Maratha power. Vishalgad was valiantly defended by the Marathas as it housed the harem of Rajaram. Nearly the whole of the Maratha State had been conquered by the Mughal forces. The Marathas, for the time being, felt that their State, founded by their great national hero, Shivaji the Great, had perished.

But this gloomy sense began to vanish and the spirit of independence and vengeance started seizing them. The very next year, 1690, saw the process of the Maratha recovery. The Marathas not only organized themselves but also fought the Mughals, defeating their renowned generals and capturing the lost territory with its forts and posts.

1) Capture of Sarja Khan

In April 1690, Shankaraji Narayan led an expedition against the thana of Sangameshwar. While Rajaram was on his way to Jinji, Ramchandrapant had attacked the thana and defeated its thanedar. But, meanwhile, Shaikh Nizam, who was encamping in the Kolhapur region, had recaptured the thana and managed to maintain it. Now, the Maratha leaders seem to have assembled at Vishalgad and decided to clear off the enemy from the region between Vishalgad to Satara. Accordingly, a force under Shankaraji Narayan marched against the thana of Sangameshwar and attacked it. Shankaraji Narayan routed the enemy and captured the thana.¹

Soon, Ramchandrapant, Santaji and Dhanaji joined Shankaraji Narayan, with their forces and they all advanced against Sarja Khan alias Rustum Khan, who had encamped at the foot of Satara with an intention to take it. When the Maratha army approached the vicinity of Satara, Sarja Khan posted his son, Galib Khan, with a force of 5,000 at the front.

1. SL, p.167

Soon, the fighting ensued and the Marathas started pouring bullets on the enemy. As a result of this firing, the elephants of the Mughals started running back through their army. Many were trampled under their feet. When Sarja Khan came to know the fiasco of his army, he immediately ran to the spot to save the front. Meanwhile, the Marathas charged the Mughals vigorously. In the midst of fighting, the Marathas at once began to flee. The Mughals thought that the Marathas had lost their heart and they had been defeated. So, they started chasing the Marathas, leaving the Khan and his son with a reduced number of troops. It was actually a tactical retreat and not the defeat of the Marathas. They had already kept one division of their army in reserve in order to make a surprise attack on the base camp of the enemy. Taking advantage of the precarious position of the Khan, the reserved division under Manaji More suddenly appeared on the scene and fiercely attacked the Khan and plundered his camp. While the Khan was fighting bravely, he received injuries of arrows and bullets and his clothes caught fire. Consequently, the Khan came down to ground unconscious. Manaji More lost no time to arrest him. While the fighting was still going on, Hambirrao Mohite, the sarlashkar, came out of the fort of Satara with 5,000 army and fell upon the disheartened enemy who were completely put to rout. The Marathas plundered the Khan's camp and captured his mother, wife and a son. Two wives and two sons of the Khan escaped the arrest, on the pretext that they were the servants of the Khan. Galib Khan was seriously wounded, but, he, too, escaped from the

battle-ground. 1500 Mughals were killed; the rest were either injured or fled away. The Marathas, too, had to suffer heavy casualties. They carried away 4,000 horses and 8 elephants as spoils of war.²

On hearing this provoking news, the Emperor dispatched Gaziuddin Khan Bahadur and Diler Khan to the region of Satara. They were ordered to besiege and capture Satara.³ However, the expedition seems to have failed, as Satara continued to remain a Maratha possession.

Sarja Khan remained in the Maratha captivity for 16 days and eventually agreed to pay a lakh of rupees as ransom. He kept his mother and son as hostages. Later on, he managed to pay the ransom and got them released. The capture of Sarja Khan took place in April 1690.⁴

2. FA, pp.41-43

3. Ibid., p.42

4. Ibid., p.43; SCP-JS, p.36

That the forts of Pratapgad and Wai were captured by the Marathas after the arrest of Sarja Khan, is very well substantiated by a note in the Jedhe Chronology and another authentic document (SCP-JS, p.36; BISM-Q, Yr.8, Iss. 3, p.156). The date of these exploits of the Marathas in the Jedhe Chronology is May 25, 1690 (SCP-JS, p.36). A letter from Ramchandra-pant to the Marne Deshmukha of Mathe Khore throws light on these exploits (SCS, VI, p.77). In it, the Pant had mentioned his recent expedition and the capture of Pratapgad. Its date is May 6, 1690. Now, if the Sarja Khan episode took place

2) Capture of Wai, Pratapgad etc.

After routing the army of Sarja Khan, the Maratha army, led by Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji and Dhanaji, penetrated in the region of Wai. The fortress of Wai was captured along with its thanedar, Khidmat Khan. Immediately, Pratapgad was stormed and taken. Its killedar was stripped of everything. Almost all the thanas in the Wai-Satara region were captured (May 1690). Soon, the Maratha forces marched against the forts of Rohida, Rajgad and Torana and captured them. Unfortunately, no detailed information about these gallant deeds of the Marathas, is available. The Jedhe Chronology is very brief and only records in one sentence that Ramchandrapant and Sankaraji Narayan took the forts of Pratapgad, Wai, Rohida, Rajgad and Torna.⁵ According to Khafi Khan, mere demonstration of the Maratha army around the fort of Rajgad frightened Abul Khair, its killedar, to surrender and vacate the fort for the Marathas. Later on, the Khan, stripped of everything, fled to the imperial camp in

(Foot-Note 4 contd....)

before the capture of Wai and Pratapgad, the date of the arrest of the Khan, i.e. May 25, 1690, given in the Jedhe Chronology, is evidently wrong. Therefore, it may be surmised that the Khan was arrested before the date of the letter of Ramchandrapant, i.e. May 6, 1690. Hence, the date of the Sarja Khan episode must be placed in the third or fourth week of April 1690.

disgrace. When the Emperor came to know the impotence of the Khan, he banished him to Mecca.⁶

3) Fighting in the Khatav Region

One of the Maratha armies encamped at the foot of Wandangad. The very presence of the Marathas terrified Muhammad Amin Khan, Saddi Hilal Khan, the thanedar of Khatav and other thanedars of the region. They abandoned their thanas and fled away. The Marathas were not slow to grasp the situation : they quickly advanced, occupied the thana of Khatav and plundered it. They also arrested the notable local persons and began to demolish the fortification of the thana. Meanwhile, they learned of the Mughal reinforcement under Marhmat Khan who had come upto Aundha. They boldly moved to fight the Mughals. But, it seems, the Mughals shrewdly avoided the open combat, managed to come to Khatav and occupied it. The Marathas followed the Mughals and besieged the thana. The siege lasted for 12 days.⁷ The Marathas seem to have abandoned the siege and dispersed away. Later on, Rannast Khan came to Khatav to regain the lost prestige of the Mughals in the region. He searched for a suitable person for the thanedari of Khatav. But nobody came forward to accept the

6. MM-SP, p.23; HA, V, p.25

Khafi Khan wrongly places the event in early 1669.

7. BISM-Q, Yr. 8, Iss. III, p.156

offer, out of a fright of the Marathas. The Khan stayed there for 12 days and later on, was ordered to go to Masur. When the Marathas came to know the departure of the Khan, they descended from Vardhangad⁸ and resorted to arson and looting in the Khatav region. This went on for 20 days, as a result of which the region became barren and depopulated. Thereupon, Mampur Khan came to the thana and repaired the dilapidated fortification.⁹ Meanwhile, the Emperor had dispatched Lutfullah Khan¹⁰ to the Khatav region to curb the irritant activities of the Marathas. While the Khan was on his way to Khatav, he was trapped in the difficult hilly region near Mhaswad¹¹ by Satvaji Dafle, a brave Maratha commander.¹² Satvaji had a force of 8,000 horse and 'innumerable foot.' The Khan strategically arranged his force, keeping his bag and baggage at the centre. A severe battle was fought upto evening, when Santaji and Dhanaji joined Satvaji with their 5,000 chosen horse. In his letter to the Emperor, the Khan writes that his men fought bravely and

8. 8 m.n.w. of Khatav .

9. BISM-Q, Yr. 8, Iss. III, p.156

10. In a Marathi document, he is referred to as Wudalik (Ataliq) Khan. Ataliq means a guardian. He was the guardian of Prince Muizuddin (Ibid.).

11. 60 m.e. of Satara.

12. Founder of the Jat State.

defeated the enemy, killing their 1,000 men. He says that on the Mughal side 200 were killed and 300 wounded (June 1690). 13

Lutfullah Khan reached the environs of Khatav and encamped outside the thana. He gave the thanedari of Khatav to Naro Ragho, a Maratha commander in the Mughal service. He assured the people of the protection and asked them to settle down in the region. Soon, the Khan had to face the onslaught of the Marathas, led by Santaji. (July 6, 1690). Santaji was at the foot of Satara with 10,000 horse and 'innumerable foot.' Because of the heavy rains, the Khan's men could not dig trenches for the protection of their camp. Santaji seized the opportunity and made a surprise attack on the Mughal camp during night. The unexpected attack created confusion amongst the Mughals. Khalil, son of Lutfullah Khan, Mamur Khan, Khudavand Khan and others got ready with their men to face the enemy. A fierce action was fought. The Marathas charged the Mughals again and again. At last, they withdrew their force and fled to Wardhangad with Khalil on their heels. According to the report of Lutfullah Khan, 500 Marathas were killed, 100 captured. The Mughals lost their 67 men. They captured 300 horses and other war materials. The Emperor was pleased to learn the bravery of the Khan and his son and subsequently raised their mansabs as rewards. 14

13. LP, p.113

14. Ibid., pp.114-115

4) Desais in Konkan

When the Mughals invaded south Konkan, the desais of the region submitted to them. However, they soon realized the true nature of the Mughal aggression. While stating the religious and social persecution and victimization of the Hindus at the hands of the Mughals, the Viceroy of Goa writes to his king, "The desais left the side of the Mughals and attacked them, partially because they belong to the same caste as that of Rajaram. But they also did so out of anger for the Mughal arrogance and high-handedness. As the Muslims ravaged the Hindu women and desecrated the Hindu temples, it is no wonder that the desais revolted against them." 15

Thus the Mughal aggression was not a purely political aggression. It was essentially an encroachment upon the religion, social traditions and institutions of the Hindus. As a matter of fact, the desais of Sankhali, Maneri and other mahals raised the banner of revolt against the Mughal imperialism and naturally sought the help of the Marathas, who were fighting for the very existence of their state and independence.

It seems that in north Konkan too the Mughals had no strong hold as such. The subhedar of Tal-Konkan, in his letter to the desais and other watandars of subha Chaul, has denounced them, as they had not submitted to the imperial forces, which had encamped there for six months. He further reprimanded them that they should join the Mughal Officer

Damaji Raghunath and Keroji Pawar, sent to that region to tighten up the grip of the Mughal power.¹⁶ This shows that some of the watandars were still reluctant to accept the rule of the victorious Mughals. And those like Sarjerao Jedhe, Nagoji Mane, Amritrao Nimbalkar and others, who had joined the Mughals, comprehended the rise of the Maratha power from its ashes and began to defect to the Maratha side.¹⁷

5) Rao Dalpat and the Marathas

The Emperor had entrusted to Rao Dalpat Bundela, a valiant commander in the imperial service, the work of guarding the route from Aurangabad to Tuljapur. While he was escorting Prince Bidar Bakhta from Aurangabad to Sholapur, he learned that the Marathas had plundered Manegaon¹⁸ on the highway. He at once marched against them. Mamur Khan from Chausala joined him in the expedition. An action was fought in the environs of Tuljapur. According to Bhimsen Saxena, 800 Mughals fought with 12,000 Marathas and routed the latter.¹⁹ (1690).

It is very difficult to digest this story of Bhimsen Saxena. Even a casual glance at the history of those times shows the Marathas were never so weak, so that 12,000 of them could be routed by 800 of the enemy soldiers.

16. SCS, IX, p.82; August 26, 1690

17. MIS, XV, pp.272-375; IS-AT, I, p.39;
SL, p.168

18. Taluka Parenda, Dist. Osmanabad.

19. TD, p.105

Another army of 3,000 horse of the Marathas under Lakhamu Shinde was pillaging the Mughal regions. The vanguards of Rao Dalpat Bundela fought an action, in which Lakhamu Shinde and his companions were taken prisoners. Bhimsen Saxena says that the brothers of Lakhamu Shinde and many of his men were killed and their bodies were heaped together on the battleground (1690). 20

6) Ali Beg and the Marathas

There was a constant conflict between Shankaraji Narayan and Ali Beg, Mughal thanedar of Junnar for the acquisition of the region with the forts therein from Junnar to Bhor. Shankaraji inspired the brave Maratha captains like Sonaji Farjand and Gunaji Savant to capture the lost forts. Accordingly, Sonaji Farjand and his men had successfully captured the fort of Korigad (40 m.w. of Poona). Gunaji, inspired by the brave act of Sonaji, assailed the fort of Sidhagad ²¹ and defeated its garrison. When he took possession of the fort, he found out that the food-grain stock had already been exhausted. Meanwhile Ali Beg came to know of the plight of the Maratha garrison of Sidhagad. He quickly besieged the fort. Gunaji realised that the tables were turned and left the fort in order to bring the provision from the fort of Korigad. Meantime, Rajaji Savant, the brother of Gunaji, lost his heart and sold out the fort for five hundred rupees. However, the shrewd

20. Ibid., p.106

21. Near the Bhimashankar hill in north Konkan (SR, p.54)

Ali Beg deceptively imprisoned Rajaji, after taking over the possession of the fort. But the enemy could not hold this fort for a long time, as it was soon recaptured by Gunaji.²² (c. 1690-1691).

7) Maratha Activities on the Karnatak Border

Jannisar Khan and Tahvvur Khan were dispatched to the border of Karnatak, probably in the Hukkeri region, to check the activities of the Marathas under Santaji, Dhanaji, Manaji More and Hambirrao Mohite the sarlashkar, (c. June 1691). A fierce battle took place in which the Mughal army was completely routed and its artillery and bag and baggage were destroyed. Jannisar Khan and Tahvvur Khan were wounded and had a hair-breadth escape. Khafi Khan writes, that the event was so dangerous that the Khans looked upon it as a second birth. When the fiasco of the Mughal forces was reported to the Emperor, he exclaimed, "There is nothing in the hands of man. Everything is done by the will of God."²³ However, in fact,

22. SL, pp. 171-172

23. MM-SP, p.27

The abovementioned account is mainly taken from the source-book of Khafi Khan. It is also supported by a Marathi document, which mentions the expedition in the Hukkeri region and the names of the abovementioned Maratha commanders in it. The date of the document is June 19, 1691. Khafi Khan does not give the date of the incident, as usual. (SCS, VIII, p.26)

he did not seem to have accepted 'the will of God.' Soon he sent his artillery officer Mukhtyar Khan to the Raibag-Hukkeri region to prevent the Marathas from consolidating their success. 24

In the first week of October 1691 the Marathas captured Chikodi and carried away the horses and booty. ²⁵

In December, Ramchandrapant led an expedition in the Bhudargad-Hukkeri region. No further details about the expedition are available. 26

8) Revival of the Maratha State

From the abovementioned skirmishes, battles and expeditions, one can very well visualize the continuous Mughal-Maratha struggle in these years. The year 1689 was a very critical year in the history of the Marathas : Sambhaji was captured and subsequently executed; Rajaram had to flee to Jinji in Karnatak; the queen Yesubai and her son Shahu were captured along with Raigad, the capital of the Marathas; and the whole of the Maratha State was wiped out by the swarming army of the Mughals. This critical phase in the history is described in the contemporary documents as follows : "The enemy captured a number of forts and regions. It seemed that the Maratha State almost ceased to exist." 27

24. MA-SP, p.49

25. SCS, XII, p.28

26. Ibid., pp. 29-30

27. TKK, p.71

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However, the Marathas strenuously fought the enemy with a spirit of independence and love for the land. They regained the confidence, while defeating the enemy and recapturing the lost territory. So much so, that they began to boast, "By the grace of God the state of affairs of our state is getting on well." ²⁸

The Maratha rank and file under Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji, Dhanaji and scores of other leaders stoutly defended the Maratha State against the Mughal aggression. A letter of Rajaram to Shankaraji Narayan, dated September 9, 1691, reveals that the Kolis and Berads in the vicinity of Purandar were eager to capture the fort and thus to serve the cause of the Maratha State. ²⁹ So, it was this wonderful union of the Marathas, high and low, that prevented the Emperor from consolidating his success. Another reason for the Maratha recovery was that there was a radical difference between the ideology of the Marathas and that of the Mughals. The Marathas were fighting for the maintenance of their own freedom and their State. It was a life and death struggle for them. On the side of the Mughals, they were fighting for the ever unceasing design of the Emperor for more and more territory. It was the desire of the Emperor to enhance the glory of the Mughal Empire and Islam that urged him to crush the rising power of the Marathas in vain.

28. SCS, VI, pp.77-78

29. MIS, XV, pp. 382-384; PD, 31, p.47

It is interesting to note that the Marathas not only thought of freeing their land from the enemy, but also dreamt of capturing the territories of Bijapur, Bhaganagar, Aurangabad and even that of Delhi. In June 1691, while appealing to the conscience of Hanmantrao Chorpade, a Maratha commander in the Mughal service, Rajaram had promised him a saranjam in the following manner : Hanmantrao was to get a saranjam of 5,00,000 hons. Out of these five lakhs, 62,500 hons were to be given after capturing the prant of Raigad, 62,500 hons after capturing Bijapur, 62,500 hons after capturing Bhaganagar, 62,500 hons after capturing Aurangabad and 2,50,000 hons after capturing Delhi. 30

One cannot definitely know as to whether it was a wishful-thinking of Rajaram or a definite policy laid down by him. But it is an undisputable fact that the Marathas, at this stage, were feeling confident to meet the challenge of the Mughal aggression.

Part - IV

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Karnatak :

1692 - 1693

Siege of Jinji, its Second Phase : 1692-1693

The act of joining of Prince Kambaksha and Asad Khan to the Mughal army before Jinji increased its strength in men and materials. The siege was once again started with vigour

(January 1692). Along with the imperial commanders like Ismail Khan Maha, Kakar Khan and others, Zulfiqar Khan took the positions around the fort, while special precaution was taken to protect the camp of the Prince from the impending onslaughts of the Marathas.¹ Sacks filled with earth were used to raise the batteries.²

In January 1692, the garrison twice attacked the besiegers. Once the Marathas could capture many horses, one elephant and some other transport animals.³ To be on the safer-side, the Prince and Asad Khan removed their tents from the Singhavaram hill to the Alimadad hill, where Zulfiqar Khan was encamping. Sayyid Laskar Khan was posted to the Singhavaram hill. Zulfiqar Khan dug the trenches in front of Chandrayandurg and raised the batteries. Both the sides started artillery fire.⁴

The Mughals were confident of their strength and success and expecting a speedy fall of the fort. However, they feared that Rajaram would escape before the fall of the fort. On February 17, Asad Khan writes to the English in his parwana.⁵ "And if that ill, unfortunate fellow Rama should offer to make his escape by sea, let him by no means effect it, but endeavour

1. TD, pp. 110-111

2. MM-JS, pp.242-243

3. Ibid., p.242

4. TD, p.111

5. A sealed paper of authority - (MED, p.492)

to intercept and take him, which will be a most singular and acceptable piece of service to the king. (the Emperor)." ⁶
 The English were also asked to furnish ammunitions to the Mughal army. ⁷

Meanwhile, Zulfiqar Khan led a small expedition, probably in the neighbourhood of Jinji. His booty consisted of droves of cattle and 7,000 to 8,000 captives : men, women and children. Later on, they were all sold as slaves (c. February-March 1692). While the Khan was away from the camp, the Marathas attacked the Mughal convoys of provisions and ammunitions and carried off a number of horses. ⁸

On March 1, the Marathas clashed with the Mughals near Pondicherry, the latter having come to buy food. The fighting continued for about 20 days in the environs. ⁹

The Mughals had strengthened their positions by posting the best of their troops, in order to check up the succour, passing into the fort of Jinji. But the supplies could not be stopped as they were brought into the fort at night; and secondly, it was rumoured, because of the collusion of Zulfiqar Khan with Rajaram. ¹⁰ However, both the Khans were apparently

6. DC, 1692, p.9

7. Ibid., pp. 8-9

8. MM-JS, p.243

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

showing that they were making sincere efforts to capture Rajaram. For example, Asad Khan asked the English to keep "a watchful eye on the unfortunate Rama, because his fall is at hand and as he constantly seeks for an opportunity to abscond, you must endeavour to prevent it and endeavour to arrest him, which shall give particular satisfaction. Wherefore, we ordered everyone, especially the French and other nations, to obey the said (English) Governor to render him their aid ... by arresting the unfortunate (Rama Raja) a service shall be rendered (by you) to the Emperor." (June 14, 1692).¹¹

Skirmishes, plunder and burning both by the Marathas and Mughals continued during the period between April and July. The Marathas raided the country with fire and sword almost upto Pulicat.¹² (25 m.n. of Madras).

Another encounter took place between the Mughals and the Marathas near Pondicherry. (c. last week of July). The Marathas lost their two prominent men. Rasul Khan, the Mughal commander, was wounded.¹³

The Mughals delivered many attacks on the bulwork of Jinji and caused a breach in one of its bastions. But they could not secure a lodgement on it, owing to the brave defence of the garrison. They were repulsed with heavy

11. CRM, pp.131-132

12. MM-JS, p.243

13. DC, 1692, p.35

losses of men.¹⁴

Though, hitherto, the garrison could hold on its own against the besiegers, its numerical strength was comparatively, much less and, hence, weak. Rajaram felt it insecure to remain at the fort and so he left it for a safer place (August). The English record on August 29, "King Rama Raja is fled from chingee to Carnatta which puts his subjects in great consternation, and that the Moors are very strong and advanced more to the southward, that it is supposed, in a little time, they will take chingee."¹⁵

In September, the Marathas quite successfully attacked the Mughal camp twice and slain a commander of 3,000 horse and many others. Besides, 5,000 oxen loaded with provisions on their way to the Mughal camp were attacked and 3,000 of them were seized by them. At the same time, the garrison received vast reinforcement of food and money from Shahaji, the king of Tanjore.¹⁶ By October, Rajaram seems to have returned to Jinji.

Soon the Mughals advanced upto the walls of the fort and began to deliver attacks everyday. The Marathas defended the fort valorously. They often resorted to sorties and destroyed the trenches of the enemy. At the same time Rajaram sent his envoys to Prince Kambaksha, Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan

14. MM-JS, p.243

15. DC, 1692, p.47

16. MM-JS, p.244

for concluding a treaty. On 27th October this move, on the part of the Marathas, was reported to the Emperor, who asked the court officials to prepare a kaul (a writing of assurance) to be sent to Rajaram, through Asad Khan.¹⁷ However, it seems that no further progress was made in that direction. The reasons are unknown to history.

The rainy season began and the rains started pouring. The Mughals began to suffer from the scarcity of food.¹⁸ In the month of November, the garrison twice attacked the siege-trenches and damaged them. Though the Mughals assailed the fort frequently, there was in view no sign of its fall. On the contrary, the Emperor suspected the secret understanding between Zulfiqar Khan and Rajaram. He threatened the Khan that he would cut the ropes of his tent and make him to camp in open air, until he took the fort.¹⁹

Early in November, Santaji with 15,000 horse and Dhanaji with 7,000 horse were sent from Maharashtra by Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan. This measure was designed to relieve the pressure of the Mughal army on Jinji. Dhanaji was first to arrive in Karnatak.²⁰ When his army came nearer to Jinji, the Mughals thought it wise to abandon the posts around the fort and concentrate their forces at one place. This strategy was planned, keeping in view the superior numerical strength of the Marathas. The orders were sent to that effect. Accordingly, Sayyid Laskar Khan and Kakar Khan

17. BIS, Jan.73; Iss. 44, pp.49 & 51; AMM, yr. 36, p.46

18. TD, p.111

19. MM-JS, p.244

20. SCP-JS, p.36; MM-JS, p.244-245; RSP, 184

joined the main camp overnight. However, Ismail Khan Maka was on the western side of the fort and his men delayed his march, as they wasted their time in packing up their bag and baggage. Meanwhile, the Khan received the news that Dhanaji was marching upon him. So he somehow rallied his scattered force and started for the main camp; but he could not escape the attack of Dhanaji. His position became critical when the garrison sent a detachment to envelope his force. Both the Maratha forces stormed the Mighals. Yashvantrao Dalvi fell fighting on the Mughal side. Fighting the enemy, Ismail Khan retreated to the post of Kakar Khan. Henceforth, the darkness obstructed his march. Some of his companions left him and tried to flee to the main camp; but they were captured on their way. The Khan bravely fought with his small force and eventually fell down wounded from his elephant. He was made a captive and carried off into the fort.²¹ (December 13, 1692). The spoils consisted of 2 elephants, 500 horses, several captives and ample baggage.²²

Ali Mardan Khan, the fouidar of Conjeveram,²³ who generally held the plain with 12,000 to 15,000 horse to guard the line of communication, was escorting a large succour to

21. TD, pp.112-113

22. MM-JS, p.245. It is note-worthy that the Jedhe Chronology has also mentioned the like number of elephants and horses as the spoils (SCP-JS, p.36) .

23. TD, p.115

the Mughal camp before Jinji. Santaji got the intelligence of his movements and decided to intercept him. He appeared before the Khan with a small force of 2,000 to 3,000 horse, while the rest of his horsemen were asked to fall back. The Mughals saw the comparatively small force of the Marathas and began to chase it. They were not aware of the reserved force of the Marathas. Santaji strategically retreated and brought the enemy to a place, where the reserved force was posted. The Mughals soon realized that they were fooled and trapped. A battle was fought for hours together and the Mughals were routed. Ali Mardan Khan along with his officers and merchants was taken captive. Besides, the Marathas got 5 elephants, 300 good horses, and other transport animals with loaded provisions.²⁴ (December 14, 1692).

Ismail Khan Maka secured his release through the good offices of his old friend, Yachappa Naik, who was then in the Maratha service.²⁵ Ali Mardan Khan could effect his release, only when he paid a lakh of pagodas as ransom to the Marathas.²⁶

It is already seen, how the dissention between the Prince and Asad Khan began to take place, while they were coming to the aid of Zulfiqar Khan. The Emperor, it seems,

24. MM-JS, pp. 245-246. The Jedhe Chronology mentions that 1,500 horses and 6 elephants were siezed along with Ali Mardan Khan (SCP-JS, p.36).

25. TD, p.113

26. HG, p.299

had not placed the Prince in position of the supreme command of the army before Jinji. Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan were in charge of the command of the army and the general management of civil and revenue affairs in that region. Both the Khans were acting independent of the Prince. This offended the Prince, who wanted to carry on the siege of Jinji in his name. ²⁷

As a result of the Maratha movements in Karnatak, especially those of Santaji and Dhanaji, the line of communication between the besieging army and the imperial base in the northern Karnatak was already cut off. All the roads were blockaded. As there were no regular news-letters from the Emperor's camp, at Galgala ²⁸ the rumours prevailed in the camp before Jinji that the Emperor was dead. ²⁹ The counsellors of the Prince advised him that in view of the huge Maratha forces and the critical Mughal position, he should imprison Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan and form an alliance with the Marathas. It appears that like his younger brother Prince Akbar, he wanted to join the Marathas and crown himself as an Emperor of India with their assistance. The Marathas watered the false hopes of the Prince by exciting his apprehensions and holding out allurements. ³⁰

27. MM-ED, pp.348

28. 32 m.s.w. of Bijapur on the southern bank of the Krishna.

29. TD, p.113

30. MM-ED, p.349 - According to Martin the Prince had written to Rajaram that he was coming to join the latter (MM-JS, p.245)

The Prince got ready in night with his force for the execution of his plan. But soon his design was foiled by the prompt action of Asad Khan who quickly alerted his son, Zulfiqar Khan and other imperial officers. The very day, the panic-stricken Mughal army decided to abandon their trenches. Accordingly, they destroyed their guns and withdrew to their main camp. The Marathas came down the fort and destroyed the trenches. 31

Saki Mustaid Khan gives very interesting account of the retreat of Zulfiqar Khan's army before Jinji. He writes, "Nasrat Jang (Zulfiqar Khan) hastened the work of withdrawal from the trenches, the large guns were damaged by hammering nails into their touch-holes and having arranged his men he carried off all the property to the camp. At this time, the enemy (the Marathas) in great confidence, joy and vigour surrounded Nasrat Jang in a body of one lakh of horsemen and infantry ... The audacity of the infidels was beyond measure and death faced the Muslims. At this time the Khan Bahadur and all the other commanders had not with them more than 2,000 troopers. The Khan ... joined the battle with a loud cry. The heroes made brave charges, a great give and take battle was fought. About three thousand infantry of the enemy were slain by the Islamic ghazis, and three hundred cavalry too. The Khan Bahadur, on an elephant, drove them back to the door of the fort. The garrison shut the gate. In this conflict one thousand

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infantry of the enemy perished. The imperialists gained the victory and the enemy took to flight ..."³²

It is hard to believe Saki Mustaid Khan who says that more than one lakh Marathas were routed by 2,000 Mughals. His account seems to be partial and his figures of the Maratha as well as the Mughal army are obviously exaggerated.

Soon Zulfiqar Khan and other officers assembled at the tent of Asad Khan and, in consultation with the latter, decided to put restraints on the Prince. Subsequently, Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan went to the tent of the Prince and arrested him without much resistance from his men. The Prince was kept under surveillance near the tent of Asad Khan. (December 16, 1692).³³ Both the Khans publicly, gave out that they had made security arrangements "of guarding the Prince from the nightly fire and hostile threats of the garrison of the fort."³⁴

In about third week of December, the newly arrived Marathas made a sortie and assaulted the Mughal artillery. They seized 14 brass guns, 2 elephants and amunitions. The booty was carried off into the fort.³⁵

The Mughals, who had already raised the siege, were to face the daily encounters with the Marathas. Instead of besieging the fort, they found themselves besieged by the

32. HA-JS, p.216

33. TD, pp.114-115; SCP-JS, pp.36-37

34. HA, V, p.68

35. MM-JS, p.245

enemy. The Maratha army was more than 20,000 in number and at its head was Dhanaji Jadhav. The Mughal strength of army was comparatively smaller. The major portion of the Mughal army was posted to guard the main camp and to keep watch on the Prince. The Mughal position was worsened when the officers posted under the Prince remained inactive in the warfare.³⁶

As there was no succour from out side, the Mughal army began to starve. There was a scarcity of fodder, too. Zulfiqar Khan at the head of cavalry made two attempts to get some provisions, but he had to retreat by the way he went. (c. last week of December).³⁷

In his third attempt, Zulfiqar Khan could succeed in going to Wandiwash, some 25 miles away from Jinji, to secure some ration from the waniaris. So was the indiscipline and disorder in the Mughal camp that the Turkish soldiers looted the stores of these waniaris at night. Next morning, the Khan collected the remainder and started for the camp. At Desur, he was intercepted by Santaji with his 20,000 men and forced to seek shelter in the fort of Desur (13 m.n.e. of Jinji). Later on, the Khan, with his brave assistant, Rao Dalpat Bundella, had to make his way through the shower of the bullets. The transport animals could not advance, on account of the muddy roads. The munition had already been exhausted.

36. TD, pp.115-116; CRM, p.134

37. MM-JS, p.247

It was only when the Khan was reinforced by Sarfraz Khan with 5,000 army, he could reach his camp safely. (First week of January, 1693). ³⁸

The food-supply brought by the Khan fell short to meet the increasing demand of the starving army. It became well-nigh impossible for the Mughals to stay there any longer. ³⁹ The English had aptly given the account of the plight of the Mughals: "Zulphkar Cawn and Assid Cawn ... are reduced in to such streights by the Morattes, that unless a speedy supply of men and provissions, arrive they will be forced to quit the seige of chingee and withdraw their forces out of these parts, which yet is doubtful whether they can escape the Morattes, who are grown too strong of late by a recruit of numbers ... it will be difficult for them (Mughals) to escape..." ⁴⁰

The only way left out for Zulfiqar Khan was to resort to a truce with the Marathas. Accordingly, he sent his envoy to Rajaram begging to allow the Mughal army to retire safely to Wandiwash. In the beginning, Rajaram did not respond to his request. Rajaram decided to wait until the arrival of Santaji, who had gone away to intercept the reinforcement directed to the Mughal camp. However, soon, he seemed to have changed his mind. He accepted the truce and allowed the Mughal army to retire to Wandiwash in safety. Zulfiqar Khan paid

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38. TD, pp.116-117; HG, p.307; DC, 1693, p.23

39. TD, pp.117-118

40. DC, 1693, p.24

Rajaram one lakh of rupees in gold, besides jewels worth 60,000 pagodas. Rajaram also sent to the Khan jewels valued at 15,000 pagodas, one elephant, two horses, many camels and 2,000 oxen for transport purpose. ⁴¹

Meanwhile, Santaji came to Jinji and counselled Rajaram to keep Prince Kenbaksha as a hostage or destroy the Mughal army which had become helpless and crippled. But Rajaram did not accept his advice. So, Santaji marched away in anger and encamped in the vicinity of Jinji. ⁴²

On the Mughal side too, Rao Dalpat Bundella counselled Zulfiqar Khan not to retreat under any circumstances. He offered his gold and silver worth Rs.30,000 to Rs.40,000 for the expenses of the army. ⁴³ The Khan was in two minds. But the Mughal army was not in a sober mood. On January 22, 1693, the artillery men left the camp on their own and sent a message to the Khan that they were dying of hunger and hence were going to Wandiwash. Finally, Zulfiqar Khan decided to leave the place in the noon. The starvation had caused heavy casualty of the transport animals. Most of the baggage were to be burnt or left behind only to be plundered by the Marathas. ⁴⁴

41. MM-JS, pp.247-248

42. Ibid., p.248; TD, p.118

43. TD, p.118

44. SCP-JS, p.36; TD, pp.118-119; DC, 1693, p.40 - The artillery worth Rs.4,50,000 was abandoned at the foot of Jinji. Later on the Emperor asked Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan to compensate the amount (BIS, Oct, 74, Iss. 43, p.65).

The Mughal camp began to retreat in a most lamentable way. A force of 1,000 Maratha horsemen was at its heel, looting its baggages. The Mughals reached Wandiwash after three days' arduous journey. ⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the Emperor had dispatched Qasim Khan with ample provisions and strong army to the Jinji region to take the place of Ali Mardan Khan at Conjeveram and to help the distressed army under Zulfiqar Khan at Wandiwash. While the Khan was coming to Conjeveram, Santaji fell upon him near Kaveripak (20 m.w. of Conjeveram). Fighting continued till both the forces reached Conjeveram. There Santaji routed the Mughal army. Bhimsen Saxena says that the Khan had to take shelter in a temple at Conjeveram and save his life. Meanwhile, Zulfiqar Khan had learnt Santaji's attack on Qasim Khan and left Wandiwash to join him. He arrived at Conjeveram in time to save the Khan and provisions; and brought them safe to Wandiwash. ⁴⁶ (February 7, 1693).

The Emperor had sent Asad Khan and the Prince in a great anticipation to conquer the newly established capital of the Marathas with their king Rajaram. But his hope was ruined, due to the mutual jealousy and rivalry between the Khans and the Prince. Santaji and Dhanaji, the two veteran Marathas' generals, captured the renowned imperial commanders

45. TD, p.119

46. Ibid., pp.119-120

such as Ali Mardan Khan and Ismail Khan Maka. By these extraordinary and gallant deeds of the Marathas, the Mughals before Jinji lost their heart altogether. Their army lost morale and subsequently the discipline. The situation in the Mughal camp was further deteriorated with the arrest of the Prince. Both Zulfiqar Khan and the Prince had their selfish designs, ready to be executed immediately after the death of the Emperor. Very diplomatically, Rajaram played upon their feelings. He kept secret understanding with both of them. To the Prince, he promised his support in case of the death of the Emperor.⁴⁷ His dealing with Zulfiqar Khan was an open secret. Martin records it as early as in January 1692.⁴⁸ Had Zulfiqar Khan tried sincerely to capture Jinji, it would have been difficult for Rajaram to defend it for a long time. It was in this sense of gratitude, that Rajaram allowed him to withdraw to Wandiwash safely. The Maratha army-chief, however, failed to understand and appreciate this deeply diplomatic move that Rajaram took at a proper moment of time.

47. MM-SP, p.30

48. Martin writes, "There is public talk there (at Jinji) of the imperial General (Zulfiqar Khan) in collusion with Rajaram- (MM-JS, p.242)

Part - VMughal - Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra :1692 to 16931) Marathas dominant

It is already discussed how the Marathas were recovered from the shock of the disaster in 1689. They had organized their armies and begun to recapture the lost regions and forts. They had spread over almost all the regions of Maharashtra and Karnatak. They had also proved too dominant and powerful to be crushed down by their enemy. The English from Karwar write to Surat, "... Marathas are likely to get the better of the Moghull, whose forces are so decreased with the pestilence that in all the places near us, they (the Mughals) are willing to parley and may easily be persuaded to relinquish their title of any place in possession on reasonable terms..."¹ (April 4, 1692). This situation continued and in May, the English write to Surat that the Marathas were "keeping the chokies (posts) at all considerable places of trade."² Again they write on September 23, 1693, "... Since the rains the Sevagees (the Marathas) are keeping the Gauts (ghats) and robbing all that pass that way."³

1. CRM, p.236

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.237

2) Bid to capture Raigad

It is already seen how Raigad, the capital of the Marathas, was taken by the Mughals. Its garrison was demoralised and subsequently capitulated. The fort was surrendered to the enemy only after negotiations. Thus, it was not a fort, which could easily be attacked and captured. Because of its invincibility, Shivaji the Great, had chosen it as the capital of the Maratha State. In the reign of Rajaram, the Marathas were smarting under its loss. For them, Raigad was their honour and pride. So, they were longing for its capture. Early in the year, 1692, Ramchandrapant planned an expedition against Raigad. The Pant entrusted the work of capturing the fort to Abaji Sondeo, a renowned commander of Shivaji's times. He was asked to lead an army of mavalas who were well-known for night-attacks and scaling the walls and cliffs of the hilly forts of the Sahyadris. The mavala captains the Jawulkars, the Darekars and others were asked to assist Abaji Sondeo in his mission. Rajaram himself had sent a letter from Jinji to the abovementioned captains and encouraged them to capture the fort. Unfortunately, no further details of the expedition are available. It seems that Abaji could not succeed in his mission. (April-May 1692). The expedition must have been a failure.

3) Lutfullah Khan's Fight with the Marathas

Lutfullah Khan was sent to the Satara region to quell down the Maratha activities. In June 1692, he clashed with the Maratha commanders, the Manes and the Dafaes, near Rahimatpur. These commanders were reported to have 15,000 to 20,000 army. The Khan's force consisted of his assistants like Adul Kadar, Khudavand Khan, Achal Singh Chavan, Aga Ashur Beg and others. The Marathas gallantly dashed at the enemy and assailed them with arrows and bullets. However, according to Lutfullah Khan's report, the Marathas were defeated and put to flight. 500 of them were killed and 100 captured. Later on, the captives were put to death. No mention of the casualty on the Mughal side has been made. ⁵

4) Capture of Panhala by Parashuram Trimbak

The most heroic achievement of the year 1692 was the capture of Panhala by Parashuram Trimbak, a budding politician and general of the Marathas. It is already observed that the Mughals had captured the fort by the end of 1689. It was essential for the Marathas to have the possession of this fort, in order to exert a check upon the aggressive activities of

5, This account is based on Lutfullah Khan's letter to Mukhatyar Khan. Lutfullah Khan neither mentions the proper names of the Maratha commanders nor does he give the number of his army. (LP, p.119).

the enemy in the southern part of the Maratha land, more particularly in the region of Kolhapur. The work of capturing such an important and big fort was assigned by Ramchandrapant to Parashuram Trimbak. Khafi Khan says, "The fort of Parnala was one of the highest and most celebrated of the forts belonging to Bijapur, and had been captured by the royal forces with good deal of difficulty. It was now taken with little exertion by Rama Raja's officers, and its commandant was wounded and taken prisoner." (c. August). ⁶

The capture of Panhala was doubtlessly a feat of high military skill of the Marathas. We have no adequate source material to know how Parashuram Trimbak achieved this great success. Certainly, it must have been a surprise night attack by the Marathas. It should be recalled that in the times of Shivaji the Great in 1673 Annaji Datto and Kondaji Farjand had captured this fort by a surprise night attack. Kondaji with his 60 gallant comrades scaled the walls of the fort with the help of ropes and succeeded in entering it. By his martial and valiant act Parashuram Trimbak had manifested to the enemy that Maharashtra could still produce the Kondajis and Tanajis who could capture the great forts like Panhala and Sinhaged in a single night. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the subsequent period it took several months for the Emperor himself in his campaign to capture the fort of Panhala.

6. MM-ED, p.346; SCP-JS, p.36

5) Activities of Santaji and Dhanaji

The armies of Santaji and Dhanaji were roving in the regions of Maharashtra - Karnatak border. About September - October, 1692, they were making havoc in the region of Belgaum and Dharwar. They were also successful in capturing some forts in the vicinity of Belgaum. The fort of Belgaum was itself invested, while standing crops were destroyed, by feeding the horses on them (first week of October). However, it seems, the Marathas could not succeed in capturing the fort of Belgaum.⁷ On October 13, it was reported to the Emperor that Santaji had marched towards Jinji, however, he changed his mind and turned back again to Belgaum. On October 27, the Emperor was further informed that both Santaji and Dhanaji had marched towards Dharwar. They laid siege to the fort of Dharwar. However, they soon abandoned the siege and left for Nargund (last week of October). By the middle of November, they were in the vicinity of Govindgad in Karnatak, with Qasim Khan at their heels.⁸

Meanwhile, the Emperor had despatched Hamiduddin Khan and Matlab Khan respectively to Belgaum and Dharwar to crush down the activities of the Marathas. He had also ordered Qasim Khan to protect Bankapur and other places from the Maratha attacks. This arrangement was intended to stiffen

7. HA, V, p.33

8. BIS, Jan. 75, Iss. 44, pp.45-46, 48, 50-51.

the defence of the Kanara region. Soon the Matlab Khan was reported to have defeated one Maratha commander near Dharwar and captured his son and daughter.⁹ (c. October 1692).

6) Struggle for Panhala

The Emperor was much grieved at the loss of an important fort like Panhala. Hence, he dispatched Prince Muizzuddin, the eldest son of Prince Muazzam, to recapture it. The Prince came to Panhala with his army in October 1692 and started besieging the fort early in November. The Emperor had ordered the Maratha chiefs of the region, like Piraji Ghatge of Kagal, who had joined the Mughals to succour the besieging army of the Prince. Soon, Iftikhar Khan, an assistant of the Prince, invested the two gates of the fort. In the middle of December, the Emperor, appointed Lutfullah Khan as the adviser to the Prince in the undertaking. Some letters of the Khan, written to the officers in the Mughal army, are available. From these letters, it appears that the Khan had sincerely tried his best to capture the fort. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Alate, a village between Panhala and Miraj, was created an out-post, in order to keep up the line of communication and succour to the Mughal army before Panhala. In January, 1693, four large pieces of artillery were sent to the Prince. Safshikahn Khan was the chief of the Mughal artillery before Panhala.¹⁰

9. HA, V, p.33

10. HA, V, p.26; LP, pp.117, 121-122; BIS, Jan, 75, Iss, 44, pp.48 & 50; Oct. 74, Iss. 43, p.56

On April 18, 1693, it was reported to the Emperor that the Marathas had rallied their forces in the Mahadeo hills to perform a puja and intended to march upon the Mughal army at the foot of Panhala, with 7,000 army to succour the garrison. The Emperor ordered Hamiduddin Khan to make military preparations to face the impending Maratha attack.¹¹ However, before the Khan could reach Panhala, the Marathas came with 6,000 oxen loaded with grain at a distance of 7 kos from Panhala. Prince Muizzuddin sent his assistants, Muhammad Askari and Ali Murad Koka, to fight them out. The said Mughal commanders defeated the Marathas and captured their loaded oxen. However, their joy of victory was short-lived. Another army of 3,000 Marathas, marching from the Mahadeo hills, suddenly appeared on the battlefield. The fighting resumed and the Mughals were badly defeated. They lost 500 men and their commanders fled away to save their life. Thus the Marathas could secure their loaded oxen back and safely bring the succour to the garrison (c. April 25, 1693). However, the fighting between the Mughals and the Marathas in the environs of Panhala went on. In the first week of May, the Mughals lost two of their mansabdars, Muhammad Tahir and Hidayatulla.¹²

The siege of Panhala dragged on and the Prince could not achieve anything notable. However, the besieging army of the

11. BIS, Oct. 74, Iss. 43, p.62

12. Ibid., pp.64 & 65

Mughals at the foot of the fort was an eyesore to Ramchandra-pant, who was organizing the war-efforts from Vishalgad, a fort just 30 miles northwest of Panhala. Hence, the Pant, along with his colleagues Shankaraji Narayan and Dhanaji, decided to attack the besieging army, in order to succour the garrison and, if possible, to raise the siege. On, October 20, 1693, these three leaders of the Marathas, with 10,000 army, fell upon the enemy. The fighting went on for days together, while the Marathas could successfully bring fresh troops and provisions into the fort. They, with the help of garrison, attacked the Mughal trenches and destroyed them. Some guns and wheeled field pieces were taken off from Safshikan Khan's position. Some Mughal officers were slain and several others wounded. This was reported to the Emperor who ordered Gaziuddin Firuz Jang and Khanazad Khan, the renowned Mughal commanders, to rush to the rescue of the Prince. When the Marathas learned the news of the despatch of the Mughals' relieving army, they disappeared from the region of Panhala. Dhanaji started with his force towards Satara. On his way at Karad, he clashed with the force of Gaziuddin Firuz Jang. Chin Qalich Khan, Firuz Jang's son, and Rustam Khan fought with Dhanaji and defeated him. They inflicted a heavy loss on him, killing many of his men. 30 Marathas were imprisoned and 600 horses captured. Casualty on the side of the Mughals was also heavy. Soon, Firuz Jang and Rustam Khan reached the foot of Panhala and joined the Prince. (c. The first week of November, 1693). All the efforts of the Prince in the year in capturing Panhala proved a lost

labour because of the severe handicaps inflicted upon him by the Marathas. The fieldworks and trenches were destroyed and the fort was well-provided with food-grains and arms. Thus, the prospects of capturing the fort became more obscure. Though the siege was raised, the Prince was still encamping there, hoping to besiege the fort again. Really, this was being done to escape from the wrath of the Emperor.

The Emperor was so much upset by the Prince's failure to take Panhala that he, at that time, made up his mind to march upon the fort, personally. He had even sent orders for the preparations of this expedition. However, later on he changed his mind and left the idea of besieging the fort, himself. ¹³

13. HA, V, pp.26-28; BIS, Oct. 74, Iss. 43, pp.68, 70-72.

A letter of Prince Muizzuddin to the Emperor is available (LP, pp.126-127). In it, he writes that when the garrison felt short of food-grains and other material, they begged to spare the lives and were ready to evacuate the fort. But the Prince could not grant the request as it would not have pleased the Emperor. Meanwhile, Ramchandrapant and Parashuram Trimbak fell upon the Mughals with 80,000 horse and innumerable foot. A severe battle was fought and Parashuram Trimbak was killed with a bullet. The Marathas lost their heart and took to flight. Innumerable Marathas were killed and a great victory was won. It is evident that the letter is full of gossips, e.g. the death of Parashuram Trimbak and the defeat of 80,000 horse and innumerable foot of the Marathas. It is proved in the preceding pages that the Marathas were more than a match for the Mughals in this long-waged fight at the foot of Panhala.

7) Capture of Sinhgad by the Marathas

In the previous year the Marathas had attempted in vain to capture Sinhgad by scaling its precipice. But, due to the vigilant petrolling of the fort, they had to retire. This time the work of capturing the fort was assigned to Nawaji Balkawade and Vithoji Karake, the commanders of 5,000 foot. The fort was well-equipped and garrison was more alert, due to the last years attempt of the Marathas. Nawaji and Vithoji left Rajmachi¹⁴ with their force and encamped in the woods at the foot of the fort (June 30, 1693). There, they selected the men who would actually scale the precipice. Late in night, Nawaji and Vithoji advanced with their fellow-men to the precipice and climbed it with the help of ladders and ropes. The Marathas fought a stiff fight. The garrison was routed and the fort was captured (July 1). The rank and file of the Marathas recalled the valiant deeds of Tanaji Malusare, who nobly laid down his life in capturing the fort in the same way in times of Shivaji the Great.¹⁵

8) Revolt of Bahirji and Yachappa Naik

Thus the Marathas had recovered from the shock of the year 1689. Sambhaji's arrest and execution, flight of Rajaram, fall of Raigad and subjugation of the Maratha land meant for a

14. 6 m.n. of Borghat in the Maval region.

15. SCS, V, pp. 188-190

while complete collapse and destruction of the Maratha power in the Deccan. However, the Marathas fought gallantly for the cause of liberty with revenge and unity. They not only recovered some of the forts and regions from the Mughals, but defeated them at different places, creating immense confidence among their fellow men. The capture of the renowned generals like Sarja Khan in Maharashtra and Ali Mardan Khan and Ismail Khan Moka in Karnatak, increased the Marathas' ambition for the further annihilation of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. The confidence and the ambition of the Marathas were not out of place.

However, the dust of terror and dismay of the Mughal aggression slowly settled down and as a result of that, unity and integrity of the Maratha leaders assumed a schismatic nature. In March, 1693, Bahirji Ghorpade left Rajaram for the reasons unknown to the history. In May, Santaji himself got disagreed with Rajaram and returned to Maharashtra. He was removed from the post of senapati and in his place Dhanaji was appointed.¹⁶ It was the misfortune of the Marathas that this inner indiscipline resulted into mutual fights, thereby presenting a poor picture of the Maratha leadership. The Jedhe chronology notes that Rajaram had to fight a battle with Bahirji and Yachappa Naik at Vellore.¹⁷ (June). The note does not throw any light

16. SCP-JS, pp. 36-37

17. Ibid., p.37

on the outcome of the battle.

9) Activities of Santaji

Though removed from the office of senapati, Santaji was commanding a big army of 20,000 horse. On July 11, 1693, the English from Karwar note, "...we heard it for certain Santagee Ghorpure passed the Ghants (ghats) with 20,000 horse..."¹⁸ In the beginning of the campaigning season, i.e. October 1693, he was moving in the neighbourhood of Bhopalgad (76 m.s.e. of Satara).

Hanmantrao Nimbalkar and Bahirji Pandhare, who had joined the Mughals after Sambhaji's death, had now come over to the Maratha side and started raiding campaigns in the Mughal territories. The Mughal commander, Himmat Khan, was pursuing Hanmantrao, but he could not overtake him. While the pursuit was still on, he learned Santaji's activities in the region of Bhopalgad. So he left the track of Hanmantrao and started for Bhopalgad.¹⁹ Before Himmat Khan reached there, another Mughal commander, Najib Khan Bahadur fell on Santaji and was reported to have defeated him near Bhopalgad, killing many of his men.²⁰ Najib Khan soon seems to have left the region of Bhopalgad (c. October 20, 1693).

18. CRM, p.189

19. BIS, Oct. 74, Iss. 43, p.67

20. Ibid., p.68

Soon, Himmatt Khan arrived and the fighting between him and Santaji began. Santaji defeated the Khan and encircled his army near a village, Mangaon (c. First week of November). At this time, Hamiduddin Khan and Kwaja Khan rushed to the rescue of Himmatt Khan. When Santaji learned the development of the enemy's position, he quickly withdrew his forces. Consequently, the Khans started chasing him. In a combat between them at Vikram-halli, Santaji lost his 300 men. His Berar ally lost 200. The Mughals, though suffered heavy casualties, could capture 300 mares and other war materials. (c. November 14).²¹

Then the quarrel ensued amongst the Khans. Hamiduddin Khan and Kwaja Khan did not co-operate with Himmatt Khan in the pursuit of Santaji and left for Gulbarga. However, Himmatt Khan resolutely followed Santaji. At this stage. Santaji despatched Amritrao Nimbalkar with 4000 horse to Berar and himself reached Malkhed²² with 6,000 horse. He had sent well in advance his demand to the deshmukhas of the Malkhed region to pay the long due chauth of 7,000 hens. Upon learning the activities of Santaji, the Emperor ordered Lashkar Khan to go in his pursuit and Abdullah Khan, the subhedar of Nanded, to help Himmatt Khan to crush him. The two commanders, Hamiduddin Khan and Kwaja Khan, who had refused to co-operate with Himmatt

21. Ibid., pp. 71 & 73; HA, V, p.34

22. Known as a gate of Goleonda State. It is 45 m.n.e. of Sagar in Karnatak.

Khan, were now ordered to follow Amritrao in Berar. It seems that Santaji soon left Malkhed for the Torgal hills in the Berar country. Later on, Himmat Khan, while encamping at Malkhed learned that Santaji had left for Hyderabad. Soon Sayyid Abdullah joined Himmat Khan and both of them started pursuing Santaji, who took shelter in a small fort, Alur. (14 m.s.w. of Malkhed). The Mughals immediately besieged it. (c : November 21) ²³ It seems that Santaji could effect his escape from Alur and went away.

A considerable historical material, especially in the Persian records, about Santaji's warfare with the Mughals, is available. However, there is a possibility of it's being one-sided. A tactful retreat in guerrilla warfare seems to have been taken as a defeat of the Maratha forces. Furthermore, it is praise-worthy that even though Santaji was removed from his office, he did not join the enemy. On the contrary, he kept on fighting them.

Part - VI

Mughal - Maratha Struggle in Karnatak :

1693 - 1695

1) Marathas in High Spirits

By the end of 1692, Dhanaji and Santaji had achieved great victories over the Mughals in Karnatak. They had defeated and captured renowned Mughal commanders such as

Ismail Khan Maka and Ali Mardan Khan and taken them to Jinji. The Mughal army before Jinji, completely distressed and demoralized, had to face daily attacks of the Marathas. The besieging army found itself besieged by the Marathas. The situation was worsened when Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan arrested Prince Kambaksha in the Mughal camp. The quarrel among these high Mughal commanders ruined the Mughal cause in Karnatak. Zulfiqar Khan had to beg Rajaram for a truce to allow the Mughal army to withdraw peacefully to Wandiwash. These victories of the Marathas had so much boosted up their morale that in early days of 1693, they issued a proclamation, declaring the assumption of the government of Hyderabad Karnatak from Conjeveram to Cuddapah. How the Marathas were in high spirits, can be observed from a letter of Velogottee Yansomonaik (?), a Maratha official at Jinji, to capt. More of Chunampetta (60 m.s. of Madras). He writes, "you are very sensible that the Mogull's army being against this place (Jinji) cannot effect their design after a long time, lying before it. Since thirty thousand of our horses came from above at once, at first bout, we took Allemaunde Cawn (Ali Mardan Khan) and Macaye Small Cawn (Ismail Khan Maka), whom we have now in our fort of Chingee. Since, the Mogull's death, and Shah Allum's coming to the throne, ¹ who had always a great kindness for (the states of) Vizapore and Goloondah, which your honour is very

 1. At that time it was rumoured that the Emperor had died and that Shaha Alam had got himself crowned as the Emperor of India. (DC, 1693, p.24)

well sensible of, my enemies have come to nothing and Caun Bux (Kambaksha) being now a prisoner, Assid Caun and Zulphakore are very much troubled, but we concern ourselves no more about them than with Macaye Small Caun, whom we look upon as our prisoner likewise, for we now value not our enemies one farthing.² Over Golcondah country forts, Conjeverone (Conjeveram) and Callapa (Cuddapah) countries, we have made Cansau Ramannah (Keshav Ramanna) subidore, who will bring all (the regions) under our government and he will write to you desiring your assistance therein. Our enemies being now dispersed, I understand, fly with their families and estates to your place and since your honour and we are so great friends, I reckon it the same thing as if they were in our custody. Therefore, I desire it of your honour to keep watch upon them that neither they nor anything they have, may escape from you, which you may easily do."³ (January 2, 1693).

Keshav Ramanna is mentioned as a subhedar of Hyderabad Karnatak in the above-mentioned letter. Rajaram had sent him with an army of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot to Conjeveram. Keshav Ramanna marched upon Conjeveram and routed the enemy. He captured their drums, flags, trumpets and 40 horses. The Marathas used to feel now so much over confident of their strength and success that Keshav Ramanna writes to the English that they (the Marathas) would arrest all their enemies and

2. A kind of British coin in those days. One-quarter of a penny.

3. DC, 1693, pp. 22-23

bring them in Jinji fort within 4 to 5 days (January 8, 1693).⁴

Meanwhile, a truce between Rajaram and Zulfiqar Khan was made and the latter was allowed to withdraw safely to Wandiwash. Accordingly, the Mughal army before Jinji beat a retreat to Wandiwash. (January 22, 1693). There the Mughals, soon, received ample provisions, brought by Qasim Khan, who was sent to the Eastern Karnatak by the Emperor. For so many days, the Mughals had been suffering from starvation. Now, they were relieved of the sufferings. Food became abundant in the Mughal camp at Wandiwash. Soon, the Mughals received the heartening news that the Emperor was alive and that he was in good health. The news was celebrated by beating the drums.⁵ Meanwhile, the poligars (local chieftains) in the eastern Karnatak had taken advantage of the plight of the Mughal army and started robbing travellers and banjaris, who brought grain-supplies to the Mughal army. So, Zulfiqar Khan and Qasim Khan jointly led an expedition to suppress their pillaging activities. The expedition was successful. The Khans punished the poligars and collected fines from them. Thereafter, they returned to Wandiwash (c. February, 1693).⁶

It is already seen that the Emperor had sent Qasim Khan to the eastern Karnatak in place of Ali Mardan Khan, who was captured by the Marathas. The Emperor had also dispatched

4. Ibid., p.23

5. TD, p.120

6. Ibid.

Prince Azam with 8,000 horsemen to Cuddapah to reinforce the Mughal army in the Jinji region from the rear.⁷ He hoped to maintain his sway over Hyderabad Karnatak, by posting the Prince in the Cuddapah region and Qasim Khan in the Conjeveram region.

The financial position of Zulfiqar Khan was not sound. In March 1693, he found himself hard-pressed for the shortage of money. Since January, he had not received any succour from the imperial camp. So he requested the English of Fort St. George to lend him two lakhs of rupees and assured them that he would send them a bill of exchange to be paid in his jagir in Bengal. The English, however, declined to lend any amount. Instead, they sent a present to him.⁸

2) Rajaram on the Trichinopoly Expedition

The Naik of Trichinopoly was on inimical terms with Shahaji II, Raja of Tanjore. Shahaji had been co-operative with Rajaram, ever since the latter had come to Jinji. In times of difficulties Shahaji had sent his men and material to the help of Rajaram. Now, Jinji was relieved of the siege of the Mughals and the spectacular victories of Santaji and Dhanaji had altered the balance of power in Karnatak in favour of the Marathas. The Naik of Trichinopoly had helped Zulfiqar Khan with men and material in his siege of Jinji and now, it

7. LFG, 1693-94, Vol. IV, p.21

8. DC, 1693, p.57

was a proper time to teach a lesson to the Naik. At first, Rajaram dispatched Santaji, to besiege Trichinopoly.⁹ Santaji besieged the place in March 1693. Soon, Rajaram also came out of the fort of Jinji and joined him. The Naik was no match for the Maratha might, and hence, he sued for peace, which was made on April 23, 1693.¹⁰ Having subdued the Naik, Rajaram went to Tanjore (32 m.e. of Trichinopoly) to meet Shahaji probably to express his gratefulness to him and mature the political and military plans in future. By the end of the month, Rajaram started his returned journey to Jinji.¹¹

3) Dissension among the Marathas

It was unfortunate for the Marathas that while their prospects in Karnatak were growing bright, dissensions and personal rivalries among their generals started and, that naturally spoiled the splendid opportunity to consolidate their grand victory over Zulfiqar Khan's army in the beginning of 1693.

The Jedhe chronology mentions that Bahirji Ghorpade and Yachappa Naik deserted Rajaram and captured Satgad, (26 m.w. of Vellore) an ancestral possession of Yachappa (March 1693).¹² It appears that Bahirji and Yachappa rebelled against Rajaram, when the latter with Santaji was out of Jinji on the Trichinopoly

9. 110 m.s.w. of Jinji

10. SCP-JS, pp. 36-37

11. The English note in their records that Rajaram was moving towards Jinji with a big force of 20,000 horsemen - (DC, 1693, p.74)

12. SCP-JS, p.36

expedition. It is already seen that Santaji took active part in the expedition. He might not be in the know of the plans of Bahirji, his brother and Yachappa. But, soon, after the arrival of Rajaram at Jinji towards the end of April 1693, Santaji, too, followed the way his brother went by. He fell out with his master and left him in May. Rajaram appointed Dhanaji Jadhav, Santaji's rival, in his place. ¹³

The Jedhe chronology furnishes bare facts and does not discuss the underlying causes leading to these major developments. Martin has discussed the disagreement between Rajaram and Santaji, but it was in the different context i.e. Santaji did not like the truce made by Rajaram, who allowed Zulfiqar Khan's army to withdraw to Wandiwash. However, it should be noted here that Rajaram had already explained to Santaji his policy and pacified him. All this had happened in February 1693, and not in May 1693. ¹⁴

The probable cause of this dissension might be that Santaji, Bahirji and Yachappa might have thought that Rajaram had shown more favour to Dhanaji than he deserved; or that Rajaram inclined to accept Dhanaji's counsel, throwing all these generals into the background.

The English have recorded that Rajaram had been left with an inconsiderable force at Jinji and if he did not patch up his differences with Santaji, Bahirji and Yachappa, Jinji

13. Ibid., p.37

14. MM-JS, p.248

would soon be captured by the Mughals after their arrival (May 18, 1693). ¹⁵

In the month of June, Rajaram himself got out of Jinji and fought a battle with Bahirji and Yachappa, near Vellore. ¹⁶ No mention is made of the outcome of the battle.

Santaji had left for Maharashtra but his brother was still with his friend Yachappa, roving independently in a rebellious mood in Karnatak. Yachappa found it wise to abandon the role of a bandit and joined Zulfiqar Khan who secured for him "a mansab of 6-hazari and a jagir of 3 lakhs of huns in the Karnatak," (c. December 1693). ¹⁷ However, it is noteworthy that both the Ghorpade brothers did not join the Mughals as Yachappa Naik did. Had they joined the Mughals, they could have amassed good fortune for themselves.

4). Asad Khan and the Prince Rucalled

The collusion of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan with Rajaram was an open secret in Karnatak. The Emperor also knew the Khans' deceptive and disloyal nature, but kept quiet as he would have probably felt that open rebuke might lead to the Khans' revolt. In such a situation, it would have been difficult to manage the affairs in Karnatak.

15. LFG, 1693-94, Vol. V, p.1

16. SCP-JS, p.37

17. Ibid., HG, p.315; BIS, Oct. 74, Iss. 43, p.76

Both Asad Khan and Prince Kambaksha were ordered to repair to the imperial court. Asad Khan was ordered to stay at Sagar (50 m.s. of Gulbarga) on the way, while the Prince was asked to proceed to Galgala, where the Emperor was encamping. The Prince, arrived at the camp on June 14, 1693 and sought an interview with the Emperor through the mediation of Zinatunnisa Begam. There, he tried to prove how he was innocent and how the Khans were disloyal to the imperial cause. ¹⁸

Mean-time, wild rumours were circulated that Asad Khan had taken poison in order to avoid the disgrace at the court and that Askar Khan or Bahadur Khan might come to supplant Zulfiqar Khan (June 1693). ¹⁹ But, soon, the clouds of rumours were dispelled from the political horizon in Karnatak. It was reported that Asad Khan was in favour of the Emperor and Zulfiqar Khan had received the fresh orders to besiege the fort of Jinji. ²⁰ Asad Khan met the Emperor on January 8, 1694 and was allowed to enjoy the imperial favour. ²¹

5) Zulfiqar Khan on the Tanjore Expedition

In October 1693, Zulfiqar Khan left Wandiwash and came to the foot of Jinji, with an intention to make a fresh attack on it. On October 24, 1693, the English from Fort St. David (40 m.s. e. of Jinji) have noted the report that the Mughals have returned

18. TD, p.121; MA-JS, p.217

19. DC, 1693, p.116; LFG, 1693-94, IV, p.27; LFG, 1693-94, V, p.13

20. LFG, 1693-94, IV, p.47; DC, 1693, p.120

21. MA-JS, p.220

to the siege of Jinji and Rajaram's position has become critical on account of the desertion of Yachappa Naik and Bahirji. The English further add that if the Mughals prosecute the siege in an earnest way, they would be the master of the place in no time.²² But Zulfiqar Khan did not achieve anything till February 1694, when he set out on the expedition of conquering the regions south of Jinji, including Tanjore. He wanted to bring under his control the regions like Tanjore from where the garrison of Jinji used to receive regular provisions. Unless these supplies of provisions were effectively prohibited, strict and successful siege of Jinji was not possible.

Zulfiqar Khan first marched against the fort of Perumakkal (18 m. n. of Pondicherry). This rock-fort was stormed by his gallant assistant, Rao Dalpat Bundella. Rao Dalpat's Rajput soldiers fought valiantly, slew the garrison and captured the fort in the presence of the Khan. Thereafter, the Khan with his army, moved down the east coast towards Tanjore, by way of Pondicherry and other European factories. On his way, he went on capturing fort after fort. By the end of February 1694, he reached the region of Cuddalore on the east coast.²³ Yachappa Naik was, then, accompanying the Khan. The English records refer to him as an officer who "much governs the camp's motion."²⁴

22. LFG, 1693-94, V, p.38

23. TD, p.123; HA, V, p.80

24. LFG, 1694, p.58

It is already seen how Rajaram had led an expedition against the Naik of Trichinopoly and subdued him. Shahaji II, the Raja of Tanjore, had also seized some of the regions of the Naik. Now the Naik caught the opportunity of the Mughal expedition and joined Zulfiqar Khan, appealing him to recover for him his lost regions from Shahaji. The Naik had helped the Mughals in the siege of Jinji and hence, the Khan felt it necessary to oblige the Naik. His army captured the lost regions, which were handed over to the Naik. ²⁵

Then Tanjore itself was attacked by the Mughal army (March 1694). A skirmish was fought and Shahaji saw no point in fighting a mighty enemy like Zulfiqar Khan. At this juncture, Rajaram had also dispatched his force under Bahirji (who had recently been pacified) to assist Shahaji in his fighting the Mughals. ²⁶ But it seems that both the Maratha armies could not effectively resist the invader and Shahaji sued for peace. He sent a letter of submission to the Khan (May 22, 1694). He agreed to desist from helping Rajaram, to serve the Emperor as a vassal, to pay 30 lakhs of rupees annually as a tribute, to cede the forts of Palankota, ²⁷ Sittanur, ²⁸ Tungamur ²⁹ with their dependent regions, as well as

25. TD, p.123

26. SCP-JS, p.37

27. 15 m.s.w. of Chidambaram.

28. 10 m.w. of Tindivanam.

29. 4 m.s.w. of Chidambaram.

Kulmanargudi,³⁰ Shrimushanam,³¹ Tittagudi,³² Trinnamur,³³
 Elavanasore,³⁴ Kalakurachi,³⁵ Pandalum,³⁶ and other
 places, mortgaged to him by Rajaram. 20 out of 30 lakh tribute
 were paid in ready cash.³⁷ The Khan accepted the proposal of
 peace and granted him a gauinama (a letter of assurance) and
 promised him to procure for him the firman of the Emperor.³⁸

Palankota was mortgaged by Rajaram to Shahaji. On learn-
 ing the above-mentioned agreement between Zulfiqar Khan and
 Shahaji, Rajaram sent his force to Palankota and captured that
 fort. When the Khan came to know the capture of the fort by the
 Marathas, he immediately set out on the expedition of Palankota.
 Soon, he arrived at the foot of the fort and started attacking
 it (c. June 15, 1694). After a six days' trench warfare, Rao
 Dalpat, with his Rajput soldiers, captured a petta (a fortified
 village) in front of the fort-gate. The garrison realized that
 they could not hold the place and so abandoned it in the dark
 night of June 23.³⁹ Rajaram knew for certain that the Mughals
 were going to make fresh attacks as soon as their Tanjore

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30. 13 s.w.s. of Chidambaram.
 31. 19 n.w. of Chidambaram.
 32. 17 n.s.w. of Vriddhachalam.
 33. 27 n.n.e.e. of Trichinopoly.
 34. 17 n.n.w. of Vriddhachalam.
 35. 15 n.w. of Elavanasore.
 36. 11 n.n. of Kalakurachi.
 37. IS-TR, pp.51-52; HA, V, p.81
 38. Ibid.
 39. TD, p.124; HA, V, p.82

expedition was over. So, while the Tanjore expedition was still in operation Rajaram had started negotiations with the Emperor (April 1694). It is interesting to note that the news of this diplomatic move on the part of the Marathas had been relayed from Karnatak to Surat on the west coast. The English from Surat write, "There is report that the King (Aurangzeb) is inclined to make peace with Rana Raja who prefers to submit himself to be a tributary prince, and serve him as his own charge with 5,000 horse, provided he may have the repossession of his own country..." (June 13, 1694).⁴⁰ However, it seems that the Emperor was not prepared to hand over the captured regions of the Maratha State. Hence the negotiations failed and Zulfiqar Khan was ordered to advance to rebesiege Jinji.

6) Siege of Jinji : its Third Phase : 1694-1695

From Palankota, Zulfiqar Khan came to the woods of Vetavalam, south of Jinji. The poligars of the Vetavalam woods had now left the side of the Marathas and joined the Khan. With their help, the Khan established the Mughal out-posts in the woods in order to stop the supplies of the provisions to the fort of Jinji. The Marathas in the woods could not succeed in holding on to their out-posts and hence had to retreat to the fort.⁴¹ Soon, the Mughals reached the foot of the fort and started the work of besieging it. (September 15, 1694).⁴² At

40. CRM, p.188

41. SCS, IV, pp.81-82

42. SCP-JS, p.37

this time, there was only one capable general in the fort. That was Bahirji Ghorpade in whom Rajaram had full trust about his valour and enterprise regarding the defence of the fort. However, almost all the out-posts in the vicinity of the fort were captured by the enemy and consequently, the supplies of the provisions to the garrison were stopped. Under ~~th~~ such circumstances, the garrison could not hold the fort for long. A strong army was required in order to attack the besieging army of the enemy and manage to bring fresh supplies of men and material into the fort. At this time Santaji and Dhanaji, the two brave Maratha generals, with their armies were in Maharashtra. To them, Rajaram had already sent urgent orders to come forthwith to Jinji and to face the imminent attack of the Mughal army. In this context, a very important letter of Rajaram to Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar, is available. It throws light on the critical position of Rajaram in the fort. Rajaram writes, "The enemy have captured almost all the places in the environs of Jinji. Recently, they, with the help of the treacherous Poligars have taken Vetavalam. Our men withdrew before the advancing army of the enemy. Very shortly, the enemy would reach the very walls of the fort of Jinji and make an assault on it. They are very much over-confident of their victory. Hindurao (Bahirji) Ghorpade, the Mamalakatmadar Samsherbahadur, ⁴³ and others are here with me in the fort. They are loyal to the cause of the Marathas. They would unfailingly punish the enemy and would not care a fig for them. However, it is absolutely

43. The titles of Bahirji.

essential to get reinforcement from Maharashtra to destroy the besieging enemy. I have dispatched so many letters, asking Santaji Ghorpade, the senapati, Dhanaji Jadhav, the sarlashkar, and you, to come forthwith with army to Jinji. But you do not seem to have started out for Jinji as yet. Here, we are passing through a crisis. If you come with your army within a month, the Maratha State would survive, I would get satisfaction and you a success. In case, your army's arrival is belated, we cannot sustain for more than a month and the State would wither away. Then, what use are you to the State! If it is so, it is upto me to protect the State as I can. But beware, you people would come into trouble. If you wish my satisfaction and your well-being, you, with your force should join Dhanaji Jadhav, the sarlashkar Umdatulmulka,⁴⁴ and start for Karnatak immediately."⁴⁵ The Maratha army from Maharashtra did not come to Jinji within a month. And yet, the Maratha capital remained uncaptured and the Maratha State was saved. It was because of Zulfiqar Khan who did not vigorously prosecute the siege. There seems to be a mutual understanding between the Khan and Rajaram that neither party should take any decisive step to end the siege. This secret understanding had not been liked by many Mughal commanders in the army before Jinji, Yachappa Naik being one of them. Yachappa soon fell a prey to the deceitfulness and wickedness of Zulfiqar Khan.

44. The title of Dhanaji.

45. SCS, IV, pp. 81-82

Yachappa was a brave soldier. He had left the Marathas and joined the Mughals in hope to get better prospects. He had urged Zulfiqar Khan to give him a chance to capture Jinji and he wished he would capture it, in a short span of time. As the Khan wanted to prolong the siege, naturally, he did not like Yachappa's meddling in the siege-operation. The matter could have ended there. But Yachappa, finding his request gone unheeded, had written directly to the Emperor that he would capture the place in 8 days exclusively with his own troops. Unfortunately for Yachappa, the letter had been intercepted by Asad Khan who was then encamping at Sagar; and his whole plan was foiled. Asad Khan immediately had written to his son, exposing to him the dangerous activities of Yachappa and asked him to get rid of him immediately. Zulfiqar Khan was a shrewd politician. He had comprehended the peril and decided to turn the tables on Yachappa. He had written to the Emperor that Yachappa had committed the crime of being in correspondence with Rajaram and sought his orders to slay him.⁴⁶

Soon after the arrival of his army at the foot of Jinji Zulfiqar Khan called a council of army officers for the

46. SM, III, p.271; TD, pp. 124-125

Mannucci writes that Zulfiqar Khan, first beheaded Yachappa and, then, informed it to the Emperor. (SM, III, p.272) Bhimsen Saxena and the Madras Factory Records agree on the point that the Khan had sought the orders of the Emperor for the execution of Yachappa (TD, pp.124-125; DC, 1694, p.102).

deliberation of the strategy to be adopted to capture Jinji. Yachappa was also invited for the meeting. When the meeting was over, the Khan got him arrested by his men. On the next day, he was put to death publicly at the orders of the Emperor, and his camp was plundered as well. The members of his family committed a collective suicide by killing one another in order to avoid the ill-treatment and disgrace at the hands of the Khan. ⁴⁷

It appears from the contents of Zulfiqar Khan's letter to the English that immediately after Yachappa's arrest the Khan delivered an attack on Jinji, thereby giving an air that he had resolved to take the place in the near future. ⁴⁸

47. TD, pp. 124-125; DC, 1694, p.102

The date of the execution of Yachappa Naik can be fixed approximately from the note of the English in their 'Diary and Consultation Book' on September 19, 1694. It reads, 'Received advice from Zulphaker Cawn's (camp) that he has seized Arseno-naigue (Yachappa Naik), and put him in irons...' (DC, 1694, p.99). Zulfiqar Khan had come to the foot of Jinji on September 15. And immediately after that he must have arrested Yachappa, probably on September 16. Bhimsen Saxena says that Yachappa was killed on the next day of his arrest (TD, pp.124-125). That is probably on September 17. On September 22, the English record the report that Yachappa had been killed (DC, 1694, p.102).

48. DC, 1694, p.99

Due to lack of sources, it cannot be ascertained as to how many days the Khan stayed at the foot of Jinji. But it seems that he again withdrew to Wandiwash. By the end of October, 1694, he left Wandiwash in order to take the Changmon fort, (42 m.w. of Jinji) and encamped north of it. The Marathas were hovering round the Mughal army and were making daily incursions into the camp, carrying off their horses. To make the condition of the Mughals critical, the Marathas had mixed milk-hedges in the tanks in the vicinity and poisoned the waters, thereby killing a great number of people. The Mughals, too, plundered the region and carried off people and goods as their booty. The poor masses suffered heavily at the hands of both the Marathas and the Mughals. They had to flee to safer places to save their lives.⁴⁹ The English letter of November 13, 1694, notes that Zulfiqar Khan, has removed his camp further inland and his infrequent marches and his design unknown..."⁵⁰ It does not mention the capture of Changmon by the Khan. Probably, he did not even capture it.

Meanwhile, the rumours were spread in Karnatak that there had been a severe conflict between the loyal officers like Daud Khan Panni, Kishore Singh Hada and Rao Dalpat Bundela on one side, and Zulfiqar Khan on the other. The officers had got annoyed at the Khan's collusive policy in the siege-operation. The Khan was rumoured to have sent to Rajaram ten camels laden with coins. However, they were intercepted by Daud Khan. Again

49. Ibid., pp.127-128.

50. LFG, 1694, p.94

it was rumoured that Daud Khan and other officers already had the orders of the Emperor to seize Zulfiqar Khan and were looking for a suitable opportunity to put the Khan in chains. These rumours were reflected in the English Factory Records of September 1694.⁵¹ It might be either they were fake or the officers found it difficult to arrest the Khan.

When Zulfiqar Khan was encamping at Saddam in December, 1694, he received from the Emperor a treasure of three lakhs for the payment of the army.⁵² By March, 1695, the Khan took several forts in the region of Jinji, but still he did not advance to attack the fort of Jinji.⁵³

The year 1695 passed dull. Both the parties remained comparatively inactive till the coming of the Maratha forces under Santaji and Dhanaji in Karnatak (November, 1695). The scarcity of grain prevailed in the Mughal camp throughout the year and it intensified the grievances of the Mughal troops.

There is no event worth mentioning, till Vellore was besieged by Zulfiqar Khan in October, 1695.⁵⁴ While the prospects of the garrison of the fort were gloomy, Dhanaji came from Maharashtra to the Jinji region (December 1695).⁵⁵ On learning the news of the arrival of the Maratha force, the Khan sent the families and the camp baggage with Rao Dalpat Bundella to the fort of Arcot and abandoned the siege in order

51. DC, 1694, pp.127-128; LFG, 1694, p.94

52. DC, 1694, p.139; DC, 1695, p.1

53. PDE, 1694-96, p.19

54. SCP-JS, p.38

55. Ibid., p.38

to encounter the enemy. Thus, Dhanaji was successful in raising the siege without fighting even a single battle.

The Khan learned that Dhanaji had turned towards Jinji and, forthwith, started pursuing him. Dhanaji was also alert. He moved further towards south and encircled Sadatmand Khan, the fouidar of Tiruwadi. Zulfiqar Khan was on Dhanaji's track. Soon he fell upon and defeated him. Later on, the Khan withdrew to Arcot for safety. ⁵⁶ Dhanaji came to Jinji with 6,000 horse by the end of the year. ⁵⁷

At this time, a thundering news of the defeat of renowned commanders like Qasim Khan, Khanajad Khan, Safshikan Khan and others at the hands of Santaji relayed to the Mughals in Madras-Karnatak. Consequently, they started decamping and evacuating their families to the safer places. ⁵⁸ The year ended with bright prospects on the part of the Marathas. The Mughals were half-heartedly trying to hold on to their position in Karnatak. Their strength in men and material was relatively reduced, whereas the Marathas were in full swing.

56. TD, p.127

57. DC, 1695, p.161

58. Ibid., p.156

Part VIIMughal-Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra : 1694-16951) Mughal Failure to capture Panhala

Prince Muizzuddin had encamped at the foot of Panhala, doing nothing. He could secure the fort neither by siege nor by bribe. So the Emperor ordered Khan-i-Zaman Fatehjang Khan, Raja Udwat Sing of Urechha and others with a force of 6,000 to join the Prince for the vigorous implementation of the siege. However the Prince had already abandoned the project and started for the imperial court (March 8). When the Emperor came to know the retreat of the Prince, he ordered him to go back to his previous position and secure the fort at any price. But, soon, the Emperor changed his mind and summoned the Prince to the court. The officials under the Prince were asked to return to Panhala and lay the siege under the command of Lutfullah Khan. Later on, the Prince met the Emperor on March 29. ¹

Meanwhile, the Emperor had decided to dispatch Prince Bidar Bakht to capture Panhala. On March 26, 1694, he ordered the Prince to set out on the expedition. ² Accordingly, on April 5, the Prince started for the Panhala region and subsequently laid a siege to the fort. ³ In May 1694, it was reported to the Emperor that the Prince had destroyed one of the bastions

1. HA, V, pp.28-29; BIS, April 75, Iss. 45, pp.61 & 64.

2. BIS, April 75, Iss. 45, p.68

3. Ibid., p.71

and that the fort would be captured within a day or two. ⁴ However, the fort could not be captured and the siege dragged on. Later on, the Prince was sent on the expedition of the Belgaum-Dharwar region, probably for putting down the Maratha activities there. Consequently, the siege was discontinued. However, later on in April 1695, the Prince again besieged the fort. ⁵ It seems that he continued the siege, with no avail, till the end of January 1696, when, after Santaji's victory over Qasim Khan, the Emperor ordered him to hasten to Basavapatan in Karnatak. Thereafter the siege was continued under the command of Firuz Jang. But he, too, failed in capturing the fort. ⁶

2) Activities of Santaji

It is already discussed how Santaji and Bahirji got disagreed with Rajaram at Jinji and eventually deserted him. Santaji had left Karnatak and was roving with his army in Maharashtra. On March 6, 1694, it was reported to the Emperor that Himmat Khan had followed Santaji in the Golconda territory and overtaken him at Behram. It was further reported that the Khan had defeated him; and that Bahirji Pandhare had fought very bravely. ⁷ Bahirji Pandhare, a brave Maratha captain, had again

4. Ibid., Oct. 75, Iss. 47, p.61

5. HA, V, p.29

6. Ibid.

7. BIS, April 75, Iss. 45, p.61

joined the Mughals.

Later on, while a Mughal officer Chhatrasal Rathod, was escorting nine big guns on their way from Aurangabad to the imperial camp at Galgala, Santaji intercepted them at Kallar.⁸ However, soon, Matlah Khan came to the rescue of Chhatrasal and defeated Santaji who, later on, retreated to the Mahadeo hills.⁹ (March).

In April 1694, both Santaji and Dhanaji, with their armies, were in the Satara region. About this time, Rajaram sent his delegate Vitthal Nilkanth to Maharashtra to pacify Santaji and to patch up his differences with Dhanaji. In this mission, he was also helped by Parashuram Trimbak, who was specially sent to Satara by Ramchandrapant. Vitthal Nilkanth's mission proved successful and eventually both the generals agreed to mutually cooperate in the interest of the Maratha State.¹⁰ About this time, Dhanaji seems to have surrendered his post of senapati to Santaji. The Jedhe chronology contains an important note on this episode. It refers to a meeting between Santaji and Shankaraji Narayan the sachiv. It reads, "Santaji promised Shankaraji Narayan on an oath that he would wholeheartedly serve the Master with his army; would be humble and respectful to him and would raise the siege of Jinji." Shankaraji asked

8. Sarkar gives it as Maklur. HA, V, p.35

9. BIS, April 75, Iss. 45, p.66; HA, V, p.35

10. RSP, p.191

Yesaji Malhar to accompany Santaji as his deputy. The note further says that Santaji resumed his campaign with 25,000 horse and commanders including Hanmantrao Nimbalkar. ¹¹

Since April 1694, Rajaram was expecting the arrival of the armies of Santaji and Dhanaji. He had even sent several letters to them to come speedily to Jinji to relieve him of the pressure of the Mughal army. ¹² After the reconciliation between Santaji and Dhanaji, they should have gone to Jinji; but for the reasons unknown to history, they did not. They kept on moving with their armies in Maharashtra. On May 29, Santaji marched towards Nargund (60 m.e. of Belgaum) with 7,000 cavalry and an equal number of infantry. ¹³ But, soon, he seems to have returned to the Satara region. On June 19, the Emperor received the report that Santaji had started from Bhopalgad to the Mahadeo hills. ¹⁴ The Emperor had already sent Chin Qalich Khan, a renowned young commander, to the Satara region to cripple down the Maratha activities. He fought a skirmish with one of the Maratha columns and reported to the Emperor that he had driven away the enemy and rescued the live-stock captured by them. (June). ¹⁵ On July 22, the Emperor received the report from Abdullah, the thanedar of

11. SCP-JS, p.37

12. SGS, IV, pp.81-82

13. BIS, Oct. 75, Iss. 47, p.65

14. Ibid., p.73

15. Ibid., p.69

Talbid (10 m. n.w. of Karad) that Dhanaji and Hanmantrao Nimbalkar had approached the vicinity of the thana with 8,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry and that Santaji had also encamped about 2 kos from the thana. The report says that they were waiting for the arrival of Ramchandrapant. The Emperor ordered Himmat Khan Bahadur to march against them.¹⁶ Soon the Pant joined the Maratha commanders and they all started for Mahimangad (30 m. s.e. of Satara). It seems that the Marathas had decided to capture that fort. On August 1, the Emperor received an urgent request from Killedar Khan, the killedar of Mahimangad, to send succour to the fort. The Marathas were encamping near Warugad (25 m.e. of Satara) and had blocked the roads leading to Mahimangad. They had also sent their troops to besiege the fort.¹⁷ From his camp at Aklooj, Himmat Khan had written to the Emperor that he had only 1,000 cavalry and the Marathas were numerically superior to him. Thereupon, the Emperor ordered two of his officers, Afish Khan and Ismail Khan Maka, to hasten to the assistance of Himmat Khan. A force of 1,200 horse from the army of Hamiduddin Khan was also ordered to join the army of Himmat Khan (August 5).¹⁸ It must have taken some time for Himmat Khan to receive the succour, sent by the Emperor. Hence he encamped at Aklooj till the end of August

16. Ibid., April 76, Iss. 49, p.86

17. Ibid., p.91; HA, V, pp.35-36

18. DIS, April 76, Iss. 49, pp.92

and left for Warugad in the beginning of September.¹⁹ On September 9, the Emperor sent 8,000 ashrafas²⁰ to the Khan's camp near Warugad for purchasing gun-powder.²¹ Unfortunately, the Mughal newsletters do not throw any more light on the impending struggle between the Mughals and the Marathas in the vicinity of Mahimangad. It seems that with the approach of the Mughal army, the Marathas abandoned the siege and dispersed away.

In October 1694, Santaji was encamping near Satara, along with his army.²² Soon he marched towards the Golconda territory. When the Emperor learned the news of Santaji's activities he ordered Himmat Khan to pursue him and drive him out from the said territory. Rustumdil Khan, the subhedar of Hyderabad, was ordered to assist Himmat Khan in his expedition. Himmat Khan immediately set out on the expedition. But many of his assistants left him owing to the hardships of the expedition. The Emperor had to appoint special officers to repel those men.²³ Meanwhile, the Khan had continued the pursuit of Santaji, who soon left the Golconda territory for that of Bijapur. Himmat Khan had a small army. So the Emperor sent orders to Gaziuddin Khan Bahadur to dispatch his son, Chin Qalich Khan, for the help of Himmat Khan.²⁴ On November 30, 1694, an action was

19. Ibid., July 76, Iss. 50, p.65

20. A gold mohur. MED, p.52

21. BIS, July 76, Iss. 50, p.65

22. MIS, XV, p.80

23. BIS, Oct. 76, Iss. 51, p.53

24. Ibid., p.57

fought between Himmat Khan and Santaji near Panur and the latter had to retreat, losing thereby two of his assistants.²⁵ Soon, the Khan fought another battle with Santaji near Naldurg (25 m. n.e. of Sholapur, Usmanabad District) and reported to have defeated him. Both sides sustained losses (c. December 7).²⁶ Later on Santaji moved to the Raichur region in the east. The Khan did not leave his pursuit and brought him to an action near Raichur (110 m.s.e. of Bijapur), in which the former was reported to have won victory over the latter. Santaji lost three of his assistants. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Soon, Santaji seems to have retired to the Mahadeo hills.²⁷

In the beginning of 1695, Santaji and Shankaraji Narayan planned expeditions in the regions of Khandesh and Nasik-Baglan, respectively. Early in January 1695, Santaji set out on the expedition with a huge cavalry force of 20,000. He first marched on the region of Aurangabad and plundered it. Then he moved further north and plundered Dharangaon (80 m.n. of Aurangabad) and other adjacent towns in Khandesh. (Last week of January).²⁸ From Dharangaon, Santaji led his army against the important city of Burhanpur (80 m.n.e. of Dharangaon) and demanded a chanth from its Mughal governor. The governor

25. Ibid., p.59, HA, V, p.37

26. BIS, Oct. 76, Iss. 51, p.62; HA, V, pp.37-38

27. BIS, Jan. 77, Iss. 52, p.24; HA, V, p.38

28. CRM, p.237

challenged Santaji on the battleground, where the former was badly defeated. Now, Burhanpur fell a prey to Santaji, who plundered it and collected "money and jewels" as a booty. (First week of February). Upon learning the plundering of distant regions like Khandesh and Burhanpur by the Marathas, the Emperor instantly dispatched "Ghazade Cawne" (Gaziuddin Khan) to expel them from there. The Emperor was verily burning with fury. The English from Surat write on February 20, that he (the Emperor) "hath sent him (the governor of Burhanpur) some of those rings women wear on their arms for he had more men in the field than Santoo." Gaziuddin Khan rushed into Khandesh, but he could not catch the elusive Maratha army under Santaji.²⁹

From Burhanpur, Santaji intended to march upon Surat and plunder that famous city, looted twice by Shivaji the Great. The reports had already been reached to the inhabitants of Surat, who were greatly alarmed by the news of the impending Maratha attack. The English from Surat write to Bombay on February 20, 1695, "(We) have been busy in making the best preparations we could for defence of the factory against Rama Rajah's troops which have been daily expected by the town people, who are in great hurry, consternation and fright thereupon. They are hurrying and securing what they can underground and packing up the rest to be gone on news of approach. The Governor hath written to Surjeet Cawne, Subha of this

29. Ibid., p.238

province, for more soldiers, and to the king likewise..."³⁰

The English from Surat also requested Bombay to send them "ammunition and arms" for the defence of their factory. On February 28, Bombay sent some arms and ammunition to Surat.³¹

However, it seems, Santaji changed his mind and left the idea of attacking Surat. He now besieged Nandurbar, (130 m. w. of Burhanpur), a city on the way to Surat. The demand of chauth was sent to the governor of Nandurbar, who flatly refused to pay it and resolved to defend the city against the imminent attack of the Marathas. He recruited more troops and posted them to the defence of the city. Surjeet Khan, the subhedar of Ahmadabad and Jaitpur,³² sent a force of 1,000 to the help of the governor. Other Mughal officers also sent their forces to Nandurbar. Being well-prepared, the governor came out of the city and fought an action with the Marathas at Sallabatpur. Then he withdrew to the city. The Marathas tried to attack the city, but to no avail. However, they could not spare more time for besieging the city. Besides, the scarcity of provisions and water compelled them to discontinue the siege. Hence, they left the place, divided their army and plundered the region up and down. It seems that early in March, they started their homeward journey.³³

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p.239

32. Jaitpur 65 s.e. of Ahmadabad.

33. CRM, pp. 239-240

3) Activities of Shankaraji Narayan

It is already observed how Shankaraji Narayan scolded Santaji for his obstinate nature and advised him to serve the Maratha King faithfully. Shankaraji himself was busy with organizing defences of the Maratha land and recapturing the lost forts and regions from the Mughals. The following account of his struggle for Korigad (Kuarigad) would throw light on his sincere efforts to fight out the enemy in Maharashtra.

Korigad is about 40 miles west of Poona. The fort was held by one Trimbakpant who was Shankaraji's deputy. Trimbakpant was assisted by Yado Shamraj and Mahadaji Baji in the work of defence of the fort. Ali Beg, an enterprising Mughal officer and the faujdar of Junnar, tried successfully to bribe Rayaji Bahulkar (who seems to be an officer in the fort) and captured the fort by scaling the walls by means of ropes and ladders. In the action that followed, Trimbakpant and Moro Narayan were taken captive. Abajipant Sabnis and Girjoji Nimbalkar Dinkarrao were killed. Yado Shamraj and Mahadaji Baji escaped with their families by the western gate of the fort. When Shankaraji Narayan learned of the enemy's success, he decided to recover the fort at any cost. He came to Rajgad and, thence, dispatched Pantaji Shivdeo, Chapaji Kadam and Damaji Narayan along with the contingents of several forts in the region. The Marathas invested the fort and hard-pressed the garrison. Consequently, Ali Beg capitulated and evacuated the fort. Trimbakpant, Moro Narayan and several other persons were set free. Later on, Shankaraji himself went to the fort and meted out corporal

punishment to Rayaji Bahulkar who was subsequently kept as a prisoner at Rajgad. (c. November, 1694).³⁴

While the Marathas were besieging the fort of Korigad, Mansur Khan, a Mughal commander, was coming to the help of Ali Beg. However, Badoji Dhamale, a Maratha commander of 5,000 troops, attacked the Khan on his way to the fort. In a stiff action, Badoji died a hero's death. But the Marathas did not give up a fight and routed the enemy in the end. Thus, the Khan could not succour the Mughal garrison of Korigad.³⁵

Santaji's expedition in Khandesh in January-February 1695 is already discussed. At about the same time, Shankaraji Narayan led a second expedition in the Nasik-Daglan region. In this expedition Shankaraji was assisted by Hanmantrao Nimbalkar and 13 other Maratha commanders, with a force of 10,000 to 12,000 horse. While on their way, the Marathas resorted to looting of the mahals in the enemy's territory (February). Matabar Khan, a Mughal officer in the Nasik region, rallied a force and sent it to check the pillaging Marathas, who had collected a large amount of booty and herds of cattles. The Mughals overtook the Marathas in the Karnala ghat in the Mannad-Malegaon region. In a heavy fighting that followed, a cousin of Hanmantrao was killed and many injured on both the sides. The Marathas were reported to have been defeated and

34. SCP-JS, pp.37-38

35. SL, pp.173-176

made to flee. The cattles were rescued and delivered to their owners. Immediately after this, the Mughals chased the Marathas to the south of the Godawari and were reported to have defeated them for the second time. (First week of March 1695).³⁶

While Santaji was plundering the Khandesh region and Shankaraji Narayan was pillaging the Nasik-Baglan region, the Maratha navy had moved to the north to the mouth of the Tapi. (February, 1695). Unfortunately, we do not have any references to the activities of this Maratha navy except a single reference made by the English from Surat. They write, "Rama Rajah's galvets have been plundering at the river's mouth, have taken a boat of Mocha goods, computed worth 80,000 rupees, a boat with Ballast we sent to them and many they seized, but finding nothing but stones, they beat the poor laskars and flung their sails and rigging overboard, in the interim (not knowing thereof) we sent Capt. Dingle....." (February 11, 1695).³⁷

4) Fighting in the Khatav region

The Mughals had retained their thana at Khatav in the Satara district, against the heavy onslaughts of the Marathas. In July 1695, the Marathas under Santaji besieged the thana of Khatav. Its thanedar Ramchandra was trying his best to

36. It should be noted here that this account is taken from a letter written by Matabar Khan himself to the Emperor. No other document, to corroborate the contents of the letter, is available. (NB, Nov. 69, p.57).

37. CRM, p.237

defend it. The Emperor had sent Hamiduddin Khan to drive away the Marathas from the Khatav region. He had also ordered Chin Qalich Khan to help Hamiduddin Khan in his expedition. Chin Qalich Khan seems to have been in some other region away from the imperial camp. So he took some time to arrive in the Khatav region. By the time Hamiduddin Khan reached there, the Marathas seem to have abandoned their siege (August). However, the Marathas had brought three divisions of army in the field and Hamiduddin Khan's force was outnumbered. Upon learning this, the Emperor sent another force of 3,500 horse under Khanajad Khan to Khatav (September 8). However, Hamiduddin Khan did not wait for the arrival of either Chin Qalich Khan or Khanajad Khan. He sent Fatullah Khan, his assistant, to burn a hamlet at the foot of Chandan-Wandan (twin forts near Satara). Santaji, who was heading the Marathas in the region, came to know the enemy's plan and decided to strike at Fatullah's army. But Hamiduddin Khan, too, was alert. He brought timely reinforcement to Fatullah and pushed back the Marathas into the forts. In this battle, the Marathas lost one officer and a son of Dhanaji. The Mughals burned the hamlet and carried off 200 mares and some swords as spoils of war (First week of September, 1695). ³⁸

Soon, Dhanaji joined Santaji and both of them marched against the Mughals who were led by Fatullah Khan and Nyahar

38. BIS, Jan. 77, Iss. 52, pp. 40-44; HA, V, pp. 38-39.

The Emperor sent a sword to Hamiduddin Khan as a reward for his victories over the Marathas (September 13, 1695).

Khan. The Mughals were reported to have defeated the Marathas and captured 200 mares and many swords.³⁹

Part - VIII

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Karnatak : 1695-1696

1) Disaster of Dodderi

On the occasion of the dasara day (i.e. October 7, 1695), all the Maratha leaders rallied round Ramchandrapant and formed a grand strategy to beat the Mughal forces scattered in the Deccan.¹ Accordingly, Santaji set out on the expedition of Karnatak and by the end of October 1695, he besieged the fort of Ramdurg (52 m.e. of Belgaum). When the Emperor came to know the activities of Santaji he ordered Nasullah Khan, son of Sayyid Lashkar Khan (who was the subhedar of Bijapur), to rush to the help of the killedar of Ramdurg. The Emperor also expected Himmat Khan to go in the pursuit of Santaji.² However, before these Mughal commanders reached Ramdurg, Santaji seems to have abandoned the siege and advanced in the south-east direction into Karnatak. On November 9, 1695, he arrived with his army in the region of Gadag (42 m.e. of Dharwar).³ Soon

39. BIS, Jan. 77, Iss. 52, pp. 44-45

1. SR, p.76

2. BIS, Jan. 77, Iss. 52, p.47

3. An important letter of Santaji, dated November 11, 1695, to Hanraji Banaras, deshmukh and deshkulkarni of tarf Haveli, kille Koppal, is available. Santaji writes, " I have come with
(Contd...)

he crossed the Tungabhadra and arrived in the region of Chitradurg. The Emperor, who had been receiving frequent reports of Santaji's turbulent activities, was greatly disturbed and was anxious to destroy him as early as possible. So he sent urgent orders to Qasim Khan, a renowned commander and the governor of Sera (50 m.s.e. of Chitradurg) to crush down Santaji on his way to Jinji. Qasim Khan was then encamping near Dodderi (22 m.e. of Chitradurg) and was having a good force with efficient artillery. From his side the Emperor sent a considerably big force from the imperial guards and personal retinue under Khanazad Khan, Safshikan Khan, Sayyid Asalat Khan, Muhammad Murad Khan to help Qasim Khan in the impending struggle. A contingent from Prince Kambaksha's army was also attached to that force.⁴

The aforesaid Mughal commanders joined Qasim Khan about 10 miles from the expected track of Santaji's army. Qasim thought it proper to please Khanazad Khan, who was the son of the late pay-master general, Ruhullah Khan and the grandson of the Empress Mumtaz Mahal's sister. Other commanders were

(F.N. 3 Contd...)

my sturdy army to the prant Gadag. But you have not sent your force and munition to me; nor you have written to me. Presently, I have asked Mahadaji Shankar, the sarsubhedar of prant Koppal to meet me. Now, you should send your troops and munition with Mahadaji Shankar and should act according to his orders in future. (SCS, VI, pp. 27-28)

4. MA-JS, p.227; MA-SP, p.61

also officials of great influence in the imperial court. Hence, the Khan's hospitality demanded that the guests should be befittingly honoured, by arranging a grand dinner party. He, therefore, brought from Adhoni fort showy articles like karnataki tents, vessels of gold, silver and china clay and sent them "six miles ahead of his halting place to be kept ready for himself and his guests when they would arrive there at the end of the next day's march." Santaji, who was not very away from the Mughal armies, kept a watch upon their movements. He had the intelligence of the enemy's plan. So, he skilfully divided his army into three divisions. One was sent to plunder the advance camp, where the Khans were to share their dinner next day. The second was to encounter the Mughal force, which might come to the rescue of the advance camp. The third was kept in reserve.⁵

Early in the morning the first division of the Marathas attacked the advance camp. (c. November 13, 1695). It slew and wounded the troops and carried away everything.⁶ On hearing the news, Qasim Khan at once started in haste to fight back the enemy without disturbing Khanazad Khan from his sleep. But he was intercepted in the midway by the second Maratha division and the fight began fiercely. Khanazad Khan, too, came to know of the surprise attack of the Marathas and rushed to the battle-ground, leaving the camp-baggage without a sufficient

5. MA-JS, p.228; HA, V, pp. 91-92

6. MA-JS, p.228.

number of guards. The Marathas had a numerical superiority in infantry and cavalry. A fierce battle ensued. The Mughal commanders fought bravely but the Marathas showed ^{an} equal valour in combating and did not budge an inch of ground. In the thick of battle, news of the Maratha attack on the Mughal camp and the looting of everything there reached the Khans. This naturally demoralised the Mughal commanders who decided to retreat to the neighbouring fort of Dodderi. Fighting for a distance of two miles, they reached the fort in the evening. But the garrison of Dodderi shut the gates and thus the shelter was denied to the exhausted Mughals by their fellow-men in the imperial service.⁷ So the Mughal army had to encamp on the bank of the tank near the fort. Qasim Khan, Khanazad Khan and other officials shared the food they had brought. But the soldiers and animals had nothing to eat; hence they had to remain satisfied with water of the tank.⁸

When it grew dark, the Marathas besieged the Mughals, but did not resume the fighting. Their plan, it seems, was to frighten the enemy and stop the supply of food to the Mughal camp. The Marathas remained inactive for three days (c. November 13, 14, 15). Meanwhile, Barmappa Naik, the Zamindar of Chitradurg, smarting under the humiliation at the hands of Qasim Khan in the past, joined Santaji with some thousand troops.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

On the forth day, the Marathas started attacking the ill-starred Mughals. Saki Mustaid Khan records the number of the Maratha army as ten times the Mughal army.⁹

The Mughals had lost all the artillery, ammunition and the baggages of the camps. And whatever they had brought had already been exhausted in the combat. The Mughal soldiers, who were fatigued and helpless, were killed in a large number. The only way out for this predicament was to force their way into the fort and they did it. One third of them had been killed since the first attack of the Marathas on the advance guards was launched.¹⁰

As soon as the Mughal army got into the fort, the Marathas besieged it. They knew that the provision in the fort would run short and the garrison would soon be reduced to a miserable plight. In the fort, they were treated with the breads of jawari and bajra only, and animals were fed with the thatches. On the second day, neither food nor fodder was available. Both men and animals began to strave. The morale was further ebbd, when Qasim Khan died. The official history records that he was greatly addicted to opium, which could not be procured owing to the siege and thus, he died for want of opium. It may be contended that Qasim Khan, a man of self-respect, might have committed suicide, in order to avoid

9. Ibid., pp. 228-229

10. Ibid., p.229

humiliation at the hands of the Marathas.¹¹ (c. November 17).

The Marathas felt jubilant on hearing the news of the death of Qasim Khan. The condition of the garrison was becoming worse day by day. The soldiers began to kill the transport animals and eat them. Many of them leapt out over the walls of the fort and went to the side of the Marathas for food. Severe losses on the battle-field, death of Qasim Khan, shortage of water and food, and spread of disease reduced the garrison to total distitution.¹²

Ordinary soldiers in the Mughal army became desperate and wanted either to make a truce or to fight to the last, but their commanders did not accede to this. At this juncture, a bastion was blown up by the Marathas, who pushed their way into the fort and subsequently, a total annihilation of the Mughal army appeared imminent. Consequently, Khanazad Khan and other officers were compelled to sue for peace. Khanazad Khan had to surrender all the cash, articles, jewellery, horses and elephants of Qasim Khan, and agreed, as well, to pay 20 lakhs of rupees as fine. A son of the chief officer of Qasim Khan was to be kept as a hostage.¹³ (November 20).

Soon, Santaji assured the Mughal soldiers their safety. He informed them that they could leave the fort to buy the necessary commodities. He also showed magnanimity of heart in offering them bread and water. For two days the Mughal army

11. Ibid.

12. MA-ED, pp.356-357

13. MA-JS, p.229

was encamping at the gate of the fort. On the third day, Khanazad Khan left for the imperial court. A Maratha column escorted him. On the way, he was given horses, tents, dress, food and money by the imperial officers.¹⁴

In the meantime, the Emperor learnt about the inglorious happening and, therefore, sent Hamiduddin Khan from the court to rescue the besieged army. He had also ordered Rustumdil Khan from Hyderabad to proceed to the help of Qasim Khan. By the time both the commanders arrived, the game was over. However, they imposed forced contributions on the people of Adoni to furnish the defeated army with necessary things like tents, dress, cash etc. and to bear the expenses.¹⁵

When the Emperor finally heard the news of the debacle, he exclaimed in extreme grief that it was the will of the

14. The Jedhe Chronology gives the date of the Qasim Khan episode as January 5, 1696 (SCP-JS, p.38). Masire Alamgiri records it as January 19, 1696 (MA-JS, pp.227-228). Both the dates are wrong. On December 5, 1695, the English have noted in their "Diary and Consultation Book" a report of the defeat of Qasim Khan, by the Marathas (DC, 1695, p.156). Obviously, the Qasim Khan episode must have taken place at least 15 days prior to the abovementioned date, probably on or before November 20, 1695.

15. MA-JS, p.230; HA, V, p.98

almighty,¹⁶ and posted the disgraced commanders to the distant places like Bidar, Malwa and Gujrat.¹⁷

16. MM-SP, p.35

17. TD, p.128

Saki Mustaid Khan and Kafi Khan give a detailed description of the Qasim Khan episode. The account, above-mentioned, is mainly based on the Masire Alamgiri by Saki Mustaid Khan. The Masire Alamgiri is more contemporary and trustworthy. However, the following are some additional points, Kafi Khan makes, while narrating the episode.

1) Qasim Khan and Khanazad Khan were separately attacked by the Marathas (Kafi Khan does not tell when they joined.).

2) The Mughals fought the Marathas for three days, and were compelled to retreat to the fort of Dodderi.

3) While the Mughal army was encamping at the gate of the fort, the Marathas did not cease fighting. They carried away transport animals and horses.

4) On the forth or fifth day, the Marathas received the reports that Himmat Khan was coming to the help of the Mughals. Santaji did not raise the siege; but proceeded with some force to encounter Himmat Khan. Later on, he was told that Rajaram had managed to check the Khan. So Santaji returned to his camp before Dodderi.

2) Santaji's Second Great Victory

Himmat Khan had followed Santaji into Karnatak and when the battle of Dodderi took place, he was in the same region. The Emperor had also ordered him to help Qasim Khan to liquidate Santaji and his army. But he had a very small force of 1,000 cavalry. Hence, he had taken refuge in Basavapatan (40 m.w. of Dodderi). When the Emperor learnt the news of the Dodderi disaster, he sent urgent orders to Himmat Khan to comfort

5) Qasim Khan secretly entered into the fort with the help of a rope. Khanazad Khan and Safshikan Khan entered it through the main gate, but they had to fight their own soldiers to push their way in the fort. (Kafi Khan graphically describes the incident).

6) The Mughals were besieged for a month. (This is incorrect).

7) It was reported that Qasim Khan took poison since he was irritated by the defeat.

8) A fine of seven lakhs was imposed on the Mughal commanders.

9) While the Mughals left the fort Santaji, posted his men at the fort and took away everything : elephants, horses, jewellery etc. worth 50 to 60 lakhs of rupees (MM-SP, pp. 31-35).

Khanazad Khan and other officers who had been stripped off every thing by Santaji.¹⁸ Himmat Khan was a noble-hearted man. He met Khanazad Khan and gave him saranjam i.e. cloth, closes, four elephants, four horses and a sum of 2000 hons. He offered likewise gifts to other Mughal officers also. These officers reached Adoni (96 m.n. of Dodderi) under the escort provided by Himmat Khan.¹⁹

Defeat and humiliation of the Mughal army at Dodderi dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the Mughal power in the Deccan. The Emperor had already ordered Hamiduddin Khan from his side, and Rustumdil Khan from Hyderabad to rush to the rescue of Qasim Khan. Both the Khans met near Adoni and could achieve nothing except consoling the returning Khanazad Khan and other Mughal commanders.²⁰

Santaji garrisoned the fort of Dodderi with his men and divided his force into two divisions. He had the intelligence that Hamiduddin Khan intended to march against him. So he deployed one division to encounter him and the other one, he took to Basavapatan, where Himmat Khan had taken refuge. Santaji had 10,000 cavalry and an equal number of infantry. On hearing the approaching enemy, the Khan sent an urgent request to the imperial court : "Santa is coming with a large force to

18. EA, V, p.98; BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, p.39

19. BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, pp. 39-40

20. EA, V, p.98

encounter me at Basavapatan. But my force is small. No important reinforcement has upto now reached me. My men have dug trenches near Basavapatan and we shall sacrifice our lives." Upon learning this report, the Emperor forthwith sent orders to Hamiduddin Khan and Rustumdil Khan to rush to the rescue of Himmat Khan²¹ (January 25, 1696). Even Prince Bidar Bakht, who was then at the foot of Panhala, was ordered to march towards Basavapatan in order to punish Santaji²² (January 26). However, before any Mughal reinforcement reached Himmat Khan, Santaji appeared before Basavapatan and took his position on a hill nearby. Without waiting for any reinforcement to come, the Khan boldly came out of the fort and attacked the Marathas. 500 of them were slain. When the Khan was pushing his way to the position of Santaji, he was hit in his forehead by a musket ball. The sight of the terribly wounded commander began to demoralize his army. Just then, Ali Baki, a brave Mughal captain, came forward. "The Khan is alive" he cried and asked the Khan's mahout to goad his elephant forward. He tried to encourage the Mughal soldiers to fight on. However, he too sustained wounds and fell down to the ground. The Marathas carried him away. The disheartened Mughals took their wounded commander, Himmat Khan, to the fort of Basavapatan. Their defeat was complete. The Marathas plundered the Mughal camp of its baggage, munition and elephants. The Khan died

21. ADM, Yr. 39, p.149; BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, p.41

22. ADA, Vol. V, Yr. 39, p.151; BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, p.42

of his wounds on the same day at midnight. Santaji also received two injuries of arrows (January 20, 1696). ²³

23. BIS, April, 77, Iss. 53, pp.44-45; ADA, Vol. V, Yr. 39, pp.161-163; ADM, Yr. 39, pp.154 & 162; HA, V, pp.98-99; MA-JS, p.230; SCP-JS, p.38, TD, p.128

Khafi Khan narrates the event as follows :

"..... Soon afterwards he (Santaji) heard that Himmat Khan was approaching by forced marches to the relief of the besieged army. Santa divided his forces into two divisions and marched to meet him. At the distance of sixteen kos, the force under the command of Santa fell in with Himmat Khan and a great battle followed. Himmat Khan fought with great spirit and bravery. Numberless Mahrattas were slain and many of his army perished. Santa's forces retreated and the royal forces were led against the second army (of the Marathas). Himmat Khan made arrangements for the pursuit. By orders of Santa many musketeers had taken positions in the thick jungle and among the trees, to impede the advance of Himmat Khan. Some of the best marksmen had climbed the trees and concealed themselves among the thick branches. When Himmat Khan approached, a ball entered his forehead and killed him immediately. All the baggage and elephants and munitions of war belonging to Himmat Khan then fell bodily into the hands of Santa." -

(MM-ED, pp. 357-358)

It is already seen that Hamiduddin Khan and Rustumdil Khan were encamping at Adoni where they, now received urgent orders to rush to the rescue of Himmat Khan at Basavapatan. However, Hamiduddin Khan alone proceeded to Basavapatan with 12,000 strong army. After the victory over Himmat Khan, Santaji had laid siege to Basavapatan. Sayyid Azamatullah and Muhammad Euz, the two gallant Mughal officers, were defending the fort. When Santaji learnt that the Mughal army under Hamiduddin Khan was marching against him, he himself started to encounter the enemy, leaving the work of the siege to his assistants. Some 16 miles from Basavapatan the two armies clashed with each other and a battle took place (February 26, 1696). The Mughal newsletter says that Hamiduddin Khan defeated the enemy and went in pursuit of them for 4 kos. It further says that the Khan plundered the camp of Santaji who fled away to Chitradurg. Thereafter, the Khan proceeded to Basavapatan. Meanwhile, the Marathas had abandoned the siege of Basavapatan and dispersed away. A few days later, a second battle took place between the Khan and Santaji in the environs of Basavapatan. The Mughal newsletter says that Santaji was defeated and the Mughals carried away 200 mares and many weapons of the Marathas. When the Emperor learnt of the gallantry of the Khan, he praised him in the open court and conferred the title of Bahadur Khan on him.²⁴

Santaji had bagged two major victories over the Mughals that year. He had caused the death of the renowned governor

24. BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, pp.48, 51, 56, 58, 60; HA, V, pp. 99-100; MA-SP, p.67

Qasim Khan and humiliated reputed commanders like Khanazad Khan and Safshikan Khan. He had slain another brave Mughal commander Himmat Khan. It is only Hammiduddin Khan, who could successfully challenge the triumphant Santaji and defeated him twice.

3) Activities of Dhanaji

Early in January 1696, a battle was fought between Zulfiqar Khan and Dhanaji Jadhav. It was reported to the Emperor that many Marathas were killed and that their leader, Dhanaji, had to flee to Jinji.²⁵

In the middle of January, Dhanaji, Amritrao Nimbalkar and Gopal Pandit invested the fort of Tiruvadi (35 m.s. of Jinji). Ibrahim Khan Ghorl was its killedar, who defended it most ably. The English Factory Records mention the arrival of two guns at the camp of Dhanaji from Jinji (February 1, 1696). However, the Marathas could not capture the fort. On February 5, 1696, they received the reports that Daud Khan Panni with 3,000 choice horse was coming to the relief of Tiruvadi. So they raised the siege before the sun-rise and fled away. Daud Khan was soon followed by Zulfiqar Khan who rewarded Ibrahim Khan Ghorl 4,000 rupees in cash and a bill for one lakh of rupees for the brave defence of the fort.²⁶

On February 8, 1696, another battle was fought between Zulfiqar Khan and Dhanaji. One of the brave Maratha soldiers,

25. BIS, April 77, Iss.53, p.59; ADA, Vol.V, Yr.39, p.139

26. FDC, 1696, pp.3, 12 & 13

Gangaji Babar, the deshmukh of Naneghol, was killed in it. A reference to this battle is made in some Marathi documents. As they deal with a grant of land to the son of Gangaji, no details of the battle or its out-come, are recorded in them.²⁷ A document from the 'Fort St. David Consultations' dated March 5, 1696, mentions Dhanaji with a big army at Pondicherry.²⁸ Other one of March 11, notes that he had left for Jinji.²⁹

4) Relative Strength and Prospects of the Mughals and the Marathas

It may not be out of place to observe the relative strength and prospects of the Marathas and the Mughals in Karnatak as reflected in the contemporary English Records. The English note in their "Diary and consultation Book" on January 20, 1696; "The Moratta's (...) increasing at Chingee (Jinji) frequently sending parties into several parts of the country near Tegnapatam (12 m.s. of Pondicherry) ... and it is our opinion that there ought to be a fair correspondence kept with them from that place, during the present uncertain posture of things between them and Moors, the former by all advices appearing to be in all probability of being masters of all their country, unless the Mogull shall speedily send a very considerable army to the assistance of Zulphakar Cawn..."³⁰

27. RR, Yr. 22, Iss. 260, pp.2-4; SL, p.175

28. FDC, 1696, p.27

29. Ibid.

30. DC, 1696, p.9

A letter, dated January 31, 1696, from the Governor of Fort St. George notes : "Zulphakar Cawn's camp which [✓] has not had above eight thousand horse for above a year past and at this time is less than five thousand at present. There passes nothing from hence to the camp but a little grain, the merchants being frightened with (rupture) of the Morattas forces, which rob all they meet."³¹ The English at Surat had also received the reports of the increased strength of the Marathas and the miserable condition of the Mughals in Karnatak. They write to their Directors in England, "The forces of Rama Raja at Ginjee have of late much increased on the Moghul, which causes him to be thoughtful; they have lately won a considerable victory over his (Emperor's) forces and robbed the town of Golconda." (June 19, 1696).³²

An interesting information is recorded in the English letter of February 19, 1696 that Zulfiqar Khan sent emissaries to Rajaram for the division of Karnatak. Rajaram wanted the Khan not to hold any fort south of Conjevaram. When those negotiations were in progress, the Marathas attacked the Mughal camp in night. The Khan, instead of fighting the Marathas, hastened to Arcot with disorder.³³ No other source is available to check the veracity of this report.

It is already seen that owing to the shortage of supply of money and material from the Emperor, the army under

31. PDE, 1694-96, p.43

32. BM, p.50

33. LFG, 1696, pp. 13-14

Zulfiqar Khan, was reduced to a miserable plight. There was no fresh reinforcement of troops to his army, nor could he move fearlessly in the region and raise funds for its maintenance on account of small army. So early in March 1696, he demanded a loan of one lakh of hons from the English and sent them jewels as its security. But the English feared that the Mughals would never repay the amount under some pretext. They write, "..... for if we take the pawns we can't sell them, and if the Nabob be displaced, his successor will demand the jewels as belonging to the king (the Emperor) or if the Morattas overcome the (country) they will make the like demand."³⁴ Thus the English very politely refused the demand, saying that they were themselves in heavy debts (March 10, 1696).³⁵ This irritated Zulfiqar Khan, who threatened the English to capture Fort St. George (October 30, 1696).³⁶ But they did not yield to the threats. Instead, they put the place "into the best posture of defence."³⁷ The Khan could do nothing more than the verbal threats, as he would have to think twice before attacking the English who possessed an excellent artillery. Meanwhile, Zulfiqar Khan had sent urgent requests to the Emperor to send money to pay the arrears of his army. On March 19, 1696, the Emperor granted his request and despatched a sum of 15 lakhs to him.³⁸

34. DC, 1696, p.28

35. LFG, 1696, p.17

36. DC, 1696, pp. 129-130

37. Ibid., pp. 130-131

38. BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, p.53

It is already noted that while Prince Bidar Bakht invested the fort of Panhala, he received the imperial orders to proceed to Basavapatan (January 1696). By the time he reached Basavapatan, the Marathas had raised the siege and Hamiduddin Khan had defeated them twice. Santaji had already left the region for Madras Karnatak (Last week of March 1696). From Basavapatan, the Prince sent the columns to avenge the misbehaviour of Barmappa Naik, the zemindar of Chitradurg, who had joined the Marathas and actively helped them in their siege of Dodderi. The Naik was no match for the might of the Prince. He was soon humbled and compelled to agree to the humiliating conditions of the imperialists.³⁹ Though Bidar Bakht did not descend into Madras Karnatak this year, the rumours were that he was coming with an army to displace Zulfi-gar Khan.⁴⁰ (March and April 1696). It was also believed that Santaji had stayed in that region in order to oppose the entrance of the Prince.⁴¹

5) Rebellion of Santaji

The English record on April 23, 1696 that Santaji was coming to Jinji.⁴² But in fact, he could not come to Jinji in April as he was attacked and defeated near Arni by Zulfiqar Khan

39. HA, V, pp. 100-101

40. LFG, 1696, pp. 21 & 29

41. Ibid., p.29

42. FDC, 1696, p.52

in the same month.⁴³ On May 8, 1696, Santaji was reported to be arrived at Jinji with an army of 40,000.⁴⁴ He seems to have stayed in Jinji during May, 1696. Early in June 1696 he was preparing for an expedition in the southern part of the Jinji region.⁴⁵ But that did not happen. The course of action took most unfortunate and disastrous turn. Santaji quarrelled with Rajaram. The English note on June 10, 1696, "Our spies from the Moratta Camp and several other credible advices from other hands do give an account of the nondutiful behaviour of Santogee Goarpurrow and his brother Virogee (Bahirji) Goarpurrow which has caused a general dissatisfaction amongst the Moratta commanders. We have reason to believe that they will not follow Santogee Goarpurrow and his brother, but that they may all wait upon king Rama Raja. ... From the above advices we conclude that the Moratta's affairs will take up some time to be settled anew at Chingie..."⁴⁶ The English do not give the real cause

43. TD, p.128

44. FDC, 1696, p.59

The Jedhe chronology records that Santaji met Rajaram at Jinji in the Chaitra, Shak 1618, i.e. March-April, 1696 (SCP-JS, p.38). The date, it seems, is wrong. The English write on May 11, 1696, "Having certain advices that Santogee Goarpurrow arrived Chingie on Friday last (May 8) with 40,000 horse and foot." (FDC, 1696, p.59)

45. Ibid., p.67

46. Ibid.

behind the quarrel. The probable causes and circumstances leading to the murder of Santaji are discussed in the next part.

Santaji seems to have left the court of Jinji immediately after the discord. It should be noted that he was having nearly 40,000 army.⁴⁷ A refractory general having such a huge army was certainly a great menace to the Maratha State itself. Bhimsen Saxena writes that it was Dhanaji who unfolded the peril of Santaji's becoming free and rebel and persuaded Rajaram to crush him.⁴⁸ Rajaram was not slow in comprehending the serious situation. He took prompt decision to strike Santaji and followed him with Dhanaji and Amritrao Nimbalkar. A stiff battle was fought at Aiwargudi, 11 miles north-west of Vriddhachalam. The forces of Rajaram were defeated. Dhanaji escaped and fled to Maharashtra. Amritrao was captured and trampled down under the feet of an elephant. Rajaram, too, was captured. On the second day of the battle, as Saki Mustaid Khan says, Santaji appeared before Rajaram with his hands tied together, saying that it was because he (Rajaram) wanted to make Dhanaji his equal, he had behaved discourteously. Later, on he offered his loyal services to Rajaram and escorted him to Jinji⁴⁹ (June, 1696).

The rebellion of Santaji was a stormy affair in the camp of the Marathas at Jinji. Naturally, it gave birth to various

47. Ibid., p.59

48. TD, p.131

49. MA-JS, pp.243-244; TD, p.131; SCP-JS, p.38; SL, pp.177-178; PD, XXXI, p.73

rumours throughout the Deccan. While giving an account of the feud amongst the Marathas, the English from Surat write to Bombay that at time Santaji had even thought of surrendering the person of Rajaram to Zulfiqar Khan. The English write, "Rama Rajah is surprized by one of his Captains Santo Ghorpura, and taken prisoner. It is said he designed to serve the Raja so; and they report likewise Zulphikar Cawn (Asad Cawn's son) offered him a vast reward in the King's (Emperor's) name to surrender him up, and the King himself promised to make him a Barra Hazari Umrao, but some give out common danger hath united them again and Rama Rajah is set at liberty, which others contradict. So that in this important affair their is nothing of certainty..." (July 18, 1696).⁵⁰ Report that Santaji had thought of surrendering Rajaram to the Mughals was a rumour relayed from Karnatak. The subsequent activities of Santaji show that eventhough he was removed from the office of senapati he did not join the Mughals. He was not a that Maratha who aspired for an imperial mansab, however high sounding it might be. Had he desired such a mansab, the Emperor would have been rejoiced to confer it upon him long ago.

Early in June 1696, Zulfiqar Khan is reported to have returned from Vellore to Wandiwash.⁵¹ For about three months or till September, 1696, no military or other activities of the Mughals and Marathas in Karnatak are recorded. In September Zulfiqar Khan marched from Arcot with his army to attack Santaji.

50. CRM, p.197

51. PDE, 1694-1696, p.21

But instead of crushing him the Khan's army was enveloped by Santaji. The Khan's provisions ran out and he had to beg for the safe withdrawal to Arcot. Santaji granted the permission and the Khan withdrew to Arcot accordingly. There seems to be some understanding between the two.⁵² But the truce was temporary. Soon, both of them are found fighting each other. While Santaji was planning to besiege Arcot where Zulfiqar Khan had taken refuge, the latter took offensive and fought many skirmishes with the former. At that time Santaji had 12,000 army whereas the Khan had 4,000 only. Nevertheless, it is reported in the English records that Santaji was defeated and hotly pursued upto Trivellore (40 m.n.e. of Arcot) by the Khan (October, 1696). Santaji went on plundering the region upto Krishnapatnam (80 m.n. of Madras) where he captured forty-two elephants. The Khan stayed at Trivellore for some time and returned to Arcot. Thereupon, Santaji marched southwards to Tiruppattur (60 m.s.w. of Arcot) and stayed there, keeping his eye on the imperial treasure at Kaveripatnam (25 m.w. of Tiruppattur). (October 1696).⁵³

A letter, dated October 27, 1696, from Rajaram to Ramchandrapant, regarding the mokasas and inams of Makaji Devkate, mentions that Rajaram had removed Santaji from the post of senapati and the army under him had been recalled to Jinji. Accordingly, Makaji Devkate came to Rajaram with his force.⁵⁴

52. LFG, 1696, p.91

53. PDE, 1694-1696, p.66; LFG, 1696, pp.100 & 104

54. PD, XXXI, pp. 61-62

However, it is evident that Rajaram must have removed Santaji from the post of senapati long before the date of the aforesaid letter. Having failed in an attempt to put down the rebel senapati, Rajaram decided to bring his army under his command and he succeeded in the mission. Thus, it may be surmised that Santaji took to flight in his skirmishes with Zulfiqar Khan because a major portion of his army had already deserted him.

At this time, Santaji received the intelligence that the Emperor had sent treasure for the payment of the army of Zulfiqar Khan and it had been loaded at Cuddapah (100 m.n. of Vellore) on its way to the Khan's camp. He at once started for Cuddapah to sieze the treasure. The Khan, too, was alert and proceeded to Cuddapah as a precautionary measure. However, he returned from the half way to Arcot as he learnt that Santaji had followed another route.⁵⁵ Santaji thought it wise to give up the plan because he, it seems, wanted to take away the treasure without any fighting.

In December, 1696, Zulfiqar Khan received the imperial orders to chase Santaji away into the region of Bijapur upland. Accordingly, he pursued him in that direction upto Penukonda.⁵⁶ At this time, Prince Bidar Bakht was encamping at Penukonda under the imperial orders to crush the Marathas. The Khan met the Prince with his force. The Marathas immediately dispersed

55. DC, 1696, p.142

56. Ibid., p.166



in view of the huge assemblage of the united Mughal army.

Subsequently, the Khan returned to Arcot.⁵⁷

A siege of Jinji, a main enterprise of Zulfiqar Khan, was not in operation in this year. It was seriously hampered by the shortage of funds and reinforcements. The Maratha forces have been dominant throughout the year. The Khan achieved nothing notable except some successful skirmishes with Santaji and Dhanaji. His mission, for which he was deputed with great hope, was to capture the fort of Jinji with its master. But that had been conveniently ignored by the Khan. The English give a very graphic account of his policy towards the Marathas : "He (the Khan) hath been frequently ordered to take Chingee and it hath been in his power to do it and destroy all the Morrattas in the country, but instead of that it appears plain that he hath joined council with them and notwithstanding all the endeavours of his enemies, his father still prevails at court to keep the Nabob in his Government....."⁵⁸

Part - IX

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra : 1696-1697

1) Activities of Dhanaji and Jawaji Naik

It is already seen that Rajaram alongwith Dhanaji and Amritrao Nimbalkar encountered Santaji at Aiwargudi (June 1696). Rajaram was badly defeated by Santaji; Dhanaji was made to flee

57. TD, p.130

58. DC, 1696, p.134

and Amritrao was trampled under the feet of an elephant. After this fight Dhanaji did not stay in Karnatak. He left for Maharashtra. A letter, dated June 20, 1696, from Namaji Gaikwad, the hawaldar of the fort of Kopal (32 m.e. of Gadag) to Hanmaya Desai mentions that Dhanaji had come to that side on his way to Maharashtra.¹ Soon Lutfullah Khan was ordered to pursue Dhanaji who was reported to be in the region of Chikodi (32 m.s.e. of Kolhapur). Accordingly, the Khan advanced with his force. However, before the arrival of the Khan, Dhanaji left the region for Vardhangad (8 m.n.w. of Khatav) in the region of Satara. The Khan followed him and encamped at the foot of the fort. He began to ravage its environs with sword and fire. Soon, Dhanaji seems to have baffled the Khan who left the pursuit of the former and encamped at Indapur (80 m.s.e. of Poona) (November, 1696). Later on, he sent Rijwan Khan to drive out the Marathas from the region of Parenda (15 m.w. of Barsi) and himself set out for the region of Chikodi to put down the Marathas.²

It is already seen that Korigad was captured by Ali Beg, the foujdar of Junnar, through treachery of a Maratha officer on the fort. Shankaraji Narayan retaliated and took it back in 1694.³ In 1696 the fort again seems to have been lost to Ali Beg. At the instruction and inspiration of Shankaraji Narayan, Jawaji Naik Balkawade, a gallant and enterprising

1. SCS, VI, p.28

2. LP, p.118

3. SCP-JS, pp.37-38

captain of the Maratha infantry, laid a siege to the fort and stopped the provisions coming into it. The garrison was soon reduced to a bad plight. On learning the predicament of the garrison, a son of Mansur Khan started from Junnar with some cavalry and artillery. Jawaji, too, was alert. He did not want his army to be sandwiched between the Mughal garrison and the coming reinforcement. So Jawaji struck the auxiliary on its way to Korigad. He fought with valiance and inflicted severe losses on the Mughals. The Mughals were routed and their horses were carried off. This victory was soon followed by the capture of the fort by Jawaji⁴ (1696).

In the same year Jawaji added another feather to his cap. The Siddis ascended the ghat and looted the peth of Korigad. While they were descending into Konkan, Jawaji received the news of their pillaging activities. He forthwith marched upon them and routed them. Whatever booty, the Siddis had gathered, was brought back.⁵

The information available about the Mughal Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra during 1696-1697 is scanty. Both the Mughals and Marathas seem to have engrossed in the usual military activities and some skirmishes here and there. However, the Maratha side suffered a severe blow from the mutual rivalries between their two great generals, Santaji and Dhanaji.

4. SCS, V, pp. 190-191

5. Ibid.

Consequently, it resulted into the murder of Santaji, which was ^{important} the most and unfortunate event of 1697.

2) Murder of Santaji

It is already mentioned that Zulfiqar Khan pursued Santaji upto Penukonda. Santaji soon disappeared from the scene and appeared near Bijapur. Gajiuddin Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang, one of the renowned imperial commanders, was then encamping in the region of Bijapur in order to check the activities of Santaji and other Maratha bands. Lutfullah Khan, a notable Mughal commander, was also in his army. When Firuz Jang learned that Santaji was away from him only about 8 to 9 kos, he became terribly frightened. Nevertheless, he declared that he would march on Santaji and vanquish him. He also sent advance guards for petrolling. However, he did not dare fight Santaji. He unsoldierly fled towards Bijapur to seek a shelter there.⁶

Santaji did not fall on Firuz Jang. Instead, he had to fight his rival, Dhanaji, who was on his trail in the Bijapur region. Dhanaji had already induced the army officials under Santaji to join the Maratha King.⁷ Hanmantrao Nimbalkar, a brother of Amritrao Nimbalkar who was slain by Santaji, was the chief companion of Dhanaji in this plan. When the fighting broke out many colleagues of Santaji deserted him. Many were

6. MM-SP, p.37; MM-ED, p.359

7. Khafi Khan writes that Santaji had an army of 25,000 before he fought Dhanaji (MM-SP, p.37). This number seems to be exaggerated.

either killed or wounded. His baggage was plundered. Santaji fled to Maharashtra with his remaining force.⁸

While Firuz Jang was on his way to Bijapur, he received the news of Santaji's rout. The jubilant Khan took counsel of his colleagues to pursue Santaji. Meanwhile, the Emperor had sent him a letter under his signature to go in his pursuit and crush him. The forces of Prince Bidar Bakht and Hamiduddin Khan were also asked to join his force and Matlab Khan was appointed as a special executive officer in his army.⁹ Thus, Santaji was being pursued by both Dhanaji and Firuz Jang. Dhanaji and Hanamantrao had some skirmishes with Santaji in Maharashtra also.¹⁰

8. MM-SP, pp. 37-38

Saki Mustaid Khan writes that Santaji fled to Maharashtra with Rajaram after the fall of Jinji (MA-JS, p.244).

Jinji was finally captured in January 1698. Santaji came to Maharashtra in March 1697 and was murdered in June 1697. Hence, Saki's statement is evidently wrong.

9. MM-SP, p.38; MA-SP, p.72; SCP-JS, p.39

10. SR, p.83

An important letter of Santaji, dated April 1, 1697, to the army officials, is available. It warns the officials not to molest the village Wadgaon which was granted to Jayram Swami, a sadhu in the region of Khatav (BISM- VI, 1837, p.314). It should be noted that he has used the title of senapati in the letter though he was removed from that post long ago.

As a result of this almost all the force of Santaji was destroyed (March 1697). Consequently, he sought the final refuge in the Mahadeo hills from where he had led his glorious and swift expeditions against the enemy in the past.¹¹

Nagoji Mane, a notable Maratha chieftain, had left the imperial service and joined the Marathas at Jinji in 1690. Radhabai, the sister of Amritrao and Hanumantrao Nimbalkar, was given to him in marriage. Thus, the Nimbalkar brothers were closely related to Nagoji. When Amritrao was trampled down under the feet of an elephant by Santaji, Nagoji naturally harboured ill-feelings against him. The opportunity to wreak vengeance came handy when Santaji, deprived of all his force, power and prestige, came to the Mahadeo hills.

In June, 1697, Santaji was roving about in the environs of Mhaswad near the Mahadeo hills. Mhaswad was the native place of Nagoji, who could easily learn the movements of Santaji in the neighbourhood. Soon he contrived to swoop on him. He started with his party and found Santaji bathing in a stream. Santaji one of the greatest of the Maratha generals,

11. MM-SP, p.38

at that time was weary, fatigued and almost lonely. Nagoji took him unawares and killed him.¹² Thus died most unceremoniously the hero of a hundred battles.

The men of Firuz Jang were already on the track of Santaji. Nagoji decided to hand over the severed head of Santaji to the Emperor, who would certainly reward him for the killing of the most dreaded enemy of the Empire. Lutfullah Khan was in the van of the army of Firuz Jang. Nagoji offered the head to Lutfullah Khan who sent it to Firuz Jang. The soldiers of Firuz Jang congratulated one another and expressed their joy by beating the drums. Firuz Jang sent the head to the Emperor along with Khwajababa Turani. The rejoicing Emperor had a look at it and thanked the Almighty for such a priceless gift. He ordered to beat the drums of joy and rewarded Khwajababa Turani with the title of Khushkhabar Khan (one who brings pleasant news). The head of Santaji was paraded in the main military camps and cities of the Deccan.¹³ Firuz Jang was applauded for his success and was rewarded with a turban.¹⁴ The murder of Santaji is the most treacherous, ignoble and unsoldierly act of Nagoji. What he achieved in this murder

12. MM-ED, p.360

13. MM-SP, pp.38-39; MA-SP, p.72

14. MA-SP, p.72; MA-JS, p.244

is the satisfaction of avenging the death of his brother-in-law by Santaji.¹⁵

15. There are various accounts of the death of Santaji. It is interesting to study the various narrations of the Persian chroniclers :

Bhimsen Saxena writes : After the battle of Aiwargudi, Rajaram and Dhanaji returned to Jinji. Santaji came to Maharashtra and disbanded his force. Santaji had few companions with him. When he was passing by the native place of Amritrao Nimbalkar, the men of Nagoji and Amritrao united together and attacked Santaji. They sent the severed head of Santaji to the Emperor (TD, p.131).

Bhimsen is ignorant of Dhanaji's flight to Maharashtra. Santaji was murdered near the native place of Nagoji. Bhimsen has very little to add to the existing account.

Khafi Khan narrates a very amusing story : Having murdered Santaji, Nagoji put his head in a bag and started on horse to the camp of Dhanaji, the bag fell off on the road. It was picked up by the men of Firuz Jang (MM-ED, p.360; MM-SP, p.38). Nagoji could not be stupid enough to let his bag fall off from the horse and lose the chance of presenting the head of his enemy to the Emperor for a reward. Hence the account may safely be discarded as a hearsay.

Saki Mustaid Khan has his own version : After the defeat of Santaji by Dhanaji, the former fled to the home-land of Nagoji and sought the refuge in his house. Nagoji

Jadunath Sarkar seems to have attributed the act of murder to Hanumantrao Nimbalkar and not to Nagoji Mane.¹⁶ There should not be any doubt as to who actually murdered Santaji. The Jedhe chronology explicitly says that Nagoji Mane treacherously killed Santaji near the Mahadeo hills.¹⁷ Khafi Khan elaborately narrates the train of events leading to the murder and expressly writes that Nagoji murdered Santaji.¹⁸ Moreover the letter from Lutfullah Khan to Nagoji complimenting him for his success, doubtlessly proves the said charges against Nagoji.

chivalrously offered a shelter to him. But his wife, Radhabai and brother-in-law, Hanumantrao, wanted Santaji to be killed. Nagoji bade a farewell to Santaji in friendliness but Hanumantrao started pursuing him. There are two versions of death of Santaji. First, he was captured by the men of Firuz Jang and subsequently put to death. Second, he was slain by his enemies (Hanumantrao ?) and his head fell into the hands of the soldiers of Firuz Jang - (MA-JS, p.244; MA-SP, p.72).

It seems improbable that Santaji, a man of self-respect, would approach Nagoji for a shelter. In the light of the sources which floodlight Nagoji's treachery beyond doubt, this account may also be spurned as another hearsay.

16. HA, V, p.104

17. SCP-JS, p.39

18. MM-SP, p.38

It says that Nagoji sought the shelter of the Mughals and liquidated the enemy (Santaji) by blockading his way. It further adds that Nagoji had excellently served the imperial cause and should come to the imperial army along with Ranadullah Khan. Latfullah Khan had written to the Emperor to forgive the guilts of Nagoji and bestow inams upon him for his services (August 7, 1697).¹⁹ On July 9, 1697, the Emperor himself sent a letter of assurance to Nagoji, complimenting his services to the Mughals. Nagoji was assured of pardon and was directed to join Ranadullah Khan.²⁰ On February 21, 1698, the Emperor granted the request of Nagoji to carry without any obstacle the horses, camels, oxen etc., captured after the murder of Santaji.²¹ This proves beyond a shadow of doubt that it was Nagoji who murdered Santaji.

It is plain why Nagoji murdered Santaji. His brother-in-law, Amritrao, was relentlessly trampled down under the feet of an elephant. Naturally, Nagoji wanted to take revenge of Santaji. Moreover, there seems to be an envious feeling between the Ghorpades and the Mane-Nimbalkars before this event. While Nagoji Mane was at Jinji, his son, Subhanji, was in the army under Santaji in Maharashtra. In 1695, Subhanji was mortally insulted by Santaji, who was later on severely scolded by Rajaram. The contents of Rajaram's letter to Santaji may

19. SL, pp. 85-86

20. RSP, p.148

21. Ibid., p.149

throw some light on the relations between the Chorpades and Manes. It also reveals the nature of Santaji. The letter reads: "Nagoji Mane left the Mughal service and joined the swami with his force. He has been serving the swami with loyalty. The swami is in a critical position and has hope in him. His son, Subhanji Mane, is in your army with a considerable force in Maharashtra. It is reported that you have spoken in the offensive manner to him and asked him to go anywhere he would like. The swami is surprised to know that a wise man like you who knows the welfare of the state should have dismissed a man like Subhanji Mane. This is undesirable. You should console him and bring him with his force along with your army. In any case he should not be dejected." (July 12, 1695)²² Rajaram wrote a similar letter to Ramchandrapant, scolding Santaji for his arrogant behaviour.²³ Thus, the killing of Amritrao at Aiwargudi was the result of the family rivalry. So, it is not surprising that the next victim of this rivalry was Santaji himself.

There is a reason to believe that Nagoji had been motivated by another factor also. He was a man of fickle loyalty. He deserted the Mughals in 1690 not for waging the 'War of Independence' of the Marathas but, it seems, with selfish motives. Having served the Maratha State for seven years, he was now aspiring for an imperial favour. He translated his act of personal revenge into imperial service. Thus he served the

22. SCS, V, p.105

23. Ibid., p.104

two ends. The above statement is fully substantiated by the aforesaid letter of Lutfullah Khan to Nagoji.

It is a common legend in Maharashtra that it was Radhabai who killed Santaji out of vindictiveness. This legend has certainly some basis in the historical sources. Khafi Khan writes that under the guidance of Radhabai, Nagoji led a party in pursuit of Santaji.²⁴ Saki Mustaid Khan writes that when Santaji sought the shelter in the house of Nagoji, Radhabai urged Nagoji not to let him go away alive. Nagoji dismissed Santaji with friendliness but Hanmantrao went in pursuit seeking an opportunity of wreaking vengeance on him.²⁵ A Marathi document of the later period also states that Radhabai was directly involved in the killing of Santaji.²⁶ It seems probable that she was a contributing factor in persuading Nagoji to murder Santaji. It was natural that she wanted to avenge the death of her brother.

It was Santaji whose name was a terror both to the Mughal generals and the Emperor. It was he who had sapped their prestige and reputation. He had routed and put to shame the renowned Mughal commanders like Ali Mardan Khan, Sarja Khan, Qasim Khan, Khanazad Khan, Himmat Khan; and many others. Thus, deep animosity, hatred and vindictiveness existed between him and the Emperor. The Emperor would leave no stone unturned to

24. MM-ED, p.360

25. MA-SP, pp. 71-72

26. APY, p.503

get him killed even though he was a spent-force. It should be noted that the Emperor had ordered Firuz Jang to chase the fatigued Santaji and that Nagoji handed over the severed head of Santaji to Lutfullah Khan, an imperial officer and sought the imperial favour and reward. Thus, it substantially proves that the Emperor played an active role in this machination.

3) Was Rajaram Responsible for the Murder of Santaji ?

G.S. Sardesai has made two grave charges against Rajaram. First, the fact that Rajaram failed to conciliate and save Santaji, is a stigma on the capability of Rajaram. Second, it sounds that Santaji was murdered at the stimulation of Rajaram out of fear of his over-matching strength.²⁷ In the light of the available sources, it is difficult to accept the said views of Sardesai. So it would not be out of place to scrutinise the relations between Rajaram and Santaji.

There is no source to trace the exact cause that led to the open quarrel between Rajaram and Santaji. The English whose reports are considered most contemporary and valuable make a reference to the rupture as "the nondutiful behaviour of Santogee Goarpurrow."²⁸ They give no further details.

Sarkar and Sardesai have their own views regarding this rupture. Sarkar writes, "He (Santaji) seems to have claimed the office of senapati, contrasting his own brilliant performance

27. SR, pp. 82-84

28. FDC, 1696, p.67

with Dhana's poor record of victories.²⁹ Sarkar's statement is wrong as Santaji was already a senapati, when he came to Jinji. According to Sardesai, Rajaram did not encourage Santaji after his unparalleled victories over Qasim Khan and Himmat Khan. Instead he lauded Dhanaji.³⁰ This, it seems, is the surmise of Sardesai. It appears improbable that Rajaram offered a cold welcome to the victorious Santaji and aggravated the already existed rivalry between him and Dhanaji. Such treatment would not have been in the interest of the State which was threatened by the Mughals. No wise king would do that. Further, Sardesai has quoted, though not accepted, the statement of Wilks that Santaji was planning to dethrone the Chhatrapati.³¹ There is no definite proof to testify to such a statement. Had Santaji really thought to dethrone Rajaram he would have easily done so at the time of Rajaram's rout at Aiwargudi. So, it is difficult to accept the statement of Wilks.

The reason, why Santaji met such a fate, should be sought in his behaviour and temperament, sufficiently reflected in the contemporary documents. Martin notes in his diary in 1692 that when Rajaram did not accept the counsel of Santaji to crush the army of Zulfiqar Khan or to keep Prince Kambaksh as hostage, Santaji marched away in an angry mood and encamped in the vicinity of Jinji.³²

29. HA, V, p.102

30. SR, p.81

31. Ibid., p.80

32. MM-JS, pp.248-249

In 1693, both Santaji and Bahirji had a difference of opinion with Rajaram. Santaji left Jinji for Maharashtra. Subsequently, he was removed from the office of senapati and his rival, Dhanaji was appointed in his place.³³ A letter written about this time, i.e. 1693-94, by Santaji to Ramchandra-pant throws light on Santaji's nature, his resentment towards the partial treatment of the Pant to him, his trust in the Pant, and his deep-rooted rivalry with Dhanaji.³⁴ His arrogant and insulting treatment to Subhanji Mane has already been observed in the preceding pages. As a general, he was a strict disciplinarian. Khafi Khan writes that he was very severe in the punishment he inflicted on his men. For a trifling offence he would cast a man under the feet of an elephant.³⁵ Though Khafi Khan's statement seems to be an exaggeration, it reveals the violent and furious nature of Santaji. Thus the temperament of Santaji was an intermixture of an exceptional courage, chivalry, valiance, rashness, violence, discourtesy and aggressiveness. It is very difficult to analyse these shades of his character and personality.

It could not be expected from Rajaram to submit mutely to the whims of such a general. There was, and ought to be, some limit to the restrained, pacific and judicious nature of Rajaram. How could it be expected from him to conciliate and

33. SCP-JS, pp.36-37

34. BD, pp.53-55

35. MM-ED, p.359

save his general who behaved "nondutifully" in the court and openly defied his authority. It should be recalled that Shivaji the Great forthwith dismissed his senapati Netaji Palkar who failed in his duty and behaved insolently. Another senapati Prataprao Gujar who showed laxity in his duty was severely scolded by the same Chhatrapati. Prataprao did not rebel but laid his life to wipe out the stigma of discredit and disgrace. Hence, the ruin of Santaji cannot be regarded as a stigma on the capability of Rajaram.

It is true that Santaji was hotly pursued in Maharashtra by Dhanaji and eventually routed by him. However, this act of Dhanaji does not prove the charge that Santaji was murdered at the stimulation of Rajaram. The very fact that Nagoji offered the severed head of Santaji to the Emperor and not to Rajaram, as well as sought reward from the Emperor and not from Rajaram very well stands testimony to that it was the Mughals who stimulated Nagoji and not Rajaram.

It is also difficult to agree with the uncharitable view of Sarkar, when he says, "He (Santaji) lived and died merely as a most successful brigand and selfish adventurer and exercised no influence on the political history of the Marathas or even on the general effect of Aurangzib's campaigns." ³⁶ Though fallen out with the Maratha King, it is worthy of praise that he did not join the Mughals. Had he been really a brigand and a selfish adventurer, there was ample scope for his brigandage

and selfishness in the then uncertain and unstable political conditions. Had he sought the favour of the Emperor he would have easily been raised to the position of a commander of 10,000 horse. The reign of Rajaram is after all a story of the brave deeds of Santaji, Dhanaji, Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Rupaji Bhosale, Santaji Jagtap, Jawaji Balkawade and hundreds of other brave Marathas. It is they who fought the War of Independence and saved the Maratha State. Santaji played a major role in this war and undermined the morale of the Mughal army. Sarkar himself has praised Santaji : "his greatest monument is the abject fear he inspired in all ranks of the Mughal army."³⁷ This abject fear had definitely its impact on the Mughal - Maratha struggle which has been considered as the glorious saga of the Maratha History.

Part - X

Mughal-Maratha Struggle in Karnatak : 1697-1698

1) Deputation of Raja Karna

The Emperor had ordered Prince Bidar Bakht to expel the Marathas from the region of central Mysore. Accordingly, the Prince had encamped at Penukonda (75 m.n. of Bangalore). The Emperor had also asked Zulfiqar Khan to come to help of the Prince from the south. Accordingly, the Khan came with his force and joined the Prince at Penukonda. By that time, the Marathas had left the region. Hence the Khan had to return

37. Ibid., p.105

to his base at Arcot (145 m.s.e. of Penukonda) without any fighting (C. February 1697).¹

Soon Zulfiqar Khan kept baggage in Arcot and started for raising the funds from the chiefs of Tanjore and other places (C. February 26, 1697).² No details of this expedition are available. Tribute that the Khan could collect was soon exhausted and hence he could not pay all the arrears of his army.³ The Khan returned to Wandiwash via Trikolur and Trinomali⁴ (C. August 1697) and encamped there till November, 1697.

There seems to be no major army of the Marathas in the east Karnatak in the first half of the year, 1697; nor any notable event took place on either side. The Marathas were unfortunately engaged in the internecine feuds. Their senapati, Santaji Ghorpade, was dismissed and had fled to Maharashtra. Their new senapati, Dhanaji Jadhav, was on his heels. This internecine quarrel ended in the murder of the ex-senapati (June 1697). Hence, all the activities of the Marathas to resist the Mughal aggression in Maharashtra and Karnatak were stopped for the time being.

On August 8, 1697, Rajaram sent a deputation of Raja Karna, his illegitimate son, to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan. The deputation comprised Shankaraji Malhar, the sumant, Girjoji Yadav, the officer of the household affairs and one Bawaji

1. TD, p.130

2. DC, 1697, p.14

3. TD, pp. 130-131

4. DC, 1697, p.99 ; HA, V, p.86

Prabhu.⁵ Ramsing Hada, a notable Rajput chieftain in the Mughal army, was the chief mediator between Rajaram and the Khan.⁶ The purpose of the deputation was to make a treaty of peace and friendship with the Mughals.⁷

It should be noted that at that time the Khan had not besieged the fort of Jinji. Hence, it is not intelligible from the extant sources why Rajaram felt it necessary to send the deputation to the Mughal camp for peace and friendship. It appears that a need to make such a treaty arose from the fatal feud of the Maratha generals, that had weakened the unity and strength of the Maratha State. Besides this, Rajaram, too, was in financial difficulties.⁸ Had the Khan besieged Jinji right

5. SCP-JS, p.39; TKK, pp.93, 197, 475-476

Sardesai has accepted the statement of Malhar Ramrao that Rajaram sent Khando Dallal along with Raja Karna to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan (SR, p.71).

However, the records of the Yadav family explicitly mention the names of Shankaraji Malhar, Girjoji Yadav and Bawaji Prabhu as the members of the deputation, headed by Raja Karna. Had Khando Dallal ^{been} in the deputation, his name would have certainly been listed in the documents of the Yadav Records (TKK, pp. 197, 475-476).

6. TD, p.131

7. TKK, p.197

8. HG, p.329

then, Rajaram's condition would have been very critical. Thus, it seems, he thought it expedient to start negotiations with the Mughals, and thereby delay their onslaught on Jinji for some time.

Zulfiqar Khan was not a competent authority for making the peace-treaty. The Khan had to seek the sanction of the Emperor for it. Accordingly, he sent Rajaram's peace proposals and the reports of the parley to the Emperor.⁹ To annihilate the Maratha power in the Deccan had been the mission of the Emperor. Hence, he reproachfully disapproved of the proposals and ordered the Khan to capture Jinji without any further delay. Thus, the negotiations proved to be abortive. The Khan sent back Raja Karna along with other delegates to Jinji (October 1697).¹⁰ Upon the safe return of his beloved son, Raja Karna,

9. TD, p.131

The English from Surat write to Bombay, "Our Vakeel writes the King (the Emperor) is making peace with Rama Rajah whose son has made his obedience to him. It is said the Raja (Rajaram) will be the Desai of the country of Deccan and possessor of Rairee castle..." - September 20, 1697 (CRM, p.202).

10. DC, 1697, p.128

Sardesai writes that because Raja Karna had won over the Khan, Rajaram could safely escape from Jinji (SR, p.71).

At that time Raja Karna might be at the most 7. How could a lad of seven impress and win over the veteran Khan? The credit of his escape from Jinji should go to the diplomacy of Rajaram.

to Jinji, Rajaram awarded 1,00,000 chakras¹¹ to Shankaraji Malhar, 50,000 chakras to Girjoji and 25,000 chakras to Bawaji Prabhu.¹²

2) Rebesieging of Jinji

The Emperor had already learnt from Prince Kam Baksh and other spies about the secret understanding between Zulfiqar Khan and Rajaram. However, the Emperor did not dismiss this treacherous general, whose father was his prime-minister. It was true that the Khan could not vigorously invest the fort on account of shortage of supply of men and material. The brave deeds of the Marathas in Karnatak had also seriously hampered his efforts. Yet, the Emperor was in no mood to patiently comprehend the Khan's difficulties. He reproached the Khan for his failure to capture the fort. The Khan had also received secret intimation from his friends in the court that only an immediate capture of the fort could save him from disgrace and dishonour.¹³ The Khan seems to have conveyed Rajaram the

11. A small gold coin worth two rupees and one tenth (HA, V, p.54).

12. TKK, pp. 197, 475-476

13. HM, p.133. Later in July 1698 the English from Surat write, "Chindee (Jinji) was deserted by Rama Raja at Zulfiqar Cawn's request and not one man (was) killed at taking it ... his (Khan's) friends (in the court) wrote him if he took not the place speedily he would be deprived of his honours, estate, liberty and perhaps life itself..." - July 21, 1698 - (CRM, p.208).

Emperor's severe warning to him (the Khan) and urged him to leave the fort for Maharashtra at an earlier and convenient time.¹⁴

Rajaram seems to have sent his favourite servants like Khando Ballal to grasp the general situation in Maharashtra.¹⁵ Like his historic journey in 1689, Rajaram had to plan his return journey also. For that he had to stay in the fort of Jinji waiting for the plan to mature. That is why, it appears, he could not leave Jinji, before it was invested by the Khan. As a precautionary measure, he made arrangements vigorously to defend the fort against the impending attack and redistributed the sub-ordinate commands for adequate security.¹⁶

The Emperor expressed his trust and hope in rewarding the Khan, with the title of Nusrit Jang. The Khan celebrated

14. Malhar Ramrao has confused the order of the events. He has described at length the renewal of the siege of Jinji and Rajaram's escape after the fall of the forts of Satara and Parli. He writes that Rajaram sent Khando Ballal to Ramchandrapant in Maharashtra to convey his (Rajaram's) critical position and to bring in army for escorting him to Maharashtra. Malhar Ramrao further adds that while coming to Jinji, Khando Ballal was arrested by the enemy, but was set free by Zulfiqar Khan after a year (RC-MR, pp. 58-66).

The whole narration of Malhar Ramrao is a typical specimen of loose writing. He has not considered the time factor in it.

15. Ibid., p.66

16. HM, p.133

the occasion with great pomp.¹⁷ The Emperor had also sent fresh succour of money and material to him for the vigorous attack on Jinji.¹⁸ From Wandiwash, the Khan marched to the foot of Jinji and invested it on November 8, 1697.¹⁹ He distributed amongst his lieutenants the posts around the fort and himself halted with imperial force before the Vellore-gate towards the Sanghwaram hill. Ramsing Hada was asked to be on the western side. To the south, Daud Khan Panni was posted at the foot of Chikkalidurg (Chamar hill).²⁰

A force of Daud Khan was lacking in artillery and siege material. Nevertheless, he forcefully assaulted Chikkalidurg and captured it in a day. Though Daud Khan had shown earnestness in his efforts, Zulfiqar Khan was not actively pushing up the siege-operation. Bhimsen Saxena remarks that had Zulfiqar Khan wished it, he could have captured Jinji the very day he reached there.²¹ Wilks writes, "(The Khan) always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and the place of attack, and the troops of Daud Khan were often repulsed with slaughter."²² Rao Dalpat Bundella's post was facing Krishnagiri. He

17. TD, p.132

18. HG, p.332

19. SCP-JS, p.39

20. TD, p.132

21. Ibid.

22. HM, p.133

succeeded in pushing his trenches upto the walls of the fort. But suddenly he was recalled by Zulfiqar Khan and asked to remain with him in his trenches.²³ All these acts of the Khan imply his collusion with Rajaram that prolonged the siege for two months.

3) Escape of Rajaram

There are some versions of the escape of Rajaram and his family from Jinji. Malhar Ramrao describes it in details and attaches more importance to the role played by Khando Ballal in it. It should be remembered that Malhar Ramrao was the descendant of Khando Ballal. Hence, his account should be viewed at more cautiously without impairing the historical truth. Two more families have substantial share in this episode. They are the Shirkes and the Yadavs. The family records of the Shirke and Yadav families explicitly mention the parts played by Ganoji Shirke and Girjoji Yadav respectively in effecting the escape of the royal family from Jinji.

It is needless to write that Zulfiqar Khan was friendly to Rajaram. There were two main reasons for their friendship. First, in January 1693 the Khan raised the siege and had to beg Rajaram for a safe retreat of his army to Wandiwash. Rajaram diplomatically granted him the permission. The Khan and his army were saved from disgrace and ruin. Thus, he always felt grateful to Rajaram for his magnanimity. Secondly, both Rajaram and the Khan were eagerly waiting for the impending death of the Emperor. His death would mean a great relief to

23. TD, p.133

the Marathas and blessing in disguise to the Khan who was aspiring to carve out a separate principality in the Deccan with the help of the Marathas.²⁴ Thus, it was in the interest of the Khan to save the life of Rajaram.

Rajaram was facing two problems. He had to effect not only his escape but that of his family also. It was comparatively easier for him to escape from the fort, but for his harem it was risky. The Khan was friendly, but that was not sufficient in itself as his lieutenants like Daud Khan and Rao Dalpat Bundella were hostile to the Marathas. They wanted immediate seizure of the fort and the royal family. Thus, the Khan could not openly help Rajaram. He wanted somebody from the Mughal camp to help Rajaram to effect the escape.

The choice of both Rajaram and Zulfiqar Khan to execute this plan seems to have fallen on Ganoji Shirke. Shivaji the Great had given in marriage his daughter Rajkunwar to Ganoji. Yesubai, queen of Sambhaji, was the sister of Ganoji. Thus, the Chhatrapati family and the Shirke family were closely related. However, the Shirkes had become the enemy of Sambhaji and consequently of the Maratha State; and hence they had joined the Mughals. In the last phase of the siege of Jinji, Ganoji seems to be in the besieging army under Zulfiqar Khan. The task of bringing Ganoji to the Maratha side was entrusted by Rajaram to Khando Ballal. He held secret meetings with Ganoji Shirke. By evoking his conscience and his relationship with the Chhatrapati

24. LFG, 1696, pp.13-14

family, Khando Ballal appealed to Ganoji to save Rajaram, and thereby the Maratha State. This, of course, had the desired results. The hostility was suppressed under the surge of patriotism and sense of kinship.²⁵

Girjoji Yadav, an officer of the household affairs, was to look after the amenities of the harem of Rajaram. The Yadav Records, some of which are the watanpatras given to Girjoji himself, explicitly mention that it was Girjoji who effected the escape of the harem.

Thus, the main participants in effecting the escape of Rajaram and the royal family were Zulfiqar Khan, Khando Ballal, Ganoji Shirke and Girjoji Yadav. From the subsequent history, it appears that the following plan was hatched by them. Rajaram should vacate the fort; and Zulfiqar Khan should capture it immediately. If the royal family failed to escape along with Rajaram, the Khan should manage to let it leave after the fall of the fort. Following were the notable persons in the court of Jinji at the time of the escape : Shankaraji Malhar, Khando Ballal, Antaji Mangaji, Awaji Nilo, Mansing More, Amburao, Khanderao Dabhade, Krishnaji Rao More and Prataprao More. With the secret and active help of Ganoji, Rajaram left the fort in the company of the above-mentioned persons (approximately twenty). It was the Monday night of

25. RC-MR, p.69

December 26, 1697 : Ganoji himself escorted him upto Arni
(30 m.n. of Jinji). ²⁶

4) Various Accounts of Rajaram's Escape

Bhimsen Saxena's account of Rajaram's escape is very brief. He writes : Rajaram was short of war-materials. The

26. DSP, p.78; RC-MR, pp.67-70; FDC, 1698, p.1;

SL, pp.218-219; SCS, III, p.51

According to Sardesai the Shirkes and the Mohites (who were in the Mughal service) asked Rajaram to sit in the covered palanquin. Saying that it carried the wives of their relatives, they brought him to their camp. Next day (Ganoji) Shirke went out of the camp under the pretext of hunting and handed over Rajaram to the army of Dhanaji (December 1, 1697) (SR, p.72).

Sardesai seems to have based his account on Malhar Ramrao's bakhar. The date of escape, mentioned by him, is wrong. Rajaram escaped from the fort on December 26, 1697. This is clear from a note in the English Records of January 1, 1698, which is hitherto gone unnoticed by the historians. It reads, "Rama Raja with his legitimate son, Managee Morra and some others to the number of about 20 made their escape out of Chingie on Monday the 26th inst. at night and the report is that they got safe to Vellore. It is believed the Nabob ordered Rama Raja to go away." (FDC, 1698, p.1)

fort (Jinji) was besieged. After the fall of Chamar hill (Chikkalidurg) he left the fort along with some prominent persons for Tanjore, leaving behind his family.²⁷

It is surprising that Bhimsen who was present in the besieging army while Rajaram escaped should write that Rajaram escaped to Tanjore.

The English from Bombay mention a secret understanding between Rajaram and Zulfiqar Khan in the former's escape from Jinji. They write, "The King's (Emperor's) forces have taken Chindee (Jinji), Zulfikar Cawne being necessitated to do for that the king has written to him to do it or else to repair to him; but he (the Khan) forgot not to provide for Rama Raja's safety by sending him away." (April 14, 1698).²⁸

Malhar Ramrao has described the escape of Rajaram in details. He has mentioned a prominent part played by Khando Ballal in the escape. He writes :²⁹ Khando Ballal, the ohitnavis, Awaji Nilo, the parasnavis and Antaji Mangaji, the wakenavis used to secretly meet Zulfiqar Khan. The Khan conveyed to Rajaram the urgency to invest and capture Jinji. Hence, Rajaram ordered Dhanaji, Santaji and other commanders to bring their forces together and hide them in the woods along way to Banglore. At the same time, he put in a word to the

27. TD, p.133

28. CRM, p.207

29. It is a summary of his account of the escape of Rajaram.

Khan not to besiege the fort for eight days. The Marathas could not make adequate defence arrangement in the said period. Meanwhile, the Khan besieged the fort. The Marathas fought the Mughals with valour but they could not raise the siege. So the said trio again met the Khan and asked for his advice. The Khan asked Rajaram to escape in the heat of fighting or to seek the help of the Maratha sardars in the Mughal army. However, Pralhad Niraji, the pratinidhi, counselled Rajaram not to take any risk in leaving the fort in the heat of the fighting. So the second choice had to be accepted. Ganoji Shirke and Ranoji Shirke were the only relatives of Rajaram who were in the Mughal army that besieged the fort. But they were deadly against the Chhatrapati family. So Khando Ballal was sent to win them over to the Maratha side. Khando Ballal met Ganoji who wanted to take vengeance on the Chhatrapati family. Khando Ballal cunningly pacified him and offered him his watan of the deshmukhi of Dabhol. Eventually, Ganoji agreed to his request. The Khan was informed accordingly. The Khan advised that Rajaram should leave the fort and assured him that he would let the royal family go as the members of the Shirke and Mohite families would leave. Rajaram left the fort in the night with prominent persons of his court and came to the camp of the Shirkes and Mohites. The next day under the pretext of hunting, the Shirkes and the Mohites escorted him to a place where the Maratha army, headed by Dhanaji, was encamping.³⁰

The above-mentioned account of Malhar Ramrao is somewhat flimsy. The references to Dhanaji, Santaji and Pralhad Niraji are unhistorical. At the time of Rajaram's escape Dhanaji was in Maharashtra. Santaji was murdered in June 1697 and Pralhad Niraji had committed suicide. These unhistorical references have impaired the writing of Malhar Ramrao.

5) Fall of Jinji

The siege was pressed hard after the escape of Rajaram on December 26, 1697. Daud Khan had well entrenched opposite Chandrayandurg. He was busy in exploring a tract that might lead into the fort. One day while he was trying to scale the walls of the fort, Rao Dalpat Bundella from the north, scaled the northern walls of Krishnagiri and captured the outer fort. The garrison then took shelter in the inner fort, called Kalakot. Soon, Rao Dalpat and his Rajput troops entered it too. After killing many, they took its possession. By the time, the surviving force of the Marathas retreated to Rajgad, the highest and strongest fort in Jinji. Rao Dalpat captured five elephants of the Marathas and halted at the entrance of Kalakot. Immediately, he conveyed the news of his achievement to Zulfiqar Khan. By that time, the Khan had moved to the west of the fort. He was trying to enter the fort from that direction. The entrance on that side was called Shaitandari. It was completely bricked up. The Khan succeeded in blowing it up and entered on foot into the fort. Rao Dalpat and Zulfiqar Khan met and congratulated each other. Meanwhile, Daud Khan

succeeded in entering Chandrayandurg. Then he also moved to Krishnagiri. Some of the inhabitants of Jinji had sought the shelter at the top of Krishnagiri. But they soon realized their helplessness and capitulated. The Mughals secured horses, camels and a vast amount of other materials. The royal family had taken shelter in Rajgad which was then invested by the Mughals. Zulfiqar Khan himself held up the entrance of the fort. Ramsing Hada crossed the chasms at its foot and scaled the walls of Rajgad with the help of ladders. Consequently, the royal family capitulated. Thus the last fort in Jinji was lost to the Mughals. Zulfiqar Khan sent palanquins for the royal family to fetch it out of the fort. Its members were kept in captivity honorably and all amenities were provided to it. There were few combatants among the four thousand men and women in Jinji.³¹

The Khan encamped in the fort for the next day also. He asked Rao Dalpat Bundella to accept the killedari of Jinji. However, Rao Dalpat declined the offer. Therefore, Khan temporarily appointed Gazanfar Khan as the killedar of the fort, which was sufficiently manned for the defence. Then, he came out of the fort along with the royal captives : four wives, three sons and two daughters of Rajaram. Many Maratha officials were put to death. Naro Pralhad, son of Pralhad

31. TD, pp.133-135; HA, V, pp.88-89

Niraji and Timaji Raghunath, son of Raghunatha Hanmante were arrested by the Khan, who put Naropant to death. Timaji somehow escaped to Maharashtra. Walls of the fort were repaired and all the secret tracks leading into the fort were closed. On hearing this pleasant news, the Emperor raised the grade of Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan by one thousand troops each, and of Rao Dalpat by two hundred troops. The fort was renamed as Nasratgad.³²

It is already seen that Rajaram fled from Jinji on the night of December 26, 1697. From the following English letter, dated December 28, 1697, it seems that Zulfiqar Khan attacked Jinji soon after the escape of Rajaram. The letter reads, "There is a report here that Zulphaker Cawn hath set up his flag upon one of the hills of Chingie & makes a show as if he did really intend to take the place, a little time will show the truth."³³ It appears that the Khan achieved this first victory on December 27, 1697. Another English letter records on January 1, 1698 : "Zulfaker Cawn took Chingie on Thursday the 30th past."³⁴ Krishnagiri seems to have fallen on the date above-mentioned. Thus a process of capturing the fort began from 27th December, 1697 and was completed by the capture of Rajgad, with the royal family on January 2, 1698.

32. TD, pp.135-136; SR, pp.73-74; MA-JS, p.238

33. LFG, 1697, p.34

34. FDC, 1698, p.1

Bhimsen Saxena, the eye-witness and the active participant in the operation, gives the Sankrant day, i.e. January 2, 1698, as the day of the capture of the fort.³⁵ So, it is evident that Rajgad was captured on that date.

6) Escape of the Royal Family

It is generally held that it was Ganoji who took the royal family out of Jinji. The documents of the Shirke family explicitly mention that Ganoji brought Tarabai, Rajasbai and his wife, Rajkunwar, out of the fort and sent them to Arni in the night. As a reward for his help, Rajaram had regranted the deshmukhi of Dabhol to Ganoji. The mention of this grant of the deshmukhi of Dabhol is made in the watanpatra given to Pilaji,

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35. TD, p.135

1) Saki Mustaid Khan gives a wrong date : Shaban 6, 1109 hijri - i.e. February 7, 1698 (MA-SP, p.69).

2) Malhar Ramrao makes a gross mistake : Chaitra Shudha 1, Shak 1618, i.e. March 24, 1696 (RC-MR, p.72).

3) Sardesai gives February 7, 1698. He seems to have accepted the version of Saki Mustaid Khan (SR, p.73).

4) Sarkar quotes various sources on the issue of the date but does not give his own opinion (EA, V, p.89).

5) C.S. Srinivasachari the author of "A History of Gingee and its Rulers" elaborately discusses the problem of the date and concludes "Hence Gingee should have been completely captured between the 28th December, 1697 and 5th January, 1698" (HG, pp. 343-345).

the son of Ganoji.³⁶ But Rajaram's watanpatra, granting the said deshmukhi to Ganoji, does not mention of his escorting the royal family to Arni.³⁷

Two facts should be noted here : first, Jinji was completely and finally captured on January 2, 1698; second, the royal family escaped from the fort after its total fall i.e. on or after January 2.³⁸

The following letter of the English, dated January 1, 1698, reveals that Ganoji Shirke was arrested by Daud Khan before January 1, probably on 29th or 30th December, 1697 :
 "..... this day are informed by a Moratta (who X delivered Beetle to Gunnagoe Raja X & was taken prisoner by Dowd Cawn but made his escape hither) that his Master Gunnagee Raja & Amborow are prisoners to Dowd Cawn with many others of less note, they being upon one of the hills surrendered themselves upon discretion ..."³⁹ The reference to the hill captured by Daud Khan is, it seems, about Chandrayandurg captured by the Khan in the beginning of his assault. The letter quoted above proves that Ganoji not only assisted Rajaram in his escape but joined the Marathas at the eleventh hour of the siege-operation. It seems that while Daud Khan was capturing

36. SCS, III, pp.50-51; DSP, p.83

37. CGM, p.23

38. TKK, p.476

39. FDC, 1698, p.1

Chandrayandurg, Ganoji was defending it. After its fall he was arrested along with Amburao, a Maratha commander.⁴⁰

Rajaram had escaped with his notable courtiers and army officials and seems to have entrusted the work of taking the royal family out of Jinji to Ganoji and Girjoji. When Ganoji was arrested by Daud Khan, the whole responsibility of taking the royal family out of the fort naturally fell on Girjoji. It is already observed that Girjoji was a trust-worthy servant of Rajaram. When Rajaram was attacked at Shimoga by the Mughals, he had asked Girjoji to bring the jewellery safe to Jinji. Girjoji very skilfully accomplished this risky job. When Raja Karn was sent to the Mughal camp, Rajaram had asked Girjoji to look after his safety.

Rajaram had a large harem which included many queens and mistresses. According to Martin, he had married 'three or

40. The English write on January 6, 1698, "This evening had certain advices of Ambo Row the great Maratta General, his being out off by the Moors..." (Ibid., p.4). However, the English had received the false report. It is true that Amburao was arrested; but it seems that he managed to escape from the Mughal captivity along with Ganoji Shirke. An authentic document of Shahu's reign reveals that in 1718 he was present at a majalas (meeting) at Satara, regarding the sardeshmukhi and deshmukhi watans of the Shirkes. (DSP, p.78).

four women during the first two or three months after his arrival.⁴¹ This shows that he had some three to four 'married women' (queens) in his harem before the coming of Tarabai and Rajasbai to Jinji. One of the historically important documents⁴² of the Yadav Records makes a mention of 'four queens' of Rajaram.⁴³ Thus, it may be concluded that at the time of the fall of Jinji, Tarabai and Rajasbai were not the only two queens in the harem of Rajaram. But Girjoji Yadav in his statement, embodied in the above-mentioned document, says that he escorted only two queens, namely Tarabai and Rajasbai, out of Jinji to Vellore.⁴⁴ So it is evident that other queens and mistresses of Rajaram were taken captive by the Mughals.

It was already an open secret that Zulfiqar Khan was in collusion with Rajaram. Obviously, he had helped Rajaram in his escape from the fort and probably must have promised him the safe escape of his harem also. But he could not do so. He must have been placed in a serious dilemma as what to do with Rajaram's harem. Had the Khan allowed all its members to

41. MM-JS, pp.236-237

42. This is a partition-deed of the deshmukhi of pargana Karad between Swarupji Yadav and Girjoji Yadav (TKK, pp. 458-494).

43. Ibid., p.475

44. Ibid., p.476

escape, he would have certainly be considered as a traitor in the eyes of the Emperor. To avoid the suspicion of the Emperor and the consequent punishment, it was necessary for him to make a show that he had tried sincerely to capture the fort along with the royal family. On the other hand, had he put all the members of the royal family under arrest, it would have destroyed his friendship with the Marathas and his designs to be fulfilled with their cooperation after the Emperor's death. So, it seems, he quite diplomatically decided to allow the most important members of the royal family to escape. Those were the two queens Tarabai and Rajashai, the Princess Soyarabai and the Prince Shivaji II. It is significant to note that Zulfiqar Khan had shown the presence of mind and shrewdness in capturing the fort and the royal family. He himself and his trusted assistant Ramsing Hada had invested Rajgad, where the Maratha royal family had taken shelter. It should be also noted that Daud Khan, who was deadly against the Marathas⁴⁵ and who also disliked the Khan's slow-going siege-operations, was not asked to scale the walls of Rajgad. Ramsing Hada led his troops and captured it. The royal family was kept in a captivity under the personal supervision of the Khan who encamped in the fort for the next day also. It was at this stage of the operation only the above-mentioned four members of the royal family escaped from the fort with the help of Girjoji. Girjoji secretly led the royal family out of the fort and brought it safe to Vellore

45. LFG, 1698, p.25

where Rajaram sojourned on his way to Maharashtra. The courage and loyal services of Girjoji must be appreciated. But, he would not have accomplished that feat without the active and secret help of Zulfiqar Khan. The Khan had a lion's share in the escape of the royal family. Rajaram was highly delighted by the safe coming of his two queens, son and daughter and praised the services of Girjoji. At Vellore many important persons in the court were present. The names of Baji Kadam, Khandoji Dabhade, Khando Ballal, Ravloji Ingawale, Rekhoji Jadhav Naik are found in the contemporary documents.⁴⁶

7) Return of Rajaram to Maharashtra

After making the necessary repairs of the fort and defence arrangements, Zulfiqar Khan left Jinji and encamped at Wandiwash.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, it seems that at the end of January, 1698 Dhanaji with three to four thousand force⁴⁸ came from Maharashtra to Vellore for escorting Rajaram and his family. Rajaram, with the said force, seems to have started for Maharashtra early in February. On February 22, 1698, he arrived at Vishalgad via Koppal and Bhudargad.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, on learning the arrival of the Maratha force at Vellore, Zulfiqar Khan had decamped from Wandiwash and

46. TTK, pp.476-477, 546

47. TD, p.136

48. LFG, 1698, pp.25-26

49. SCP-GPS, p.66; TTK, p.477

marched towards Vellore.⁵⁰ He pursued Rajaram upto Seerapa (Seerpe) and returned half way to Wandiwash in the first week of April 1698.⁵¹ While returning to Wandiwash, he attacked Vellore but failed to capture it.⁵²

It should be noted that Zulfiqar Khan did not pursue Rajaram immediately after the fall of Jinji. It seems, that he waited till the arrival of the Maratha force under Dhanaji at Vellore.

8) Mughals Triumphant in Karnatak

Jinji and Vellore were the main centres of the Maratha administration in Karnatak. Jinji fell on January 2, 1698. But Vellore withstood the Mughal aggression in Karnatak upto August 14, 1702. It seems that except Vellore, all the Maratha pockets with their dependent regions were conquered by the Mughals, soon after the fall of Jinji. The English of the Fort St. George record on January 11, 1698, "It is certain that Zulphaker Cawn has taken Chingie and thereby become absolute masters of this country ... It hath been said the king (the Emperor) designed to carry his conquest to Cape Concorine, and prosecute that design they must carry their army that way..."⁵³ The English write on February 1, 1698, "The Nabab hath taken Chingee and there is no army of the Morattas in these parts..."⁵⁴

50. LFG, 1698, p.29

51. Ibid., p.38

52. HA, V, p.90

53. LFG, 1698, p.6

54. Ibid., p.14

Furthermore, on March 28, they record the rumour of the coming of a Maratha force : "... a great army of Morattas were coming to retake Chingie but they don't appear."⁵⁵ Saki Mustaid Khan writes that after the fall of Jinji the hundred other forts in Karnatak with European settlements were annexed to the Mughal Empire. The powerful and rich Zamindars in Karnatak surrendered and sent proper tributes to the Emperor through Zulfiqar Khan.⁵⁶ With the fall of Jinji and other forts in Karnatak the major Maratha forces were withdrawn to Maharashtra and the political balance of power in the Deccan was upset.

The English record is a barometer for comprehending the comparative strength of the Mughals and the Marathas in Karnatak. When Jinji was lost to the Mughals, it appeared for some time that the Maratha power in Karnatak had been extinguished. Till then the English could manage their affairs by befriending both the Mughals and the Marathas. Many a time the English did not help the Mughals in their adversity. Nevertheless, the Mughals could not go beyond the verbal threats. The reason for their deliberate neglect was that they had been engaged in the struggle with the Marathas. Secondly, they used to get guns and gun-powder from the English. However, after the fall of Jinji and Rajaram's departure to Maharashtra, the Mughals took the English to task. In the second week of February, 1698, Zulfiqar Khan sent a letter to them and demand-

55. Ibid., p.38

56. MA-JS, p.238

ed the delivery of Cuddalore and Tegnapatam (12 m.s. of Pondi-cherry) to Gazanafar Khan, the new killedar of Jinji. The said places were mortgaged by the Marathas to the English in 1690. They were now included in the jagir of Gazanafar Khan.⁵⁷ The English learnt through their envoy at the Mughal camp that Zulfiqar Khan would settle the business of Tegnapatam provided he got 10,000 pagodas (March 28, 1698).⁵⁸ However, the Khan does not seem to have pressed for the demand.

After the capture of Jinji, Daud Khan wanted to carry on the conquest of Karnatak. But Zulfiqar Khan was not enthusiastic about the conquest of the regions further.⁵⁹ Vellore was still in the possession of the Marathas. The Emperor now ordered the Khan to capture it and then proceed against Tanjore (June 16, 1698).⁶⁰ The Khan seems to have invested the fort of Vellore immediately after receiving the imperial order. However, the fort was stoutly defended by the Marathas. The Khan had to fall back to Arcot (c. December 6, 1698).⁶¹

A reference to "the near approach of the Morattas Army" is found in the 'Fort St. David Consultations', dated December 23, 1698.⁶² Soon, in the beginning of January, 1699 Rajaram

57. DC, 1698, p.17

58. Ibid., p.32

59. Ibid., 1698, p.22

60. LFG, 1698, p.75

61. FDC, 1698, p.162

62. Ibid., p.171

set out on the expedition to Karnatak region. However, he did not seem to have proceeded beyond the river Tungabhadra. Hence, reference to his arrival in the Karnatak region is not found in the English Records. However, the Maratha bands under anonymous commanders seem roving in the Jinji region. The English from Fort St. George write on January 20, 1699, to the Dy. Governor of Fort St. David, "you write about the Moratta's coming into those parts; at first they were represented to be very formidable ... It is said that Dydarbux (Bidar Bakht) the Mogull Grandson is coming into these parts."⁶³ In February, 1699, Bidar Bakht came with an army to expel the Marathas from the region. He also met Zulfiqar Khan.⁶⁴ Regarding his movements no further details are available.

Sarkar writes that Zulfiqar Khan started for the imperial camp in Maharashtra on April 25, 1699.⁶⁵ However, from the following English report of May 2, 1699, it is evident that the Khan was in the Jinji region in May 1699 : "it being reported that Zulphaker Cawn is ordered to come against this place (Fort St. George) and several great officers have lately come near it under pretence of coming to see the sea."⁶⁶ The English further note on June 3, 1699 that the Khan has been recalled by the Emperor and that he has been 'seemingly' preparing for the journey.⁶⁷ It seems that the Khan left for the imperial camp in June, 1699.

63. LFG, 1699, p.2

64. Ibid., p.7

65. HA, V, p.90

66. LFG, 1699, p.26

67. Ibid., p.34

Part- XIMughal-Maratha Struggle in Maharashtra : 1698-17001) Rajaram, Active and Enterprising

On February 22, 1698, Rajaram with his family arrived from Karnatak at Vishalgad.¹ He did not stay for a long time at the fort. His queen Rajashai was pregnant. Therefore, she was kept in the fort. Soon, Rajaram set out on the expedition of north Konkan with Tarabai and Shivaji II (c. April 10, 1698).² The purpose of the expedition seems to be to inspect the forts, their provisions, and the general administration in north Konkan. While coming back to Vishalgad, he halted at Pratapgad and worshipped Goddess Bhavani. At Helwak, he got a pleasant news of the birth of a son, Sambhaji (c. Last week of May, 1698). From here, he sent Tarabai and Shivaji II along with Girjoji Yadav to the fort of Parli and himself went to Vishalgad for

1. SCP-GPS, p.66

2. No details of the expedition are available. However, it is referred to in the authentic documents of the Yadav Records (TKR, pp.198 & 477).

At this time the Emperor was on his ramjan visit to Sholapur. On April 2, 1698, Prince Bidar Bakht, who was summoned from Dehadvurgad, met him. The Prince was sent on the expedition of the Panhala region where Rajaram was reported to have arrived from Jinji. (MA-JS, p.239; SCP-GPS, p.66).

the barase³ of his son (c. First week of June, 1698). After celebrating the barase at Vishalgad, he left for Parli⁴ and from there went to Satara along with Tarabai and Shivaji⁵ (c. Last week of July).

In September 1698, Rajaram sent his envoy, Annaji, to the imperial camp and sued the Emperor for peace. However, the Emperor did not respond to his peace-overture.⁶

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3. Ceremony of naming.

4. On July 5, 1698, Rajaram was at Vasantgad on his way to Parli (MIS, XXI-B, p.112).

5. TKK, pp.477-478

6. HA, V, p.107

About this time, Rajaram was reported to have played a trick upon the Emperor. Manucci gives very interesting account of it :

Rajaram gave out that Abdul Hasan, a captive king of the Golconda State, had escaped from the prison at Daulatabad and the Marathas had carried him off to their territory. He, further, declared that the Maratha army had been making preparations to restore him to his kingdom and wrote letters to the ex-officers of the Golconda State, then in the imperial service. He appealed to them to join their master. Many Golconda officers, including Purdillah Khan, deserted the Mughals and handed over the forts in their charge to the Marathas. A great anxiety was caused in the imperial court. Consequently, the Emperor had to withdraw Abul Hasan from Daulatabad and send him to Gwalior - (SM, III, pp.192-193).

Hitherto the historians of the Maratha History only knew Rajaram's journey of 1689 in Karnatak and that has been considered his first and last journey in Karnatak. But the close scrutiny of both the old and recently published sources reveals his second journey (expedition) in Karnatak from November, 1698 to March 1699. Both Sarkar and Sardesai refer to the subsequent expedition of Rajaram in south Konkan, but do not mention the said expedition of 1698-99 in Karnatak.⁷

A clear mention of his first journey (flight) and the second journey (expedition) is made in the documents of the Yadav Family.⁸ A note in the Gadadhar Pralhad Shakawali also says that in the month of margashirshya, shak 1620, Rajaram went from Khelna towards Jinji.⁹

Rajaram seems to have set out on the Karnatak expedition in the first week of November 1698. On November 15, the English from Bombay report to London, "We lately heard that Rama Rajah is again gone to Chindee, but whether the report is true or not we do not know....." ¹⁰

7. HA, V, p.107; SR, p.88

8. TTK, pp.198, 216, 366-367

9. Margashirshya, Shak, 1620 = November 23, 1698 to December 22, 1698. (SCP-GPS, p.66)

10. CRM, p.208

It is already seen that the Gadadhar Pralhad Shakawali says that Rajaram set out on the Karnatak expedition from Khelna (Vishalgad). But, Girjoji Yadav, who was an eye witness to Rajaram's departure to Karnatak, says in his statement that Rajaram started from Satara for Karnatak.¹¹ From the above mentioned two sources, it appears that Rajaram left Satara and came down to Vishalgad and thence moved into Karnatak.

While passing by the State of Sondha, Rajaram sent a letter to its chief, Sadashiv Naik (January 1, 1699). He writes that he is going with his army to the Karnatak Prant (Madras Karnatak?) and has appointed Ramchandrapant Amatya as a sole administrator in Maharashtra. He further adds that if required, the Naik should send his envoy and contingent to the Pant, and assures him that he would assent to the treaties to be made by him with the Pant.¹²

A route of the expedition is not known. Neither its purpose nor its outcome is mentioned anywhere. However, it may be surmised that Rajaram once again wanted to divert the Emperor's attention from Maharashtra to Karnatak. To some extent he was successful in his purpose. On learning his activities in Karnatak, the Emperor despatched Prince Bidar Bakht to pursue him. The Shakawali says that Rajaram fought

11. TKK, p.479

12. SCS, III, pp.86-87

a battle with the Prince near Gadag.¹³ Unfortunately, its outcome is not mentioned.

In this expedition, Rajaram does not seem to have gone beyond the Tungabhadra. He returned to Panhala by March 5, 1699. From Panhala, he went to Vishalgad where he brought Tarabai and Shivaji II from Parli.¹⁴

In April 1699, Rajaram again set out on another expedition. It was in south Konkan. On April 8, 1699, he writes to one Naro Pandit, "The swami has recently come from the Karnatak prant to this region (the Vishalgad region). The swami would soon start for the region of Vijaydurg."¹⁵ Soon, he seems to have descended in south Konkan. On May 2, 1699, he writes to Naro Pandit, "The swami is going to Rajapur and thence he would come to Prabhanavali."¹⁶ In this expedition, he seems to have inspected the forts in the region of south Konkan and studied their defence preparations. From south Konkan, he came back to Pratapgad by the middle of June 1699. On June 18, he was at Pratapgad and granted Nilkantha Bhat an additional saramjam for the worship

13. SCP-GFS, p.66

14. TIKK, pp.198, 366-367

Shivaji II's letter, dated 11, 1712, mentions that Rajaram stayed on the day of the Moon eclipse (March 5, 1699) at Panhala on his return journey from Karnatak (Ibid.).

15. BD, I, p.95

16. MIS, VIII, p.38

of Goddess Bhavani.¹⁷ He also celebrated the jawal¹⁸ ceremony of his second son, Sambhaji, at the fort. Thereafter, he went to Satara. From Satara he came down to Vasantgad via Parli, where he brought Tarabai and Shivaji II from Vishalgad¹⁹ (July).

On July 26, it was reported to the Emperor that Rajaram had left Satara for Vasantgad and that his sardars Ambaji and others had been encamping at Dewari village with 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry. An imperial order was immediately sent to Chin Qalich Khan to march upon the Maratha camp and crush them. The Khan was then encamping at Ahmadnagar.²⁰ It is not known whether he advanced against the Marathas as per the order of the Emperor. Probably, the Maratha horsemen must have dispersed before the arrival of the Khan. Rajaram stayed on Vasantgad for 15 days and later on left for Satara (First week of August 1699).²¹ Thus, Rajaram appears to have spent the first half of the year 1699 in visiting forts and regions and making the best preparations for their defence. He seems to have also made preparations for a campaign to be undertaken in the Mughal territories after the rainy season (i.e. October 1699).

17. SCS, X, p.42

18. The ceremony of clipping the hair of a child before its head is shaved.

19. TKK, pp.548-549

For the first time, Rajaram's abovementioned movements, excepting his expedition in south Konkan, in the first half of 1699, are made known from the Yadav Records.

20. ADA, VIII, Yr. 43, pp.174-175

21. ADM, Yr. 43, p.124a

2) Plundering Activities of the Marathas : 1698

In March 1698, Shankaraji Narayan and other 15 Maratha commanders marched upon the region of Aurangabad. They blocked the roads, stopped the trade and pillaged the region. Upon learning these turbulent activities of the Marathas, Matbar Khan, a loyal and enterprising Mughal commander in the Nasik region, collected some force and sent it under Muhammad Sadiq and one Raghuji towards Aurangabad to expel the Marathas (March 20). When the Mughals came to Kannad (30 m.n. of Aurangabad), they learnt that the Marathas had spread around Khuldabad (16 m.n.w. of Aurangabad) and intended to plunder that town. Immediately, the Mughals marched upon them and attacked them vehemently. Later on, Matabar Khan, reporting about the outcome of the battle, writes to Asad Khan that the Mughals defeated the Marathas who, eventually, took to flight (April 4).²²

In March, Karwar was attacked by the Maratha navy. 300 Marathas with 22 gallivats²³ appeared in the river and

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22. NB, Nov.69, pp.58-59

23. Bal Krishna writes, "Such a vessel is described by Orme as a large row-boat with two masts rarely exceeding seventy tons ... these used to carry six to eight pieces of cannon from two to four pounders; they had 40 to 50 oars and were rowed at the speed of four miles an hour - (SG, p.91).

landed at a distance of 1/2 mile from the English factory. The Marathas attacked the town and plundered its market place and most of its parts. They carried away "all things met with any value." Later on, the Marathas moved upward and plundered some other places also. Next night they went out of the river without any opposition.²⁴

From the English Records, it is evident that in 1698 the Marathas attacked Burhanpur, the famous city of the Mughals and plundered it. On August 1, 1698, the English from Bombay write to Surat, "We hear ... that Rama Rajah's forces have lately robbed Birrahampur of 18 lack of rupees..."²⁵ A report from the English at Surat to London confirms the news : "We are often alarmed with the news of the approaching of some (of) Rama Rajah's troops, who lately plundered Brampur and burnt a town of the Portuguese near this place (Surat). Some of his forces were near Ramnagar about a mile off. They plunder near the King's (Emperor's) camp and force from the poor people the contribution of a quarter part of the revenue..."²⁶ (December 5, 1698).

Khafi Khan also gives an account of the Maratha attack on Burhanpur in the year 1698. According to him Nemaji Shinde,

24. CRM, p.242

25. Ibid., p.306

26. Ibid., p.307

Dhanaji and other sardars of the Marathas marched with a big force upon Burhanpur and laid a siege to it. Najabat Khan, the Mughal subhedar and other Mughal officials made many sorties and fought the Marathas for three days. Later on, the Marathas abandoned the siege and went away in the direction of the sarkar of Vijaygad. They intended to march into Malwa. But, Firuz Jang, who seems to have been in that region, hotly pursued the Marathas and routed them. On learning the victory of Firuz Jang, the Emperor sent him a letter under his own signature and uplauded his valour.²⁷ Thus, according to Khafi Khan, the Marathas attacked Burhanpur but could not plunder it. Subsequently, Khafi Khan tells the story of the Maratha attack on Nandurbar. He writes that, soon, Nemaji Shinde, with 8,000 cavalry, advanced to the pargana of Nandurbar. Nemaji attacked and burnt down several villages in the region. Husain Ali Khan was the Mughal officer of the region. When he learnt about the raids of the Marathas, he marched on Nemaji from Thalner, east of Nandurbar. At that time, Nemaji was engaged in the looting operation of Nandurbar. He at once suspended it and proceeded to fight the Khan. The Marathas were numerically superior to the Mughals. The Khan had only 700 to 800 horse and 2,000 to 3,000 musketeers and archers. A fierce action was fought at four miles from Thalner. 300 Mughals were slain. The Marathas encircled the Khan who received two-three serious wounds and finally fell down from his elephant. The Marathas immediately

27. MM-SP, p.39

seized him with many others and took them as prisoners. The Khan's baggage and elephants were captured. The Marathas demanded a ransom of two lacs of rupees. The Khan could raise only one lac and eight thousand from his jagir and property at Thalner. He requested the sarrafs and merchants of Nandurbar to loan him the remaining amount of ninety-two thousand. But they refused to help him out of predicament. Similarly, the inhabitants of Nandurbar had even refused to pay the chauth to the Marathas and thus offended them. The Khan too was annoyed with defiant inhabitants. He, therefore, entered into an understanding with the Marathas that they should besiege the city (Nandurbar) for a day or two. He would wage a mock warfare to defend the city and then would open its gates. It was also agreed that the Marathas should not harass the rayats but torture the wealthy persons till they recovered the balance. The Marathas executed the plan quite well. They could squeeze out one lac and forty thousand, more than what was due to them. The Khan too, collected for himself a sum of Rs.30,000 (1698).²⁸

3) Emperor on the Grand Campaign

The Emperor had encamped at Brahmapuri on the banks of the Bhima since May 20, 1695. He had selected this site in order to keep a watch on the Mughal-Maratha struggle and supervise the movements and activities of his armies both in

Maharashtra and Karnatak. It was here that a new town, had come up. Most of the imperialists thought that they would never move far away from it. So, they built beautiful mansions and houses there. But the mission of the Emperor remained unfulfilled. Rajaram had escaped from Jinji which had been besieged for years together by his brave general Zulfiqar Khan. The escape of Rajaram from Jinji dealt a severe blow to his designs of annexing the Maratha State to the Empire. The Maratha activities no doubt subsided in Karnatak but they were vigorously renewed in Western India under the leadership of the Maratha King himself.²⁹

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29. Manucci gives an interesting account of the Maratha plundering activities in the first half of the year 1699 : "At this date of writing which is the twenty-first of May in one thousand six hundred and ninety-nine my spies, who arrived at four O' clock in the after-noon, bring me letters from the army and inform me that the royal camp was in great difficulty and confusion. The reason is that another rebel has joined (the Mahrattahs). He is called Chanda, a Hindu Prince. They have invested the camp, and are carrying off the treasure coming in for the army from Hindustan, blocking the roads and the defeating the forces sent against them." (SM, II, p.232). The above-cited account of the Maratha activities is doubtlessly contemporary. However, "Chanda, a Hindu Prince" is not known otherwise in history.

Both the Mughal generals and soldiers were tired of the continuous warfare, since the coming of the Emperor to the Deccan. They were fed up with the undying desire of the Emperor to subdue the Deccan, especially the Maratha State. On the contrary, the Emperor had realised that his orders and plans were not faithfully executed by his generals. Therefore, he thought that he should himself undertake the campaign to subjugate the Marathas and conquer their hilly forts in Maharashtra; because he knew that the hill-forts were the bases of the Maratha power.

At Brahmavari he had already constructed a fortalice of stones and plaster to house himself and the royal family. Subsequently, he ordered the immediate construction of three-mile-wall around it in order to protect all the families from the onslaughts of the Marathas. The order was promptly executed in 15 days only. Zinat-un-nissa Begam, sister of Prince Azam, Udaipuri, queen of Aurangzeb, other ladies of the royal family, and the families of the common people were housed in this enclosed base. The Prime-minister, Asad Khan, himself was asked to protect the base with a considerable force. Orders were issued that no soldier of any rank, higher or low, should take his women with him in the campaign. But the orders could not be executed strictly and many took their women with them. On October 19, 1699, the imperial army, personally led by the Emperor, set out on the campaign and arrived at Miraj (c. November 9, 1699) on its way to Vasantgad. Prince Azam had been summoned from Pedgaon to join the Emperor. The

Prince joined him at Miraj. There the Emperor learnt that Rajaram had already set out on the expedition towards Berar. He forthwith sent his grandson Bidar Bakht to chase him.³⁰

While on his way to Miraj the Emperor played a hoax on Ramchandrapant and Parashuram Trimbak the veteran statesmen of the Marathas. He wrote 2 letters to them and saw to it that the letter meant for Ramchandrapant would fall into the hands of Parashuram Trimbak and vice versa. Both the letters bear the same date, i.e. October 31, 1699. A letter to the Pant reads : "The Emperor has read the Pant's letter, addressed to Tarbiyat Khan. All the requests made therein by the Pant are granted. The Pant should loyally serve the imperial cause. He should banish Rajaram and hand-over his forts to the Mughals. He shall receive the highest honour, any Maratha has ever received. If the Pant does not behave as promised he and the members of his family shall be put to death."³¹ A letter to Parashuram Trimbak reads : "The imperial army, marching to conquer the forts of Rajaram, would conquer all his forts and places. He would be captured and put to death like his brother. If Parashuram Trimbak surrenders the fort of Panhala, he shall be bestowed upon high rank and kind favours. If he does not, he and his family shall be put to death."³²

30. MA-JS, p.248; MA-SP, p.73; MM-ED, pp.363-364;

MM-SP, pp.41-42

31. KS, pp.71-72; PGI, pp.146-147

32. Ibid.

The Emperor's trick failed. Both Ramchandrapant and Parashuram Trimbak were quite astute and realised what the Emperor was upto. Both remained unwavering in their loyalty to their King and the State.

Before proceeding to Vasantgad, the Emperor despatched Ruhullah Khan and Hamiduddin to ravage the regions of Satara and Panhala. He ordered them not to leave any vestige of human habitation in the region between Panhala and Satara.³³ Further, he asked Lutfullah Khan to join the force of Ruhullah Khan. Lutfullah Khan in his letter to Bahramand Khan writes that the imperial forces have ravaged the regions and fought Ramchandra-pant who intercepted their forces in the thick forests. The Marathas were reported to have fought vigorously, but were made to flee with a heavy casualty.³⁴ The battle seems to have taken place somewhere in the region of Panhala (November, 1609).

When the Emperor came to the neighbourhood of Karad, he was informed that an old mosque ^{near} Karad was without a lamp and the imperial out-post there had been destroyed by the Marathas. He went four miles in that direction and said two-fold prayers in the mosque. He ordered to populate the place and restore the out-post. Then he proceeded to Masur, six miles east of Vasantgad and encamped there.³⁵

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33. MA-SP, p.73; MA-JS, p.249; MM-SP, p.43

34. LP, pp.124-125

35. MA-JS, p.249; MM-SP, p.43

The Emperor ordered Tarbiyat Khan to besiege Vasantgad and assault it. The Khan deployed artillery-men and guns opposite to the gate of the fort and started firing. The garrison, too, began heavy bombardment. On learning that the Marathas resisted valiantly, the Emperor advanced from Masur and encamped on the bank of the Krishna, just opposite to the fort. The Emperor was firm in his mind and the strength of the garrison was no match to the might of the Mughal army. The Marathas capitulated and the Emperor allowed them to vacate the fort. They left it under the cover of darkness. Next morning, the Mughal army took its possession. The fort was renamed as Kilid-i-Fath (i.e. Key of Victory) (November 25, 1699). The Mughals got buried treasure, provisions and weapons in the fort.³⁶ On November 29, the Emperor himself visited the fort. He saw a temple there.³⁷ It was immediately demolished as per his orders.³⁸

4) Rajaram's Counter Campaign

Rajaram spent the rainy-season of 1699 at Satara, hatching his plans for an extensive campaign in the Mughal

36. MA-JS, p.249; MA-SP, p.74; MM-ED, p.364; MM-SP, p.43

37. Probably, it is a temple of God Chandoba. It seems that the temple was rebuilt by the Marathas when they recaptured the fort. A mutilated idol of Chandoba is still seen in the temple.

38. ADA, VIII, Yr. 43, p.38

territories. He learnt at Satara that the Emperor had himself set out on an expedition to conquer the forts in Maharashtra. Considering the strength of the Mughal army led personally by the Emperor, it was futile to give a pitched battle. Hence, Rajaram thought of a strategy to open a front in the Mughal territories of north and south and attack them with all the might he had. This would naturally divert the Emperor's attention and his forces too. The Marathas rose to the occasion and various bands under the able commanders were organized to attack the imperial territories. Their exploits are narrated in the foregoing pages. Rajaram seems to have an inkling of the Emperor's impending attack on Satara. As a precautionary measure, he sent away his family to Vishalgad for safety.³⁹ And soon he set out on the expedition of Khandesh-Berar with 7,000 cavalry (October 26, 1699).⁴⁰ In his army were the notable Maratha commanders, such as Dhanaji, Dado Malhar, Parsoji Bhosale, Haibat Rao Nimbalkar, Nemaji Shinde, Kanoji Angre, Khanderao Dabhade and others.⁴¹ Rajaram had asked Ranoji Ghorpade, son of Santaji, to stay at the foot of Satara with

39. TKK, p.199

On August 24, 1699, it was reported to the Emperor that Rajaram had been staying on the fort of Satara and had designs to set out on the expedition towards Surat. It was further reported that he wanted to send away his family to Khelna (Vishalgad) - ADM, Yr.43, p.149a; ADA, Vol.VIII, Yr.43, p.149a

40. HA, V, p.108

41. B-PB, p.39; DGI, p.28

a force of 4,000. Rajaram first came to Chandan-Wandan (a twin fort, 10 m.n.e. of Satara). There, he sojourned for some three to four days. On October 31, 1699, he started for the Adarki pass (about 15 m.n.e. of Chandan), where an army of 12,000 joined him. Then he began to move in the north direction.⁴²

At that time, the Emperor was encamping at Miraj on his way to Vasantgad. When he learnt of the impending penetration of the Maratha army into the imperial territory, he immediately sent orders to Bidar Bakht to pursue the enemy. The Prince was on his way to Panhala and was at the distance of 20 miles West of Miraj. When he received the orders of the Emperor, he sent his family and baggage to Miraj and hastened in the pursuit of the Marathas. Zulfiqar Khan and Chin Qalich Khan, the two renowned commanders of the Mughals, were in the regions of Sholapur and Aurangabad, respectively. The Emperor ordered them also to reinforce the Prince by forced marches.⁴³

42. HA, V, p.108

Immediately, after Rajaram's departure from Satara fort, the envoys of Bakht Buland, the rebel Gond chief of Deogad, met him on his way and requested him to penetrate his army into Gondwana, thereby causing a diversion in the rear of imperial army in the Deccan. No source, throwing light on Rajaram's reply to him, is available- (Ibid.)

43. MA-JS, p.248; HA, V, p.109

Bakht Buland, the zamindar of Deogad, whose envoys had met Rajaram earlier at Satara, now openly deserted the imperial cause and joined the Marathas in their plundering campaign.⁴⁴

The Prince must have advanced against Rajaram with forced marches, while, Rajaram, it seems, was slow in his movements. The Prince confronted him in the region, north of the Nira river, (probably in the region between Baramati and Shrigonda). A severe battle ensued. The Marathas were reported to have taken to flight, leaving their camp and baggage behind. When the Emperor learnt the news of the Mughal victory, he sent rewards to the Prince and the brave warriors in his army such as Khan-i-Alam and Sarafraz Khan.⁴⁵

Soon ~~he~~ the Marathas, under Rajaram, seem to have turned towards the East, with Bidar Bakht, on their heels. Both the armies arrived in the region of Parenda. Meanwhile, Zulfiqar Khan had left his baggage at Sholapur and joined the Prince at Charthana.⁴⁶ Soon, the two armies clashed with each other in the environs of Parenda. A force under Dhanaji marched against the Prince, while Rajaram himself encamped 12 miles east of Parenda. In a severe battle that followed, the Mughals defeated the Marathas who were forced to flee towards Ahmadnagar (November).⁴⁷

44. MM-ED, p.364; MM-SP, p.42

45. MA-JS, pp.249-250; MA-SP, p.74

46. TD, p.143

47. HA, V, p.109

It seems that after this defeat the Maratha commanders dispersed helter skelter. Some of them fled to the east. Chin Qalich Khan, who had joined the Prince at Barsi, went in their pursuit upto Ausa (55 m.e. of Barsi).⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Rajaram had decided to abandon the campaign. He crossed the Bhima near Tembhurni (55 m.n.w. of Sholapur) and took the route back to his home.⁴⁹ The Prince and Zulfikar Khan pursued him, but they seem to have left the pursuit in the mid and returned to the imperial camp before Satara (December 26, 1699). They received many favours from the Emperor.⁵⁰ Rajaram seems to have first come to Sinhgad and thence to Rajgad. He arrived at Vishalgad at the end of December, 1699.⁵¹

Thus, it is obvious that Rajaram's campaign was a failure. His forces were defeated again and again by Prince Bidar Bakht and other Mughal commanders. It must be admitted that Rajaram could not achieve anything in his last campaign. We have no Marathi records to know the brave deeds of the

48. Ibid.

49. TD, p.143

50. SCP-GPS, p.67; MA-JS, p.255; MA-SP, p.75

51. SCP-GPS, p.67

On December 26, 1699, it was reported to the Emperor that Rajaram had alighted 15 kos from the imperial camp and intended to go to Khelana (Vishalgad) - (ADM, Yr. 43, p.60b).

Marathas; nor do we know the causes of their miserable failure. It should be noted that Rajaram had more than 20,000 army which included the brave commanders like Dhanaji, Nemaji Shinde and Khanderao Dabhade. And hence, it is surprising that he was twice defeated and forced to abandon the campaign. It may be surmised that his ill-health, which caused his death two months after, must have compelled the Marathas to leave campaign to the winds.

5) Maratha Attack on Brahmapuri

Malhar Ramrao's account of Rajaram's activities in Maharashtra during 1699-1700 is full of inconsistencies. He seems to be ignorant about the fact that Rajaram led the campaign in the Mughal territories, while the Emperor had already set out on the campaign of conquering the Maratha forts in Maharashtra. Malhar Ramrao writes that the Emperor left Burhanpur and encamped at Aurangabad, where Rajaram attacked the imperial camp in order to effect the release of Shahu. He gives a detailed description of the attack.⁵² However, it should be noted that the Emperor had left Aurangabad in 1693 and never returned to that city in his life.⁵³

V.S. Bendre seems to have accepted a statement in a yadi of 1718 that Rajaram attacked the imperial camp at Aurangabad, where the Emperor was encamping, along with Shahu and Yesubai. Bendre has placed the event in the beginning of

52. RC-MR, pp.79-82

53. HSM, p.191

January 1700.⁵⁴ It is a fact that the Emperor was encamping before the fort of Satara from December 8, 1699 to April 30, 1700. Hence, the statement in the yadi is certainly erroneous.

Sardesai gives Brahmapuri in place of Aurangabad. He writes that Rajaram crossed the Bhima near Tembhurni and attacked the imperial camp at Brahmapuri. He further states that Rajaram's intention was to set Shahu free; but that was not materialized.⁵⁵ Sardesai does not render any source for his statement. It should be noted that Shahu was not at Brahmapuri. He was in the camp of the Emperor before Satara.⁵⁶ And Rajaram must be knowing his whereabouts. Thus, the story of Rajaram's attack on the imperial camp at Aurangabad or at Brahmapuri, while returning from the campaign, is not borne out by historical facts.

However, in 1699 the Marathas did attack the imperial camp at Brahmapuri; and they were led not by Rajaram, but by his senapati, Dhanaji Jadhav. It appears that while returning from his campaign Rajaram dispatched a big force under Dhanaji to Brahmapuri. Dhanaji descended upon the camp and plundered it (c. December 18, 1699). In this context a curious and interesting letter has been brought to light by A.G. Pawar. The letter, dated December 22, 1699, is written by Parashuram Trimbak, the Prime-minister of the Maratha State, to Vithoji

54. CSM, p.659

55. SR, p.89

56. HSM, p.191

Babar, the deshmukh of kasaba Naneghol. It may not be out of place to reproduce the important and relevant portion of the letter here. It reads, "Presently, Aurangzeb himself has encamped at the fort of Satara (with an intention to capture it). In such circumstances, you should remain loyal to the cause (of the Marathas) and stand the test of time. The swami (Rajaram) has lately arrived with his army at Sinhagad and dispatched the whole army against Aurangzeb. (Recently) Jadhavrao Senapati (Dhanaji), Malharrao (?), Jayaji Shinde, Parsoji Rhosale and others have marched in the direction of Brahmapuri and made a surprise attack on the imperial camp there. They captured a begam, the daughter of the Padshah, and also the families of some high Mughal officials. About 10,000 lambans⁵⁷ were taken captive. Now, they (Dhanaji and other Maratha commanders) have come with 40,000 army towards Vardhangad (in the Satara region). Hanmantrao and Khandoji Thorat have also come with 15,000 to 20,000 army towards Chandan-Wandan (10 m.n.e. of Satara) ... Upon hearing the news of these activities of the Marathas, the enemy is demoralized. Satara is fighting courageously and cares a fig for the enemy. By the grace of God, Aurangzeb is going to be defeated."⁵⁸

Fortunately, two other supporting evidences, useful to varify the above mentioned Maratha attack on the imperial camp

57. Lamban or Laman - A caste. They are carriers of grain, salt etc. ((MED, p.709)

58. RR, Yr. 22, Iss. 260-262, pp.8-9

at Brahmapuri, are available. The first is a note from the Gadadhar Prahlad Shakawali. It says, "In the month of paushya, Shak 1621,⁵⁹ Dhanaji marched upon Brahmapuri and plundered the camp."⁶⁰ The second is a narration in the Tarikhe Dilkusha by Bhimsen Saxena. Bhimsen writes, "When, upon his unsuccessful campaign, Rajaram set on his return journey to home, he sent Dhanaji and other commanders to attack the imperial camp at Brahmapuri. They made resolute attacks on the camp. But for Zulfiqar Khan's timely arrival, the Marathas would certainly have played havoc there. On the day of attack, Zulfiqar Khan reached Brahmapuri and the Marathas marched away towards Satara. The Khan went in their pursuit up to Rahimatpur and thence to Miraj. But the Marathas soon turned back and approached near the imperial camp at the foot of Satara."⁶¹ (December 1699)

The above-cited three sources unanimously agree on one point. That is, the Maratha army, sent by Rajaram and led by Dhanaji, attacked the imperial camp at Brahmapuri. While Parashuram Trimbak's letter renders some important details of the Maratha attack and its outcome, the other two sources are very brief in their narrations. It should be noted that Gadadhar Prahlad Shakawali and Tarikhe Dilkusha are silent on the capture of the begam and families of the high Mughal officers

59. December 12, 1699 to January 10, 1700.

60. SCP-GPS, p.67

61. TD, pp.143-144

by the Marathas. Nowhere, except the aforesaid letter of Parashuram Trimbak, in any available sources, the mention to the capture of the Mughal Princess is found. However, the fact, that it is mentioned in a letter of the Prime-minister of the Maratha State, does bear some importance and that can not be overlooked. Commenting upon the contents and veracity of the letter Pawar writes, "The critics may argue that the Marathas might not have captured the daughter of the Emperor; but the rumour itself might have broken or even it might have been spread intentionally. If we are reluctant to accept the aforesaid statement of the Prime-minister of the Maratha State, a natural question arises as to why one should trust the writings of other contemporaries. Hence, from the research point of view, it is inappropriate to entertain such dubious questions. Setting aside such guess-work, therefore, one should accept unhesitatingly the bare fact in the letter that the daughter of the Emperor, who had sent a big army to capture Rajaram, was enveloped and captured by the Marathas."⁶²

Pawar's contention holds some ground. However, the reference to the capture of the Mughal Princess, is not intelligible. What happened to her afterwards? Why was she not kept as a hostage for the release of Yesubai and Shahu? These and similar other questions remain unsolved and hence the capture of the Princess remains a riddle in the history of the Marathas.

62. RR, Yr. 23, Iss. 265, pp.11-12

6) Other Maratha Activities : 1699-1700

It is already seen that after the attack on Brahmapuri, the Maratha army approached the imperial camp at the foot of Satara. The Marathas soon fell upon the camp and ravaged its market place. The Mughals could not successfully repulse the Maratha attack.⁶³ Henceforth, the imperial camps both at Brahmapuri and at the foot of Satara remained under the constant fear of the Maratha attack. Three divisions of Dhanaji's army had spread in the environs of Brahmapuri and were constantly plundering the region around the imperial camp. Asad Khan, who was left in charge of defence of the camp, had often to go out to chase away the Maratha bands. At the foot of Satara, the besieging Mughal army was practically besieged by the Maratha field armies. The Mughals were compelled to send their foraging parties under the strong escort commanded by the high nobles on successive days.⁶⁴

The aforesaid letter of Parashuram Trimbak makes a reference to two more battles of the Marathas, probably in the region of Satara. In the first battle, the Marathas fought Sangram Khan, the son of Nyahar Khan, routed his troops and captured him. They carried off the Khan, along with his 3 elephants. In the second battle with Daud Khan, they defeated him, and made prize of 3 elephants and 700 to 800 mares⁶⁵ (third

63. TD, p.144

64. IHRC, IV, p.6

65. RR, Yr. 22, Iss. 260-262, pp.8-9

week of December 1699). On December 19, 1699, the Marathas achieved another victory over the Mughals. Ghorī Khan, a foujdar of Karad was on his way to Karad from the imperial camp at the foot of Satara. He was attacked, defeated and subsequently captured by the Maratha force of 3,000. This skirmish took place between Rahimatpur and Masur.⁶⁶ Perhaps, the force was led by Dhanaji Jadhav. Because, soon on December 21, he confronted Hamiduddin Khan, a brave and active Mughal commander, in the very environs of Masur. The Khan inflicted two defeats on Dhanaji, killing his colleague Dado Malhar in the fights. The Khan was also successful in rescuing Ghorī Khan from the Maratha captivity. The Mughal newsletter says that there were heavy losses on both sides. Later on, the Marathas retreated.⁶⁷

Iklas Khan, one of the Mughal officials, was sent out for patrolling from the imperial camp at the foot of Satara. On December 27, four miles from the camp, he was enveloped by Hanmantrao Nimbalkar and slain along with his son, Muhammad Yar and many of his followers. The Marathas plundered his baggage and carried it off. When the Emperor learnt the news of the Khan, he was very much annoyed and on December 30, despatched 5 high nobles to pursue the Maratha bands. However, the Marathas had already dispersed and scattered around the imperial camp at a distance of 4 to 5 miles.⁶⁸

66. IHRC, IV, pp.6-7

67. Ibid., p.7

68. Ibid.

To the south, Rajaram had sent Bahirji Ghorpade, brother of Santaji, with a big force. A zamindar of Hubli who was hostile to the Mughals invited Bahirji to assault the fort of Hubli. Both of them ravaged the region. Later on, Bahirji was imprisoned by the enemy near Ramdari, while his force which included Bahirav, Kedarji Suryavanshi, Bhanji Raghunath, Appaji Suro, Jiwaji Shinde, Sarjerao, Bhalerao, Vithoji Salgar, Jiwaji Makav and Bal Prabhu, encamped at a distance of two miles from the fort of Hubli for three months. The Marathas gave a severe fight and conquered the kasaba of Hubli and ravaged the crops in the region.⁶⁹ (c.1699). From his activities in the later period, it is obvious that Bahirji managed to escape from the captivity.

About this time, i.e. 1699-1700, a great event took place in history of the Marathas. For the first time in their history a Maratha force of 15,000 horse, led by a brave Maratha commander Krishna Savant, crossed the Narbada and entered the province of Malwa. The Marathas plundered the region of Dhamuni and returned home. Bhimsen Saxena aptly remarks that ever since the period of the Sultanate, the Marathas had never crossed the Narbada.⁷⁰ It was really a proud achievement of the Marathas and their commander, Krishnaji. Its credit, to a certain extent, goes to Rajaram who was their king.

Zulfiqar Khan had come to the Satara region and set in the pursuit of Dhanaji, Ranoji Ghorpade and Hanmantrao Nimbalkar.

69. SCS, VI, pp.8 & 97, TD, p.143

70. TD, p.143

These Maratha commanders had rallied a force of 15,000 cavalry and encamped near Rahimatpur. The Khan had renowned commanders such as Daud Khan, Rao Dalpat Bundela and Ramsing Hada in his army. The Khan soon attacked the Marathas in the environs of Rahimatpur and a fierce battle ensued. Two more Mughal commanders, Bahramand Khan and Hamiduddin Khan timely arrived at the scene. Eventually, the Marathas got defeated and lost 500 of their men (January 10, 1700). The Emperor was so much irritated by the Maratha activities that he ordered to erect a pyramid of the severed heads of the Marathas. For the execution of his order a special officer was sent from the imperial camp before Satara.⁷¹

A few days later, Dhanaji attacked the Mughal out-post of Khanapur and captured its thanedar, Avaji Adhal. The Emperor immediately sent Zulfiqar Khan to the rescue of Avaji, but the Khan arrived late. Later on, on January 25, 1700, the Khan encountered the Marathas near Undirgaon (19 m.s. of Parenda) in the environs of Parenda and drove them away killing a hundred of them.⁷²

Muhammad Amin Khan happened to clash with the Marathas three miles from the imperial camp at Satara. The Emperor immediately sent Hamiduddin Khan to his help. (January, 1700).⁷³ The outcome of the battle is not known. A few days later Bahramand Khan and Hamiduddin Khan were despatched towards

71. HA, V, p.110; ADM, Yr. 43, p.73b; ADA, VIII, Yr.43, pp.73-74

72. HA, V, p.110

73. MA-JS, p.255

Khatav to drive away the Marathas. The Khans defeated them and brought large supplies to the imperial camp at Satara⁷⁴ (January 1700). The Emperor praised them for their achievement in the Court.

After pursuing and fighting the guerilla Maratha bands, Zulfiqar Khan went back to the imperial camp and met the Emperor (February, 1700). The Emperor ordered him to go to Brahmapuri which had been in the constant danger of the Maratha attacks. When the Khan arrived at Brahmapuri, he learnt that Ujbek Khan was bringing an imperial treasure and halted at Elgad, 24 miles from Brahmapuri, on account of the raiding activities of the Marathas in the region. Zulfiqar Khan advanced to Elgad. Leaving his baggage there, he went in hot pursuit of the Marathas and drove them away. He came back to Elgad and brought the treasure safe to Brahmapuri. He stayed in the environs of the camp for a few days.⁷⁵

On March 3, 1700, the Marathas received a severe blow. Death snatched away Rajaram at Sinhgad, since he, it seems, could not bear the strain of the recent expeditions and pursuit by the Mughal army.⁷⁶ The Emperor learnt the news on March 5, 1700 and thanked God for the death of an infidel! Drums of joy were beaten. The Mughals congratulated one another.⁷⁷

74. Ibid.

75. TD, p.144

76. RC-MR, p.82; SPA, p.60; B-PB, p.40; BISM-VI, 1838, p.20; ADM, Yr.44, p.201a

77. MA-SP, p.86; MM-SP, p.48

Rajaram's widows, Tarabai and Rajasbai and his sons Shivaji and Sambhaji were then at Vishalgad. The Emperor knew

7) Siege and Fall of Satara

On November 30, 1699, the Emperor ordered his army to march from Vasantgad towards Satara. On December 8, 1699, he reached the environs of Satara and encamped at Karanja about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the north-east of the fort of Satara. Prince Azam with Khudabanda Khan was posted to the western side on the way to Parli, while Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of the Mughal artillery, was posted facing the Mangalai gate in the northern side. Mansur Khan remained on the flank of Tarbiyat Khan and Ruhullah Khan on the southern side of the fort. All officers were briefed with the details of the besieging Mughal camp and asked to occupy the allotted places. Earlier, Tarbiyat Khan had studied the topography of the fort and drawn a plan of sites for trenches. He presented the plan to the Emperor and reported him the difficult task of digging up the trenches in the hard ground.⁷⁸

Rajaram had already an inkling of the designs of the Emperor to capture Satara. So, he seems to have stored up adequate supplies, including ammunitions, on the fort. When the imperial army laid a siege to the fort, the garrison began the bombardment day and night and took a heavy toll of men and animals.⁷⁹

Foot Note 77 Contd...

their whereabouts and hence ordered Chin Qalich Khan to invest the fort and capture it with the royal family (March 8, 1700) (ADA, IX, Yr. 44, p.199b).

78. IHRC, IV, pp. 4-5

79. MM-SP, p.44

They also made frequent sorties. In the night of December 11, 1699, they attacked the trenches of Munim Khan. The Khan was on his guard. He repulsed the attack. Five days later the Marathas again attacked the Khan and Baji Dafle, the son of Satwaji. The fighting lasted nearly for an hour. The Khan along with his several men was wounded. On the 17th of the month, the Emperor rode on a portable throne to the foot of the fort. He viewed the fort with a telescope for an hour while the shots fired by the garrison were falling around him. At the orders of the Emperor the camp limits were surveyed and found $2\frac{1}{2}$ kos and 25 tent ropes in circuit. An abatis round the entire camp was ordered to be erected for protecting it from the onslaughts of the Marathas.⁸⁰

Tarbiyat Khan began to run up the trenches towards the main-gate of the fort. At the same time, he started raising battery opposite the bastion protecting the gate. The garrison started non-stop firing of rockets, muskets, grenades and chadar. One day, the Marathas fired eighty shots, killing thereby only two Mughal workers. The imperial artillery had mounted a big gun and its firing was directed to the bastion. But the workmanship of the Mughals was equally bad. Often the stone balls fired from the gun fell near the tent of the Prince. Once the Mughals found a grenade fired by the Marathas. When presented to the Emperor, he observed it carefully and ordered its production on the similar pattern⁸¹ (January, 1700).

80. IHRC, IV, pp.5-6

81. Ibid.

In a few days Tarbiyat Khan ran the trenches from the side of the Prince to a place 13 yards from the gate. A raised battery of the height of 24 yards was erected opposite the bastion. 80,000 sacks of sand were brought to form a bulwork around it. 300 oxen were harnessed to carry the timber for the battery. Saki Mustaid Khan writes that not a tree was left within 60 miles in procuring wood for raising the battery. But the Mughals thought these preparations inadequate to capture the fort. So, a portable ladder of 24 yards in height was prepared by the Khan. A mine was run to the foot of the fort and the ladder was placed above it. However, the Mughals could not make any progress further as the garrison kept hurling and rolling the stones upon them. Another mine of 24 yards in the stony soil was carried under the wall of the fort, while Kunjamān, the mushrif of the artillery, was sent with 1400 camels under escort to bring wood for a proposed covered lane to approach the walls of the fort. Saki Mustaid Khan remarks that what appeared like the wall of the fort was entirely a rock 30 yards in height and above it loose stones were placed. There was no wall which could be shaken by bombardment. The only progress made so far by the Mughals was that the Khan mounted the small cannon on the raised wooden platform and that its firing compelled the Marathas to sit down in hiding behind the walls of the forts. However, they did not stop hurling the stones⁸² (January-February, 1700).

82. MA-JS, pp.250-251; IHRC, IV, pp.7-8;

MM-SP, p.45

Meanwhile, an attempt to scale the wall was made but it failed. So the Emperor employed 2,000 Mawala infantry, expert in capturing forts, and paid Rs.1,36,000 as an advance salary for three years. They were supplied with all the necessary material. An hour before the dawn of the 23rd January, the Mawalas started scaling the wall. At that time, a contingent of 200 Marathas was coming to the fort for reinforcing the garrison. They noticed the attempt of the Mughals and alerted the garrison by raising shouts. Thus, the Mawalas had to give up their effort. Infuriated by their failure, the Mughals chased the Marathas and killed five of them, and fourteen were made prisoners. Later on the prisoners, including a boy, were put to death in the bed of the Krishna at the orders of the Emperor. ⁸³

Parashuram Trimbak held the fort of Parli at that time. He was successful in gaining the secret co-operation of the Prince who allowed the succour from the outside to enter the fort. The Emperor suspected the Prince's collusion with the Marathas and had already established a strong out-post with an abatis round it near Parli to prevent the help coming from it. ⁸⁴

While the Emperor was having a hard time in blowing out the rocks of the fort, the Marathas were ravaging the regions, ousting the garrisons from the Mughal out-posts, capturing their thanedars and intercepting and looting the supplies coming

83. IHRC, IV, pp. 8-9

84. Ibid., p.6; RC-MR, p.58

to the imperial camp. Saki Mustaid Khan writes that count less Marathas outside the fort fell on the provisions and burnt the grass for 20 miles around. Consequently, the imperialists ran extremely short of food and fodder in their camp.⁸⁵ The oxen of the banjaris, the camels and elephants in the camp, when went out of the camp limits for foraging, were often carried off by the Marathas. So, the Emperor had ordered that the armed escort should be provided to the banjaris and the foraging parties. The strong columns were sent to occupy the strategic posts to guard the line of supplies. The Emperor bestowed lavish rewards upon the thanedar of Khatav, Ramchandra, and other thanedars, who successfully brought convoys of grain into the camp (January 10, 1700). On February 3, 1700, 8,000 oxen loaded with grain escorted to the camp. For some time the Mughals were relieved from the sufferings.⁸⁶ The news of Rajaram's death reached the imperial camp on March 5, 1700.⁸⁷ But the garrison did not seem to have lost its heart and continued a stout defence of the fort.

85. MA-JS, pp. 250-251

The English from Surat write to Bombay, "the king is sat down besides some great place of the Sevagees called Singara (Satara). Both him and his army are reduced to great straights in their being beset round by the Sevagees flying army that rob and sack all about them at pleasure ... more particularly since all the most principal roads are infected with the Sevagee's rovers ..." (February 21, 1699) - (CRM, p. 309).

86. IHRC, IV, p.7; MA-JS, p.251

87. MA-JS, p.254

On April 1, 1700, a grand assault was planned by the Marathas. A band of the Marathas left Parli in the night to reinforce the garrison of Satara. However, Ruhullah Khan and Fathullah Khan noticed their movement and intercepted them. The Marathas were repulsed with losses. In the after-noon of April 2, 1700, 300 Marathas of the garrison made a sortie and attacked the trenches of Fathullah Khan. The Khan was wounded while five Marathas were killed.⁸⁸ Despite the reverses and failure the Emperor had lost no hope. He had ordered Ruhullah Khan and Fathullah Khan to run other trenches towards the gate of the fort. The Khans had carried the trenches upto the foot of the tower within a month (March, 1700).⁸⁹

Since Tarbiyat Khan had come into disrepute by his failure to storm the fort, he wanted to regain his fame. He employed stone-masons to cut two vaults in the side of rock of the fort for posting the sentries. The vaults were 4 yards in length and 10 yards in breadth. But soon, they were found useless for the purpose (March 27, 1700).⁹⁰ However, the Emperor ordered to fill them up with gun-powder and cause a breach in the wall by blowing it up.⁹¹ Mukhlis Khan and Hamiduddin Khan were ordered to keep some thousand troops ready to push their way into the fort when the wall would be blown up.⁹² The Emperor had issued orders that

88. IHRC, IV, p.6

89. Ibid., p.9; MA-JS, p.251; MA-SP, p.80; MM-SP, p.45

90. MM-ED, p.365; IHRC, IV, p.9

91. IHRC, IV, p.9

92. MA-JS, p.252; MM-SP, p.45

all troops in the trenches near the wall should be removed. However, Tarbiyat Khan thought it uncertain that they would assault the wall immediately after the firing. So, he intimated them just some few moments before the firing of the vault. This act of disobedience on the part of the Khan ruined the lives of thousands of the troops.⁹³

It was the morning of 13th April, 1700, when one of the vaults was fired. The rock and the wall above it were blown up and fell inside the fort. A large number of the garrison had assembled inside the wall to witness the procession of the Emperor, who had specially come out of the tent and ridden on a portable throne to observe the execution of the firing. Thus, a large body of the Marathas, unaware of the impending explosion under the wall, were blown-up and burnt down. The troops posted in the trenches for storming the fort hastily pushed forward. The artillery-men thought that the wall to be blown up by the second explosion would too fall inside the fort. Hence, they fired the second vault. However, the result of the second explosion was contrary to their expectation. A bastion called Mangalai, 10 yards in height and 20 yards in length was blown up in the air and it came down on the Mughals in the trenches, thereby crushing and burning thousands of them. Saki Mustaid Khan remarks that those who had hidden themselves in the mud - holes in wait for an opportunity to storm found ready graves there. 400 Marathas were killed whereas the Mughals lost 3,000 lives. Notable of them were Sakhi Khan, Sayyid Shamsuddin, Ahmad

Khan Lodhi, Asduddin Ahmad and Muhammad Bakar.⁹⁴ Khafi Khan writes that the explosion was so terrible that the mountains and valleys shook as if an earth-quake had taken place.⁹⁵

Nearly a hundred escaped the death and ran through the breach caused by the explosions. They raised the cry of victory. But the others were so much frightened that none followed them. The garrison, aware of the danger, rushed to the breach and slain them including Baji Dagle. Mukhlis Khan, Tarbiyat Khan, Hamiduddin Khan, and other nobles now advanced to attack the garrison. But the Marathas opened the fire and rolled down the heavy stones on them. The assault of the Mughals was easily repulsed by the Marathas who now started raising the wall. The raised battery for which the Mughals had worked so hard had also fallen down and the cannon placed on it overturned on the hill-side. Saki Mustaid Khan observes, 'The plan was upset. What was done produced no better result than if it had not been done.'⁹⁶

When the Emperor was informed of the disastrous consequences of the explosions, he rode on a horse and reached the spot. He observed that his men were frightened and crestfallen. So, he began to boost up their morale by asking them not be over-come by mere imagination and agitation of mind. He tried to stir them by saying that the dead bodies of their comrades should be piled upon each other and used as shields against the arrows of

94. Ibid.; MM-SP, pp.45-46; MM-ED, p.365; MA-JS, p.252;

IHRC, IV, p.9; RC-MR, p.59

95. MM-SP, p.46

96. Ibid.; MA-JS, p.252; IHRC, IV, pp.9-10

calamity. But the ruined site was so horrible that the Emperor's inspiring words failed to electrify the minds of the panic-stricken troops. Thereupon, the Emperor decided to proceed in person with his son for attacking the Marathas. But the ministers dissuaded him from such a rash action. On the very day the Emperor ordered Sarfraz Khan and Manaji (?) to move forward and hold the trenches in the company of Tarbiyat Khan. ⁹⁷

In the night the Hindus in the Mughal army, unable to distinguish their relatives from the Muslims, set the fire to the huge wooden work of the battery in the hope to cremate their relatives according to the Hindu tradition. A great conflagration followed and lasted for a week. It destroyed all the defences which had been raised at the cost of lacs of rupees and heavy labour of men and animals. ⁹⁸

Though the thousands of the Mughals had perished in the debacle, many thousands were still there in the imperial camp to take their place. At the same time there were huge imperial sources at the command of the Emperor to prolong the siege vigorously. On the contrary, the Marathas were passing through a critical phase. Their king was dead and a temporary dejection had seized them. They also thought that the fort of Satara would not be held for a long time in the adverse circumstances. Its garrison had lost 400 of their men in the recent explosions. The wall of the fort on the side of the trenches of Tarbiyat Khan was demolished for 70 yards upto the half of the tower. The

97. MA-JS, pp.252-253; MM-SP, pp.46-47; MM-ED, pp. 365-366

98. MM-ED, p.366

imperial artillery had mounted a big gun, called Mulkzabt, on a hillock behind the trenches of the Prince and it was razing the residences and stores of the provisions in the fort to the ground. Moreover, Fathullah Khan had run the trenches right to the gate of the fort and would break it by heavy firing.⁹⁹

Parashuram Trimbak was at the fort of Parli, watching the developments of the siege operation of the Emperor. Saki Mustaid Khan writes that Parashuram Trimbak himself came out of Parli and sought the Emperor's pardon through the mediation of Ruhullah Khan.¹⁰⁰ But this is not true. Parashuram Trimbak's letter, written on the very second day of the explosion (i.e. April 14), reveals that it was the Emperor who first started the negotiations. The letter explicitly mentions that, the Emperor asked Ruhullah Khan to start negotiations and the Khan on his part sent his emissary Vithoji Patil to Parashuram Trimbak. The Satara garrison had already been passing through a critical situation. Hence Parashuram Trimbak lost no time in responding to the move of the Emperor. He sent his emissary Antaji Aapdeo to the Emperor.¹⁰¹ The negotiations between the Emperor and Parashuram Trimbak were secretly carried out as to keep up the prestige of the Emperor unharmed. Apparently, it was declared that it was Subhanji, the killedar of the fort,

99. MA-JS, p.254

100. Ibid., .

101. RSP, pp.196-197

who sent a message through the mediation of the Prince to the Emperor that he had been willing to hand over the fort, provided the Emperor allowed the Marathas to vacate it with their lives and property. The request was granted by the Emperor and 3,000 men and women were allowed to go away from the fort. On April 21, 1700, the imperial flag was hoisted on the fort which was named 'Azamtara', after the name of the Prince.¹⁰² Subhanji was brought with his hands and neck tied, to the court. The Emperor ordered him to be released and granted him a mansab of 5,000 (with 2,000 additional troopers). A horse, an elephant and 20,000 rupees in cash were awarded to him.¹⁰³ Many of his followers accepted the imperial service.¹⁰⁴ On April 22, 1700, the Emperor visited the fort and said the two-fold prayer of thanks in the old mosque built in the Bahamani period. His next target being the fort of Parli, he forthwith ordered Fathullah Khan to march in advance to invest it.¹⁰⁵

102. TD, p.148; MM-ED, pp.367-368; MM-SP, pp.49-50;

MA-JS, p.254

103. MM-ED, pp.367-368

104. IHRC, IV, p.11

105. MA-JS, p.256

Gan Savant, Dharoji Ahir, a commandant of 5,000 troopers, Yeshvantrao Satham and Suryaji Satham fought valiantly with the imperial army while Satara was invested. Their names and brave deeds are referred to in some of the Marathi documents (TKK, pp. 118-119, 562-563; IS-PD, p.342).

Last Phase of the War

1) Tarabai at the Helm of the State

It may not be out of place to review in brief the third and last phase of the War of Independence (1700 to 1707). When Rajaram died at Sinhgad, his eldest son, Shivaji II, was only four. Naturally, Tarabai, his mother, assumed the reins of the Maratha Government. In the reign of Rajaram, she had acquired enough administrative experience. It is noteworthy that Tarabai, a young widow of twenty-five, set aside her personal sorrow and accepted the challenge of the Mughal invasion. She performed the manchakarohan ceremony of her son; secured the loyalties of the state officials and commanders; organised the war machinery and made sufficient preparations to defend the Maratha State.

2) Fall of Parli

It is already observed that when Rajaram died, the Emperor had besieged the fort of Satara. On April 21, 1700, he captured the fort and immediately set out on the expedition of conquering the fort of Parli (6 m.w. of Satara). Soon, Parli was besieged and the besiegers began to attack it. The garrison ably defended the fort and the Emperor realized the difficulties in capturing it. So, he started negotiations and through the mediation of Prince Azam, he could secure the fort. However, the Emperor had to pay a certain amount as a price for it.¹ (June 9, 1700).

1. MF, pp. 119-121

3) Terrible Losses of the Mughals

The rainy season had already set in and the Mughal army had to move to the region of lesser rains. Hence, the Emperor decided to encamp near Bhushangad (30 m.s.e. of Satara). However, on his way to Bhushangad, rains, floods and hunger caused the death of thousands of men and animals in his army. It took 35 days for the imperial army to journey the distance of 45 miles ! The Emperor encamped near Bhushangad for 5 weeks. Meanwhile, he sent orders to his subhedars to send fresh contingents to him. Soon, he moved to Khawaspur, on the banks of the Man river, (36 m.e. of Bhushangad). There on October 1, 1700, a terrible flood caught the Mughal army unawares and swept away hundreds of men and valuable camp-material. However, the Emperor had not lost his heart and planned to lead an expedition to capture the forts of Panhala and Vishalgad. In December, he left Khawaspur and by the beginning of 1701, he reached Miraj, on his way to Panhala.²

Meanwhile, Tarabai kept on continuing the policy of her husband, by sending the Maratha armies in the Mughal domain and thus checking the activities of the Mughals in the Maratha land. Accordingly, Dhanaji, Hindurao, Ranoji, Krishna Savant, Hanwant-rao Nimbalkar, Shankaraji Narayan and others continued to attack Mughal thanas, capture their thanedars and pillage the regions of the Mughal Empire. Consequently, the Mughal commanders were forced to march hundreds of miles to chase the

2. Ibid., pp. 122-124

Maratha bands in the Deccan. For example, in the campaigning season of 1699-1700 Zulfiqar Khan alone had to make the movements of more than 4,000 miles.³

4) Capture of Panhala

The Emperor had already sent a force under Prince Bidar Bakht to invest the fort of Panhala. However, the Prince could accomplish nothing. Hence, the Emperor himself started from Miraj and reached the foot of Panhala in March, 1701. His besieging army comprised renowned commanders such as Bidar Bakht, Zulfiqar Khan, Tarbiyat Khan, Ruhullah Khan, Hamiduddin Khan. However, all of them had lost their interest in the imperial campaign in the Deccan. On the contrary, the Marathas were trying their utmost to defend their land. It was a life and death struggle for them. The Emperor wanted to capture Panhala before the advent of the Monsoon. So, he paid a sum of Rs.55,000 to the Marathas through the mediation of Prince Kam Baksha and Tarbiyat Khan and secured the fort (May 28, 1701).⁴

The Marathas were confident of recapturing the lost forts, as soon as the Emperor turned his back. It was their policy that as far as possible, the fort should be defended and eventually should be given away, only when the Emperor paid a handsome amount for the loss. It should also be noted that the Maratha garrison usually did not surrender a fort till the beginning of the rains. The Maratha calculation was that the

3. Ibid., pp. 125-132

4. Ibid., pp. 136-142

Emperor should not get more than one fort during his campaigning season. Once rainy season started, he was forced to remain idle for four to five months. And thus, the Marathas knew that such five to six hill forts of their land would consume the last five to six years of the reign of the Emperor.

5) Capture of Vishalgad

Immediately, after capturing the above-mentioned fort, the Emperor moved to the region of Khatav and encamped there. Soon, he could take the forts of Vardhangad, Nandgiri and Chandan-Wandan. Most of these forts were taken after negotiations. Now, the Emperor decided to capture Vishalgad. After the fall of Satara and Panhala, Tarabai had shifted her seat of government to that fort. The Emperor marched from the Khatav region towards Vishalgad and besieged the fort in the last week of December 1701. The siege was prolonged for more than four months and nevertheless the Emperor could not capture the fort. Parashuram Trimbak Pratinidhi, the minister of Tarabai, was entrusted with the work of defence of the fort; and he had been excellently doing his job. The fort could not be captured by assaults. Eventually, Prince Bidar Bakht paid a sum of Rs.2,00,000 to the Marathas and took the possession of the fort on June 8, 1702.⁵

While returning from the foot of Vishalgad the Mughal army suffered heavily from the rains, floods and starvation. Hundreds of men and animals perished on the way to Panhala.

5. Ibid., pp. 152-169

Even the Prime-minister of the Mughal Empire, Asad Khan, had sometimes no food to eat and no dry place to rest. Manucci says that the half of the Mughal army perished during this Vishalgad expedition. The movements of the army were so slow that it took 38 days to travel the distance of 30 miles from Vishalgad to Panhala ! From Panhala, the army slowly moved to Pedgaon alias Bahadurgad (November 13, 1702).⁶

6) Maratha Aggressive Policy

During 1701-1702, the Maratha leaders like Ramchandrapant, Parashuram Trimbak, Dhanaji, Hindurao and others offered a tough resistance to the Mughal aggression. They fought hundreds of battles in the Deccan. It seems that from 1702 onwards Tarabai adopted an aggressive policy. She began to penetrate her armies into the distant regions of Karnatak, Telangana, Malwa and Gujrat. Malwa was the central subha of the Mughal Empire. Strategically and financially it was the heart of the Empire. All important routes passed through it to the Deccan. When the Emperor was wasting man-power and materials for capturing the hill forts of the Marathas, the Marathas were pillaging the above-mentioned regions. It is already observed that Krishna Sayant was the first Maratha commander to cross the Nerbada and enter Malwa. Krishna continued to raid Malwa during the period of Tarabai also. While the Emperor was at the foot of Vishalgad, the Marathas attacked the prominent places like Burhanpur and Goloenda in the Mughal Empire. They arrested the subhedar

6. Ibid.



of Burhanpur, who secured his release only after paying a ransom. The subhedar of Golconda, too, had to pay a tribute in order to save the place from the Maratha attack. While the Emperor was returning from Vishalgad, the Marathas for the second time captured Ali Mardan Khan, then the subhedar of Berar.⁷

7) Helplessness of the Emperor

Since his coming down to the Deccan, the Emperor had sincerely tried to destroy the Maratha State. After the killing of Sambhaji in 1689, he could capture almost all the regions of the Marathas. For a while, he thought that the Maratha State was vanished from the political scene of the Deccan. However, to his dismay, he soon realized that his victory was short-lived. The Marathas could successfully revive their State and fight out the Mughal aggression. They established their new capital in the distant Karnatak region and began to wage the War of Independence with the enemy from Nasik to Jinji. It is already seen in detail how the Marathas fought the Mughals in the period of Rajaram. Towards the end of Rajaram's reign, the Emperor himself set out on the expedition to capture the hill forts of the Marathas. The forts in the Sahyadris were the epicentre of the Maratha power. However, nobody, except the Emperor, had any interest in the campaign. His generals, even his sons, were eagerly waiting for his death. The Emperor knew all this. But he could not abandon his mission and return to Delhi. Because, first, it would have meant a defeat of the Emperor and a great disgrace to the Mughal Empire. Secondly, the withdrawal of the Mughals would

7. Ibid., pp. 174-175.

have resulted into the Maratha conquest of the Deccan. Thirdly, the Rajputs, the Jaths, and the Sikhs would have followed the way of the Marathas and shattered the Empire ^{to} pieces. So the Emperor preferred to die in the Deccan as a fighting Emperor rather than returning to the north as a defeated and disgraced one.⁸

The Deccan campaign had proved disastrous to the Emperor. Every year one lakh people and three lakh animals perished in the Mughal camps. The subhedars were asked to send fresh forces and convoys to replace the vanquished ones. Nevertheless, the prestige of the imperial army was lowering day by day. Corruption, indiscipline and disobedience were the order of the day in the Mughal army. The Mughal officers, instead of fighting the Marathas and protecting the cities and regions, used to send imposed contribution and save themselves from the Maratha wrath. Some Mughal officials fled away and left the populace to their fate. Moreover, Tarabai began to appoint her officers and plant feudatories in the Mughal regions. Consequently the people experienced the misery of a dual government. Sometimes, both the Mughals and Marathas ravaged the regions and the rayat had to suffer much. Many regions were ruined and the population had fled away. The trade had stopped. In addition to this, the rains failed during 1702-1704 and lakhs of people died of hunger. The devastation wrought by plague was equally horrible. It caused the death of 20 lakhs in 2 years in the Deccan. In short, in the words of the English Governor Thomas

8. Ibid., pp. 178-180

Pitt, India (the Deccan) was witnessing an unprecedented chaos.⁹

8) Capture of Sinhgad

On December 2, 1702, the Emperor left Bahadurgad and marched towards Sinhgad, a celebrated fort in the Maratha land. While he besieged the fort, the Maratha bands crossed the Narbada and raided the region upto Ujjain. They also plundered the city of Khargon. Upon learning this, Prince Bidar Bakht, who was then the subhedar of Burhanpur and Aurangabad, sent Raja Jaising and Rustum Khan to crush them. But they could not. The Marathas left for Berar. At this time some other Maratha bands were also roving in the Khandesh and Gujrat regions.¹⁰

The Mughals dug the trenches and opened heavy fire upon Sinhgad, but of little avail. Tarabai herself was keen on defending the fort till the on-set of the Monsoon. But somehow the garrison lost the morale and yielded to the proposal of negotiations. Eventually, the fort was handed over to the Mughals, upon the payment of a big sum (April 8, 1703). Afterwards, the Emperor turned back to Poona and encamped there for more than six months. During this period, he tried to make peace with the Marathas. The mission was entrusted to Prince Kam Baksha, who was well-acquainted with the Maratha leaders and who had been advocating such a peace treaty with them. However, the Marathas did not respond to the Emperor's move and

9. Ibid., pp. 181-186, 200-201

10. Ibid., pp. 187-190

hence the peace proposals failed.¹¹ (November, 1703).

9) Capture of Rajgad and Torana

Now the Emperor decided to continue his campaign. On November 10, 1703, he left Poona for Rajgad. In the beginning of December, he laid a siege to the fort. Tarabai had entrusted the work of defence of the fort to Shankaraji Narayan and Santajirao Silambkar, the deshmukh of Gunjan Maval. The garrison valiantly repulsed the attacks of the Mughals. Santajirao laid down his life while fighting them. Soon, the Mughals captured one of the machis of the fort and consequently, the garrison had to withdraw to the inner fort. The Marathas thought that they could no longer defend the fort and hence, handed it over to the Emperor, upon the promise of safety to the garrison (February 16, 1704). The Emperor stayed at the fort for a week and then marched against the fort of Torana (February 23). Soon, that fort was besieged. On March 10, the Mughals scaled the walls of the fort and made a surprise attack on the garrison. Many were put to death. The rest surrendered to the enemy. Khafi Khan notes that Torana was the only fort which was captured without any negotiations. Soon, the Emperor left the fort for Khed, where he encamped till October 21, 1704. Meantime his forces captured the forts of Rajmachi and Lohgad.¹²

While the Emperor was operating the expeditions of Rajgad and Torana; the Maratha forces had penetrated the regions

11. Ibid., pp. 196-200

12. Ibid., pp. 201-207

of Karnatak, Berar, Golconda and Malwa. They defeated the Mughal commanders and officials and forced them to pay heavy contributions. These Maratha forces were led by the renowned commanders like Dhanaji, Nanaaji Shinde, Keso Trimal, Hindurao, Parsoji Bhosale and Hanmantrao Nimbalkar. Nanaaji arrested Rustum Khan in Berar and plundered the region beyond the Narbada. Another Maratha force moved to Machhalipatan and collected the chauth from the region. Even they attacked the city of Golconda and plundered it. The subhedar of the place did not venture to fight the Marathas; he fled away and took shelter in the fort of Bhaganagar. In Karnatak, the Marathas collected a huge amount of 5 lakhs from the Mughal commander, Daud Khan Panni.¹³

10) Maratha-Berar Alliance

While the Mughal-Maratha struggle was going on, the Mughals had to fight another enemy in the Deccan, viz., the Berads. Formerly, the Berads were in the service of the Adilshahi State. When the Emperor conquered that State, they did not join the imperial service, but continued to fight in the region between the Krishna and the Bhima. They had befriended the Marathas and were helping them to fight their common enemy, the Mughals. Wakinkheda was their capital and Pid Naik was their chief. The Emperor had despatched several forces, one after another, to crush the Berads, but of no avail. So, on October 22, 1704, he himself set out on the Wakinkheda expedition and reached there on February 3, 1705. Soon, the siege of Wakinkheda began.

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13. Ibid., pp. 207-212

Tarabai sent a big force under Dhanaji and Hindurao to help her ally. Both the forces of the Berads and the Marathas fought resolutely; but, they could not save Wakinkheda. On April 27, 1705, Pid Naik secretly left the fort along with his men.

Immediately, the Mughals took the possession of the fort. From Wakinkheda, the Emperor moved to Devapur, where he seriously fell ill. Soon, he recovered from his illness. In October 1705, he left Devapur and reached Ahmadnagar in January 1706. While marching towards Ahmadnagar, the Marathas continued to attack his army.¹⁴

11) Recapturing of Sinhgad

Meanwhile, the Marathas had captured many posts and forts, lost to the enemy. In December, 1704, the fort of Koppal was taken. In the beginning 1705, Lohgad was captured. In April, the Marathas made a surprise attack on the garrison of Sinhgad and captured it. At Devapur, the Emperor learnt the news of the loss of Singh Sinhgad. Immediately, he sent a force under Hamiduddin Khan and Tarbiyat Khan to recapture it. While he was on his way to Ahmadnagar, he dispatched Zulfiqar Khan along with Shahu, to the foot of Sinhgad. The Khan knew how difficult was his job of capturing the fort. So he adopted the usual way of negotiations and he succeeded in it. The Marathas received a handsome amount and, in return the Mughals got the fort. (March 1706)¹⁵

14. Ibid., pp. 213-219

15. Ibid., pp. 220-225

12) Marathas Dominant

With the coming of the Emperor to Ahmadnagar, the Mughal-Maratha struggle entered the last stage. Death was fast approaching the Emperor and hence, he had decided to stay at Ahmadnagar for the last days of his life. However, he did not suspend or end the campaign. His forces continued to fight the Marathas spread all over the Deccan and even beyond the Nerbada. In February 1706, the Maratha army under Dhanaji, Nemaji and others attacked the imperial camp at Ahmadnagar. The fight ensued and the Marathas proved dominant. The Marathas had also moved into the region of Orissa and Gujrat. They had plundered the suburbs of Surat and the region around it. Even they attacked the cities like Baroda and Ahmadabad and plundered them. They defeated the Mughal forces and arrested their commanders. (March, 1706). In Karnatak, the combined Maratha-Berad army was ravaging the regions. They captured the fort of Penukonda and arrested its killodar.¹⁶

13) Death of the Emperor

The Emperor could visualize the bloody fight for the crown amongst his sons after his death. At that time, his two sons, Prince Azam and Prince Kam Baksha, were in the Deccan. His third son, Prince Muzam was away at Peshawar. On February 20, 1707, the Emperor breathed his last. Immediately, Prince Azam, who was on his way to Malwa, turned back to Ahmadnagar and proclaimed himself as the Emperor of India.

16. Ibid., pp. 226-233

Prince Kam Baksha took shelter in the fort of Bijapur. Prince Azam wanted to crush his more powerful rival, Prince Muzam, who had also started for the final show-down. So, Prince Azam marched along with the army towards Delhi. On his way, near Bhopal, he released the Maratha Prince Shahu from captivity. Shahu came to the Deccan to claim the throne of the Maratha State and consequently it led to a feud amongst the Marathas. Meanwhile, the armies of both Prince Azam and Prince Muzam fought a severe battle near Agra, in which the latter came out victorious. Soon, Muzam crowned himself as the Emperor of India, took the title of Bahadurshah and came down to the Deccan to crush his brother, Kam Baksha. In a battle that followed near Hyderabad, Bahadurshah defeated Kam Baksha and killed him (January 3, 1709). The new Emperor did not stay for long in the Deccan. Soon, he left for the north.

Within two-three months after the death of Emperor Aurangzeb, Tarabai could capture back most of the important forts of the Marathas like Sinhgad, Purandar, Panhala-Pavangad, Vishalgad, Satara and Parli. The Emperor's hard and strenuous labour for years together was wasted. His entire campaign of 26 years ended in utter failure and disgrace. Lakhs of lives and wealth of crores of rupees were wasted merely to satiate his ego.

Chapter Four

Marathas and the Foreign Powers

As the English and the Portuguese were the neighbours of the Marathas, they came into close contact with the latter. When Rajaram established his capital at Jinji in Karnatak, other two trading nations, the French and the Dutch also tried to gain his favour, thus coming into contact with the Maratha Court at Jinji. Of the foreigners, an ample number of records of the English and the Portuguese, throwing light on their relations with the Marathas, are available. However, it should be noted that there is hardly any document from the Maratha side, related to their involvement with the foreigners. Hence, at times, it becomes rather difficult to explain the standpoint of the Marathas in their conflict with a Foreign Power.

Marathas and the English

1) Maratha-English Friendship

Since 1685, the East India Company had abandoned the passive policy, which had been laid down from the times of Sir Thomas Roe. In its place, the Company had adopted an independent and vigorous policy. Trade was the main object of the Company and generally it did not wish to interfere with the affairs of the native powers. However, their factories, being spread over the territories belonging to the various powers, it became difficult for the English to keep good relations with all of them at one and the same time. For example, if they cooperated with the Mughals, the Marathas would cause trouble to their factories at Karwar, Rajapur, Bombay on the

west coast and Fort St. George on the east coast. And if they behaved in a friendly manner with the Marathas, the Mughals would threaten their factories, such as those at Surat, Ahmedabad, Broach, Hugali etc. So the Directors of the Company had come to a conclusion that unless an independent policy, and if needed a retaliatory policy, was followed, their factories and trade in India could not be safeguarded. Henceforth, the English would fight the battles in self-defence and pay the injustice by the native powers in the same coins. It was Sir Josiah Child, Chairman of the Court of Directors of the Company, who in 1686 pushed this policy and brought the Company in trouble with Mughals, an imperial power in India.

The English had special reasons for breaking away with the Mughals. They had been granted the imperial firmans, but often the assurances therein were not honoured. The Mughal Governors of the places like Surat and Hugli used to commit oppressive acts towards them and often insisted on extortionate demands. Besides, the constant warfare started by the Mughals had been causing a considerable damage to the trade of the Company. The Mughals did not care for the sufferings of the English in the warfare, since they considered them as ordinary merchants. Against this background, the armed conflict between the Mughals and the English started first in Bengal in October 1686. However, it ended into an utter rout of the English there, and by February 1689, they had to leave Bengal for Madras in disgrace.¹

1. BM, pp. 35-36; HA, V, pp. 263-267

While the English in Bengal were fighting the Mughals, their counterparts on the western coast were following a moderate policy towards them. However, they were fortifying Bombay and making that place formidable. In May 1687, Sir John Child came from Surat to Bombay as Governor and the Company conferred upon him a high sounding title, "Captain General and Admiral of all the forces by sea and land in the northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to the Gulf of Persia."² Till then Surat was controlling the factories on the western coast. Now it was reduced to a minor factory and Bombay was given prominence and made the chief seat of the English Company. The Marathas were at war with the Mughals. Thus the Mughals became the common foe of both the English and the Marathas. It was natural for the English to seek earnestly the friendship of the Marathas. And hoping to get military assistance from the Marathas, the English formed an alliance with them. (1687).³

Next year, when it was evident that the English could not achieve any significant gain in Bengal, Sir Child opened up hostilities with the Mughals on the western coast. (October 1688). It seems that he had learnt no lesson from the happenings in Bengal and at the same time he had underestimated the strength of the Mughals. Soon he moved with his fleet to Surat and sent a list of the grievances of the English to the

2. BM, p.36

3. Ibid., pp. 39-40

Mughal Governor, asking for the compensation of their sufferings in the past and a new grant of privileges. The Mughal Governor at first started negotiations and gained time for preparations. Soon he threw away the mask of friendship and started hostilities. He immediately imprisoned the English factors and confiscated the property of the Company at Surat. Sir Child escaped the wrath of the Governor and as a retaliatory measure he began capturing the Mughal ships.⁴ (December 1688).

Soon, the situation was worsened when Sambhaji, the ally of the English, was captured (February 1689). The Marathas, shocked by the killing of their king, were fast losing their forts and regions. Substantial help from them could hardly be expected. In Bengal, Shahista Khan, the subhedar of the Mughals, had compelled the English to retreat and the latter had sailed a-way to Madras, in disgrace (February). However, Sir Child had lost no hope and continued the struggle. In the beginning of 1689, he had captured the Siddis' fleet of 40 cargo boats, supplying provisions to the Mughals at Danda Rajapuri in the north Konkan. Consequently, the Siddi chief, Siddi Yakut, led an expedition against Bombay with 20,000 army, occupied its outlying parts, Mazgaon, Mahim and Sion and invested the Bombay fort. (May, 1689).⁵

In Maharashtra, the Mughals were capturing fort after fort and had besieged Raigad, the capital of the Marathas. In order to escape the captivity, Rajaram the new king of the Marathas,

4. Ibid., pp. 41-42

5. Ibid., p.42; HA, V, p.273

had to leave Raigad and seek shelter at various forts like Pratapgad, Satara and Panhala (April - September 1689). Soon it became evident that he could not withstand the heavy tide of the victorious Mughals. However, it is noteworthy that even under such circumstances, he endeavoured to help the English. While Bombay was besieged, 3,000 Marathas were defending the fort against the besiegers.⁶ However, the English could not raise the siege. Meanwhile, Rajaram, being unable to face the Mughal aggression, had left for Karnatak (September 1689); and the Mughals had captured Raigad along with Yesubai and Shahu, Sambhaji's widow and son (November). The English endeavour to "vindicate the rights and honour of the English nation in India" proved to be an utter failure. Eventually, Sir Child sent his envoys to the Mughal Emperor and sued for peace. To the Emperor, the English were a negligible power, not to be reckoned with in the Indian politics. He severely admonished the English envoys and at their request, granted a new firman to carry on trade in his Empire. The English agreed to restore all the captured ships of the Mughals and pay Rs.1,50,000 as a fine. (February 1690). In Bengal, they were permitted to return and start trade. In August 1690, they arrived in Bengal and established their factory at Sutanuti, which in the course of time developed into a big city, Calcutta.⁷

Thus ended the Mughal - English conflict in the latter's

6. BM, pp. 44-45

7. Ibid., p.43; HA, V, p. 274

most disgraceful submission to the former.⁸ The English realized their mistake in underestimating the military strength of the Mughals. It was too mighty to be defeated by a small power like them. It was impossible for them to carry on trade in India without friendly relations with the Mughals. Now, they realized this and returned to their former passive policy. However, the English had noted in their records the assistance of the Marathas in their conflict with the Mughals and had paid a considerably good tribute to them. But for the Maratha aid, Bombay would have been captured by the Siddis long ago. The English of Bombay write to their Directors, "The next thing that hindered the Siddi encroaching upon us was an unexpected supply of soldiers from Sambhaji Raja (Rama Raja) and other places; which if not arrived in good time little had wanted of being routed, but this made us stand on our ground." (January 15, 1691)⁹

2) English Envoy to the Maratha Court at Jinji

The Mughals conquered the State of Golconda in 1687 and moved into Karnatak to capture the Qutbshahi regions. The

8. On February 22, 1690, the Emperor, in his firman to the English, says: "The English having made a most humble, submissive petition ... and (promised) that they would present the Emperor with a fine of Rs.1,50,000 ... and behave themselves no more in such a shameful manner ... His Majesty hath pardoned their faults and agrees ... that they follow their trade as in former times." (HA, V, p. 270).

9. BM, p.46

Marathas in Karnatak, led by Harji Raje Mahadik and Keso Trimal, also started capturing these regions. Soon the Mughals and the Marathas clashed and their fighting began destroying the peace and prosperity of the regions. The Mughals tried to capture the thanas in the regions and at the same time the Marathas struggled to check their aggression. However, it seems that the Marathas did not succeed in their endeavour. In 1689, when Rajaram reached Jinji, the Mughals were roving in the regions of the Coromandel Coast.

While in 1689, the English of Bombay were at war with the Mughals, the English on the Coromandel Coast did not wish to open up hostility with them. The policy of the English towards the Mughals and the Marathas is aptly stated in a letter of the Governor and Council of Fort St. George¹⁰ to John Nicks, the chief of the factory at Porto Novo. They say, "Therefore you must carry it so on both sides (the Mughals and the Marathas) as not to assist or offend either. Our parts being now only defensive..." (May 18, 1689).¹¹

Rajaram arrived at Jinji on November 2, 1689. Soon the English at Fort St. George learnt about his arrival and discussed it in their meeting of the Council. In their 'Diary and

10. Fort St. George later on developed into a big town, Madras. In 1639, the English Company had secured the lease of the place from the ruler of Chandragiri and established there a fortified factory. Soon it became the headquarters of the English settlements on the Coromandel Coast. (ANI, p. 630)

11. LFG, 1689, p.28

Consultation Book', they write, "We having certain advice that Rama Rajah, King of the Morattas is come privately from his kingdom of Pannarree (Panhala) to the Chingye Country ... We having had several factories under the Chingee Government where he now is, it was proposed and debated whether it was not absolutely necessary to congratulate his arrival & some suitable present be sent to so great a Prince and friend, he having lately been very kind and assisting to the General at Bombay in their troubles and very just and favourable to our factories and trade under his Government in these parts, but considering that our appearance from hence may exasperate the Mogull's forces against us, it was therefore thought more safe and prudent that such civilities be paid & managed by our chief at Conimere who is directly under his Government & therefore can be less resented ..." (November, 14, 1689)¹²

Soon the English received the report that the French and the Dutch had already sent their envoys to the court of Rajaram with presents worth 1,400 pagodas each. So they felt it expedient to send their envoy instantly. However, it was decided that the amount of the presents to be sent should not exceed 600 pagodas.¹³ On December 12, a congratulatory letter to Rajaram was read, approved and ordered to be sent by the Governor and the Council at Fort St. George to the chief of Kunimedu, who was to deliver it to Rajaram, personally. The

12. DC, 1689, p.92

13. Ibid., pp. 93-94

letter reads as follows - "The welcome news of Your Majesty's arrival to the Chengie Kingdom was great and strange for our belief, since we could not think Your Majesty would hazard your sacred person in so trouble-some and dangerous a journey. But I am now fully informed and satisfied of the truth thereof... I now send by Mr. John Nicks, our chief of Conomeer factory, an humble present which begs Your Majesty's kind acceptance and that Your Majesty will please to encourage and favour our present and future settlements and trade within your Majesty's territories by the grant of your Majesty's gracious phirmaund (Firman) to confirm our former privileges and such new ones as your Majesty shall graciously be pleased to confer..."¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Maratha Government had demanded 3,000 pagodas as a loan from the English Company. The English, however, did not want to comply with the demand. Instead, they added a Persian horse to the list of the present^{-ation}/articles.¹⁵ Soon an additional demand of 5,000 pagodas and of ammunition "of 100 barrels of powder and 2,500 weight of small shots" was made.¹⁶ However, the English on the Coromandel Coast had received the report of the defeat of the Company on the western coast and the subsequent peace negotiations with the Mughals. So they did not wish to give any offence to the Mughals in Karnatak. Consequently,

14. LFG, 1689, p.62

15. Ibid., p.68

16. DC, 1690, p.1

it seems, they evaded both the demands of the Marathas. The Marathas also did not press their demands further.¹⁷

In January 1690, the English envoy met Rajaram at Jinji and solicited his friendship. Rajaram, in turn, granted a sanad to the English Company for "a fortified settlement and liberty to trade at Conimere."¹⁸

3) Sale of Tegnapatam

The financial condition of the Maratha Court at Jinji was precarious.¹⁹ It was so much haunted by the financial difficulties at this time that every effort was made to raise funds. At this time, Rajaram decided to sell out the fort of Tegnapatam (100 m.s. of Madras) to the highest bidder. The

17. Ibid.

18. CRM, p.24

While the English were sending their envoy to the Maratha Court, they did not wish to offend the Mughal generals in Karnatak. They wished to remain neutral in the Mughal-Maratha conflict. While giving instructions to the envoy, the Governor of Fort St. George writes, "... by all means (you) avoid all discourse of the Mughul as much as possibly also the helping them either with men, ammunition or money which they press you. You must excuse yourself upon your being subordinate to this place & that you cannot promise or act anything without our advice and order." - (December 13, 1689) - LFG, 1689, pp. 66-67.

19. Martin writes in his diary in July 1690,

"The court of Jinji is in extreme financial distress
(Contd...)

proposal was made known to the foreigners, viz., the French, the English, and the Dutch. On May, 7, 1690, the English of Fort St. George write, "We hear that Rama Raja's occasion now incline him to sell it (Tegnapatam) and that the Dutch and French are treating with him about it. The President has therefore written to Purna Puntoloo (Pralhad Pant), Chief Minister of State & some other friends to interpose and procure it for the Company ... offering as much as they will give, with 2000 chakrams Peshkash ²⁰ to himself for his friendship therein." ²¹

Soon the English Company started correspondence regarding the sale of Tegnapatam. To the letter of the Company, the Maratha Government replied that the fort, would cost them 2,00,000 chakrams (equivalent to 1,20,000 pagodas). The details of the sum were given as follows :

Foot Note 19 contd...

for supporting its army in Karnatak, whose soldiers were deserting for lack of pay." - (MM-JS, p.239)

20. A premium paid to the state upon receiving grant, honour or hereditary right.(MED, p. 528)

21.- DC, 1690, p.34

Tegnapatam Fort	:	1,50,000 chakrams	
A present to Pralhad Pant	:	15,000	"
A present to Raghoji Pant	:	10,000	"
Presents to other officers	:	25,000	"

			2,00,000 chakrams ²²

It was a big sum for the English to part with. However, they decided to pursue the matter. Meanwhile the English received another letter from the Maratha Government, asking for their final resolution regarding the fort. On June 12, the English sent the following proposal :

Tegnapatam Fort	:	40,000 chakrams	
Chief-Minister of the State (Pralhad Pant ?)	:	4,000	"
His brother (Raghoji Pant?)	:	2,000	"
Other officers	:	3,000	"
Subhedar of Kunimedu	:	1,000	"

			50,000 chakrams ²³

On August 7, Sundar Balaji, the Maratha subhedar of Cudalore, came to Fort St. George for the negotiations. After prolonged discussion, Sundar Balaji on behalf of the Maratha Government, finally offered to sell the fort along with the Chhatrapati's sanad for 1,00,000 chakrams. The English added 10,000 chakrams more to their original offer of 50,000. It

22. Ibid., p.37

23. Ibid., p.41

seems that Sundar Balaji did not accept the proposal and left for Jinji. However, the English had resolved to purchase the fort. While noting the importance of the fort in their 'Diary and consultation Book' the Council of Fort St. George writes, "It (the fort) is being reported to be very strong, double walled about 500 foot long and 400 broad with many buildings and conveniences therein.. excellently well situated in a plentiful country for cloth trade and provisions, near the sea, surrounded with a good river, whose bar is constantly open and capable of receiving vessels of 100 tons ... If we should lose this offer and opportunity or if it should fall into the Mogull's hands, that it could not then be purchased at five times so much also ..."²⁴ Soon, the Council resolved that Thomas Yale and Barwell should be sent to the Maratha Court 'to undertake the business.' In its instructions to the envoys, the Council note, 'the place being so convenient, the privileges so great and all so, extremely cheap that there can be nothing now of the greater consequence to the Honourable Company than its purchase.'²⁵

By the end of August 1690, the English envoys reached Jinji and resumed the final round of the negotiations. Rajaram intended to sell out only the fort, while the English envoys were insisting upon the fort with a gunshot of the land around it. Rajaram did not agree to the proposal of the English and

24. Ibid., pp. 60-61

25. Ibid., pp. 66-68

hence both the parties came to a deadlock. However, the English could soon bring Rajaram to the conference table and succeed in bringing about the agreement. The Council note : "so seeing that they (their envoys) could not bring them (the Marathas) to any terms, they took their leave till the morrow, when with a small bribe to the chief Bramenee²⁶ brought the young king to allow us what towns villages etc. our guns could command..."²⁷

On September 2, 1690, a sanad regarding the sale and transfer of Tegnapatam and a gunshot of the land around it was granted to the English Company. In the sanad, Rajaram says, "I hereby ... fully give over the Fort of Tegnapatam with all its guns, buildings and necessaries there unto ... the said English Company proper and rightful possession, as also all the ground woods and rivers round the said fort within the random shot of a great gun to be in their sole and free possession ..." ²⁸ The English were successful beyond their expectations. . . They even succeeded in gaining control of Cudalore together with the river and the bar at its mouth. While expressing great satisfaction over the deal, the Council at Fort St. George jubilantly notes, "Receiving yesterday a letter ... from Mr. Yale and others at Chingie advising that beyond expectation they had succeeded with the king and others about our purchasing Tegnapatam fort ... that he had not only procured the confirmation of the phyrmaund (firman) we sent with him ... but that he had also prevailed with the king to grant us the Government of Cuddalore with the

26. Pralhadpant Pratinidhi (?)

27. DC, 1690, p.71

28. HG, pp. 272-273

river and bar as also the rents and revenues of several other places ... to Company as specified in the phymaund delivered to him." (September 5, 1690).²⁹ Soon the English got the possession of the fort of Tegnapatam, after paying the stipulated amount to the Marathas. The best brass gun of the English commanded the greatest possible range which covered several villages. Manjikupam, a village claimed by the Dutch and covered by the random shot of the English gun soon became a bone of contention between the English and the Dutch.³⁰

After the conquest of Raigad, the Emperor despatched Zulfiqar Khan to Jinji to capture Rajaram. The Khan descended into Karnatak and in August 1690 invested the Fort of Jinji. The morale of the Mughals in Karnatak was boosted up and everywhere the Marathas were on the retreat. Naturally the English thought it wise to seek the friendship of the Mughals. They even went to an extent of giving shelter to the Mughal officers and supplying them with 'powder with other services.'³¹ This help was acknowledged by Zulfiqar Khan in his letter to the English Company in December 1690. In the letter, the Khan assured the English Company the liberty to trade, according to

29. DC, 1690, p.71

30. HA, V, p.55

31. It seems that with the coming of Zulfiqar Khan to Karnatak, the English shed off the neutral policy and became partial to the Mughals.

the "former custom and usual practice of the English" and confirmed them "in possession of Vizagapatam and all their settlements in Golkonda and Jinji territory".³²

4) The Marathas, the English and the Dutch

Like the English and the Portuguese, the Dutch were an enterprising people and had undertaken several voyages to the east since 1596. The English East India Company was formed in 1600 and two years later, the Dutch East India Company came into existence. Soon the Dutch established their several factories in the south-east Asian regions. In India, they had established their factories on the coastal and interior regions. On the Coromandel Coast they had their factories at Masulipatam, Pulicat, Bimlipatam, Karakil, Negapatam etc. Pulicat was their principal factory. However, from 1670, Negapatam was made their chief seat of the administration. Though the Dutch trade was mainly confined to the Malay Archipelago and that of the English to India, throughout the 17th century, the former remained the mortal rival of the latter.³³

It is already discussed how the English purchased the fort of Tegnapatam from the Marathas. The English got not only the fort, but also the region around it. The random shot of the gun from the fort marked the limit of the English possessions. Several villages were covered by the random shot of the gun. Manjikupam was one of them. That place was then held by the Dutch at the rent of 300 chakrams per annum to the Marathas.

32. HG, pp. 273-274; CI, p.133

33. AHI, pp. 625-627

This led to the conflict between them and the English.³⁴

The English contended that by Rajaram's sanad, they had secured the fort of Tegnapatam with a gunshot of land around it and that all the towns and villages within the said limit belonged to them. On the contrary, the Dutch maintained that Rajaram had no authority to sell away their factory "being their own proper building."³⁵ They also argued that they held Manjikupam by virtue of "an old farman."³⁶ In fact, the English were aware of the rights and privileges of the Dutch factory in the environs of Tegnapatam. The Council's instructions to the English envoys at Jinji contain the following note : "(They should) insist upon all the terms included in the draft farman, particularly the land and villages within the gunshot of the fort with exception of the Dutch factory and the town of Cuddalore and exemption from taxation for all the Company's goods passing throughout the Maratha dominions."³⁷ Even Rajaram had raised this point in the course of his discussion with the envoys. The envoys themselves report to the Council at Fort St. George that Rajaram took objection "saying that it was too large it would include the Dutch factory and Cuddalore."³⁸ However, it is already seen, that with unscrupulous means, the English managed to serve their selfish end. They persuaded Rajaram through his

34. HG, p.279

35. DC, 1691, p.33

36. HA, V, p.55

37. HG, pp. 270-271

38. DC, 1690, p.71

minister to concede with their requests. However, it should be noted that nowhere in his sanad Rajaram had made any reference to the Dutch factory. The sanad made vague reference to "all the ground woods and rivers round the said fort within the random shot of a great gun."³⁹ This ambiguity gave rise to the clash between the English and the Dutch. As a matter of fact, Rajaram should have specifically mentioned in his sanad whether the Dutch factories were to be excluded from the limits of the English possessions or not. However, both the parties felt it convenient not to mention it. Consequently, both the parties later on began to interpret the wording in the sanad according to their own convenience.

The trouble between the English and the Dutch started when the Dutch affirmed their right to Manjikupam in the beginning of 1691. Naturally, it resulted into a wordy-war between them and the English.⁴⁰ The Dutch made a complaint to the Maratha Court and appealed to Rajaram to redress their grievance. Rajaram, in turn, sent a letter to the Council at Fort St. George that Manjikupam and the Dutch factory at Tevenapatam were out of the limits of the possessions of the English; and hence they should not disturb the Dutch and their business.⁴¹ This enraged the English who now decided to act firmly. Their envoys who were sent to negotiate the purchase of Tegnapatam were asked to make an affidavit.⁴² The Council at Fort St. George sent a copy of

39. HG, pp.272-273

40. Ibid., p.280

41. DC, 1691, p.24

42. Ibid., p.27

the affidavit along with a letter of instructions to the Deputy Governor of Fort St. David (Tegnapatam). The contention of the English can clearly be observed in the said letter. In it the Governor of Fort St. George has accused the Dutch of having bribed Rajaram. He writes, "by their insinuation and bribe they (Dutch) take the advantage of a variable necessitous Prince to dishonour his word and deeds, to deprive the English Company and nation." He maintains that Rajaram and his council of ministers have granted firman to the Company "without the least exception of Manjeecopang, Tevenapatam or any other place within our random shot." He further raises the point that "had the Dutch the least pretence to such a right, they would undoubtedly have declared it as it is being delivered into our possession, which they did not till long after our peaceable enjoyment of it." The Governor further argues that the Dutch themselves have admitted in their correspondence with the English that at Tevenapatam, they pay 2½ percent customs duty and for Manjikupam, they pay a rent of 25 chakrams per month to the Marathas. The Governor was very much bitter in his language towards the Marathas. He writes, "The mercenary Morattas, who no doubt may be tempered and induced by bribes to resell the fort too ten times over to the same or several persons. Nay, they will sell their honour and conscience too to any that will buy it." In the end, the Governor orders the Deputy Governor of Fort St. David to capture Man-jikupam, if the Dutch decline to pay rent to the English Company on the same terms as to the Marathas. If the Dutch should oppose the levy of the custom duties, the English were "to force them to reason, but to avoid blood-shed

offensively"⁴³ No further details of the conflict are available. However, it seems that the Dutch did not agree with the claim of the English and declined to pay the rent of to them. Hence towards the end of August 1691, the English took possession of Manjikupam.⁴⁴ Rajaram, who was fully engrossed in the war-preparations had hardly had any time or interest to interfere with the conflict between the two trading nations. It seems that he did not wholeheartedly support the Dutch against the English. His only intention in the struggle, it seems, was to exact some more money from the English who were in troubled waters.⁴⁵

5) The Marathas, the English and the Mughals

It is already seen that in 1690 the English helped the victorious Mughal armies in Karnatak and, in return, they received Zulfiqar Khan's letter, granting them liberty to trade on the Coromandel Coast and confirming them in their possessions in the Golconda and Jinji regions (December 1690). Two years later, in 1692, when the Maratha generals, Santaji and Dhanaji, inflicted heavy defeats on the Mughal forces and forced them to raise the siege of Jinji, many a Mughal was given shelter at Fort St. George. In recognition of this friendly act on the part of the English, Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan granted them the three suburbs of Egmore, Parsawakkam and Tandayarpur. (December 1692)⁴⁶

43. Ibid., pp. 33-34; HG, p.280

44. HG, p.285

45. DC, 1691, p.34

46. CI, p. 134

When the Marathas noticed that many persons from the Mughal side had taken shelter at Fort St. George, they requested the English not to shield them or help them. In this context, the Governor of Fort St. George sends a typical reply to one of the Maratha officials. He says, "It is not possible for me to know them, but having given orders to my watching peons ... I immediately ordered not to let them pass ... you know we are merchants and drive our trade in all ports and keep friendship with all men." (c. January 1693). ⁴⁷

It is already discussed that in 1690, the English on the west coast had surrendered themselves to the Emperor who had granted them a firman, pardoning "their faults" and allowing them "to follow their trade as in former times."⁴⁸ He had also written to Ibrahim Khan, the subhedar of Bengal, to allow the English to "trade freely in Bengal as formerly without giving them any further trouble."⁴⁹ However, the English had not received the imperial firman to trade freely on the Coromandel Coast and ever since Zulfiqar Khan's coming down to Jinji, they were striving hard to get it through the mediation of the Khan and his father, Asad Khan. Both the Khans had promised them to procure the firman for the Company. For that purpose the English had sent their envoy, Emsun Cooley, to the imperial court (c. 1690-91). However, he did not succeed in his mission.

47. LFG, 1693-94, IV, p.5

48. HA, V, p.270

49. Ibid.

So, when Asad Khan returned from Jinji to the imperial court, the English seized the opportunity and requested him to fulfil his promise.⁵⁰ No more details of the English efforts to secure the firman are available. It seems that they felt it futile to pursue the matter and hence left the idea of procuring the imperial firman.

In the beginning of 1693, Zulfiqar Khan abandoned the siege of Jinji and retreated to Wandiwash in disgrace. He was hardpressed for money and material. So he requested the English at Fort St. George to lend him 2 lakhs of rupees. However, the English declined to lend the sum asked, and instead sent a present to the Khan for his consolation.⁵¹ The English knew that their refusal to lend money would offend the Khan. So they feared that he would in retaliation attack Fort St. George. But that did not happen.

Early in 1694, Zulfiqar Khan planned an expedition into south Arcot region. When the English at Fort St. George received the report of this intended expedition, they sent instructions to the Dy. Governor of Fort St. David : "... The Nabob's army may come this way well as to your place. He has been long suspected to have joined in counsel with the Morrattas, for which reason it is said Prince Caun Bux (Kam Baksha) is coming down with a fresh army and private instruction to seize him. If so, it is not improbable but he may join openly with the

50. DC, 1694, p.20

51. CI, p.135

Morrattas for the security of his person for which some of our forts would be very convenient and Madrass has been (spoken of) as a fit place for his retreat. After all it is possible the Nabob may not trouble you. We hear tonight that he is secured by his own army in Wandewash Fort. However, preparation and caution will do us no hurt." (January 30, 1694) ⁵² However, the speculations of the English went wrong. Prince Kam Baksha did not come down to Jinji to punish the Khan, nor did the Khan rebel against the Emperor.

In 1695, the Marathas won major victories in Karnatak, thereby strengthening their position in the region of Jinji. However, Zulfiqar Khan's army was reduced to a plight, owing to the shortage of supplies of money and material. The strength of his cavalry had also reduced to 5,000 only and hence he could not move in the region and raise funds for the maintenance of his army. The English, as shrewd traders they were, took an immediate note of this change in the balance of power in Karnatak and felt it necessary to keep fair correspondence with the Maratha Court. The Council at Fort St. George notes in its "Diary and Consultation Book", "It is our opinion that there ought to be a fair correspondence kept with them (the Marathas) from that place, during the present uncertain posture of things between them and Moors. The former by all advices appearing to be in all probability of being masters of all their country, unless the Mogull

52. LFG, 1693-94, IV, p.89

(the Emperor) shall speedily send a very considerable army to the assistance of Zulphoker Cawn." (January 20, 1696).⁵³ While sending instructions to the officials of the Company, the Council writes, "The Moors seem to be weak in these parts to oppose the Maratha's conquest of the country which makes it more advisable for you to take the fittest opportunity of keeping Ramaraja's friendship." (February 19, 1696)⁵⁴

In 1696, Zulfiqar Khan again tried to get some loan from the English. This time, he asked for a sum of 1,00,000 hons, and sent jewels as its security. But the English declined to lend any amount, as they feared that the Mughals would never repay it. Besides, they thought that if Zulfiqar Khan was displaced, the one who succeeded him might demand for return of jewels, on the pretext that they belonged to the Emperor.⁵⁵ Hence the English very politely turned down the demand, saying that they themselves were in heavy debts. (March 1696)⁵⁶ This enraged the Khan, who threatened to capture Fort St. George (October 1696). However, the English did not give in. Instead, they started preparations to defend the fort.⁵⁷ They had an excellent artillery and the Khan did not venture to face it.

By the end of the next year, i.e., 1697, Rajaram escaped from Jinji and soon that fort was captured by the Mughals. With Rajaram's coming over to Maharashtra, the centre of the

53. DC, 1696, p.9

54. LFG, 1696, p.14

55. DC, 1696, p.28

56. LFG, 1696, p.17

57. DC, 1696, pp. 129-130

Mughal-Maratha conflict shifted to the western part of India. Soon the Marathas lost all their territory in Karnatak to the Mughals. Hence, the Anglo-Maratha relations on the Coromandel Coast came to a cease.

The Anglo-Maratha alliance, which came into existence in 1687, had ended with the complete surrender of the English to the Mughals. The English had suffered great material losses in their war with the Mughals. Besides, the war had brought disgrace to the Company's name in India. The English had learnt the lesson that as traders, they should follow a passive policy and that the day of their victory was yet to be dawned. Henceforth, they decided, as far as possible, to keep friendly relations with all the native powers. This policy is clearly stated in one of the despatches of the Directors of the Company to Bombay. They write, "We say, keep fair with all parties and side with none without an absolute necessity, and if that happen, be sure to engage no further than that you may secure your retreat and have fair excuse if afterwards questioned for it."⁵⁸

However, it seems that the English could not succeed in keeping good terms either with the Mughals or with the Marathas. Though they had concluded peace with the Mughals, their relations with them remained always fluctuating till the death of the Emperor. The main reason for the often deteriorating relations was the piracy of the Englishmen on the Arabian sea.

The Mughal vessels, especially those carrying Indian pilgrims for Mecca, were often attacked and plundered by the European pirates. Unfortunately for the English Company, many of them sailed "under English colours" and consequently, the Mughals mistook them for the Company's servants.⁵⁹ The piracy of Henry Bridgman in 1695 and that of Captain Kidd in 1697-98 brought heavy sufferings to the English factors at Surat with no fault of theirs. The Emperor wanted the European traders to clear the sea of the pirates. However, they including the English, knew that it was a difficult, nay, an impossible task.⁶⁰

The Marathas were the immediate neighbour of Bombay which was recently made the chief seat of the English Company on the western coast of India. The Marathas had recovered from the shock of Sambhaji's death in 1689 and since then were waging war with the enemy both on land and sea. Their navy had developed into a power, feared by the foreign trading nations like the English and the Portuguese. The Maratha navy had an able and brave admiral in the person of Kanoji Angre and had its chief maritime depots at Suvarndurg, Kolaba and Vijaydurg. Kanoji had established his naval reputation from Bombay to Travancore. It seems that the Marathas and the English often clashed on the sea,⁶¹ though there was no open hostility between them. Besides the English factories like those at Surat and Karwar were

59. HA, V, p.277

60. Ibid., pp. 275-287

61. CRM, p.308

sometimes in danger of the Maratha sack. For example, when in 1695, Santaji led an expedition into Khandesh, his attack on Surat was greatly feared both by the inhabitants and the foreign traders. The English, the Dutch and the French began fortifying their factories. The English of Surat write to Bombay, "our last (despatch) to you was the 16th instant, since which (we) have been busy in making the best preparation we could for defence of the factory against Rama Rajah's troops, which have been daily expected by the town people ..."⁶² Santaji did not march upon Surat and thus these Europeans and the inhabitants were relieved of a great danger.

Towards the end of the period of Rajaram it seems that the relations between the Marathas and the English were far from satisfactory. The English accused the Marathas of attacking their vessels and plundering them indiscriminately. So they requested the Directors to allow them to follow a hard line of action. They write, "The Shivajees also (finding that the Portuguese are so very patient notwithstanding all the depredations they commit on them), do often rob the passage boats and others of this island, and if they find that we continue satisfied without chastising them for their crimes, they will have encouragement at last to rob and plunder on the island, as they do in the Portuguese country. Therefore, we humbly desire, that your honours will give us the necessary orders to prevent these growing evils, else you cannot expect that your revenue on the island will increase, but diminish, concerning which we have written you

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62. Ibid., p.238

formerly, but have received no positive orders to capacitate us in any wise to curb our insulting enemies."⁶³ However, it seems that the Directors did not allow the English at Bombay to adopt such a policy, as they had not forgotten the lesson learnt in their recent war with the native Mughal power.

The East India Company was placed in a very critical condition, when with the consent of the British Parliament and the King, a new English Company, with Sir Nicholas Waite as its President, was formed and its first factory was established on April 8, 1699, at Surat. Sir William Norris, an ambassador of the King of England, visited the court of the Mughal Emperor to explore the prospects of the new Company in India. However, Sir Norris could achieve nothing significant, as he could not give any promise to the Emperor to clear off the pirates on the sea.⁶⁴ However, the unhealthy rivalry between the two English Companies continued to damage the interests of the English nation in general, and the old English Company in particular in the Indian sub-continent.

Marathas and the French

1) Founding of the French Factory at Pondicherry

The French were the last of the European nations to establish commercial contact with India. Their first Company

63. BM, p.53

64. HA, V, p.287

to trade with the East was formed in 1604. But it could not make any progress. The second French Company was formed in 1642. However, it devoted itself mainly to the cause of colonizing Madagascar. This Company also failed in its enterprise. Later on, at the instance of Colbert, the famous Minister of Louis XIV "the French East India Company" was established in 1664. Louis granted to the Company a fifty years' monopoly to trade with the East Indies. In 1666, the French East India Company secured a firman of the Emperor Aurangzeb and the first French factory was started at Surat in 1668. Soon the French started their factories at Rajapur and Mirjan on the west coast and Tellicherry and Masulipatam on the Coromandel Coast. The Marathas for the first time came into contact with the French, when the latter established their factory at Rajapur in 1668.⁶⁵

In 1673, the French Company was granted a small village by Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapuri Governor of Valikondapuram. With the help of Sher Khan, Francois Martin, the French Chief, founded a factory there, thus laying the foundation of the modern Pondicherry.⁶⁶ This place was destined to play a very important role in the history of the relations between the Marathas and the French. During his Karnatak campaign in 1677, Shivaji the Great, defeated Sher Khan and captured the whole of the region under him, including the French Factory at Pondicherry (July 17, 1677). Thus Pondicherry became a Maratha

65. RFM, pp. 1-7

66. AHI, p.635

possession in Karnatak.⁶⁷

2) Fortifications of Pondicherry
by the French

After the conquest of the states of Bijapur and Golconda, the Emperor sent his armies to the south to conquer Karnatak. It is already discussed as to how the Emperor's ambition to conquer Karnatak led to the opening up of another theatre of war in the Deccan. Early in 1688, the Emperor despatched Muhammad Sadiq, Ismail Khan Maka and other commanders to Karnatak with 11,000 army. The Mughal army arrived at Wandiwash in April and encamped there, while the Maratha army was encamping at Chittapet. Both the armies, facing each other, stationed there for a year, occasionally plundering the regions around.⁶⁸

Francois Martin, who was now 'the Director of the French establishments on the Eastern Coast of India' thought it wise to establish cordial relations with the Mughals and hence sent a letter to their commander, Muhammad Sadiq, requesting him to render protection to the French trade in the Mughal territory. At the same time, he secured a permission of the Maratha Government at Jinji to fortify Pondicherry (January 9, 1689). Harji Raje Mahadik, who was then the sarsubhedar of Jinji, allowed the French to raise walls and four high bastions at Pondicherry, on the payment of 5,000 chakrams.⁶⁹ Martin had definitely

67. RFM, pp. 19-21

68. HA, V, p.49

69. Ibid., p.55; RFM, pp. 28-30

foreseen the impending long-drawn out Mughal-Maratha conflict in Karnatak. So he had taken precautionary measures to safeguard the French Factory at Pondicherry. The French had had not only to safeguard their factory in the midst of the conflict of the two big powers in Karnatak, but also to counter-act the machinations of the Dutch at the Maratha Court at Jinji.

3) Dutch Intrigues Against the French

The Dutch were the mortal enemy of the French. From the days of Shivaji the Great, they were trying to expel the French from Karnatak. At this time France and Holland were at war in Europe.⁷⁰ Naturally, the trading companies of the respective nations were also endeavouring to damage the interests of each other in India. The Dutch wanted to attack Pondicherry and expel the French from that place : it was their long-cherished desire. However, they could not accomplish that, as Pondicherry was under the Maratha protection. So, by the lavish distribution of presents to the Maratha officials, they induced Harji Raje to allow them to attack the French. They also proposed to pay a handsome sum for it. Harji informed the French that if they wanted to retain their factory at Pondicherry, they should lend the sum of 5,000 to 6,000 pagodas. Otherwise, on account of the financial difficulties of the Maratha Government, he would be compelled to cede Pondicherry to the Dutch. The French were unable to pay the sum that was demanded. However, by continuous deliberations, they were

70. The war of the League of Augsburg.

successful to put off the issue. Meanwhile, some noteworthy political events took place in the Deccan politics. In Maharashtra, Sambhaji, the Maratha king, was captured and was put to death in March 1689 and there in Karnatak, Harji Raje died in October 1689. These events put a check to the Dutch intrigues at the Maratha court at Jinji.⁷¹

4) Siege of Pondicherry by the Marathas

After completing a hazardous journey, Rajaram reached Jinji early in November 1689. When Martin received the report of his arrival, he lost no time in sending a French envoy, M. Germain, with rich presents to congratulate him. It should be noted that the French were the first European nation to greet Rajaram at Jinji. The French envoy was accorded a warm welcome and granted a sanad, confirming the rights and privileges of the French Company. Soon, the Dutch also sent their deputation to wait upon Rajaram at Jinji.⁷²

71. RFM, pp. 31-32

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that like the French, the Dutch also tried to win the favour of the Mughals in Karnatak. In July 1689, the Dutch factors at Pulicat sent their envoy with rich presents to the Mughal camp. However, on his way to the Mughal camp, he was intercepted by a roving band of the Marathas who stripped him of the said presents - (DC, 1689, p. 65)

72. RFM, pp. 33-34

The English Council at Fort St. George records in its 'Diary and Consultation Book' that "the French and Dutch have already sent persons with considerable presents to congratulate
(Contd...

It is already discussed as to how on account of the pecuniary difficulties at Jinji, Rajaram devised various ways to raise funds. Early in December 1689, the Maratha Government decided to levy contribution in the form of presents and loan, on the European companies on the Coromandel Coast. The French were asked to lend 3,000 pagodas. A Maratha officer with a column came to Pondicherry and demanded the sum levied. The French declined to part with any amount, saying that they had already offered presents to Rajaram and hence they should no more be harassed. Thereupon, the Maratha force besieged the French factory.⁷³ Martin immediately lodged a strong protest with the Maratha Court and reminded them of the sanad recently granted to the French. Martin further urged Rajaram to redress the grievances of the French Company and to recall the Maratha force. It seems that Rajaram did not wish to press the matter further, and hence recalled the Maratha force before Pondicherry.⁷⁴

Note No. 72 contd...

him into the country, each reported to be to the amount of near 1400 pagodas." - (DC, 1689, p.93)

73. The English Council at Fort St. George writes, "This day came news from Conimere that the Morattas had besieged the French at Pullicherry (Pondicherry), demanding a great sum of money from them..." - December 10, 1689 - (DC, 1689, p.96)

74. RFM, p.34

5) Dutch Bid for Pondicherry

It is already seen how in the times of Harji Raje, the Dutch unsuccessfully tried to get consent of the Maratha Government to expel the French from Pondicherry. Now, with the arrival of the Maratha king at Jinji, they saw a chance to strike a deal of Pondicherry. Laurens Pit, the Dutch Governor of Negapatam⁷⁵ approached Gopal Pandit, a Maratha havaladar of Porto Novo, and requested him to play the role of a mediator. Pit proposed to purchase Pondicherry for 20,000 pagodas. The payment was to be made by way of presents to Rajaram and his ministers. Gopal Pandit soon arrived at Jinji and started deliberations with Pralhad Niraji and Rajaram. When the news of the secret deliberations about the sale of Pondicherry leaked out, the French agent at the Maratha court approached Pralhad Niraji and sought an explanation from him. Pralhadpant told the French agent that due to the serious financial conditions of the Government, he was compelled to sell Pondicherry to the Dutch and that within a day or two the Dutch delegation would reach Jinji for negotiations. The Pant further informed the agent that the Maratha Government was willing to mortgage or sell outrightly Pondicherry with the land around it to the French for 10,000 pagodas. The French agent immediately informed Martin the grave situation of the French affairs at the Maratha court. Martin promptly acted upon it and sent Germain, his trusted lieutenant, to the Maratha court to save the French factory at Pondicherry. Germain tried his best to persuade

75. About 85 miles south of Pondicherry.

Rajaram and Pralhad Niraji from their decision to mortgage or sell Pondicherry. He appealed to the friendship existing between the Marathas and the French, and reminded them of the sanad recently granted to the French Company. However, Rajaram apprised Germain of the serious financial conditions of the state, under which he was forced to choose such a course of action. All the efforts being proved fruitless, Martin even thought of prevailing upon Shahaji, the King of Tanjore, to intervene in the matter. But, soon, he realized that it would produce little positive gains and hence he abandoned the idea. Soon the Dutch delegation arrived at Jinji and each side began to scramble for accomplishing its object. The Dutch employed rather unfair tactics to achieve success. They spread a rumour that they succeeded in their anti-French negotiations at the Maratha Court. The rumour was widely circulated on the Coromandel Coast and for a while it appeared that the French had lost the case. However, fortunately for the French, the wise counsel prevailed upon Jinji. Rajaram and Pralhad Niraji changed their mind and decided to favour the French. The Dutch noticed that they no longer would get the same treatment from the Maratha Court as before and on July 12, 1690, they left the Maratha capital, in disgrace. 76

6) French Loan of 6,000 Chakrams to the Marathas

The Maratha Government now asked for a loan of 10,000 pagodas from the French. The Maratha Government under Sambhaji

had borrowed 1,500 pagodas from the French factory at Rajapur and had given a promissory note to be paid to the French at Pondicherry by Harji Raje. Harji had paid 280 pagodas to the French. The Maratha Government still owed 1220 pagodas to them. Besides, they also owed them a sum of 2036½ pagodas, occasionally borrowed by Rajaram. Hence, the French found it difficult to pay the additional sum of 10,000 pagodas to the Marathas. After some deliberations, a final agreement was reached and the French agreed to pay 6,000 chakrams. In a letter, promising to repay the loan, Rajaram writes to Martin, "For the security of the said sum (we said) that we would concede to you the rights of entry and exit from Pondicherry. The entire village, the (actual) terrain whereon you are settled, the bazaars and the fishing of the river, whereof the royal Company of France would have the enjoyments, until full refund of the said sum. Which (proposition) having been accepted on your part, you had made payment to us of the said 6,000 chacaras in cash and you are put in possession of the said rights and sovereignties expounded above..." (June 7, 1690).⁷⁷

77. BISM-Q. Yr. 11, Iss. 2, pp. 31-32

V.G. Hatakhar gives a somewhat different version of the agreement. He writes, "Instead of the initial demand of 10,000 pagodas, it was finally agreed that the French would pay Rajaram 6,000 chacras at 18% interest. The promissory note was to include the various amounts already advanced to the Prince, plus the 1,500 pagodas, paid to Sambhaji at Rajapur, the last sum without interest. In return for this, the customs and all other revenues

(Contd...)

On the same date, Rajaram gave another sanad to Martin, granting protection to the French Company at Pondicherry. In the sanad he writes, "That it might happen that the Dutch, the English, the Danes, or peoples of other nations might wish to dispute your possession of the places where you have settled and having asked us to aid and protect you against all those who might wish to trouble you, we promise to protect and maintain you against all your enemies. Your settlement must give shelter to all the people who are under rule and if any matter arises to the contrary, notify us thereof; and we shall remedy it at once. I have issued orders to all my officers, high and petty, to protect and maintain you in (the enjoyment of) all your rights and privileges ... And to further facilitate trade, you must protect and treat well merchants of the country (native merchants) and the foreign ones." (June 7, 1690).⁷⁸

It should be noted that had the French purchased Pondicherry outrightly, they would have been deprived of the Maratha protection. Secondly, the Dutch, who had a military superiority over the French, would have attacked Pondicherry and captured it. And had the Dutch captured Pondicherry the French would have lost the factory along with the merchandise worth 3 lacs of Francs.⁷⁹

Note No. 77 contd...

of Pondicherry were to be ceded to the French until the final recovery of the sum." (RFM, p.38)

78. BISM- Q. Yr. 11, Iss. 2, p.31

79. RFM, p.39

In July, Rajaram decided to visit the coastal regions of the Marathas. His intention was to raise funds by receiving presents from rich merchants, both the native and European. However, the French "paid 200 pagodas to one of the principal officers" at Jinji and managed through him to cancel Rajaram's visit to Pondicherry and thus avoiding to pay a big sum in the form of presents, which would have been four times greater than the said amount.⁸⁰

7) French Inability to Purchase Tegnapatam

The Maratha Government could not tide over the pecuniary distress and so they decided to sell out the Fort of Tegnapatam to the highest bidder. It is already discussed as to how it was sold to the English. It should be noted that the Maratha Government had sent the proposal of Tegnapatam to the French also. The French were fully aware of the strategical importance of the place. However, they were short of funds and hence they were not in a position to strike the deal of purchase. Martin tried through his agent at Jinji to put off the issue till the French finances improved. However, the Maratha Government could not wait. They wanted to expedite the matter as early as possible. Thus, Martin lost a good opportunity which the English seized. (September, 1690)⁸¹

8) French Friendly Overture to the Mughals

By the middle of 1690, Zulfiqar Khan arrived in Karnatak, and in August laid a siege to Jinji in order to capture it along with the Maratha King. With the coming of the Commander-

80. Ibid., pp. 39-40

81. Ibid., pp. 40-41

-in-Chief of the Mughal Empire, to the Coromandel Coast, the position of the French at Pondicherry became more delicate and intricate. The French chief, Martin, knew for certain, that in the impending struggle both the Mughals and the Marathas would ask for the French assistance. However, Martin wished to maintain the French neutrality in the war. Though Pondicherry was under the sole Maratha protection and there were friendly relations between the Marathas and the French, Martin thought it necessary to have equally friendly relations with the Mughals also. Martin must have felt that in case the Mughal conquest of Jinji, such relations would facilitate the way to maintain the French hold on Pondicherry. Keeping this object in view, he began to explore the possibilities of establishing a contact with Zulfiqar Khan. Soon he managed to convey the French overture of friendship to the Khan. The latter was happy to respond to the French move and successively sent two envoys to Pondicherry.⁸² The Khan sent proposals to Martin arguing that since the Mughals were sure to capture Jinji and consequently Rajaram would certainly ^{leave} ~~it~~ for his coastal regions to save his life, the French should render their service to the Mughals, by capturing him and handing him over to them. The Khan also asked the French to assist the Mughal forces in capturing the

82. It should be noted that the Dutch also approached Zulfiqar Khan and helped him "with their presents and military assistance." - (HG, pp. 289-290)

fort of Tegnapatam; so that Rajaram should not be able to escape to that place.⁸³ However, it appears that Martin did not respond positively to these demands.

9) French Neutrality in the Mughal-Maratha Conflict

As speculated by Zulfiqar Khan, the Maratha garrison at Jinji got very much panicky at the sight of the besieging Mughal army and consequently, Rajaram left the fort for the southern regions. Martin writes in his diary that when Rajaram came to a fortress, 8 to 10 leagues distant from Jinji, he sent a message to Martin to send some cloth, as he had left Jinji without taking any baggage. Martin promptly sent the necessary cloth to him.⁸⁴ (October, 1690)

The Khan had persistently asked Martin to send a French agent to the Mughal camp to discuss some important matter. Accordingly, Martin sent his agent to the Khan. During the discussion the Khan repeated his demands for the French help to the Mughals to capture Tegnapatam. However, the French agent expressed his inability to help the Mughals, saying that he could not promise them till the arrival of the French squadron. Secondly, the Khan requested the agent that the French should supply gunpowder to the Mughals. However, the agent once more pleaded his inability, on the ground that the French manufacturing of gunpowder was only on a limited scale, satisfying the need of the French Company only. Thirdly, the Khan sought the

83. RFM, p.42

84. Ibid., p.43

the services of the French gunners for his artillery section in the army. To this demand also, the agent gave a negative reply, saying that the French did not have sufficient number of gunners to spare.⁸⁵ From the account of the French agent's interview with Zulfiqar Khan, it appears that the French tried their best to stick to their neutrality in the Mughal-Maratha conflict in Karnatak. However, it was plain that at the same time, they did not want to spoil their relations with the Mughals.

Though the Maratha capital was besieged by the Mughals, the French factory at Pondicherry enjoyed a comparatively peaceful life. However, the French soon got entangled with the Mughal-Maratha conflict and began to experience its consequences. In October 1691, a Mughal commander arrived in the vicinity of Pondicherry and asked for the French help to capture the fortress of Valdaour. However, the French professed their neutrality in the Mughal-Maratha conflict and declined to help the commander. Soon another Mughal commander was sent to the region of Pondicherry to expel the Marathas from there. This commander, too, asked for the French assistance in his expedition. He reprimanded the French that they should not keep any correspondence with the Maratha Government. The French stuck to their policy and declared "that their only aim in India was to carry on their trade peacefully, and as such they had no desire to associate themselves in the politics of the country." Many Maratha families, who had taken shelter at Pondicherry, were now asked to leave the place, lest the Mughals should find even a slight excuse for creating trouble.⁸⁶

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid., p.44

10) French entanglement in the
Mughal-Maratha Conflict

Towards the end of 1691, the Mughal forces on the Coromandel Coast were in high spirits. Two great dignitaries, Prince Kam Baksha and Asad Khan, the Prime-minister, had arrived with a considerable reinforcement to the Mughal camp before Jinji. By the end of December, the Mughals sent a force to Pondicherry. Its commander informed the French that he had orders to secure a supply of "food, ammunition and money" from the European traders. The French feared that their rivals, the English and the Dutch, might join the Mughals in their attack on Pondicherry and that in such a situation it would be difficult for them to face their combined army. So the French tried to put off the matter by tactics of negotiations. Soon, the Mughal commander, enraged by the attitude of the French, issued a threat to them that he would secure an entry into Pondicherry by force, if they did not immediately concede to his demands. But this threat could not cow down the French, who had resolved to resist such a forced entry. When the commander came to know the resolute stand of the French, he left the place for Villenaour.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the Maratha Government received the report of the Mughal activities in environs of Pondicherry. They immediately despatched Krishna Antaji⁸⁸ with 400 horse to the region of Pondicherry. Krishna Antaji, by adopting forced marches fell upon the Mughals at Villenaour and expelled them

87. About 7 miles south-west of Pondicherry.

88. Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad (?)

from there. Thereafter, he attacked and arrested a Mughal party who had recently seized a village near Pondicherry.⁸⁹ However, the trouble with the French did not end. The Maratha Government lodged a protest with the French that they had supplied money, ammunition and food to the Mughals, the veritable enemy of the Marathas. The Mughals, in their turn, accused the French of having sought the Maratha help to attack them. So they revengefully arrested some French soldiers⁹⁰ on their way from Madras to Pondicherry. Martin, however, managed to secure their release by prevailing upon the Marathas to free a Mughal officer, recently captured by them.⁹¹

Soon, the Mughal army was sent to conquer the regions of the Coromandel Coast. Its commander had also the orders to secure all possible assistance from the European traders on the coast. He, too, asked for the French help in his expedition and wished to enter Pondicherry, along with his troops. To his demands, the French replied that as a trading nation they did not wish to join the struggle between the Mughals and the Marathas; and that the Mughal aggression upon the French

89. RFM, pp. 44-45

Now Krishna Antaji demanded a present from the French, as he had defeated and expelled the enemy, thereby protecting the French settlement. To him, the French sent a golden chain, worth about 100 pagodas. - (Ibid., p.45).

90. Native soldiers in the service of the French Company.

91. RFM, p.45

settlement would be resisted with an armed force. However, the French showed their willingness to permit the Mughals to purchase the required articles at a village near the French settlement, on condition that they should not interfere with the entry of the provisions into Pondicherry. The Marathas received the reports of these dealings between the French and the Mughals and issued a threat to Pondicherry, "to cut off all supplies from the French." Soon the Marathas blockaded Pondicherry. However, they removed the blockade after three days as the French threatened that they would join the Mughals in retaliation. (c. February-March, 1692).⁹²

In April 1692, the Maratha Government sent a force of 1200 under the command of Dharmaji to guard the region of Pondicherry. Dharmaji arrived near Pondicherry and requested the French to allow him to enter the French settlement and to render him an assistance against the Mughals. However, both the requests were turned down on the plea of the French neutrality in the Mughal-Maratha conflict. Nevertheless, the French advised the Maratha commander as to how he should follow the strategy to expel the enemy from the region. They also promised him to let him know the approach of the Mughal army in the vicinity of Pondicherry, by giving a signal of a cannon-shot from the French settlement.⁹³

Soon, Krishna Antaji followed Dharmaji. He, too, pressed for an entry into Pondicherry. But the French did not permit him (c. May 1692). Thereafter, Rasul Khan, a Mughal commander

92. Ibid., p.46

93. Ibid., pp. 46-47

and the second son of the late Sher Khan Lodi, appeared in the region and requested the French to allow him to visit Pondicherry. He too was politely refused the permission. (June, 1692)⁹⁴

In July, Dharmaji was encamping near Pondicherry. The French reported him that a Mughal party had plundered two villages near Tegnapatan and had carried away their inhabitants as captives. Dharmaji immediately pursued the enemy, who at the sight of the Maratha forces fled away, leaving the spoils and the captives behind.⁹⁵

Soon, Rasul Khan arrived near Pondicherry and encamped in the woods, with an intention to attack the French settlement and secure riches from it. At this time, the French sought the help of Dharmaji who was encamping at Villenaour : Dharmaji readily cooperated with the French and marched on the Mughal camp in the woods. The Mughals were defeated and put to flight. Thereafter, the Marathas returned towards Pondicherry and encamped near it. Rasul Khan, being disappointed at his failure to secure the booty of Pondicherry, retired from the woods along with his troops (c. August, 1692).⁹⁶

Soon, Krishna Antaji arrived with his force near Pondicherry. He once again pressed for his visit to the French settlement and the subsequent presents from the French. The latter refused to comply with his demands. The demand for the presents was turned down on the ground that the French were short of money. Later on, early in the month of September, the

94. Ibid., p.47

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid., pp. 47-48

Mughal troops appeared in the woods near Pondicherry. The Maratha force under Krishna Antaji fought a skirmish and retired to the western side of Pondicherry. Soon the Mughals fell upon the Marathas and drove them away. It was the French who saved the bewildered Marathas from their likely annihilation. (September, 1692)⁹⁷

Thereafter, Ibrahim Khan, the elder brother of Rasul Khan, came to the region of Pondicherry as a commander of the Mughals and encamped in the woods.⁹⁸ The French sent their agent, Germain, to felicitate him. The Khan, confident of his success, asked for the French assistance against the Marathas. The French declined to render any assistance on the plea that as usual they wished to remain neutral in the conflict between the Mughals and Marathas. They also turned down the request of his visit to Pondicherry (October-November, 1692).⁹⁹

On December 15, Dharmaji achieved another victory over the enemy. A Mughal party was coming to reinforce their camp

97. Ibid., pp. 48-49

98. Batakar remarks, "Ibrahim Khan was, perhaps, deliberately sent to takeover command of the Mughal troops stationed in the woods, for he was well acquainted with Martin who had met him on several occasions in his father's time. The Mughals hoped that he would bring his influence to bear on the French chief. They were, however, sorely disappointed, not having reckoned with the diplomat in the person of Martin." - (Ibid., p.50)

99. Ibid., pp. 49-50

in the woods. Dharmaji attacked it, killing many troops of the enemy. The French were happy to know the report of Dharmaji's success. Because, had the Mughal camp in the woods received the reinforcement, the hostility from that quarter would have certainly been increased. However, Dharmaji could no longer remain in the region of Pondicherry, as the Maratha Government ordered him to proceed to Tegnapatam. In place of Dharmaji, Anandrao, another Maratha commander, was sent to protect the Pondicherry region. Martin had paid a good tribute to Dharmaji, saying that he was "a man of enterprise and ability." Meanwhile, Pralhad Niraji, on behalf of the Maratha Government, sent a letter to Martin, praising profusely "the part played by the French in dealing with the Mughals." Pralhad Pant further informed Martin that on account of the report of the French assistance to the Mughals, his master had developed prejudices against them; however, presently his mind was free from such prejudices.¹⁰⁰ It seems that though the French professed and practised neutrality they did co-operate with the Marathas in expelling the Mughals from the region of Pondicherry. This was more true when their settlement at Pondicherry was threatened by the Mughals.

By the end of the year 1692, Santaji and Dhanaji arrived in Karnatak and won great victories over the Mughals. They captured Ismail Khan Moka and Ali Mardan Khan and compelled Zulfiqar Khan to retreat to Wandiwash. The Mughals had completely lost their morale and consequently, their forces in the

100. Ibid., p.50

woods of Pondicherry had to retire to a safer place. Martin, a shrewd diplomat, was keenly watching the course of events. He now decided to help the Marathas. He immediately reported to Anandrao the withdrawal of the Mughal troops from the woods. Thereafter, Anandrao promptly moved into the woods and encamped on the site where the Mughals were formerly encamping. He now asked the French to supply the Marathas with gunpowder and bullets. It is interesting to note that the French not only supplied gunpowder and bullets to the Marathas, but also at the latter's request sent a reinforcement of 50 French soldiers to the Maratha camp in the woods. The French also advised the Marathas that in order to guard the woods against the enemy they should have some fortified place in the woods. However, being short of funds the Marathas could not act according to the French advice.¹⁰¹

11) Sale of Pondicherry to the Dutch

The friendly relations between the Marathas and ^{the} French soon came to an end. The Maratha Government lodged a complaint with Pondicherry that the French had been exacting contributions from the populace of Pondicherry and that they had cut down some palm trees without the prior permission of Jinji. The Maratha Government asked for an explanation and also sent an officer for collecting the amount, which the French were said to have obtained from the inhabitants of Pondicherry. The officer was also asked to seek compensation for the palm trees cut down by the French. According to Martin, it was because of Krishna Antaji's machination, the Maratha Government had

adopted such an unfriendly attitude. The French had always rejected the request of Krishna Antaji to visit Pondicherry and had not sent any presents, while he was encamping in the environs of Pondicherry. This had roused his ire. However, no further account of the episode is available. It seems that the French soon induced Krishna Antaji by sending him handsome presents on the occasion of a marriage in his family, thereby putting a stop to the inquiry (January, 1693).¹⁰²

However, the Maratha-French relations did not improve. They were soon to be deteriorated. It is already seen that Anandrao, a Maratha commander, was posted in the place of Dharmaji and was encamping at Villenaour. Now he wrote to Martin that Jinji had instructed him to start parleys with the French "either for the loan of a big sum, or for the purchase of Pondicherry with lands depending on the settlement, failing which he had ordered to attack them with his troops." Thus, the relations between the Marathas and French took a serious turn. Martin immediately convened a meeting of the French Council. Some of the prominent merchants of the Company attended it. The merchants strongly urged the Company to strike a deal of purchase. However, Martin was not in favour of the

102. Ibid., p.52

In January 1693, Martin writes in his diary, "We have now won him (Krishna Antaji) over by the present of two pieces of Bengal flowered stuff and 3½ yards of cloth on the occasion of a marriage in his family" - (MM-JS, p.247)

purchase. He contended that once the Marathas sold Pondicherry to the French, they would no longer be interested in the French settlement and that if any European power attacked the French, the Marathas would not come to their help. Moreover, in Europe, France was fighting a war with England and Holland and if France suffered a defeat, there was a possibility of ceding Pondicherry to the victorious nations. Martin further held a view that in the case of the capture of Jinji, the Mughals would not recognize the deal of purchase. The views of Martin were upheld by the Council and it decided to send presents to Krishna Antaji and Anandrao with an intention to put off the issue. Accordingly, the presents of 250 pagodas to Krishna Antaji and of 100 pagodas to Anandrao were sent. The two Maratha officials promised a help to the French in the matter.¹⁰³

To the Dutch, it was a golden opportunity to expel the French from Pondicherry. It has been already seen how in 1690, they had made an effort to obtain the place. Now, the Maratha Government itself had taken an initiative to sell the place. As a diplomatic move, the Dutch successfully spread a report of a great naval victory of England and Holland over France in Europe. They even celebrated the victory. Accordingly to the French, it was a trick of the Dutch to impress upon the Marathas the Dutch strength and the French weakness. Secondly, in order to gain favour of the Maratha Court, the Dutch adopted the usual way of bribing the officials at Jinji. They sent a special officer for this purpose to Jinji. Consequently, the French

began to receive a cold treatment at the hands of the Marathas. Hence, Martin had to take counteracting measures against the Dutch intrigues at the Maratha Court. He tried to seek favour of Trimbak Keshav (Timaji Keshav), the subhedar of Jinji, and other Maratha officers at the Court. But the Dutch vigorously continued their intrigues unabated and kept sending presents to the Maratha officers. They even started military preparations at Negapatam. As a result of this, the French also began the fortifications of their settlement. The Marathas did not like the French efforts of fortifications and often obstructed the work (June 1693). In view of the impending trouble, Martin sent his wife to St. Thome for safety.¹⁰⁴

The French had soon an opportunity to improve their relations with the Maratha Government. Both Rajaram and his minister, Pralhad Niraji, fell ill and asked the French to send their physician to Jinji. Martin immediately sent a physician to Jinji where the latter soon gained popularity.¹⁰⁵ Through him, Martin could establish a fresh contact with the Maratha Court. Both Rajaram and Pralhad Niraji apprised the physician of their intention to sell Pondicherry to the Dutch. However, they promised that the French would be given priority, if they were prepared to pay 25,000 pagodas and inform their decision within a week. The physician posthastely sent letters to Martin, reporting him the proposal and urging him to take prompt action. Upon seeking the advice of the Council, Martin despatched

104. RFM, pp. 53-55

105. Ibid., p.54

Germain to Jinji with presents for the high officers of the Maratha Court. When Germain arrived on the outskirts of Jinji, a French interpreter gave him a copy of the agreement between the Marathas and the Dutch, regarding the sale of Pondicherry.¹⁰⁶ Rajaram was to cede Pondicherry to the Dutch upon the payment of 25,000 pagodas in three instalments. Germain immediately sent the copy of the agreement to Pondicherry and proceeded to the Maratha Court.¹⁰⁷

106. Hataalkar gives the contents of the agreement as follows: "It was proposed, under the agreement, that Rajaram should cede to the Dutch Pondicherry with all the lands depending on it, the gardens and the river as demarcated in the document. The Dutch were to enjoy the possessions in their own right for perpetuity; they could settle down there at their own choice, coin money which would be legal tender in the Maratha territory, and were to be exempted from the surveillance of Maratha officers under any pretext. For the absolute possession of the place, the Dutch were to pay 25,000 pagodas in three instalments, the first on the arrival of their squadron before Pondicherry, the second as soon as the blockade or the siege would commence and the third and the last after the capture of the place. Rajaram also undertook to provide, if required, troops as well as labourers on payment and to open markets in the Dutch camp, to enable them to buy all their provisions." - (Ibid., pp. 55-56)

107. Ibid.

On his arrival at Jinji Germain met Rajaram, who gave a cordial reception to him. However, he directed him to see Pralhad Niraji, his chief adviser, for settling the issue of Pondicherry. Germain met Pralhadpant and found him rather cold in his attitude towards the French. He unreservedly disclosed to Germain, "that the Court were left with no other choice than to propose the said treaty to the Dutch, for the French had refused to take the proposals seriously and had deliberately used delaying tactics; that the Marathas were in sore need of money, and that their situation was such that they would fain be ready to sell their wives and children if thereby they could be guaranteed the sinews of war."¹⁰⁸ Germain forcefully argued the French case, reminding Pralhadpant of the assurances given in sanads of the Maratha King ~~and~~ and the services rendered by the French to the cause of the Maratha State. But his arguments fell on deaf ears. However, Pralhadpant was willing to give priority to the French, offering them the treaty, already proposed to the Dutch. Realizing the firm decision of the minister, Germain tried to prevail upon other high ranking officers of the Court. But unfortunately for him, he came to know that, "there were very few amongst them who were unaffected by the Dutch bribes."¹⁰⁹ (presents ?)

Now, the French saw no other way out but to accept the proposal of the Marathas; and hence they took the decision to purchase Pondicherry for 25,000 pagodas. In accordance with

108. Ibid., p.56

109. Ibid.

the decision, a French envoy was sent to Jinji for the final negotiations. But it seems that the Maratha Court was reluctant to sell Pondicherry to the French and they were more in favour of the Dutch side. So they raised the purchase price of Pondicherry from 25,000 pagodas to 28,000 pagodas, plus the presents worth 2,000 pagodas. Martin now realized the real intention of the Maratha Court that they wanted to sell Pondicherry to the Dutch and hence in order to save their settlement, he appealed to Zulfiqar Khan for help. He even proposed to hoist the Mughal flag in Pondicherry and seize Valdaour and other places for the Mughals. Martin also sought the good offices of Shahaji, the king of Tanjore.¹¹⁰ However, the Dutch gave no time for the French to materialize their plans to save Pondicherry. By the middle of August 1693, the Dutch sent their fleet to capture Pondicherry. Laurens Pit, the Dutch Governor of Negapatam, was heading the expedition. It seems from the English records that the French were still trying to persuade Rajaram to sell Pondicherry to them only. On August 18, the Dy. Governor of the English from Fort St. David writes to the Governor of Fort St. George, "Governor Pit did apply himself to Rama Raja for his consent and assistance in taking Pullicherry Fort and offered, we heard, a considerable sum of money, but came to no conclusion upon it; because the French had sent a European who made offers on their side, but they likewise came to no conclusion. Rama Raja, observing that the Dutch were come with a considerable force, though they had not his consent and supposing they might be prevailing party,

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110. Ibid., pp. 56-57

thought convenient to make use of the opportunity of getting with money he could; and yesterday came letters from him to Governor Pit with propositions, as it is said, to send down 500 horse to his assistance, if he paid down 8000 pagodas." ¹¹¹ The report of the English that the Dutch fleet had arrived before Pondicherry without the consent of Rajaram, seems to be hearsay. The Dutch could not dare attack Pondicherry, without the consent of the Marathas. The decision of selling Pondicherry to the Dutch had already been taken.

The Dutch were now negotiating for the assistance of the Marathas in capturing the place from the French. Rajaram had demanded 8000 pagodas as a price for the succour of 500 horse.

Immediately after their landing, the Dutch troops laid a siege to Pondicherry, ¹¹² while furnishing the report of the fighting between the French and Dutch, the English of the Fort St. David write, "Since our last advice of the siege of

111. LFG, 1693-94, Vol. V, p.73

112. About the date of the landing of the Dutch troops Hatalkar writes that it "took place between the 25th and the 27th" August (RFM, p.57). However, the report of the Dy. Governor of St. David reveals that the Dutch fleet had already arrived and laid a siege to Pondicherry before August 18. - (LFG, 1693-94, Vol. V, p.73)

Pullicherry we are informed that (on) the 19th the French fired no guns, (on) the 20th, the afternoon, they fired 5 great guns ... which was answered by the Dutch ... Governor Pit's camp is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Pullicherry Fort and they have two parties of their body ... since their (of the Dutch) arrival at Pullicherry they have had a further supply of soldiers about 300 ... and we hear that they have 1400 European soldiers now at the camp. The Dutch have in this expedition taken all imaginable care that nothing necessary should be wanting in order to the taking of the place, and we are informed that Sono Pantulo being commissioned by Rana Raja and an acquaintance of the Dutch, they (the Dutch) desire him to procure a cowl for Pullicherry fort and town, that it should be theirs, entirely under their own Government ... For this grant they are to pay about 25,000 pagodas and we are assured they have already paid 6,000 pagodas and when Cowl comes down from Rana Raja, they are to pay 6,000 more and the rest of the money when they have possession of the Fort. Rana Raja is not obliged to assist them with any men for, we hear, they did not desire it."

(August 25, 1693)¹¹³ It is already seen how the Dutch lost Manjikupam, because it was covered by the random shot fired from the fort of Tegnapatam. Now the Dutch requested Rajaram through Sono Pant that Verampatam, a small village about 3 miles south of Pondicherry, be granted to them in lieu of Manjikupam.¹¹⁴ It seems that Rajaram conceded to the request of the Dutch and accordingly granted Verampatam. The village

113. LFG, 1693-94, Vol. V, pp.28-29

114. Ibid., p.29

was included in the final agreement about Pondicherry, signed by Rajaram.¹¹⁵

Comparatively, the Dutch had a strong naval force. The French could not resist them and surrendered the fort of Pondicherry on September 8, 1693. Thus, the French lost their long-cherished settlement on the Coromandel Coast.¹¹⁶

The story of the Maratha-French relations is entirely based upon the source material from the side of the Europeans, viz., the French and the English. Unfortunately there is hardly any document available from the Maratha Court explaining their position and views. Consequently, it may appear that the Marathas never stuck up to their words and on giving bribes they would break up their solemn promises. However, such a statement based on the European sources only would be one-sided and, perhaps, an injustice to the Marathas. Of course, it does not mean that all the Maratha officials were above corruption.

115. Ibid., p.52. The final agreement was signed by Rajaram at Jinji on August 27, 1693--(RFM, p.57)

116. RFM, pp.56-57. G.B. Malleon writes in his 'History of the French in India', "To resist this formidable attack Martin had literally no resources... (The Dutch) landed their troops at the end of August, cut him off at once from the island and from the sea and plied their attack with such energy that on September 6 having then offered a resistance of twelve days duration, Martin had no hopes of being able to prolong the defence and demanded a parley. This resulted in a capitulation signed on September 8." - (HFI, pp.28-29)

Some of them might have been prone to bribes. Secondly, it should be remembered that in the beginning the Maratha Court had sent its proposal of the sale of Pondicherry through their officer to the French. And the French had deliberately adopted 'delaying tactics' to put off the proposal. Thirdly, the Maratha Court was fully aware of the French contacts with the Mughals. Martin had made attempts to win the favour of the Mughals, by sending presents to them. Fourthly, it should be noted that the French had insulted the high officials like Krishna Antaji, by consistently rejecting their request to visit Pondicherry. Such a policy of the French, it seems, had enraged the Maratha Court and it naturally led to the Marathas' decision to punish the French.¹¹⁷

In Europe, France was at war with England, Holland, Spain and Germany. In 1697, by the Treaty of Ryswick peace was concluded and Pondicherry was restored to the French.¹¹⁸ Martin, the founder of the French settlement at Pondicherry, was once again appointed to head the French factory there. However, soon the political situation in Karnatak took a different turn. By the end of December 1697, Rajaram escaped from Jinji to

117. Hatakhar rightly remarks, "Francois Martin had overshoot the mark and paid the penalty. For even though the French were ready to pay as high a price as 25,000 pagodas for Pondicherry, the Marathas preferred to sell it to the Dutch."
- (RFM, p.59)

118. HFI, pp. 34-35

Maharashtra and at the beginning of January 1698, the Mughals captured the fort. With the conquest of Jinji, soon most of the regions of Karnatak, including those of the Marathas, passed under the Mughal domination. The Maratha rule in Karnatak, thus, came to an end and consequently, the Marathas lost their contact with the French for about 43 years to come. 119

Marathas and The Portuguese

The Portuguese were the first amongst the European nations to land on the Indian shore by the sea route. It was Vasco da Gama who opened up this new sea route via the Cape of Good Hope, to India and arrived in the port of Calicut in 1498. This event proved to be a turning point in the history of the relations between the Asians and the Europeans. In the following century, other European nations such as the English, the Dutch and the French followed the Portuguese and established their several settlements in India, thus bringing about their commercial and cultural contacts with the East. The Portuguese were more interested in Indian politics than commerce, and their political involvement in India at first led to the establishment of their domain in the first half of the 16th century. In November 1510, Albuquerque, the Portuguese Viceroy, captured the port of Goa in the Adilshahi

territory, and thus laid the foundation of the Portuguese state and power in India. In the course of time, the Portuguese successfully brought under their control many coastal regions of India. By 1550 their state included Diu, Daman, Bombay, Bassein, Chaul, Goa, Salsette, Bardesh, Honawar, Barselore, Manglore, Kananur, Kranganur, Kulam, Koochin, Negapatam, Meliyapur, Hugli and Satigaon. However, in the 17th century, they lost many of these possessions and by 1689-90, they had control only over Goa, Bardesh, Diu, Daman, Salsette, Bassein and Chaul only.¹²⁰

1) Earlier Relations between the Marathas and the Portuguese

The history of the Maratha-Portuguese relations dates back to the days of Shahaji Raje, father of Shivaji the Great. In 1636, while Shahaji was waging war with the Mughals and the Adilshah, he had requested the Portuguese to give shelter to his family in the fort of Chaul. However, fearing the wrath of the Mughals and the Adilshah the Portuguese did not comply with the request of Shahaji. Interests of the Portuguese first clashed with those of the Marathas, when in 1658 Shivaji conquered the region of north Konkan and was reported to have molested the two Portuguese villages. In the succeeding year, he started building up his navy at Kalyan-Bhivandi. The Portuguese took cognizance of the rising Maratha naval activities, and ordered their navy to impede the Maratha vessels, plying on the sea. However, the Portuguese could not check the rise of the Maratha power either on sea or on land. In the times of Shivaji, the relations

between the Marathas and the Portuguese did not remain always cordial. Sometimes, both the sides resorted to the occasional plundering and skirmishes. For example, in 1667, Shivaji led a small expedition into the region of Bardesh to punish the rebellious Desais, and the Portuguese officers who had sheltered them. However, these activities did not culminate in a regular war between the Marathas and the Portuguese.¹²¹ However, in the reign of Sambhaji, the Marathas fought a war with the Portuguese in 1683 and the relations between the two powers did not improve till the tragic end of the Maratha king.¹²²

2) Friendship between the Mughals and the Portuguese

When the Mughal forces conquered the Maratha regions in south Konkan, bordering the Portuguese state, the Portuguese felt very much relieved and happy. In his letter, dated January 31, 1689, the Portuguese Viceroy writes to the king of Portugal, "we are relieved of the oppressive Sambhaji, our neighbour. The Mughals have captured all his regions in Konkan along with his famous town Fonda, bordering our state. Our relations with the Mughals are very cordial and they have sent their envoy to us for seeking our friendship."¹²³ In February, 1689, Sambhaji was captured and was subsequently put to death in March. Raigad, the capital of the Marathas, was besieged

121. PMS, pp. 39-41, 60-61; MIS-PD, pp. 3, 6-7

122. MIS-POR, pp. 49-55

123. Ibid., p.55

and Rajaram had to escape from the fort to save his life. The Mughals learnt the intention of Rajaram to flee to Karnatak and hence, they kept vigilance on all the probable routes to Karnatak. Bahadur Khan, 'the Subhedar of Belgaum' reported to the Portuguese Viceroy the escape of Rajaram from Raigad and requested the latter to capture him, if he happened to pass through the Portuguese territory. The Viceroy promised all possible help, by posting guards at all probable routes on land (May 12, 1689).¹²⁴ In his second letter to the Khan, the Viceroy reassures his co-operation and writes that he has doubled the number of the guards on the routes on land as well as on sea (September 3, 1689).¹²⁵

While both sides, the Portuguese and the Mughals, were professing friendship and cooperation, the Mughal Emperor had sent his demands to the Portuguese that they should cede to him Salsette and Mirjan. This information is revealed by the English records, but the Portuguese records are silent on it.¹²⁶

124. TKK, pp.54

125. Ibid., pp. 55 -56

126. On December 26, 1689, the English of Bombay write to London, "The Moors are very abusive towards the Portuguese, but they bear with everything and truly are in a manner wholly at the Moors' commands and it is plain they will submit to anything and never think of contending with the Great Mugull who is now very potent and drives all before him. We have news that the Mogull has sent messengers to Goa and demands from the Portuguese a place called Salsette and Morainjan which are of great

3) Desais' Revolt against the Mughals

The Desais in south Konkan, viz., the Desais of Maneri, Sankhali, Dicholi and Fonda (Antruj) were an important factor in the south Konkan region to be reckoned with. In the reign of Sambhaji, they had rebelled against him and joined hands with the Portuguese in 1685. Later on in 1688, they accepted the overlordship of the Mughal Emperor. However after the tragic end of Sambhaji and the consequent Maratha awakening in Maharashtra, these Desais left the Mughals and joined the Maratha side.¹²⁷ Abdul Raja Khan, a Mughal commander, asked the Portuguese Viceroy to arrest these Desais and render service to the Emperor. While replying to him, the Portuguese Viceroy professes the Portuguese-Mughal friendship and writes, "... as regards your request to me to imprison the families of Desais of Maneri and Sankhali, and that of Somu Senoy (Somu Shenavi) who have revolted against the rule of the Moghul ... I have received the information that the reason of the revolt of these Desais is the assurance of aid of infantry and cavalry by Rajaram to them ..." ¹²⁸ The Viceroy further informs the Khan

F.N. 126 Contd...

importance to them, so that it is thought the king (the Mughal Emperor) designs to quarrel with them..."-(CRM, p.108)

127. However, Khem Savant, the Desai of Kudal did not desert the imperial side. - (PMS, pp. 129-130)

128. PM, p.156

that he has sent orders to his officials to arrest the Desais (August 15, 1690).¹²⁹ In his report on the happenings in India, to the king of Portugal, the Viceroy describes the revolt of the Desais against the Mughals and says, "The Desais of Konkan, seeing his (the Emperor's) limited power and the failure of arrival of the aid that he (the Emperor) called from his kingdom, refused obedience to the Moghul king and sided with Raza Rano (Rajaram). What stirred the Desais up for that act was the same caste of pagans to which they as well as the Maratha king belonged. Further, they could not tolerate the insolent behaviour towards the heathen (Hindu) women and profanation of their temples ... by the Muslims. Therefore, they unitedly rebelled against the Governor of Fonda, Sarbaz Khan and general Abdu. Reza Khan who ran from his regular fort of Kudal to Dicholi for safety. Both these commanders of the Moghul are frightened of the power of Raza Rano that on several occasions plundered the villages surrounding Fonda." (January 16, 1691).¹³⁰ When the neighbouring regions in south Konkan had passed under the Mughal rule, the Portuguese had felt relieved, but soon they realized the Marathas were the better neighbour than the Mughals. Hence, the Portuguese adopted a dual policy. While

129. MIS-POR, p.59. To Sarbaz Khan, the Mughal Governor of Fonda, the Viceroy writes, "I have issued orders preventing passage to all the families of the persons who deserted the Moghul service to join the enemy, Rajaram." (October 26, 1690) - (PM, p.156)

130. PM, pp. 157-158

analysing the policy, the Viceroy writes to the king of Portugal, "Even though the Moghuls were allowed unobstructed passage the subjects of Raza Ramo were not denied that facility. On the other hand, the latter were treated with equal promptitude when they wrote to the governors, Dom Rodrigo Da Costa and Dom Mingel de Almeida, seeking for our assistance. In the recent years they have also written to us to keep peace and friendship with Raza Ramo as this state did in old days with his father, Shivaji. We have reciprocated to these feelings of friendship, in such a way and with such a precaution that the officials of the Moghul as well as those of Raza Ramo believe that this state is propense to the individual affairs of each. This is the state of affairs between the two rulers. The Desais and other officials of Raza Ramo, persistently engaged in war, have become masters of Fonda and Dicholi. It is rather convenient to this state to have heathens (Hindus : Marathas) than the Muslims as our neighbours. The Muslims have no word. They are naturally insolent, creating occasions for discord. We put up a show of neutrality and indifference to either. They have also, shown us no signs of discontent. However, we are always cautious with arms in hand..."¹³¹ (January 16, 1691)

4) Maratha-Portuguese Friendship

In 1692-93, the relations between the Marathas and the Portuguese had certainly improved to such a degree that Tristan de Melo, the Portuguese general of Bassein, helped the Marathas

131. Ibid., pp. 156-159; TKK, pp. 61-62

in north Konkan against the Mughal commander Matabar Khan. The Mughal commander alleged that the Portuguese general had given shelter to the families of the Marathas and helped them, by sending supplies and reinforcements to capture the Mughal forts. He further levelled a charge against the Portuguese general that he had "summoned Shyamji Morodev, an officer of Rajaram, from the island of Khanderi and harboured him and his 1,500 infantry in the Portuguese village of Thana, agreeing to co-operate with him in attacking the fort of Mahuli and the village of Bhivandi held by the Mughals." 132

Consequently, Matabar Khan set out on the expedition against the Portuguese in north Konkan. Several encounters were fought, in which the Portuguese forces were driven back to their fort of Bassein. Many Portuguese families were made captive. The Mughals burnt down a church outside the fort and encamped at Bahadurpura. The Khan requested the Emperor to send him more reinforcement and some big guns to attack the fort. It should be noted that Siddi Yakut, the Governor of Danda Rajapuri, had also come to the aid of Matabar Khan in attacking the Portuguese on the sea. Meanwhile, the Portuguese Viceroy had dispatched his envoy to the Emperor, with 'a most submissive letter' requesting him to stop the war. According to the Portuguese, the Khan had not sought the Emperor's permission to open up hostilities with them. The Emperor conceded to the request of the Portuguese envoy and asked the Khan to release all the captives and return to them

all the spoils of war. All efforts of the Khan to explain his intention of the expedition against the Portuguese proved useless. The Portuguese write in their letter that the Emperor had even imposed a fine of Rs.2,00,000 on the Khan for his mischief (1692-93).¹³³

5) Deterioration of the Relations between the Marathas and the Portuguese

However, in 1694, the relations between the Marathas and the Portuguese deteriorated. For reasons unknown, the Portuguese commander attacked the Maratha port Achare and resorted to burning. The Portuguese troops also destroyed a Hindu temple and burnt down seven hedis (small boats) in the port.¹³⁴ It seems that in retaliation, Rayaji Shamrao, a Maratha commander, attacked Bardesh, the Portuguese possession in south Konkan, and plundered it. While lodging a strong protest with

133. Ibid., pp. 125-127; MIS-POR, p.63; PMS, p.130

Khafi Khan gives a brief account of Matabar Khan's campaign : "Matabar Khan made a surprise attack and took two of the small forts of the Feringis (the Portuguese). Most of them fled to Daman and Bassein, because they are weak in fighting on the plain and use no weapon except the musket and a short sword looking like a spit, and do not ride chargers. Many Feringis with their women were captured. At this a great terror seized them." - (HA, V, p.126)

134. PMS, p.131

the commander; the Portuguese Viceroy says, "From the letters, received, long back from you, from Ramohandra Pandit and from Santaji Ghorpade, I took you to be friends of the state because that was indicated and assured in the said letters. But today I see the contrary; you have descended the ghats and entered in our kingdom purely for thefts. This act is so bad that I condemn it as it does not suit within the faith that the Portuguese habitually observed. I have issued order to Chaul for the capture of the islets of Kolaba and Cundry and allowing no food stuff to pass to the said islets and to the Marathas who are in our lands ... in the north. It is certain that with small efforts I can do it to harass you in those lands and cause great damage on the sea-shore. This action that might cause fear for you was not put in practice because the Portuguese break with their friends for the most justifiable reasons only. I felt the entry of your horses into Bardes might be a disorder of your soldiers and you might be unaware of their daring. In order to ascertain the truth about the event I call upon you to declare whether you are a foe or friend and also to declare if you desire a war or peace with us. If you want war I am prepared for it. I will give your soldiers full satisfaction if they wish so much to engage themselves in it. At the same time, I will have a chance to utilize my idle arms and forces. If you desire to be ⁱⁿ peace with us you should promptly demonstrate it by removing your last soldier immediately from our stripes. Then you may ask me for the terms of peace which I will not reject having

regards to its rationality. I remind you that all our neighbours suffered loss for not keeping on good terms with us..." (November 13, 1694).¹³⁵ The Portuguese had always used such a self-glorifying language in their letters addressed to the Maratha officers. However, they knew their limitations and could hardly do any damage except the burning of a village or two on the coast or attacking one or two Maratha vessels on the sea. With the deterioration of their relations with the Marathas, the Portuguese now felt a need of friendship with the Mughals. They began to cooperate with the Mughals in putting down the activities of the Desais. In November 1694, the Viceroy sent a force to Maneri to perhaps with an intention of crushing a Desai there.¹³⁶ However, in the next year, i.e. 1695, the Mughal commander of Fonda is found complaining to the Portuguese Viceroy that the Portuguese had given shelter to the Desais of Sankhali and Dicholi. It was the dual policy of the Portuguese.¹³⁷

135. PM, pp. 162-163

136. TKK, pp. 87-88

137. S.S. Desai, a scholar of Portuguese history, remarks that the Portuguese on one side were making show of helping the Mughals and on the other side, they were giving shelter to the Desais, as they did not desire peace in the Mughal territory. The Portuguese felt that the Mughals were treacherous and feared their attack on Goa any time. - (MIS-POR, p.67)

6) Khem Sawant and his Anti-Maratha Activities

It is already discussed that when most of the Desais in south Konkan joined the Maratha side, Khem Sawant did not leave the Mughals. In 1695, he requested the Portuguese to give him a naval help to attack the Maratha ports and vessels. However, it seems that the Portuguese feared the Maratha retaliation and hence declined to join Khem Sawant in the proposed joint attack on the Maratha ports and vessels. Instead, they promised to lend a naval protection to his merchant marine plying on the sea; because they considered him as their friend. (August 1695)¹³⁸

It seems that the Portuguese did lend naval protection to the merchant marine of Khem Sawant and ultimately came to clash with the Marathas. In the same year, an encounter between the Portuguese and the Marathas was fought in the Rajapur river. The Portuguese burnt down three Maratha Vessels, "largest said to carry thirty-two guns and more than 300 men." On the Portuguese side six soldiers were killed and 34 wounded.¹³⁹

In August 1696, Khem Sawant captured the fort of Kudal, which was then in the possession of the Marathas. In a letter, dated August 17, 1696, the Viceroy has congratulated Khem Sawant for his act of capturing Kudal and the "great service

138. Ibid., pp. 67-68

139. HK, p.80

rendered to the Maghal Emperor."¹⁴⁰ However, Khem Sawant was not loyal even to the Mughals. Soon, he marched upon the fort of Vengurla and besieged it. This fort was in the possession of the Mughals.¹⁴¹ Khem Sawant in his letter to the Portuguese Viceroy gives a strange explanation of his act. He says that he wished to capture the forts of the Emperor not with an evil intention, but with a desire to defend them against the enemy, the Marathas.¹⁴² Obviously, this was a mere pretext. He was an opportunist and sought to capture the territories both of the Mughals and Marathas. In 1698, he captured from the Mughals the mahals of Sankhali and Dicholi with their forts.¹⁴³ Soon he brought under his sway the mahal of Pedne, too. He had even laid a siege to Fonda. However, the Portuguese sent timely help to Fonda and hence Khem Sawant could not capture it.¹⁴⁴ It is interesting to note that earlier the Portuguese had secretly

140. MIS-POR, p.69

141. PMS, p.132

142. MIS-POR, p.69

143. PMS, p.133

In his report to the king of Portugal, the Portuguese Viceroy writes that he has secretly given help to Khem Sawant to capture the mahals of Sankhali and Dicholi, and that the Mughals are under an illusion that the Portuguese are their friends. - (Ibid., pp. 75-76)

144. PMS, p.133

helped Khem Sawant to capture the Mughal territory, and that now they were helping the Mughals against him. Khem Sawant knew that the Portuguese had helped the Mughals in order to put up a show of friendship with them. And hence, there was nothing surprising in the Sawant's accepting the overlordship of the Portuguese, later on. The Portuguese, while accepting his services, promised to protect him against his enemies, the Marathas, the Arabs and the Malbaris. However, they warned him that they would not help him against the Mughals, arguing that "the Mughal Emperor is a friend of our state."¹⁴⁵ (September 2, 1699) It is obvious that, this contract between the Portuguese and the Savant was mainly against the Marathas.

7) Conflicts between the Marathas and the Portuguese

In 1695, Ramchandrapant appointed Ganesh Raghunatha to administer the regions of south Konkan. While expressing pleasure at his appointment, the Portuguese Viceroy has complained that though Ramchandrapant apparently behaves in a friendly manner with the Portuguese, he has allowed his commanders to harass the Portuguese vessels on the sea, and that he keeps friendly relations with the Arabs, their enemy. The Viceroy further clarifies the intention of the Portuguese to keep friendly relations with Rajaram, on the condition that his naval officers behave in a friendly manner towards the Portuguese. However, he warns that if they continue to harass

the Portuguese vessels, the Portuguese would certainly punish them (June 15, 1695).¹⁴⁶

However, the Maratha-Portuguese friendship could not be revived. It seems that the Portuguese did not cease their anti-Maratha activities and hence, the Marathas did not give a serious thought to the Portuguese overture of friendship. It is reported in the Portuguese records that in August 1696, the Maratha naval force consisting of 15 vessels and 1,000 crew from Khanderi and Kolaba attacked Turbhe, a Portuguese village in north Konkan, and that they captured 60 persons and plundered almost everything. The Portuguese navy in the rivers of Kalyan and Bhivandi tried in vain to pursue the Marathas. In retaliation, the Portuguese captain of Chaul imprisoned some Marathas, reported to have illegally entered the Portuguese territory. The Portuguese Viceroy in the Advisory Council of Goa decided to act promptly and accordingly ordered the captain of Chaul to immediately blockade the Fort of Khanderi. The Portuguese note in their letters that the blockade was so much effective that the Marathas were compelled to release the captives, including the Portuguese women. The Portuguese had frankly admitted that the Marathas had not molested the captives.¹⁴⁷

In 1699, the Portuguese joined the Mughals and Siddis in their joint attack on the Maratha navy. However, Kanoji Angre, the Maratha admiral, defeated their combined naval force

146. FKK, pp. 90-91

147. Ibid., pp. 92-94

near Sagargad.¹⁴⁸ In the same year, i.e., 1699, the Marathas twice plundered the Portuguese villages in north Konkan and their vessels attacked the Portuguese vessels, carrying food-grains to Goa. In his letter, dated March 23, 1700, the Portuguese Viceroy lodged a strong complaint with Parashuram Trimbak and warned him that if the Marathas desired friendship with the Portuguese, they should return the spoils.¹⁴⁹ Thus, it can be concluded that at the end of Rajaram's period, the Maratha-Portuguese relations were not cordial. Both sides used to resort to the occasional skirmishes, plundering and burning in each other's territory.

8) Double-dealing Policy of the Foreign Powers

While reviewing the relations between the Marathas and the foreigners, a student has to consider a fact that there are hardly any documents from the Maratha side to explain their view points on their conflicts with the foreigners. On account of this deficiency of source material the Marathas leave an impress that they were aggressive, unjust and at times treacherous in their dealings with the foreigners. However, a close study of the available sources, though one-sided, reveals that many a time the so-called unjust acts of the Marathas were the result of the double-dealing policy of the foreign powers in India. How could the Marathas forgive or trust the foreigners

148. KA, p.20

149. TKK, pp. 119-120

who made the open friendly overtures and sent war-materials to the Mughals, the enemy No.1 of the Marathas? Thus, the nature of the Maratha relations with the foreign powers largely depended upon latter's relations with the Mughals in the Deccan.

Not only in the period of Rajaram, but during the whole of the 17th century, the main object of the foreigners, except the Portuguese, was trade. Under any circumstances, they desired to protect and promote their commercial interests in India. Thus, their policy was more of a commercial nature than the political one. They did keep their watchful eye on the Indian politics and at times participated or got involved in it; but while doing that they never lost sight of their trade. As a matter of fact there was no reason that they should have any affinity for either the Mughals or the Marathas or any other native power in India. Their relations with the native powers had no sentimental value. However, as shrewd traders, they did study the political situation in the Deccan to know with whom they should cultivate their friendly relations to promote their trade. And hence, they are found pretending friendship with the Mughals, when their victorious army invaded region after region and with the Marathas, when their generals won great victories over the Mughals. Thus, theirs was a double-dealing policy. As traders, it was a natural and apt policy for them. But to the native powers, it appeared most selfish and opportunistic.

The most important event in the politics of the Deccan in the last quarter of the 17th century was the coming of the

Emperor to the Deccan. When the Grand Mughal Emperor himself was personally waging the war against a small power like the Marathas, no European power had either courage or potentiality to oppose him. It is already observed how he humiliated the English when they adopted the aggressive policy. It was a blunder on the part of the English to declare war against the mighty Mughal Emperor. They paid a heavy penalty for that and eventually compelled to decide "to keep fair with all parties and side with none without an absolute necessity." At the same time, it should be noted that both the Mughals and the Marathas were aware of the superiority of the European arms and navy. Hence, whenever the Mughal or the Maratha commanders were denied assistance by the Europeans, many a time the former had to remain content with only issuing verbal threats to the latter. Both the Mughals and the Marathas knew that, though it was not impossible for them to expel the Europeans, they would have to pay a high price for it. It was because of the highly efficient artillery of the Europeans.

It should be admitted that the Europeans suffered much in the Mughal-Maratha conflict in the Deccan. The forces of both the Mughals and Marathas continued to ravage the regions, destroying habitations and cultivations of each other. This resulted into the decline of prosperity and the consequent ruin of trade and commerce. As traders the Europeans were more worried about the commercial loss. Their position became much more delicate when the commanders of both sides asked for help in their expeditions against each other. In such a case, if

they helped one side, the other would naturally feel mortified. However, it seems that the Europeans had rendered more assistance to the Mughals than the Marathas in the warfare; and it was because of the fear in their heart for the Mughal might.

Chapter Five

Maratha Administration

1) Need of the Hour

After the capture of Sambhaji, Rajaram stayed in Maharashtra for about eight months. During this period, he left the capital Raigad and kept himself moving from fort to fort. He soon realized the danger of remaining within the walls of the forts in Maharashtra. The Mughal forces were penetrating from almost all directions and the boundaries of the Maratha State were shrinking day by day. The forts and the regions were captured one after another and there appeared to be a great decrease in the morale of the Marathas. In short, the Marathas felt that the Mughal aggression was too intensive to be repulsed. Hence, Rajaram decided to shift the centre of his activities to a far off region like Jinji, in Karnatak, thereby following the strategy agreed upon at Raigad.

In view of the Mughal conquest of the States of Bijapur and Golconda and the movements of the conquering Mughal forces in the Deccan it was impossible to run the administration and conduct the war with the Mughals in Maharashtra from the distant seat of government like Jinji. So it was highly expedient to set up such an administrative machinery in Maharashtra which could run the administration and fight out the enemy in the absence of the Maratha king.

The need of the hour was recognized and confident officials, who could be worthy of the trust reposed in them by

the Maratha king, were appointed. Fortunately, Maharashtra did possess such persons who had head to think and hand to execute. They were Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Pralhad Niraji, Parashuram Trimbak, Santaji, Dhanaji and many others. The state of the Marathas was saved from the disaster of the Mughal aggression by these Maratha leaders who could for the time being rise above their self-interest and rivalries.

2) Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji,
Chief Administrators

At Panhala Rajaram decided to entrust the task of protecting the Maratha State in Maharashtra to these persons. Keshav Pandit was present at this time at the fort. He records that the region of Korigad was assigned to Shankaraji Narayan and the rest of the Maratha territory was given in charge of Ramchandrapant. Santaji, Dhanaji and other commanders were asked to work under the guidance of the Pant and Shankaraji Narayan.¹

Though, in the beginning, Shankaraji Narayan was in the charge of a small region, later on both he and the Pant had an equal share of the administration in Maharashtra. This is evident from a letter of December 12, 1690, in which, Shankaraji Narayan explicitly writes that he is in charge of the region north of Satara and north Konkan. Similarly, the Pant was in charge of the region roughly south of Satara and south Konkan.² Thus, Raigad in Konkan and Satara on the

1. RC-Sarg IV, Vs., 11-12

2. BISM-Q, Yr. 9, Iss. 4, pp. 66-67. BALAJI CHITRAKARTHI
CHITRAKARTHI CHITRAKARTHI

ghats stood as lines of demarcation between the spheres of the administration under the Pant and Shankaraji Narayan.

Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan were in sole charge of the administration in Maharashtra. They could administer the royal powers on behalf of the Maratha king. The title of hukumatpanah and raja-inya, wielding of royal power, were also conferred upon the Pant and Shankaraji Narayan, respectively.³ Some times, such titles remained in name only; but here, they carried a practical significance. At one place Rajaram himself writes to the watandars of tarf Mitha-Khore, "The Swami (he) has kept Ramchandrapant Amatya and Shankarajipant Sachiv for the purpose of administration of the State in Maharashtra. The sanads, which they give after consideration of your case, shall be treated as those given by the Swami. The Swami will act accordingly."⁴ (August 12, 1691). In another letter he says, "Consider the sanad given by the raja-inya (Shankaraji Narayan) as a sanad from the Swami."⁵ This sense of entrustment is often expressed by Rajaram in many of his letters.⁶

3) Formation of the Rajmandal

Under the circumstances, giving the sole charge of the administration of Maharashtra to Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji

3. RC-MR, p.49; BISM- VI, Shak 1838, p.92

4. SCS, VI, p.79

5. BISM- VI, Shak 1838, pp. 92-93

6. SCS, VIII, p.53; PD, XXXI, p.48

Narayan was a wise and calculated step on the part of Rajaram. Because, had the words of the Pant and Shankaraji Narayan no weight of those of the Maratha king, they would have been hardly respected, trusted and feared. Thus, the administration would have been altogether impossible. The various watandars, on whom the then structure of the state and society rested to a considerable extent, would have been left with no choice but to submit themselves to the aggressive Mughal forces. Hence, Rajaram filled the void created by his absence by creating highpowered raj-mandal (regency-council) in Maharashtra with the Pant and Shankaraji as the chief administrators.

This raj-mandal, it seems, was working at least in the beginning under the Queen Tarabai. A document, mentioning the decision of the raj-mandal in 1690-91, with Tarabai at its head, is available.⁷ From this it may be surmised that the general policy regarding the administration in Maharashtra was some times formulated under the guidance of Tarabai. However, soon Tarabai and Rajasbai left Maharashtra for Jinji and there was nobody left from the royal family to guide or head the raj-mandal. Consequently, both Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan got full freedom of action in the fields of administration and war till the return of Rajaram to Maharashtra in 1698. It may also be surmised that the raj-mandal comprised besides the Pant and Shankaraji Narayan, the great generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji and some times high officials of the state like sarsubhedars and subhedars.

7. BD, Vol. I, pp. 34-36; AVV, p.43

4) Pradhan-mandal (Council of Ministers)

The (ashta) pradhan-mandal was an important feature of the Maratha administration. Shivaji the Great had appointed ministers for the administrative purposes even before his coronation. By the time of the coronation the full-fledged pradhan-mandal had come into existence with the new Sanskrit designations.

In the reign of Sambhaji, the ministers like Moropant Pingle and Annaji Datto proved to be faithless to him. Hence, he lost his trust in his ministers. The only significant and dignified post in the pradhan-mandal of his reign was that of the senapati. That too vanished after the death of Hambirrao Mohite at Wai in 1687. Since that time, Kavi Kalash became his sole adviser and held the key position in his administration. Thus the pradhan-mandal system was as good as extinct in these years.

This state of affairs changed soon after the capture of Sambhaji. The subsequent national calamities brought all divergent interests and elements together, setting aside the petty quarrels for power. The high sense of swarajya grappled the leading persons in Maharashtra. They whole-heartedly extended their co-operation to Rajaram to wage the War of Independence with the Mughals. Rajaram was to select his ministers from them and exploit their talent, experience and wisdom for the good of the Maratha State.

It should be noted that the formation of the pradhan-mandal of Rajaram did not take place at one time or at one

place. In fact, he had no peace of mind to form his pradhan-mandal in a normal manner. Some of the appointments of his ministers were made while he was in Maharashtra and some others while he was at Jinji in Karnatak. Here follows a brief history of the formation of his pradhan-mandal :

1. Mukhya-pradhan :

In the reign of Sambhaji, Nilkantha Moreishwar was the mukhya-pradhan of the Maratha State. Rajaram's letter, dated September 14, 1689, bears his seal as mukhya-pradhan.⁸ It brings forth a fact that he was already continued in the same post by Rajaram, while the latter was in Maharashtra. Nilkantha Moreishwar accompanied Rajaram in his historic journey from Panhala to Jinji and remained there throughout the stay of the latter. He escaped from Jinji round about the escape of Rajaram. Though almost every letter of Rajaram bears his seal, it is difficult to state how far he was actually handling the daily administration of the State. His own administrative letters are rarely found.⁹ His name seldom figures in the correspondence of the foreigners also.

Nilkantha Moreishwar died in a battle with the Mughals at Miraj in 1699.¹⁰ So, Rajaram appointed Parashuram Trimbak

8. RSP, p.174

9. One such letter, dated May 17, 1696, written by him to the mohlisman and others of tarf Masur and Umbraj is available. - (MIS, XV, p.98).

10. PTP, p.14

in his place. The first letter bearing the seal of Parashuram Trimbak as mukhya-pradhan dates October 3, 1699.¹¹ This substantiates that after the death of Nilkantha Moreshwar, Parashuram Trimbak was appointed in his place sometime before October, 1699.

Before his appointment as mukhya-pradhan, Parashuram Trimbak was holding the post of pratinidhi. However, his post was given to Timaji Raghunath who had escaped from the Mughal captivity to Maharashtra after the fall of Jinji. This might have made the position of Parashuram Trimbak like that of a minister without portfolio. So, when Nilkantha Moreshwar died in a battle at Miraj, Rajaram deemed it proper to fill up the vacancy by appointing him as his mukhya-pradhan. A letter, dated May 16, 1700, of Parashuram Trimbak to sarsubhedar of Vyaghragad mentions him as mukhya-pradhan.¹² This shows that he was holding the said post even after the death of Rajaram.¹³

2. Pratinidhi :

Malhar Ramrao writes : Pralhad Niraji was the confidant of Rajaram. The former being wise and active, the latter

11. SV, III, p.76

12. SCS, V, p.270

13. The four more letters mentioning Parashuram Trimbak as mukhya-pradhan are available. They are of the following dates respectively : October 24, 1699; December 19, 1699; March 1, 1700 and March 30, 1700 - (SV, III, p.76; TKK, p. 115; PGIS, p.397; TKK, p.120)

decided to bestow one of the posts in the pradhan-mandal upon him. But there was no post vacant. Hence, he created an additional as well as the highest post in the pradhan-mandal by designating it as pratinidhi (king's proxy) and gave it to Pralhad Niraji in 1692.¹⁴

Grant Duff and Sardesai hold the same view.¹⁵ But the recent publication of the documents has shed light on the appointment of Pralhad Niraji as pratinidhi. The aforesaid letter of Rajaram, dated September 14, 1689, just 12 days before his departure from Panhala to Jinji, bears the seal of Pralhad Niraji as pratinidhi.¹⁶ This invalidates the accounts of Malhar Ramrao and substantiates the fact that Pralhad Niraji had already been appointed as pratinidhi at the fort of Panhala in 1689 and not at Jinji in 1692 as Malhar Ramrao and the other historians say.

The last available letter of Rajaram bearing the seal of Pralhad Niraji as pratinidhi, is of July 2, 1696.¹⁷ The date of the death of Pralhad Niraji is not known. It is however, certain that he died before the escape of Rajaram from Jinji. Malhar Ramrao provides us an interesting story of his death. He writes, "Pralhad Niraji incurred the disfavour

14. RC-MR, pp. 44-45

15. HM-GD, p.267; SR, p.41

16. RSP, p.174.

17. Ibid., p.192

of Rajaram. He went to Pandharpur, stayed there for some time and later on, one day, committed suicide in front of the temple of Pundlika. Meanwhile Rajaram conferred the post of pratinidhi on Naropant, the son of Pralhad Niraji. Naro Pralhad was pratinidhi for only nine months. Later on, Rajaram gave his post to Timaji Raghunath Hanmante.*¹⁸

In the history of the pratinidhi family, it is stated that Pralhad Niraji died in 1697 at Jinji. Timaji Raghunath Hanmante was appointed pratinidhi in his place in January 1698.¹⁹ However, this date is wrong. The seal of Timaji Raghunath as the pratinidhi of Rajaram is available. It dates March 27, 1697.²⁰ This amply proves that Pralhad Niraji died before the said date and Timaji Raghunath was in his place at that time, i.e., March 1697. But the seal of Naro Pralhad as pratinidhi is not available.

The appointment of Timaji Raghunath to the pratinidhiship was made by Rajaram when the latter was at Jinji. Soon Rajaram left Jinji for Maharashtra. Timaji remained at Jinji and was taken captive by the Mughals. So, Rajaram appointed Parashuram Trimbak as his pratinidhi. Meanwhile, having managed to escape from the Mughal captivity, Timaji Raghunath came to Maharashtra. Rajaram was pleased to see him alive and conferred the pratinidhiship on him, again.²¹

18. RC-MR, pp. 77-78

19. FGI, p.132

20. CGM, p.31; FGI, p.132

21. PTP, p.13-14

Thus, Parashuram Trimbak was the pratinidhi of Rajaram for a short period during 1698-1699. The first available letter, bearing the seal of Parashuram Trimbak as pratinidhi dates March 16, 1699.²² The last available letter, bearing his seal as pratinidhi, dates June 20, 1699.²³ It seems, therefore, that Timaji Raghunath continued to be in his post till the appointment of Parashuram Trimbak as pratinidhi by Tarabai.

3. Amatya :

Raghunath Narayan Hanmante was Sambhaji's amatya. He died in May 1683 and his son, Narayan Raghunath succeeded him. V.S. Bendre holds that after the death of Narayan Raghunath, probably Timaji Raghunath succeeded him. He further adds that Timaji and other members of the Hanmante family accompanied Rajaram to Jinji. Consequently, the post of amatya remained vacant in Maharashtra and so Ramchandrapant was appointed in the post.²⁴

22. MIS, XXI - R, p.29

23. Ibid., XX, p.261

The four more letters, mentioning Parashuram Trimbak as the pratinidhi of Rajaram, are found. They date March 25, 1699; April 25, 1699; May 10, 1699; and May 13, 1699, respectively - (PD-P, p.3; MIS, XV, p.211; SV, III, p.76; BD, I, p.97)

24. CSM, pp. 130-131

However, one of the earliest letters of Rajaram, dated April 23, 1689, makes a reference to Narayan Raghunath (Naropant Amatya) as amatya.²⁵ This testifies to the fact that in the beginning of Rajaram's reign Narayan Raghunath was alive and was still holding the post of amatya.

The exact date, on which Rajaram transferred this post from Narayan Raghunath to Ranchandrapant, is not traceable owing to the lack of sources. However, it is definite that Ranchandrapant got this post after Rajaram had established his seat of government at Jinji. Shivaji II has mentioned this in his sangad to Ranchandrapant in a later period.²⁶ The approximate time of the appointment can be stated with the help of a letter of December 12, 1690, of Shankaraji Narayan, in which he writes that the Chhatrapati has bestowed the amatyaship upon Ranchandrapant.²⁷ It is, therefore, clear that Ranchandrapant must have got the post prior to the abovementioned date, i.e., December 12, 1690.

It is already seen that Rajaram had also conferred upon Ranchandrapant the high title of hukumatpanha which empowered him in absence of the Maratha king to administer the Maratha State with absolute powers. In this sense, the Pant was the real pratinidhi of Rajaram in Maharashtra. The Pant was continued ⁱⁿ his post of amatya even after the death of Rajaram.

25. SCS, X, pp. 24-25

26. SL, pp. 186-187

27. BISM - Q, Yr. 9, Iss. 4, pp. 66-67

4. Sachiv :

After the arrest of Annaji Datto by Sambhaji the post of sachiv was given to Ramchandrapant. Ramchandrapant continued in the post till the early period of Rajaram's reign.²⁸ Soon the portfolio was transferred to Shankaraji Narayan. In his letter of January 23, 1690, Shankaraji Narayan has used the title of sachiv.²⁹ That indicates that Shankaraji was made sachiv before the abovementioned date.³⁰ It should be noted that he was continued in the same post even after the death of Rajaram.³¹

5. Senapati :

V.S. Bendre writes : After the death of Hambirrao Mohite at Wai, Sambhaji appointed Mahaloji Ghorpade in his post of senapati; Mahaloji was killed in the skirmish at Sangameshwar in February 1689; later on, on the advise of Ramchandrapant,

28. SCP-JS, p.36. Rajaram's letter, dated September 29, 1689, mentions Ramchandrapant as sachiv. - (RSP, p.176)

29. SCS, V, p.201

30. According to G.S. Sardesai, Rajaram gave the sachivship to Shankaraji Malhar Nargundkar. Later on, he got disgusted with the administration and left for Kashi. So, Rajaram gave that post to Shankaraji Narayan on October 23, 1690 - (SR, p. 43). But as is shown above Shankaraji Narayan was holding that post on January 23, 1690.

31. SCS, 1, p.90

Rajaram appointed Santaji in the said post probably in 1689.³²

Bendre's statement is based mainly on the references in the Yadis which mention Mahaloji Ghorpade as the sarnobat of Panhala. The Yadis further add that he was in charge of a force of 500 horse.³³ Ordinarily, sarnobat means senapati or commander-in-chief of an army.³⁴ But in the Maratha administration in those times, sarnobat means not necessarily senapati. At every fort in Maratha State sarnobat and tatsarnobats were appointed to defend it against an enemy.³⁵ Here, sarnobat is a small army officer in charge of the defence of a fort. The Yadis too mention Mahaloji as the sarnobat of Panhala and not a senapati of the Maratha State. Moreover, it should be noted that no where in any authentic document, Mahaloji has been mentioned as the senapati of the Maratha State. Thus, it is plain that Mahaloji was a small army officer at the fort of Panhala, commanding a force of 500 and not the senapati of the State.

Some Yadis state that Mahadji Naik Pansambal was made senapati after Rajaram reached Jinji.³⁶ However, Malhar Ramrao has a slightly different story to tell. He writes : Rajaram

32. CSM, pp. 132 & 623

33. Ibid., p.119; FY, pp. 384-385

34. MBFS, p.785; SS, p.164

35. CSB, p.22

36. IS-PD, p.335; SB, pp. 56-57

wanted to give the senapatiship to Dhanaji Jadhav, but he bestowed it upon Santaji at the request of Ramchandrapant³⁷ after Santaji's dare-devil attack on the camp of Aurangzeb. Later on, Santaji did not reinforce the garrison of Panhala when the fort was besieged in 1690. So as a disciplinary action, Rajaram removed Santaji from his post and gave it to Mahadaji Naik Pansambal in shak 1612. (1690-91). Afterwards, when Mahadaji died at Jinji, Santaji was reinstated in his office.³⁸

This account of Malhar Ramrao is not corroborated by any of the authentic documents. Similarly, we do not find any reference to the post of senapati of the Marathas in any of Marathi letters or documents of the years 1689-1690. It should be noted that the letters of the said years mention Santaji as a senapanchshashree.³⁹ Another great general, Dhanaji, was also having the same title.⁴⁰ This shows, beyond doubt, that Santaji was not holding the post of senapati in the early years of Rajaram's reign. The earliest reference to Santaji as senapati is found in a letter dated September 7, 1691.⁴¹ So it is clear that he had got that post some time before the said date.

37. Malhar Ramrao gives the date of Santaji's appointment as July 22, 1688. It is needless to say that the date is evidently wrong.

38. RC-MR, pp. 35-36, 42-43, 49-50

39. AP, p. 1; RSP, p.179

40. RSP, p.179

41. MIS, XV, p.382

In May 1693, Santaji had a quarrel with Rajaram who removed him from the post and appointed Dhanaji in his place.⁴² However, soon Santaji was pardoned and reinstated in his post. In his letter to Rajaram, dated October 15, 1694, he has used the title of senapati.⁴³ It shows that he was reinstated before the said date of the letter. However, he did not remain in the office for a long time. On account of his 'non-dutiful behaviour' he was removed from his office for the second time (June 1696) and his rival Dhanaji was appointed in his place.⁴⁴ Dhanaji continued in the office even in the period of Tarabai. It is interesting to note that Santaji continued to use the title of senapati even after his dismissal.⁴⁵

6. Sunant :

Malhar Raurao does not give the name of sunant of Rajaram.⁴⁶ Grant Duff writes that Mahadaji Gadhadhar was appointed as sunant.⁴⁷ G.S. Sardesai gives the same name.⁴⁸ But the Yadav Records end the ambiguity of the subject. Shivaji II in his sanad to Girjoji Yadav explicitly mentions

42. SCP-JS, p.37

43. MIS, XV, pp. 80-81

44. SCP-JS, p.38 ; FDC, 1696, p.67

45. BISM- VI, 1837, p.314. In his letter to the army officials, dated April 1, 1697, he has used the title of senapati.

46. RC-MR, p.50

47. HM-GD, p.267

48. SR, p.43

Shankaraji Malhar as sunant in the reign of Rajaram. It is already seen that Shankaraji and Girjoji accompanied Raja Karna to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan before Jinji.⁴⁹

7. Mantri :

According to Malhar Ramrao, Datto Mangaji was Rajaram's mantri. After his death, Rajaram gave this post to Shamajirao Punde.⁵⁰ Grant Duff mentions Ramchandra Trimbak Punde as mantri.⁵¹ G.S. Sardesai renders the same information.⁵² A concrete statement in this respect cannot be made unless some authentic source comes to light.

8. Panditrao :

In Sambhaji's reign, Moreshwar Raghunath was panditrao. However, when Kavi Kalash was made the ohhandogamatya, the post of panditrao receded to the background. Rajaram in his reign conferred the post of panditrao on Shrikaracharya Kalgaonkar who had accompanied Rajaram to Jinji.⁵³ Shrikaracharya's letter, dated March 18, 1698, is available.⁵⁴ He seems to have held the post during the entire reign of Rajaram.

49. TKK, pp. 197 & 476

50. RC-MR, p.50. Malhar Ramrao does not mention the year of death of Datto Mangaji.

51. HM-GD, p.267

52. SR, p.43

53. Ibid.

54. BISM - Q. Yr. 9, Iss. III, p.15

9. Nyayadhish :

According to Grant Duff, Rajaram appointed Niraji Raoji as nyayadhish.⁵⁵ G.S. Sardesai mentions Balaji Sendeo(?) as Rajaram's nyayadhish.⁵⁶ However, both the names are not corroborated by any authentic documents. In this respect, an important letter of Rajaram, dated March 16, 1699, to Mahadaji Balal, the sabhasad and namiad of subha Dabhol, is available.⁵⁷ The letter refers to Konher Pandit⁵⁸ as nyayadhish. After his return from Jinji to Maharashtra, Rajaram had appointed a one-man-commission of Konher Pandit to scrutinise the sanads of disputed watans.

Thus the pradhan-mandal system of Shivaji the Great continued to exist in the reigns of Sambhaji as well as Rajaram. However, it underwent many changes in its functions and importance. Though Shivaji was a sovereign king, he had judiciously distributed the duties and responsibilities of the administration among his ministers. It is, however, true that

55. HM-GD, p.267. Does Grant Duff mean the famous Niraji Raoji ? Niraji had died long ago at the end of Shivaji's reign - (CSM, p. 130; SC, p.375)

56. SR, p.43

57. MIS, III, p.132

58. Konher Jagannath (?)

his ministers hardly enjoyed the position and power of the ministers in today's democratic countries like England and India. But they certainly had responsible and active roles to play in the departments under them. Sambhaji might have continued the system with the same importance; however, he lost his confidence in his ministers due to their treacherous actions. Instead of entrusting the responsibility of the administration to them, he had to punish them for their perfidious deeds. Though some of them were continued in their posts almost all the ministers, except the senapati, were reduced to the position of mere figureheads. Sambhaji concentrated all the powers of the state in his hands and bestowed some of them upon Kavi Kalash, his most favourite servant. A new post of the ohhandegamatya was specially created for him. He remained the chief counsellor to Sambhaji till the latter's death. Hambirrao Mohite, the senapati, was the only active member of the pradhan-mandal under Sambhaji and he proved to be his most loyal and trustworthy servant. He died fighting the Mughals in 1687 at Wai. Since then, the pradhan-mandal system under Sambhaji had been virtually eclipsed. This was the condition of the pradhan-mandal when Rajaram took up the reins of the Maratha Government, as a Chhatrapati. Rajaram did not get enough time to consolidate his ministry. The Maratha State itself was passing through a critical situation. Rajaram had to flee to Jinji to save his own life. His first and foremost duty was to beat back the Mughal forces and free his land from the clutches of the enemy. Soon, in 1690 the Marathas began to feel confident of their strength, fought

and won many battles and freed thanas and forts in Maharashtra. Rajaram established a seat of the Government at Jinji and began to reign from that capital. Though he had made some of the new appointments of the ministers such as the pratinidhi and the mukhya-pradhan in Maharashtra, he formed his complete ministry at Jinji only. The new ministry began to function under the pressure of different circumstances. Though its frame-work remained much the same as that of the (ashta)pradhan-mandal of Shivaji, its essence was already changed. The main reason for this change was the long-raged Mughal-Maratha war. The Marathas never got the peace of mind to assume the normal mode of administration. In fact, for the major part of the Rajaram's reign, his ministry remained divided. Some of the ministers, Ramchandrapant, the amatya and Shankaraji Narayan, the sachiv, were in Maharashtra and never visited Jinji, the Maratha capital in Karnatak for eight years. The other ministers were at Jinji with Rajaram. However, their names except those of Pralhad Niraji and Nilkantha Moreswar, rarely occurred in the contemporary documents. So, it has become quite difficult to know about their powers, functions and deeds under the changed circumstances.

Of the ministry, there were four members who took prominent part in the administration and war. They were Pralhad Niraji, the pratinidhi; Ramchandrapant, the amatya; Shankaraji Narayan, the sachiv, and Santaji Ghorpade, the senapati. By creating a new post of pratinidhi, Rajaram had made a notable addition to the pradhan-mandal. It should be noted that the

occupants of this post played an important role in the Maratha administration till the rise of the Bhat Peshwa family under Shahu. The pratinidhi was the proxy of the Chhatrapati. He was to represent his master in his absence. His position in the ministry was next to the Chhatrapati. He was the chief counsellor and a prominent personality in the Court of Jinji. The French Governor, Martin, has referred to the name of Pralhad Niraji at many places in his diary.⁵⁹ However, there are very few references in the Marathi sources to the political activities of Pralhad Niraji as pratinidhi. Some information about his position and activities could be had from Martin's diary and Keshav Pandit's "Rajaram Charitam". However, his position as a chief counsellor to Rajaram did not seem to have lasted long. Rajaram seems to have started managing the administration independent of his pratinidhi. His independent moves soon pushed Pralhad Niraji into the background. It further resulted into an open disagreement which led Pralhad Niraji to resign his post. He went to Pandharpur and, later on, committed suicide there.

5) Nature of the Maratha Administration

Shivaji the Great had not only founded a state but also built a very strong and efficient machinery to run its administration. However, after his death the Maratha State had to face the Mughal aggression of great magnitude, led by the Mughal Emperor himself. The Maratha State was put under heavy

59. MM-JS, pp. 236-237

weight of the aggression which demanded unceasing war-efforts on the part of the Marathas to protect their land and freedom. However, at that critical juncture, the Maratha administration suffered a heavy set-back on account of the conspiracies of the high Maratha officials. This naturally resulted in Sambhaji's distrust in them. Consequently, he and his trusted servant Kavi Kalash carried on their shoulders the whole burden of the administration till their unfortunate capture in February 1689.

However, the entire picture changed soon after the capture of the Maratha king. The Marathas were shocked and left leaderless and demoralized. The forts and regions were conquered one after another and the Maratha State, founded by Shivaji the Great, almost vanished within a short span of a year. The situation was further worsened by the capture of the royal family and the flight of Rajaram to Karnatak.

However, soon the Marathas recovered from the shock and they revived their State. Along with the revival of the State, they also revived its administrative machinery. Though the outward structure of the administration much resembled that of Shivaji's reign, it underwent the major changes which characterised the reign of Rajaram.

The first and foremost of the factors that had decisive effects on the nature of the Maratha administration was the establishment of a new Maratha capital at Jinji in Karnatak, about 500 miles away from Maharashtra. As a military strategy

it did lead to some important favourable results for the Marathas. But administratively it resulted in loosening the hold of the Maratha king on the administrative machinery in the state. Rajaram, who was besieged in a distant fort for eight long years, could not be expected to exercise effective control over the administrative officials in Maharashtra. Of course, he certainly knew it, and hence he delegated all his royal (mainly administrative) powers to Ramchandrapant, the amatya and Shankaraji Narayan, the sachiv. It was undoubtedly a need of the hour. Under the circumstances it was the most opportune step for saving the state from destruction. But it must be admitted that it naturally set about a process of decline of the royal absolutism in the Maratha State and the consequent rise of the prestige and power of the ministers in the Maratha politics in the subsequent quarter of the 18th century.

The second factor, which differentiates the Maratha administration under Rajaram from that under Shivaji, is the liberal granting and regranting of inams and watans to the inamdars and the watandars in Maharashtra. This was a total deviation from the principle of Shivaji's administrative policy. Howsoever imperative it was to revive the inamdari and watandari systems in the most critical period, it certainly wrought about undesirable changes in the Maratha State. By resurrection of the said systems, the Maratha administration had again given rise to the socially and politically privileged class in the Maratha society.

The third factor is the revival of feudalism. Under the unprecedented circumstances the feudalism was revived and it gathered greater momentum in the subsequent reigns of Tarabai and Shahu. It should be noted that the Maratha administration under Rajaram had not become entirely feudal : it was just the beginning of the process. But the feudal elements must have begun creeping into the administrative machinery. For lack of ~~in~~ sources, it is very difficult to analyse the feudal influence on the contemporary Maratha administration. However, it might not have created much administrative inconvenience as the grants of saramiams were usually made in the enemy territory. Moreover, it seems, that the Maratha administration was not much bothered about the administration of such saramiams as their grants were, at times, on paper only.

In the end, it should be mentioned that there are very few documents throwing light on the working of the administrative machinery in the period of the War of Independence. The documents regarding the inams and the watans have been published in hundreds, but they are of little use with reference the subject under discussion.

Chapter Six

MARATHA MILITARY SYSTEM AND WARFARE

An attempt is made here to elucidate some aspects of the Maratha Military System and their Warfare in the reign of Rajaram. There is a dearth of source material on this subject too. However, wherever possible, the military system of Rajaram's reign is compared with that of Shivaji's reign. At the outset, it should be noted that the tragic end of Sambhaji and subsequent mighty Mughal aggression in 1689 brought about some undesirable but inevitable changes in the Maratha Military System during the reign of Rajaram.

A) Maratha Army

1) Revival of Feudalism

The Emperors of Delhi and the Sultans of the Deccan had created feudal lords in their respective domains. The feudal lords were granted fiefs for maintaining troops which formed the major portion of their armies. Sometimes the feudal lords were tyrannical and disloyal to the central authority, exploiting every opportunity to repress the people. The jealousy among them often led them to resort to arms and consequent destruction of human habitations. Moreover, they hardly cared for training and discipline in the army. Their forces mainly consisted of men who were not inspired by any set ideals of state. Such a mercenary army, devoid of loyalty, discipline and ideals could hardly achieve any substantial gains, while fighting the patriotic Maratha army

under Shivaji the Great.¹

One of the outstanding achievements of Shivaji was the abolition of the feudal nature of the army, since he had fully realized its grave shortcomings. So, he substituted it, by creating a standing national army mostly recruited by the government. However, this national character of the army could not be maintained in the critical period that followed the tragic death of Sambhaji. Feudalism was revived, as a matter of expedience, in order to save the Maratha State. The feudal lords were obliged to furnish the troops to the army and granted fiefs in lieu of their payment. Though there was still a numerical superiority of the standing army, the feudal elements started gradually creeping in. A case of Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar may exemplify as to how the feudalism in army was revived by the Maratha Government under Rajaram. The Adilshah had bestowed a fief of Faltan mahal upon Bajaji Naik Nimbalkar, father of Mudhoji. The Nimbalkars used to supply 100 troops to the Adilshahi army. Later on, Shivaji discontinued the fief. In 1698, Rajaram regranted it to Mudhoji on the condition of furnishing 100 horse to the Maratha army.²

2) Cavalry

A cavalry of the Marathas consisted of two wings : the paga and the shiledars. The paga (regular cavalry) was

1. SG, IV, pp. 61-62

2. PD, XXXI, p.61

owned by the State. They were paid servants of the State. The shiledars were the horsemen who had their own horses and arms and who rendered their services to the State for a certain period of the year.³ In the reign of Shivaji the numerical strength of the naga was more than that of the shiledars who were placed under the jurisdiction of the former. This helped him to maintain discipline in his cavalry.⁴

The numerical superiority of the infantry over the cavalry continued as before even in Rajaram's reign. However, the strength of the cavalry was increased in a large scale as the Marathas had to carry on their warfare throughout the Deccan and their long marches and quick movements demanded a larger number of horses in the army.

A havalidar was the lowest officer in the cavalry : he had twenty-five horsemen under him. A water-carrier and a farrier were attached to each unit. A jumledar commanded five such units, while a hazari commanded ten jumledars. A panchhazari commanded five hazaris and all the panchhazaris were directly under the command of sarnobat (Senapati), i.e., the Commander-in-Chief of the army.⁵

3) Infantry

A naik was the lowest officer in the infantry. He commanded ten troops. A havalidar commanded five such units, while a jumledar commanded two or three havalidars. Ten

3. SG, IV, p.65

4. MSM, p.8

5. MSM, pp. 8-9; SG, IV, p.65

junledars were placed under a hazari and all the hazaris were placed under the direct command of the sarnobat. sabnis was the civil officer, attached to each junla and hazari. He used to keep accounts and the muster roll of the infantry.⁶ In Rajaram's reign all the ranks in the cavalry and perhaps in the infantry also, were preserved as before. The ranks, such as the senapati, the panchhazari, the hazari, the junledar and the havalidar are referred to in the documents of Rajaram's reign.⁷

4) Corps of Camels & Elephants

There were some units of camel corps in the Maratha army. Though there is no concrete evidence regarding the number of camels and elephants in the army under Rajaram, there are references to their corps in the contemporary documents.⁸ Camels and elephants were employed for carrying the guns, and bags and baggage. There is a reference to an elephant corps placed at the van of the Maratha army fighting with Sarja Khan near Satara.⁹

5) Arms and Weapons

Swords, daggers, scimitars, straight rapiers, spears, spears with a string, poniards, bows and arrows, rockets,

6. MSM, p.9; SB, p.24

7. BISM- VI, 1838, pp. 93-94; SV, VII, pp. 53-54

8. SCS, V, p.11; MIS, XX, p.260; FA, p.41

9. FA, p.41

carbines, match-locks, coats of mail, head-armours, helmets, cloth-covers, body-armours, armours for horses and elephants etc. were the conventional arms and weapons of the Marathas in Shivaji's times.¹⁰ Those must have been in use during Rajaram's reign also.

Fortunately, there is direct reference to the weapons used by both the Marathas and the Mughals, in the diary of Martin. He writes, "Their (Marathas') ordinary arms are the half-lance, the sabre for the offensive, and the round shield for defence. Some have bows and arrows but few. The Moors have this advantage over the Marathas that besides the musketeers which they have in their cavalry, the bows and arrows which they use ordinarily and preferably, are better than their enemy's and stop the Marathas from a distance."¹¹

6) Recruitment :

In Maharashtra a career of soldier was open to all. The people took to the Maratha army irrespective of their caste or creed. A contemporary poet Vitthalidas says : "When Rajaram sent for an army from Maharashtra, Ramchandrapant inspired the people with a sense of mission and sent them to Jinji to destroy the enemy. The people from all walks of life joined the Maratha army. They were the Patils, the Shetias, the Kunbis, the Chambhars, the Kumbhars, the Parits, the Nahvis, the Sonars, the Kolis, the Udmis, the Fularis

10. SG, IV, pp. 75-76

11. MM-JS, p.246

and others.¹² It should be noted that Shivaji used to enlist his soldiers after a careful scrutiny and a procurement of security bonds. This could not be expected of Rajaram because of the turmoil and troubles during his reign. When the Marathas conquered a certain region in Maharashtra, the deshmukhs of the region were asked by the Maratha Government to send recruits to the newly appointed Maratha subhedar of the region. It seems that it was one of the duties of the Maratha subhedar to enlist the recruits for the army.¹³ Similarly, some times when watans were regranted to the watandars, they were also asked to supply troops to the Maratha army. When Kanoji Zunzarrao, the deshmukh of Kanad Khore, was regranted his deshmukhi, he was obliged to send 20 troops to the army.¹⁴

When Rajaram was away in Karnatak Ranchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan were in charge of the administration in Maharashtra. Besides, they supervised the army organization and the military activities of the Marathas in the western part of India. They appointed army officers, conferred saranams on the sardars and informed the same to Rajaram in Karnatak. Rajaram in turn used to confirm these

12. THK, pp. 4-5; MIS, XV, pp. 382-384;
SG, IV, p.84

13. SCS, VI, p.77

14. Ibid., pp. 81-82

appointments and grants of saranjams.¹⁵ It is already seen that he had often and explicitly mentioned that the sanads of Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan carried the force of his sanads.

7) Strength of the army

It can positively be said that the Marathas were successful in raising a big army. In 1690, they had an army of more than a lakh, in Karnatak alone. In his letter to Baji Sarjerao Jedhe, Shankaraji Narayan writes that Rajaram has raised an army of 40,000 cavalry and 1,25,000 infantry in Karnatak.¹⁶ Martin, who was a witness to the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Jinji region, records in his diary that the Marathas have '1,50,000 horsemen standing.' (December 1692).¹⁷ In his letter to the Emperor, Prince Mujiuddin writes that Ramchandrapant and Parashuram Trimbak attacked his besieging army at the foot of Panhala with 80,000 cavalry and innumerable infantry. (1693)¹⁸

15. Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan appointed Malharji Bhandwalkar as panchhazari in the cavalry. This was duly reported to Rajaram, who confirmed the appointment. (BISM-VI, 1636, pp. 93-94)

16. AP, p.1

17. MM-JS, p.246

18. LP, p.126

In the reign of Rajaram, the Mughal-Maratha war was no longer restricted to Maharashtra alone. It had reached over the vast peninsula of the Deccan. Consequently, this necessitated an increase in the army and especially in the cavalry. With the cavalry alone, it became possible for the Marathas to make forced marches, surprise attacks and quick dispersals. While making an estimate of a number of the Maratha army, the strength of the garrisons holding the forts and thanas, the small and big contingents roving in the Deccan; and the crew on the sea, must be taken into account. Naturally, the number would easily exceed two or, perhaps, three lakhs.

8) Pendharias

The Pendharias were the professional plunderers attached to the main army. They had notoriously become a common feature of the Maratha army in the later half of the eighteenth century. It is note-worthy that the Maratha army in Rajaram's reign never employed the Pendharias in their expeditions. This, of course, did not mean that the Marathas were not knowing the Pendharias. It is interesting to note that Zulfiqar Khan had employed one corps of the Pendharias in his siege-operation and he himself was their commander.¹⁹

9) Forts

Shivaji took every precaution in making appointments of the officers at the forts in his State. The officers, such as havaladar, sabnis and karkhanis were selected after a

careful scrutiny and getting from them an assurance of bond. In general, havaladar was in charge of a garrison; the sabnis maintained accounts and muster rolls and karkhanis was the head of the commissariat department. It was a custom that the havaladar was a Maratha. (high caste Maratha), the sabnis a Brahmin and the karkhanis a Prabhu. Such a heterogeneous combination of castes was intended to check a possible joint action against the State. Secondly, it also helped to utilize the best talents in each caste in the interest of the State. Their functions were so interdependent that any act of betrayal was made almost impossible.²⁰ This kind of arrangement must have also continued during Rajaram's reign.

Sabhasad says that there were 240 forts in the Maratha State under Shivaji. Out of these 240 Shivaji himself built 111 forts.²¹ In the Mughal-Maratha struggle both sides took and retook the forts several times. This went on till the end of the war. Hence, an exact number of forts in the possession of the Marathas cannot be stated.

Since Shivaji realized the importance of the forts, he took every precaution for their maintenance. In 1671, he raised a fund of 1,75,000 hons for repairs of the forts and raised another sum of 1,25,000 hons for the provisions in the forts. The said amounts were to be used in emergency. Even in normal times he used to spend considerable amount on

20. MSM, pp. 81-84

21. CSB, p.105

constructing the new forts and repairing the old ones. He had on his pay-roll many skilled masonry workers.²² For guarding the outskirts and slopes of the forts, he employed men from the depressed classes, such as the Mahars, the Mangs, the Ramoshis, the Kolis and others. He used to pick up and choose men for jobs. He and his ministers used to pay surprise visits to the forts and inspect the strength of garrison, fortifications, stock of provisions and other materials at the forts.²³

Rajaram did not have time to inspect the forts in Maharashtra as he was away in Karnatak for eight years. However, he seems to have inspected them after his return from Karnatak.²⁴ It was his ministers Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan, who were in charge of defence in Maharashtra. But it was difficult for them to strictly follow the defence rules of Shivaji in the critical period of the Mughal-Maratha struggle. It should be noted that during the reign of Rajaram, the forts in Maharashtra had become sanctuaries for the many Maratha families. Those engaged in the warfare with the enemy used to keep their families in the forts.²⁵

10) Payment of the army

Shivaji made regular payments to his soldiers either in cash or in kind, so that there would not be any indiscipline

22. SG, IV, pp. 81-82

23. Ibid., pp. 84-85

24. TKK, pp. 198, 477-479

25. TKK, pp. 88-89

among them.²⁶ Bhimsen Saxena writes that the monthly payments to the Maratha army were discontinued after the death of Shivaji. When Rajaram left Raigad and fled to Jinji, the Maratha bands began to rove every-where, devastating the regions. They levied taxes for their maintenance. Bhimsen further states that the Maratha army used to hand over a certain share of their spoils to Rajaram.²⁷ However, it would be incorrect to say that for all the time the Maratha army was financed by the means of the spoils of war only. It is found that some times the Maratha Government did finance the military expeditions through its treasury. For example, it is revealed from a document that the amount of 300 hons, due from the nadgaunda of Khanapur, was diverted by Ramchandrapant to Santaji's expedition in Karnatak.²⁸ Ramchandrapant made Sarjerao Jedhe a panchhazari of the cavalry, asked him to raise a corps and serve under Dhanaji. The Pant also informed Sarjerao that he would receive all emoluments of his men as per the rules of cavalry through Dhanaji.²⁹ It should be noted in this context that Shankaraji Narayan's army in Maharashtra was fully financed by the Maratha Government.³⁰ An important document, dated June 14, 1690, about the emoluments of hazari and jumledar of cavalry (the Shiledars)

26. MSM, p.11

27. TD, p. 159

28. MIS, VIII, pp. 46-47

29. Ibid., XV, p.375

30. KY, p.204

states that Tulaji Nikam was given the post of hazari while his son, Miraji, was made jumledar. Tulaji and Miraji were to get enoluments of 700 hons and 300 hons per annum respectively.³¹ Thus, it is evident that in the reign of Rajaram the system of cash payment to the army was not altogether abandoned.

11) Spoils of War

Shivaji had laid down definite rules about the spoils of war. A general in charge of an expedition had to surrender all the booty to the government. After Shivaji's death, Sambhaji could not tide over the financial difficulties and make regular payments to his army. This led to the relaxation of army code and discipline. The army began to keep the spoils of war with it. Rajaram's financial difficulties were worst, compared to those of Sambhaji. He had to fight back the Mughals, when there was almost neither the State nor the treasury in early period of his reign. It was but natural that in such a situation the spoils would be kept with the army for its maintenance. As the military strength and the general condition of the Maratha Government improved in the succeeding years, the generals and feudal chiefs were asked to surrender a certain portion of the spoils to the government. In 1691, while bestowing a saranim of six lakhs of hons upon Nagoji Mane and Krishnaji Chorpade, Rajaram asked them to surrender to the government half of wealth and all the elephants, banners and kettle-drums out of their spoils.

31. SV, VII, pp. 53-54

They were allowed to keep all the captured horses with them.³² Nevertheless, this did not seem to have set a precedent in respect of the spoils. The government's share in the spoils was often relaxed from time to time on account of the changing circumstances. When the Emperor besieged the fort of Satara, Parashuram Trimbak, the mukhya-pradhan, wrote to Vithoji Babar, a Maratha commander, to intercept the succour being carried to the imperial camp. Vithoji was exempted from surrendering the government share of spoils. He was asked only to hand over the banner and kettle-drum of the defeated enemy to the government.³³ The banner and kettle-drum were considered as symbolic of prestige and honour of an army. Losing them to the adversary was considered as not only disgraceful but also as losing the battle itself.

12) Enslavement of People

In 1692, Zulfiqar Khan abandoned the siege of Jinji and set out on expedition of plundering the Karnatak regions. Martin reports that the Khan had collected a large booty such as droves of cattle and 7000 to 8000 persons (men, women and children) whom he sold as slaves.³⁴ It was quite common with the Mughals to enslave the people in the enemy territory. The Marathas, however, never resorted to such cruel practice. The Great Shivaji had laid down a healthy practice which was faithfully observed by his successors during the period of the War of Independence also.

32. SCS, V, pp. 10-12

33. RR, Yr. XXII, Iss. 260, pp. 8-9

34. MM-JS, p.243

13) Use of Telescope

A telescope is reported to have been used by the Mughals in their war with the Marathas. In 1699, the Mughals invested the Satara fort. On December, 17, the Emperor left his tent and proceeded in an uncovered palanquin to the very foot of the fort. From there he observed the fortifications through a telescope.³⁵ However, it is not known whether the Marathas had any such telescope in Rajaram's reign.

B) Maratha Navy and its Activities :

1) Shivaji, the Father of Indian Navy

Neither the Sultans of the Deccan nor the Emperors of Delhi were a master of the Indian waters. Sea remained exclusively the preserve of the Arabs, the Siddis and the European nations. When Shivaji the Great conquered the regions of Konkan he realized the importance of sea and thereby of navy. For guarding these newly conquered regions a need for a strong navy was felt. Hence, he immediately set on the work of ship-building and came to be known as the 'Father of Indian Navy.'

The Maratha navy consisted of the following types of ships : Gurab, Galbat, Shibad, Tarande, Taru, Pagar, Tirkathi, Pal, Machava, Hodi, Mahagiri etc. Shivaji did not go in for the big ships for want of skill for building them and guns and ammunition for protecting them. Besides, the rocky nature of the western coast was not so favourable for building and plying such big ships on the sea.³⁶

35. MA-SP, p.79

36. SG, IV, pp. 89-93

At the outset, it should be noted that very little is known about the naval activities of the Marathas during the reign of Rajaram for the want of source material. Naturally, there is a gap in the naval story of the Marathas from the end of Sambhaji's reign to the rise of Kanoji Angre, which took place almost at the end of Rajaram's reign.

It seems that the stunning blow to the Maratha State in 1689 must have paralysed the naval activities of the Marathas on the west coast. While studying the histories of the Marathas, so far published, one gathers an impression that the Marathas lost their navy with the fall of Sambhaji. However, that does not appear true. It should be noted that the Maratha navy did not perish in 1689; nay, it carried on naval warfare throughout the reign of Rajaram. Here follows a brief history of the Maratha naval activities during the said period.

2) Some Maratha Naval Activities

Sidhoji Gujar was the chief naval commander of the Marathas in the reign of Sambhaji.³⁷ Mankoji Marathe, Udaji Fadwal, Subhanji Kharade and Bhivaji Gujar were his subordinate officers, posted at Khanderi, Sagargad, Rajkot and Kolaba, respectively.³⁸

37. BC-MR, p.74

38. MIS, III, p.511

After Sambhaji's death the Mughal aggression in Konkan, both from the north and the south, was vigorously pushed on. Within a year, almost all the coastal region, except some strongholds, came under the Mughal sway. The Siddis, the staunch enemy of the Marathas, rendered a great help to the Mughals in eliminating the Maratha power in Konkan. The bakhar of Chaul says that Rajkot, Sagargad and Pali were lost to the Mughals; hence Mankoji Marathe, Subhanji Kharade and Udaji Padwal shifted to Prabalgad; however, Bhivaji Gujar and Kanoji Angre remained at the forts of Kolaba and Khanderi and continued their resistance to the enemy.³⁹ In the same year, despite many odds, Kanoji fought two naval battles with the Siddis and defeated them near Sagargad and Rajkot.⁴⁰

It seems that though the Mughals conquered almost the whole of Konkan they were not able to capture all the sea-fortresses of the Marathas. On December 26, 1689, the English of Bombay write to London, that all the neighbouring regions of the Marathas have been conquered except the forts of Khanderi, Kolaba and Padmadurg.⁴¹ It appears that the strongholds on the coast like Sindhudurg and Vijaydurg were also not lost to the Mughals in 1689-90. An important Persian document bears the testimony to the above statement : "Fath Jang Khan submitted a petition (to the Emperor) that

39. Ibid.

40. KA, p.20

41. CSM, p.645

Shivaji's forts situated in the sea can be captured by blockading the supply which reaches these forts through the intermediary of European traders and by giving valuable presents to the commandants of these forts. Thereupon imperial orders were issued that a separate petition should be put up with regard to the present to be given to the commandants while the guards of the forts should be persuaded to give up resistance." (March 12, 1690)⁴² It is obvious, therefore, that in 1689-90 the Marathas had retained some naval strongholds on the west coast which enabled them to fight the Siddis, the Mughals and the Portuguese on the sea.⁴³ The main reason of the inability of the Mughals to capture the sea-fort resses of the Marathas was their own weak navy and their dependence on the Siddis who had accepted the overlordship of the Emperor but, in fact, were an independent naval power on the west coast.

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42. SDAR, p.231

43. The above-mentioned statement is supported by Khafi Khan also. He says, "The Mahrattas also possess the newly built forts of Khanderi, Kolaba, Kansa and Katora in the sea opposite the island fort resse belonging to the Habshis. Their warships cruise about these forts and attack vessels whenever they get the opportunity - (MLEB, p.355)

The bekhar of Chaul says that after the defeat of Sambhaji, the Mughals captured the Chaul region and appointed Shaikh Muhammad as a revenue officer for the region. In 1691, Kanoji Angre and Bhivaji Gujar fought a battle with Shaikh Muhammad and obliged him to make a truce. The Mughal officer conceded the Maratha demand of the revenue of half of the Chaul subha.⁴⁴

In the succeeding years, the Maratha navy was getting stronger and stronger and was feared by the European powers such as the Portuguese. In October 1694, the Portuguese Viceroy writes to Khem Savant, "Now a days, we are greatly harassed by the Maratha navy. The Marathas call themselves our friend, but they recklessly ransack our Gallivats. Last year, they looted our ship belonging to Paneli harbour. Their navy moves on the sea in search of a prey. As a retaliatory measure, we have burnt down a Maratha village on the coast."⁴⁵

Khem Savant, the Desai of Kudal, had joined the Mughals in 1688. The Emperor had granted him the sardeshaukhi of Kudal in 1689.⁴⁶ In 1695, he decided to send 8 Gallivats and some Hodis to attack the Maratha navy and harbours. He also requested the Portuguese to lend him a naval help in this endeavour. But the Portuguese Viceroy in Advisory Council deliberated over the question and resolved not to render any

44. MIS, III, pp. 511-512

45. MIS-POR, p.64

46. PMS, p.128

naval help to Khem Savant for attacking the Marathas. However, they decided to lend a naval protection to his merchant marine since, it was noted, the former Portuguese Viceroy had given him a promise of help.⁴⁷

But the Portuguese could not remain neutral for long. It seems that while escorting the ships of Khem Savant, they naturally came into conflict with the Maratha navy. Soon, in 1695, a naval battle in the waters of the Rajapuri river was fought between them and the Marathas. The Portuguese burnt down the three Maratha ships. The largest of the destroyed ships was reported to have carried 32 guns and more than 300 crew. On the Portuguese side, 6 were killed and 34 wounded.⁴⁸

Khem Savant's trouble-some activities against the Marathas continued in the next year also, i.e., 1696. Consequently, a big armada of the Marathas was reported to have attacked the region of Kudal and plundered it.⁴⁹

In 1695, the Maratha navy led an expedition to the Surat coast. The English at Surat received the reports of the activities of the Maratha navy and recorded them in their dispatch to Bombay : "Rana Rajah's galvets have been plundering at the river's mouth, have taken a boat of Mocha⁵⁰ goods, computed worth 80,000 rupees, a boat with Ballast we sent to

47. MIS-POR, pp. 67-68

48. HK, p.80

49. MIS-POR, p.69

50. A very fine kind of coffee produced in Arabia and brought from Mocha, the port of Yemen.

then and many they seized..."⁵¹ (February 11, 1695)

On December 4, 1696, a Maratha squadron of 15 vessels and 100 crew from Khanderi attacked Turbhe, a Portuguese village in north Konkan and captured 60 Portuguese subjects including a woman, Portuguese by birth. The Maratha plundered everything in the village and safely returned to their base. The Portuguese navy, in the waters of Kalyan and Bhivandi, gave a chase to the Marathas but in vain. The Portuguese soon laid a siege to Khanderi and obliged the Marathas to free the captives. The Portuguese Viceroy makes a special mention in his letter to the King of Portugal that the Marathas did not molest the captives.⁵²

In April 1698, Karwar was raided and plundered by the Maratha navy. The Maratha naval force consisted of 22 warships and 300 crew. The English at Karwar describe the Marathas' plundering activities in their report to Bombay : "This day ... in the morning came into the river 22 Sevages's galvets and landed about 300 men within 1/2 a mile of factory, who presently plundered most parts of the town and bazaar, carrying away all things met with of any value ... After this (the Marathas) went some leagues up the river and robbed some towns... the next night (they) went out of the river again without any opposition."⁵³ (April 13, 1698)

Later on, in December 1698, while reporting the Maratha

51. CRM, p.237

52. TKK, pp. 92-94

53. CRM, p.242

activities in the Karwar region, the English of Karwar write to Bombay : 'The Savages have 60 and odd galvets a little to the southward of the place and are fortifying upon an island that lyes off Onore (Honavar?).'⁵⁴

In 1698, Shidoji Gujar, the Navy Chief of the Marathas, died. By that time, Rajaram had returned from Karnatak. His choice obviously fell on Kanoji Angre, a brave naval officer. He was appointed as the Chief naval Commander with a title of Sarkhel.⁵⁵

54. Ibid., pp. 307-308

55. KA-AS, p.5; RC-MR, p.74

The original surname of Kanoji's ancestors was Sankpal. As they hailed from Angarwadi, a hamlet near Poona, they were called the Angres. (AC, pp. 171-172; MIS, III, p.512). Tukoji Angre, father of Kanoji, was a notable officer in Shivaji's navy. In the reign of Sambhaji, Kanoji took to naval career. In the subsequent reign, he was second in command in the Maratha navy (MA, p.30). The date of his appointment to the chief command with a title of Sarkhel cannot be fixed. D.G. Dhabu in his book, Kulabekar Angre Sarkhel, says that Kanoji got the title in 1694. For substantiating his statement, he has furnished a document found at Trimbakeswar. However, the document does not mention Kanoji as the Sarkhel. Instead, Kanoji is addressed as 'Subhedar presently residing at Suwarndurg.' (KA, p.7)

In 1699, the Marathas were reported to have twice attacked and plundered the Portuguese villages in north Konkan. They also attacked the Portuguese vessels, carrying foodgrains to Goa.⁵⁶

In the same year, i.e., 1699, the Portuguese, the Siddis and the Mughals set out on a joint naval expedition against the Marathas led by Kanoji Angre. In the naval battle that followed Kanoji defeated them all near Sagargad. Subsequently, these three powers were obliged to make the following treaty :

1. The Marathas should collect $\frac{2}{3}$ of the revenue of Khanderi, Kolaba and Sagargad; $\frac{1}{2}$ of the revenue of south Chaul and the whole revenue of north Chaul and Rajkot.
2. The Mughals should collect $\frac{1}{2}$ of the revenue of south Chaul.
3. Siddis should collect the revenue of Parhur.
4. The Portuguese should not violate the boundary of south Chaul.⁵⁷

Lastly, it would be interesting to cite out some observations of Francis Gamelli Careri, a European traveller who visited India in 1695.

56. MIS-POR, p.77

With respect of the abovementioned attacks the Portuguese Viceroys lodged a complaint with Parashuram Trimbak (March 23, 1700)

57. KA, p.20

He writes : "We were oblig'd to lie close by the coast of Savagi, who is a mortal enemy to the Portuguese. This Savagi, whom his subjects call Raja which signifies petty king, is so powerful that he maintains war at one and the same time with the Great Mogul and the Portuguese ... All the coast from Chaul to Goa, for the space of 250 miles belongs to him ... Ramrao (Rajaram) ... endeavours daily to enlarge his Dominions, along the coast of Undrin (Underi) and Candrin (Khanderi) as far as the Bay of Galas, besides what he has up the land. His subject are robbers both by sea and land, that being the pay he allows them, and make it dangerous sailing along that coast, so that it was not to be done without a good convoy; for being to pass by their forts, they run out in small boats well man'd and rob friends and foes, because as has been said their king gives them leave ..." ⁵⁸

From the above-cited observations of Gamelli Careri, it is evident that the Maratha navy had grown powerful on the west coast and was feared by the Europeans also.

Thus, in the reign of Rajaram, it can be said, the Maratha navy maintained its hold on the sea, controlled waters from Chaul to Goa, fought many battles with the Mughals, ^{the} Siddis and the Portuguese and defended the coastal regions of the Maratha State. Moreover, the rise of Kanoji Angre as a gifted naval commander of the Marathas was an outstanding event in the Maratha annals. Rajaram's liberal policy must have greatly helped his rise, besides his sterling qualities as a naval commander.

0) Maratha Warfare

1) Geographical Factor

For comprehending and appreciating the nature of the Maratha warfare, a geographical background must be taken into consideration. The geographical condition of land to a great extent governs the destinies of its people. It should be noted that the Maratha guerilla warfare had its roots in the geography of Maharashtra. The Sahyadri ranges, stretching from the north to south, form the backbone of Maharashtra. Besides, there are many hill-spurs and small rivers which divide the land into many rugged and rocky regions. Thick forests in the valleys and forts on the tops of the mountains were the resorts of the hardy Marathas. The valleys and forts were ordinarily inaccessible and impregnable. This topographical nature of the land had made its people freedomloving, courageous and active.

2) Maratha Simplicity

The nature also was responsible for the simple living of the Marathas. The poor land did not provide them a delicious food. They were never introduced to ostentatious living for want of abundance and wealth. Being brought up in the adverse circumstances they were used to all sorts of odds and difficulties. While engaged in warfare, they did not care for their meals even. Malhar Ramrao says, "The Marathas neither bothered about their meals nor paid heed to the sun, rain, cold and darkness. They did not bother even to get down from horse and eat comfortably. In mounting position they could take their simple food made of bhakari (bread),

chatni (appetiser), kanda (onion) and harbhara (grams).⁵⁹

Francis Gemelli Careri gives an interesting account of the simplicity of the Maratha soldiers in these words : "He (Rajaram) brings into the field 50,000 horse and as many, or more foot, much better soldiers than the Moguls; for they live a day upon a piece of dry bread, and the Mogul's will march at their ease, carrying their women, abundance of provisions and tents, so that their army looks like a moving city."⁶⁰

Simplicity in the army was the legacy of Shivaji. A French officer Monsieur Germain, sent by Francois Martin to Shivaji's camp in Karnatak, writes, "The camp of Shivaji is without pomp, without women, and without baggage. It has only two tents, both of simple coarse stuff, and very small one of them for himself and the other for his Prime Minister."⁶¹

Another foreigner, the East India Company's physician, John Fryer gives a graphic account of the life of soldiers of both the Marathas and the Mughals. He writes, "Seva Gi's men thereby being fitter for any martial exploit, having been accustomed to fare hard, journey fast, and take little pleasure. But the other (the Mughals) will miss of a booty rather than a dinner; must mount in state and have their arms carried before them, and their women not far behind them, with the master of mirth and jollity; will rather expect than pursue a foe; but then they stand it out better; for Seva Gi's men care not much for a pitched field, though they are good at surprizing and

59. RC-MR, p.57

60. ITC, p.184

61. MHI, pp. 155-156

ransacking; yet agree in this, that they are both of stirring spirits."⁶² All this was true of a Maratha soldier during the reign of Rajaram.

3) Maratha Discipline :

In 1689, the Mughal aggression, the tragic end of Sambhaji, the flight of Rajaram to Karnatak and the eclipse of the Maratha Government must have left the Maratha army in a lurch. It is already seen how the Marathas recovered from the stunning shock and soon mobilized their armed forces. However, the new army of the Marathas lacked the sense of discipline of Shivaji. It was due to the fundamental changes such as the revival of feudalism and the weakening of the Maratha king's hold on the army. Hitherto, the Maratha king was in direct touch with the army, its needs and its discipline. Rajaram, who spent most of the years of his reign in the besieged fort, could hardly be in direct touch with the army. Hence, the problem of discipline was left to the generals who compromised it to their needs and advantages.

Nevertheless, the general principles of the (moral) discipline of the army, such as giving respect to women, Brahmins and cows and making no enslavement, were faithfully observed by the Marathas. Moreover, it may be mentioned that compared to the discipline in the contemporary Mughal army, the discipline in the Maratha army was quite high and praise-worthy in the War of Independence. Khafi Khan, a

contemporary Mughal historian records that Santaji was a stern disciplinarian. Even for a slightest violation of the army rule he used to trample the violator under the foot of an elephant.⁶³ Such a discipline did largely contributed to the great victories of the Maratha forces in the war. The Marathas were good at guerilla warfare, which demanded rapid movements, long marches, punctual execution of orders, surprise attacks, ambushes and quick dispersal. All this could be achieved only when all guerillas observed the strict discipline.

4) Extreme Mobility

The Maratha forces on campaigns mainly consisted of cavaliers. The Jadhe Chronology notes that in 1692 Ramchandra-pant dispatched Santaji to Karnatak with 15,000 horsemen. In his another Karnatak expedition in 1694, Santaji was leading a force of 25,000 cavalry.⁶⁴ Saki Mastaid Khan writes that Santaji had an innumerable cavalry when he encountered Qasim Khan.⁶⁵

Resorting to cavalry was useful system for long marches and surprise attacks. A Maratha trooper in cavalry was often supplied with a spare horse. Besides, he hardly bothered about the food, tents or even fodder. They could feed their ponies on the wayside grass. Artillery and workshops were hardly seen in the camp.⁶⁶ By virtue of such simplicity in the cavalry,

63. MM-SP, p.37

64. SCP-JS, pp. 36-37

65. MA-SP, p.62

66. MHI, p.155

the Marathas could earn a characteristic of extreme mobility and consequently the marvellous victories in the period of Rajaram.

As a result of the extreme mobility of the Maratha army, the Marathas were branded as "a treacherous and surprizing people," in the contemporary English records.⁶⁷ While narrating the "invariable custom" of the Marathas, Manucci says, "For that Prince (Rajaram) followed his father's plan of avoiding a meeting in the field, and instead plundered in all directions without ever allowing any rest to Aurangzeb's forces. The (Mughal) generals were forced to rush with reinforcements wherever they heard that Shiva Ji (the Marathas) was pillaging. While they were advancing to the east, that prince would appear all of a sudden on the west, and this was his invariable custom."⁶⁸

Jadunath Sarkar has aptly described the Maratha warfare as follows : "The efficiency of the Maratha system lay in this that their vast hordes of horsemen could march long distances with extreme speed and secrecy, disperse for foraging or bewildering their enemy and yet combine their striking blow. This mobility also enabled them to break off engagement at any time they chose and vanish to a safe distance without giving their enemy a chance of crushing them by pursuit."⁶⁹

67. LFG, 1698, p. III

68. SM, II, p.317

69. MHI, p.157

5) Guerilla Tactics

Thus, the guerilla tactics had become a salient feature of the Maratha warfare. Martin had placed on record that the Mughals were better soldiers. A thousand of their horsemen would not retreat before a body of three or four thousand horsemen or even more.⁷⁰ In spite of this, the Marathas proved to be dreadful and victorious. The secret of their success lay in their guerilla tactics. The Marathas were not known for the pitched battles. Ordinarily, they would give a lightning blow to an enemy and disappear quickly to their hiding places.

One more thing about the Marathas may be said that they were never crushed altogether. They would remain subdued for some time or they would bide their time against formidable enemy, but when they would rise and fight, they would fight with all strength and vigour. Their temporary retreat was always mistaken as their defeat by the Mughals.

The outstanding characteristics of the guerilla warfare of the Marathas may be stated as follows -

- 1) Forced and long marches with extreme mobility.
- 2) Surprise attacks on the enemy camps.
- 3) Quick retreat, if the tables were turned upon them.
- 4) Often misleading the enemy into a trap where the Maratha army lay in wait to pounce on it.

70. MM-JS, p.346

- 5) General policy of 'strike a blow and flee.'
Avoiding a pitched battle.
- 6) Efficient espionage, thereby knowing in advance every move of the enemy and eventually stealing an initiative.
- 7) Cutting off the supplies, poisoning the water and devastating the regions so that the enemy would not get any food or fodder.
- 8) And lastly, human treatment to those who surrendered completely.

A few examples of the Maratha guerilla warfare in the period of Rajaram would throw light upon the above discussed subject. The battle of Satara in 1690 is a good illustration of the guerilla warfare. The Marathas attacked Sarja Khan who was busy at the work of besieging Satara. The Khan bravely faced the Maratha offensive. In the midst of fighting, all of a sudden the Marathas began to flee. The Mughals thought the Marathas had lost their heart. So they started pursuing the Marathas. The Khan was left behind with a slender force, which was fiercely assailed by the reserved column of the Marathas. Consequently, the Khan was captured and had to face the disgrace.⁷¹

Early in November 1692, Santaji started with 15,000 cavalry for Karnatak. On his way to Jinji, he got the report that Ali Mardan Khan, the Foulidar of Conjivaram, was escorting a large succour to the besieging Mughal army before Jinji. All

of a sudden he appeared with a small force of two to three thousand horse before the Khan. The rest of his horsemen were asked to lie in wait. The Mughals saw a comparatively small force of the Marathas and began to chase them. Santaji tactfully retreated and brought the enemy to a place where his reserved force was posted. In a fierce battle that followed, the Mughals were completely routed and the Khan, along with his officers, was taken captive.⁷²

Santaji's another great victory at Dodderi is already described fully in the previous pages. The battle of Dodderi is one of the glorious battles in the annals of the Maratha warfare. In it, Santaji carried out his plans so successfully that the renowned generals of the Mughals were humiliated and forced to pay heavy ransoms. One of them, Qasim Khan had to commit suicide to avoid disgrace.

These Maratha victories exemplify how the enemy was made to miscalculate the strength of the Marathas, and often fooled to chase them to a place, where a trap was laid for their ruin.

6) Santaji Ghorpade

No history of the War of Independence would be complete unless a word is said about Santaji Ghorpade, the greatest general, the war had ever produced. He had left a mark of his bravery, heroism and versatile military genius on the guerilla warfare of the Marathas. No doubt, the Marathas in the days of Shivaji and Sambhaji did resort to such a warfare; but the credit of imparting its training to the large boards of cavaliers

and perfecting it as a weapon of humiliating and defeating the mighty enemy, goes to Santaji. It was because of him that the Marathas carried on the warfare from Gujrat to the Coromandel Coast, gained excellent victories, inflicting smashing defeats on the renowned generals of the Mughals and created havoc and panic in the Deccan. Consequently, he became the object of the abuses and curses of the enemy and their historians.

Malhar Ramrao says that the fright of Santaji and Dhanaji was felt by the Mughals so much that they used to ask their horses whether they saw the image of Santaji and Dhanaji in water, when they did not drink it.⁷³

Khafi Khan, an enemy historian, has paid glorious tribute to Santaji. He says, "Santa more especially distinguished himself in ravaging the cultivated districts, and in attacking the royal leaders. Every one who encountered him was either killed or wounded and made prisoner; or if any one did escape, it was with his mere life, with loss of his army and baggage. Nothing could be done, for wherever the accursed dog (Santaji) went and threatened an attack, there was no Imperial amir bold enough to resist him and every loss he inflicted on their forces made the boldest warriors quake."⁷⁴

7) Tragedy of the Emperor

The Emperor often declared and described his war with the Marathas as Jihad, a holy war of Islam against the infidels.

73. RC-MR, p.57

74. MM-ED, p.347

However, his cry of Jihad could no longer inspire his generals and soldiers as they had lost their faith and hope in it. They also knew for certain that the Emperor's war had basically been political in character. Ever since his coming to the south, he had lost a generation of soldiers in his futile attempts to conquer more and more territory in the Deccan. However, he did not wish to renounce his long cherished design to extend the frontiers of the empire of the House of Timur to the Indian ocean. But it was a lone journey. No body wanted to dedicate himself to the cause of the Emperor. On the contrary, his generals including even his sons and grandsons, were eagerly awaiting his end. No body, except the Mullas and Maulvis, wished him long life. Manucci rightly observed, "They (the Mughal officers and generals) aim only at their personal advantage and ordinarily make no account of the royal commands, except only when it is necessary in order not to be expressly found out as traitors."⁷⁵

Khafi Khan gives a graphic example of the army's disobedience to the Emperor. In 1699, the Emperor set out on an expedition to conquer the Maratha forts. In order to avoid the botheration of women and property in the campaign of the hilly regions, he issued an order "that all amirs and officers should leave their wives, families and property behind. The people belonging to the royal establishments were also to remain. Strict orders were also given that no ahadi (soldier) should take his wife or children with him. Great stress was



laid upon his order, but in the marches and campaigns of Hindustan such orders could not be enforced without resorting to such punishments as the Prince of the House of Timur held to be inconsistent with their sense of justice. So the order was not obeyed as it ought to have been."⁷⁶

The Emperor himself knew that his orders were not carried out by his officers. Akhbarat gives a very interesting anecdote about the regret and remorse of the Emperor : "One prahar and four gharis after night-fall, the Emperor summoned the chief Qazi Muhammad Akram and asked him to sit down, which he did in a corner. His Majesty then rose from his throne and sat down by the side of the Qazi. He said, 'I wished to pass the month of Ramzan at Sholapur, engaged in prayer. But my officers do not apply their bodies to my work. I urge them again and again but it has no effect.' For two gharis did His Majesty talk in this vein, complaining of his servants and then dismissed the Qazi to his quarter."⁷⁷

The Marathas were quite confident of wiping out the imperial conquests as soon as the Emperor turned his back. They fully realized that he could not make a permanent mark of his conquest on Maharashtra, nay, in the Deccan. Manucci had correctly observed the futility of the Mughal warfare in the Deccan. He writes, "Aurangzeb is well aware that if he does not go in person at the head of his armies it is impossible to become master of any fortress. To carry on this war he is put

76. MM-ED, pp. 363-364

77. IHRC, IV, p.3

to enormous expense and when all things are reckoned up, many a year he has gained nothing, although he has consumed many men and much money. Nevertheless, he never ceases to push on his purpose, and this way his conduct of affairs is not without profit to Shiva Ji (the Marathas) who like an able men succeeds in making use of this persistence for the advancement of his own interest. At times, he is sly enough to let a fort be taken, then waiting till it is fully provisioned and afterwards fortified, he retakes it with even great readiness than it had ever fallen before."⁷⁸

Thus the secret of the Maratha success and the dismal failure of the mighty Emperor in the Deccan war, to a great extent, lay in the peculiar kind of the Maratha warfare. The war had brought many evil things to the Mughals. They had to lose one lakh of men and three lakhs of horses, oxen, camels and elephants annually in the Deccan. The war also destroyed peace and prosperity in the empire and created universal panic and disorder in the army. It also resulted into the weakening of imperial hold on the northern provinces and the tragic end of the heartbroken Emperor. The Marathas did suffer and lose; but they rarely suffered from demoralization. On the contrary, after the death of Rajaram, the Marathas found their unyielding and brave leader in the person of Tarabai. She infused a new spirit of unity and heroism into the Marathas and led them against the Mughal aggression. The contemporary Marathas hailed her as an incarnation of Bhadrakali who destroyed the Mlechhas (the Mughals).⁷⁹

78. SM, III, pp. 305-306

79. TKK, pp. 6-11

Chapter Seven

Socio-Economic Conditions : Some Glimpses

No history of a period could be said to be complete unless its socio-economic aspects are dealt with. Unfortunately there is no enough source material for writing such a socio-economic history of the Maratha society in the last quarter of the 17th century. However, with the source material that is available, an attempt is made here to shed light on some socio-economic conditions of the Maratha society, such as famines and epidemics, fanaticism and sacrileges, shrines and Maths, learning, inams, watans, jagirs, judiciary and revenue. The following discussion at some places does not strictly confine exclusively to the reign of Rajaram. Since it deals with the socio-economic history of the 17th century Maharashtra, it is but inevitable to refer to some stray references of the earlier period of Shivaji and Sambhaji and the later period of Tarabai and Shahu.

1. Famines and Epidemics

In general, Maharashtra has little fertile soil. The Desh or the eastern part of Maharashtra receives inadequate rains during the Monsoon. This was true of the 17th century Maharashtra too. Sometimes the failure of rains resulted in severe famines which caused heavy casualties in the land. Thousands perished and many were compelled to leave their habitations. Sometimes the situation was aggravated by the swarms of mice and the forces of the enemy which destroyed whatever the helpless tillers had produced in the harvest.¹

1. MIS, XVII, p.53

To add to the famines, epidemics like cholera² and plague took a heavy toll of people in the Deccan. The gruesome epidemic of bubonic plague caused the death of 1,00,000 people in three months in Bijapur only (1688). About 95,000 died in western India in 1694 and 1696 on account of similar epidemics. From 1702 to 1704, the severe droughts and plague ravaged the regions in the Deccan, killing 20,00,000 souls.³ The sufferings of the people in Maharashtra knew no bounds when the mighty Mughal Emperor sometimes ordered his generals not to leave any vestige of human habitations during their expeditions against the regions under the Maratha rule.⁴

2) Fanaticism and Sacrileges

Famines and epidemics were natural calamities and those could hardly be overcome either by the people or by the government. But the people were also hit hard by religious fanaticism coupled with economic exploitation under the Mughal rule. The non-Muslim population was forced to pay the unjust poll-tax called the Jizya. The Emperor had appointed special officers for collecting the tax. Bhimsen Saxena says that he was unable to describe the oppressive acts of those officers who collected crores of rupees but remitted very little amount to the imperial treasury.⁵ Sometimes the

2. Ibid., XV, p.72

3. HA, V, p.362

4. MA-JS, p.249

5. TD, p.158

collection-work was assigned to contractors, generally the deshmukhs of the region. For example, Godaji and Wakoji, the deshmukhs of pargana Kasegaon, accepted the job of collecting the tax from 40 villages in their pargana and agreed to pay Rs.2,000 to the Mughals (1700).⁶

Generally, a tax of Rs.3.5/16 per head was charged.⁷ It should, however, be noted that children, the lame, blind and mad were exempted from paying it. The Jizya was imposed only on the able-bodied non-Muslims.⁸ Moreover, while repopulating a certain region, the Emperor might please to exempt the cultivators from paying the tax. For example, in 1689 while the Emperor was encamping at Koregaon, he exempted the people of the Poona region from paying the tax in view of rehabilitating the region.⁹

It seems that the Mughals made a discrimination on the religious grounds in levying other taxes too. A document, belonging to the Mughal rule in the Chaul region, reveals that the Mughal thanedar of Chaul had issued orders that the Muslim

6. SCS, XI, p.28

7. Ibid., IV, pp. 43-44

8. Ibid., V, pp. 7-8

9. Ibid., p.79

While interpreting a firman of the Emperor to the Mahanubhavi saints in his book 'Mahanubhav Sanshodhan' V.B. Kolte says that not only the Mahanubhavs but also the Hindu Fakirs were exempted from paying the tax. (MS, pp. 141-143)

traders were exempted from paying the octroi. (1693-1694)¹⁰

The sufferings of the people were further aggravated whenever the Mughals took to religious bigotry. There is some evidence to maintain that the Mughals often committed religious atrocities in Maharashtra. In his report to his king, the Portuguese Viceroy writes : "The behaviour of the Muslims (the Mughals) is insolent and arrogant. The dosais in Konkan have risen against them as the latter have violated the honour of the Hindu women and desecrated the Hindu shrines." (January 16, 1691).¹¹

The sacrilege and fanaticism of the Mughals in Maharashtra are proved beyond the shadow of doubts by a statement of Dadbhat, the upadhyay of Sindhudurg. He recalls, "The Mughal forces came to Kudal and devastated all the region. Many were taken captive. The rest fled to some safer places. Afterwards Khem Savant left the Maratha side and joined the Mughals. He brought Muhammad Abbas and Abdul Raja Khan, the Mughal commanders, with their forces to Kudal. While they were encamping in the region, they fell on Malvan. They plundered the town and captured the people. Cows were slaughtered in the temples of Shri Narayan and Rameshvar, thus desecrating the shrines."¹²

Sometimes, the Mughals built a mosque on the ruins of a Hindu temple. Martin writes in his diary in November 1689: "The Muslim, having set about to destroy a temple in the Karnatak, as ordered by the Mughal - the Hindus rose up to oppose it. The two nations fought and some were slain on each

10. SCS, X, p.32

11. TKK, p.61

12. FY, p.36

side, and the Moors were forced to put off the demolition to another time."¹³ A note of 1698 in the Masire Alangiri runs as follows : "Hamiduddin Khan Bahadur who had gone to demolish a temple and build a mosque (in its place) in Bijapur, having excellently carried out his orders, came to court and gained praise..."¹⁴ These two instances are from Karnatak. The temples in Maharashtra also were not spared. The temple of Rameshwar at Dindori, pargana Sanganner, was destroyed by one Muhammad Nur who built a mosque on its site (1693)¹⁵. In retaliation, the Marathas do not seem to have resorted to such fanatic policy. On the contrary, they seem to have spared the mosques in their expeditions. For example, while on his way to Vasantgad, the Emperor learnt at Karad that a Mughal out-post in the vicinity had been destroyed by the Marathas and a mosque nearby was without a lamp. The Emperor went there and offered his prayers in the mosque.¹⁶ This incident proves that though the Marathas had destroyed the Mughal out-post they had spared the mosque standing nearby.

Whenever the Mughal forces cast their shadows on the shrines, the pularis used to remove the idols from the temples to some safer places. The idol of Goddess Bhavani at Pratapgad was removed to some unknown place before the

13. MM-JS, p.236

14. MA-JS, p.241

15. SL, p.91

16. MA-SP, p.73

fall of the fort in 1689. However, the fort was soon recovered and the idol was reinstalled.¹⁷ Similarly, whenever the Mughal forces threatened Pandharpur, the Badavas used to remove the idol of Vithoba to Devgaon, traf Mohal. The Badavas used to reinstall the idol, as soon as the enemy forces left the place.¹⁸

Instances of the forcible proselytism of the Marathas to Islam were not rare. Shankaraji Narayan writes, "The policy of Aurangzeb is to convert the maharashtra lok (the Marathas) to Islam. Accordingly, Netoji Ghatge, Sabaji Ghatge, Janoji Raje and so many Brahmins in Maharashtra are compelled to embrace Islam." (March 22, 1690)¹⁹ Though Shivaji had set a precedent of taking back into Hindu-fold any person willingly or forcibly converted to Islam, the Maratha society remained absolutely orthodox on this social problem. Despite the desire of many converts to rejoin the Hindu religion, they were simply condemned to remain as the Muslims. Bapuji Chikana, a Maratha, dined with Nyahar Khan, the fouidar of Wai. Consequently, the caste Hindus declared him as pariah.²⁰ It is not known whether a reclamation in his case took place or not. Perhaps it did not.

3) Shrines and Maths

The shrines at Paithan, Nasik, Alandi, Dehu, Chinchavadi, Jejuri, Chafal, Pali, Wadi Ratnagiri, Kolhapur, Tulajapur,

17. SCS, IV, p.61

18. Ibid., XI, pp. 30-32

19. AP, p.2

20. AIC, II, p.53

Pandharpur etc. were the main centres of worship in Maharashtra. The records of these shrines speak mostly of the grants of inams they received in the different regimes and the conflicts amongst inam holders. The temple management at the shrines consisted of various officers, namely, puiundar, sabnis and havaladar.²¹ Sometimes these posts were held by the prominent persons in the State. For example, Ramchandra-pant Amatya was holding the 'sabnishi of Bhavani' at Pratapgad. In fact, the Pant did not go to the fort for working as sabnis. He had appointed one Balaji Vishvanath as his deputy at the fort.²² Some temple management appointed puranik for the purpose of puranvaahan in the temple. These puraniks were granted petty inams by the government.²³ It seems that the above-mentioned posts were hereditary.

The puiaris of the temple were granted some inams, consisting mainly of land. Sometimes the government granted varshasans to them.²⁴ Sometimes, they received foodgrains and oil from the government store for the purpose of naivadhya and nandadeep of the deity.²⁵ They also received dakshanas from the worshippers. The government officials were forbidden to interfere with it. However, the puiaris were required to spend from the dakshanas on ornaments, clothes and other daily requirements of the deity.²⁶

21. SCS, I, p.63

22. Ibid., X, p.38

23. IA, V - SG, p.91

24. SCS, X, p.42

25. FD, XXXI, pp. 65-66

26. SCS, V, p.66

Generally, the shrines were granted inams of lands or villages. The income from such inams was utilized for the purpose of upkeep of the buildings and for annachhatras etc. at the shrines. Sometimes, the army or the government officials molested such inams in consequence of which the Maratha king had to issue strict warnings to them.²⁷

The institution of the Maths held an important place in the social life of Maharashtra. Prominent amongst them were the Math of Samarth Ramdas at Chafal; of Sadanand Gosavi at Nimb, pargana Wai; of Jairamswami at Wadgaon, prant Khatav; of Maunibaba at Patgaon, prant Kudal etc. Generally the senior-most disciple of the founder of the Math would become a mathadhipati. He was supposed to be well-versed in the Dharmshastras. He also represented a particular sect. In the period of Rajaram some of the mathadhipatis had gone even to Jinji and secured the inams for their Maths.²⁸ Some of them were expert in the Yogvidhya also. Bhavangiri Gosavi of Nimb, who had gone to Jinji, buried himself for nine days during the Navratra festival and to the astonishment of all came out alive. Rajaram was greatly pleased with him and praised his sadhana in the court.²⁹

The Maths used to hold annachhatras and bhandaras (free distribution of food) for which they had been granted inams of lands and villages. They spent a considerable amount of their income on these charitable activities.³⁰ Sometimes

27. SCS, XI, p.31; MIS, XV, pp.202-203; RR, Yr. 22, Iss. 260, pp. 7-8

28. SCS, IV, p.99; MIS, XX, p.210

29. MIS, XV, p.213

30. Ibid., pp. 202-203; BISM-VI, 1837, p.179

the annual cash payment for the expenses of the Maths was made by the government. For example, the Maratha Government had granted a sum of 700 hons for the annual expenses of the Math at Patgaon. In the reign of Rajaram, the Math could not receive the grant on account of constant warfare in the region. Later Turtgiri, the mathadhipati went to Jinji and expressed the grievances of the Math in the Maratha Court. So, Rajaram granted an inam of two villages in lieu of the annual grant of 700 hons (January 1, 1694).³¹

It may be instructive to note that inams were granted by the Maratha Government not only to the Hindu shrines and Maths, but to the Muslim shrines also. For example, Rajaram had continued an inam of a village to Sayyid Ahmad Pir at Kanwad, tarf Alate, prant Panhala.³²

31. SCS, IV, p.99; TKK, pp. 83-84

32. TKK, pp. 109-110

Incidentally some of the names of the prominent persons in the field of religion in Maharashtra during the period of Rajaram may be mentioned :

1. Kalyan, the disciple of Ramdas - (PR, p.235)
2. Anandgiri, the disciple of Sadanand - (MIS, XV, pp. 200-202)
3. Bhavangiri, the disciple of Anandgiri - (Ibid.)
4. Turtgiri, the disciple of Maunibaba - (BISM-Q, Yr. 13, Iss. IV, p.118)
5. Narsawa Gosavi, the disciple of Jairamswami - (BISM-VI, 1837, p.179)
6. Narayan Gosavi Dev of Chinchavad - (SL, p.172)

4) Learning

Learning was the monopoly of the Brahmins and some high caste Maratha families. As there were no schools, education was supposed to be a private affair. The common man did not bother about any education and hardly could he learn to read or write.

However, some high caste Marathas, including their ladies, knew reading and writing. V.K. Rajwade has published a letter of one Vithoji Raje Shinde and added a footnote to it, saying that the document is written by a warrior from the Shinde family belonging to the Maratha Kshatriyas.³³ The famous letter of Tarabai to Girjoji Yadav regarding the dispute over the dabi³⁴ at Pali, bears her two signatures, one at the top and the other at the bottom of the letter (February 21, 1699).³⁵ This brings forth a fact that at least the royal ladies knew the art of reading and writing.

A few names of extraordinary learned persons occur in our records. Shrikaracharya, who was holding the office of panditrao in the Council of Ministers under Rajaram, was a great versatile scholar of the Dharmashastras. While at Jinji, he proved his scholarship in the galaxy of the scholars of Karnatak.³⁶

Avaji Nilo was the parasnavis at the Maratha Court and was considered an expert of the Persian language. According

33. MIS, XV, p.57

34. The offerings made to Khandoba at Pali

35. TKK, p.106

36. SL, p.203

to Malhar Ramrao, after the fall of Jinji he was made captive and produced before Zulfiqar Khan to whom the former expounded many mysterious things from the Akbarnama, the Shikandarnama and other Persian works. The Khan was extremely pleased with Avaji who, as a reward for his learning, was allowed to return to Maharashtra.³⁷

Keshav Pandit who composed the Rajaramcharitam in Sanskrit and Ramchandrapant Amatya who later on wrote the famous Ajnapatra in Marathi were the well-known scholars of Rajaram's period. Gopal Shridhar Joshi and Sidheshvar Bhat Brahme were the other two prominent names amongst the Pandits of the period.³⁸

Astrology was a popular science with the Marathas. Bal Joshi and Khand Bhat Shaligram were the astrologers of repute, patronized by the Maratha court. Rajaram set out on his crucial journey to Jinji at the muhurt (an auspicious moment) suggested by Bal Joshi.³⁹ Khand Bhat Shaligram found out the muhurats for the Maratha expeditions against Shaikh Nizam at Sangameshvar and Sarja Khan at the foot of Satara in 1690. The expeditions were highly successful, in consequence of which the Maratha Government was pleased to grant a varshasan of 500 hons to the Bhat.⁴⁰

37. RC-MR, p.72

38. SV, 1836, p.74; AIC, IV, p.179

39. RC-MR, p.38

40. SL, p.167

Inams

Shivaji confiscated the inams not only of the watandars but of the Brahmins also. He did grant some new inams of land or villages to the shrines, the Maths or the persons of high learning or bravery.⁴¹ But those were an exception to the rule. It should be noted that Shivaji granted the dharmadayas⁴² to those Brahmins whose inams were confiscated by the government.

In the reign of Rajaram, the inams were granted to the watandars and Brahmins alike. A document, pertaining to the regrant of an agrahar inam⁴³ of Saidapur to the Brahmins at Karad, reads : "When Tirtharup Rajashri Kailasvasi Chhatrapati (Shivaji) conquered this region, he confiscated all the inams of the watandars, including those of the Brahmins also. However, he granted the dharmadayas to the deserving Brahmins. Presently, the warfare has made the country disolate. Hence, the system of the dharmadayas could not work. The Brahmins have become distressed. This is a state of Gods and Brahmins. Here the Brahmins should live happily, perform their religious duties and wish welfare of the Swami and his State ... So, the said village is hereby g reganted as an agrahar inam to the Brahmins at Karad." (July 30, 1697)⁴⁴

41. SPSS, pp. 129, 589, 593, 633; SL, pp. 121, 132-134; 142, 146, 148

42. An endowment of revenue for a religious purpose.

43. A village or land assigned to the Brahmins for their maintenance.

44. SL, p.137

It is said that Ramchandrapant has expounded Shivaji's administrative policies in his famous Ajnapatra. With regard to the system of granting inams and its consequent evils in the State, the Pant writes : "Hereditary estates should not be granted as this method leads to a great injustice. Only an enemy of his kingdom should be generous in granting inams. This method would result one day in granting away the whole kingdom ... Therefore, a king should not at all get infatuated and grant land to the extent of even a barley corn."⁴⁵ To our surprise, however, the Pant seems busy with the work of receiving grants of the inams and the watans, during the reign of Rajaram. The Pant alone received the following grants of inams and watans in the reign of Rajaram only :

1. A regrant of an inam of one chahur land at Kelwade in subha Maval. (December 4, 1689).
2. A new grant of the deshkulkarn watan of Ajara mahal (September 26, 1691).
3. The continuation of the grant of kulkarn and ivotish watans at Tandali, prant Junnar (January 7, 1692).
4. A regrant of the deshmukhi watan of tarf Sonwale, prant Bhivandi (February 8, 1693).
5. A new grant of inams of two villages, Murbad and Kadwai, to the Pant's wife and daughter respectively (June 21, 1693).
6. A new grant of the sardeshmukhi watan of Salashi mahal along with an inam of two villages (August 15, 1693).

7. A new grant of the sardeshmukhi watan of Kharepatan mahal along with an inam of two villages (June 22, 1697).
8. The continuation of an inam of the village Muradpur, tarf Devrukha (April 7, 1699).⁴⁶

However, it should be remembered that the Pant's was not an exceptional case among the high Maratha officers. It is discussed in the subsequent pages how almost all high officers received the grants of inams and watans during the reign of of Rajaram.

It is interesting to note that sometimes the inam of land, or a village or even a pargana was granted in the enemy territory. For example, Shivaji Dabhade, brother of Khanderao Dabhade and a brave Maratha commander, led an expedition into Berar. While fighting the enemy, he was killed at kasaba Dahihande in Berar. Later on, in 1699 Khanderao Dabhade requested Rajaram to grant him the whole pargana of Dahihande as an inam to him. Accordingly, Rajaram granted him the inam of the whole pargana.⁴⁷ (October 11, 1699). It is superfluous to mention that Berar did not constitute a part of the Maratha State in the reign of Rajaram.

Watans

Maharashtra was the land of watans. Dhanaji Jadhav, the renowned Maratha general, took pride in calling himself 'the mokdam (patil) of mouje Majgaon.'⁴⁸ Nay, even the

46. BD, I, pp.32-33, 37-38, 40-41, 43-48, 49-50, 68-70, 93-94

47. RSP, p.104

48. MIS, VIII, p.39

Chhatrapatis were proud of their watans. For example, Shahu has put his seal on a document regarding the dispute of a watan as 'the deshmukh of pargana Wai.'⁴⁹

In the Deccan, the government used to grant lands, certain rights and privileges to persons who performed certain services for the State or for a village community. These grants were hereditary in nature and were called watans.⁵⁰

Patil, Kulkarni, Chaugula, Mahar etc. were the watandars at the village level; while the Deshmukh, Sardeshmukh, Deshpandes, Sardeshpandes etc. were the watandars at the district level. Generally, a watandar was granted a rent-free land (inam) or some share in the revenue. Some of them were paid in kind too. Moreover, each watandar carried with his watan certain rights and perquisites (hakka and lajima) mentioned in his watan-deeds.⁵¹

Shivaji was not in favour of granting new watans and inams to his people. However, he did not wish to abolish the watan-system itself. He retained the frame-work of the system, but at the same time he brought about some important and drastic changes in it. He asked the watandars to carry on

49. Ibid., XX, p.52

50. A.R. Kulkarni defines watan as follows :

'Watan is a grant made by the state to a person who holds a certain office and the grant continues in his family so long as the services are rendered efficiently, in theory, but in practice as long as he is loyal.' - (MAS, p.28)

51. Ibid., pp. 59-61

their respective duties in their respective spheres, but prohibited them from enjoying the inams, rights and perquisites attached hereditarily to their watans. In compensation of these inams, rights and perquisites, he assigned a certain amount of the revenue as mushahira (salary) to them.⁵² This was the system of cash payment in lieu of the hereditary rights and privileges of the watandars. By introducing this reform, Shivaji tried to do away with the evils of the watandari system in the Maratha society.

It is said that the watan system was revived in the reign of Rajaram. What exactly he did was the regranting of inams, rights and perquisites of the watandars, confiscated in the reign of Shivaji. The causes of this revival are found discussed in the contemporary government orders. For example, in his letter to the havaladar and karkun of tarf Mathekhere, Mahadaji Shamraj, the subhedar of prant Maval, says : "For the last thirty years, the Mughals have been carrying tumultuous activities in our state. Consequently, our territory has become desolate. Last year (1689) Raigad was captured and the Mughal rule was established throughout the land. Now a days, with the grace of God, our state is being revived. Under these circumstances, the deshmukhs and the deshkulkarnis of the said tarf came to the subha and made the following request: 'We, the watandars, are loyal to the Rajashri Saheb (Rajaram). Rajashri Kailasvasi Swami (Shivaji) confiscated our watans and started making cash payment in lieu of our rights.

52. SL, pp.137, 143-144; SCS VI, pp. 77-78;
SPSS, p.213

Presently, the people have deserted the region on account of the constant warfare and famine. Some of them perished and those who survived have neither food nor any shelter. This is their plight. The rayat is to be encouraged for bringing the land under cultivation and making supplies to the forts. Hence, we request the Sahab to kindly regrant our watans to us with their inams, rights and perquisites.' Taking into consideration the request of the watandars, the government comes to realize that unless the watans are regranted entirely, the watandars would not sincerely try to bring the region under cultivation, nor would the administration in the region be built up. Hence the deshmukhs, deshkulkarnis, mokdams and other watandars are hereby regranted all their watans with their inams, rights and perquisites." (September 24, 1690).⁵³

It may sound strange that Rajaram himself had justified the case of the watandars who had procured the firmans for their watans from the Mughals. In his letter to Babaji Narayan, the subhedar of prant Satara, Rajaram explains his policy of forgiving the watandars who had met the Mughal Emperor or the Mughal officers and managed to get the firmans from them for their watans. In the context of the deshmukhi watan of Mahadaji Jagdale of Masur, Rajaram writes, "Mahadaji met Aurangzeb and secured the firman of the deshmukhi of Masur. If we are to blame him for his act, we should consider the fact that the watandars have to secure the sanads from every succeeding regime. Mahadaji behaved accordingly. Now that he has come to the Swami who has forgiven him for his guilt

and regranted him his deshmukhi watan." (1691)⁵⁴

Even the watandars, who were in the service of the Mughals and who rejoined the Maratha side, had frankly admitted their greedy attachment to their watans. Madhoji Naik Ninbal-kar says, "We were in the service of the Mughals. We left it and joined the Maratha State for two reasons : first, to make the Maratha State prosperous, and secondly, to get our watans back."⁵⁵

The persons, holding high offices in the Maratha state, such as Ramchandrapant,⁵⁶ Santaji Ghorpade,⁵⁷ Khando Ballal,⁵⁸ Khandoji Dabhade⁵⁹ and others also had their share in the scramble for the watans. The seamy side of the scramble for the watans was manifested in the case of Shankaraji Narayan. Shankaraji, the second top official of the Maratha Government in Maharashtra, sent a false report to the Maratha king at Jinji and managed to secure for himself the sanads of the

54. MIS, XV, pp. 62-63

55. SCS, IV, pp. 80-81

56. Ramchandrapant received the deshmulkarn, deshmukhi and sardeshmukhi watans from Bajaram - (BD, I, pp. 37-38, 43, 49-50, 62-70)

57. Santaji got the deshmukhi watan of manale Miraj. (July 29, 1692), (TKK, pp. 72-73)

58. Khando Ballal and others got the sardeshmukhi watan of manale Chaul. (June 10, 1698), (IA-AVV, pp.31-32)

59. Khandoji Dabhade got the sarpatilki watan of 1355 villages in prant Junnar. (October 19, 1698), (BISM-Q. Yr. 8, Vol. III, pp. 123-125)

kulkarni watan of Dadaji Naras Prabhu. When Rajaram came to know the trick of Shankaraji, he rebuked him in his letter and subsequently returned the watan to Dadaji.⁶⁰ When the persons of the stature of Ranchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan are found scrambling for the watans and inams, it was but natural for the petty watandars like the deshmukhs and deshpandes that they surrendered to or joined the Mughals in order to get or save the watans and inams in the period of turmoil, like that of Rajaram. For them, the watan was everything; because in it lay their prestige, honour and status.

In the reign of Sambhaji, some watandars did surrender to the Mughals, and got the firmans for their watans. Whenever the Mughals captured a region and built up their administration there the watandars had no other choice but to submit to the former. However, a large scale surrender of the watandars to the Mughals took place in 1689, especially after the death of Sambhaji in the Mughal camp. There are a good number of instances in the contemporary records which elucidate the above-mentioned observations. For example, while in 1689 the Emperor was staying in the Poona region, he ordered all the watandars of the pargana to his presence and asked them to help in establishing the rule of the Mughals in the region, for which the latter had to give written bonds to the former.⁶¹

60. SL, p.57

61. MIS, XX, p.50

When the Mughal thana was established at Wai, the deshmukhs and deshkulkarnis of the region met the thanedar and accepted the Mughal rule. The thanedar in turn, exacted presents from and imposed fines on them and took written bonds from them, perhaps for securing their permanent loyalty to the Mughal rule. Subsequently, the deshmukhs handed over the revenue of the Wai pargana to the thanedar.⁶²

But there were some watandars who did not approach or join the Mughals for the continuation or the regrant of their watans. Consequently, they had to suffer. The deshkulkarni watan of karyat Maval, prant Poona, belonged to Antaji Namdeo, Yado Namdeo, Namaji Appaji and Mahadaji Appaji. When the Poona region was conquered by the Mughals, these watandars did not join them and remained loyal to the Maratha cause. Consequently, the Mughals confiscated their watan and bestowed it on Ramohandra Babaji Honap and Moro Viththal Honap, the deshkulkarni of prant Poona, who had joined the former and laid a false claim to the watan.⁶³

The Maratha watandars like the deshmukhs and deshpandes were of much help to the Mughals in building up their administration in the newly conquered regions of Maharashtra. So, it is not surprising that the Mughals granted, regranted or continued their watans. However, it is certainly noteworthy that they continued the inams of the Brahmins also.⁶⁴

62. Ibid., p.207

63. SCS, VI, pp. 50-51; PD, ^{XXXI,} pp. 57-58

64. SCS, II, pp. 398-399

In 1689 the Emperor continued the grant of an inam of Tulapur village to the Brahmins there.

It was quite natural that Rajaram confiscated the watans of those who joined the enemy. For example, Moro Viththal, Ramaji Govind and Mukund Kanho, the deshpandes of prant Poona joined the Mughals in 1689. Consequently, the Maratha Government confiscated their watans.⁶⁵ The case of the deshmukhi of namale Miraj is also interesting. It shows as to how the watans were granted and again taken away by the government. In 1692, the Maratha Government granted the deshmukhi watan of namale Miraj to Santaji Ghorpade. At that time it was explicitly mentioned in the watanpatras that the said deshmukhi was without any claimant and its mutalike had joined the enemy; and hence, the watan was confiscated and granted to Santaji.⁶⁶ Later on, in 1696 Santaji fell out with Rajaram who dismissed the former from the post of senapati. Consequently, it seems, his deshmukhi watan was also confiscated. It is interesting to note here that in 1699 Rajaram granted the deshmukhi to Vyankaji Dado, Adnaik Savant, Tamaji Narsinha and Annaji Adnaik who had come forward to claim the watan. It is mentioned in the watanpatras given to them that Santaji had made a false report at Jinji and secured the watan for himself.⁶⁷ In fact, it seems, neither the watan was without claimant, nor did Santaji deceive the government.

65. PD, XXXI, p.80

66. TKK, pp. 72-73

67. Ibid., pp. 113-114

It appears to be a fact that Vyankaji Dado and other deshmukhs of Miraj had joined the enemy; consequently their watan had been confiscated and granted away to Santaji; later on they came over to the Maratha side^{and,} in return, got their watan back.

Thus the position of the watandars in Maharashtra was precarious. If they remained loyal to one party, the other would confiscate their watan and grant it away to somebody else.

Sometimes a certain watan was granted to more than one family. Consequently, claims and counter-claims led to a lot of confusion and disturbances. The deshmukhi of Masur (prant Karad) was claimed, both by the Jagdales of Masur and the Yadavas of Karad. A number of documents regarding the conflict of the deshmukhi have been published.⁶⁸ Each side had pleaded the genuineness of its claim. Rajaram gave the watanpatras of the said deshmukhi to both the families at different times in his reign. Consequently, such an act of his resulted in a lot of confusion in the region which is revealed by the letter of Santaji to the former at Jinji. It reads : 'Mahadaji Jagdale approached the Swami at Jinji and was granted the deshmukhi of tarf Masur. Thereafter Mahadaji returned to Maharashtra and enjoyed the watan. Now the Swami has given the sanads of the said deshmukhi to Padaji Yadav and his kins. The Yadavs have now come to Maharashtra and started trouble. Consequently, both the watan and the region

68. MIS, XV; TKK.

are being disturbed.⁶⁹

Rajaram did try to check the confusion created by the duplication of grants of watans. In March 1699, he issued orders to the subhedars of the State that if any dispute arose regarding any watan the concerning parties should be directed to the Maratha court; Konher Pandit, the nyayadhish, would scrutinize the sanads of the watan in question and give decision thereof. It was further stated in the orders that Rajaram would give final orders on the basis of the decision of Konher Pandit.⁷⁰

A watandar was at liberty to sell his watan or part of it. For example, Mahadaji Jagdale sold the deshmukhi of four villages out of his deshmukhi watan of tarf Masur to Janrao Wagmode, the mokdan, mouje Fodsiras, kasaba Dahigaon, prant Man, for the sum of 400 hons (June 7, 1691).⁷¹

Rakhamaji Khando, Balaji Khando and Ramaji Malhar sold their kulkarn watan of mouje Akurde, pargana Kolhapur, to Kashi Ranganath for the sum of Rs.175. (September 10, 1691).⁷²

69. MIS, XV, p.88

70. RSP, p.101

It is in this document that Rajaram has frankly admitted the fact that many took undue advantage of his critical position arising out of his Karnatak journey and his subsequent stay at Jinji. He had to grant whatever they demanded. This he did in order to appease them. But it resulted in the duplication of claims to the watans.

71. MIS, XV, pp. 57-58

72. TKK, pp. 65-66

Shankaraji Nikam sold his deshmukhi watan of mouje Rethare, pargana shirale, to Ghil Sheti and Samb Sheti for the sum of Rs.500 (February 25, 1705).⁷³

However, such sales of watans were not a frequent feature in those times. Unless compelled and made helpless by the circumstances, a watandar would not sell away his watan which he rightly considered an honour and prestige of his family. For example, Mahadaji Jagdale sold his deshmukhi of four villages in order to pay harki⁷⁴ to the Maratha Government at Jinji. While regranting the watan to Mahadaji, Rajaram asked him to pay 400 hons as a harki to the government. As Mahadaji had no other source of money at Jinji, he was obliged to sell out a part of his watan to Wagmode.

Jagirs

Rajaram not only returned the confiscated watans and inams to their owners, but also started bestowing the jagirs upon the small and big Maratha chieftains in Maharashtra. In the first intensive and extensive wave of the Mughal aggression in 1689, the Mughals appeared to be almost the master of the Maratha land and the chances of the Maratha recovery appeared to be very bleak. Many Maratha chieftains joined the victorious Mughals in hope of getting better prospects in the new regime. But in a year or two the victory wave of the Mughals

73. SCS, VIII, pp. 37-38

74. Money paid to the court, in token of his gratification by the successful suitor or litigant - (MED, p.887)

subsided. The Marathas rose to the occasion and successfully continued the resistance to the enemy both in Maharashtra and Karnatak. They defeated the renowned Mughal commanders and recaptured the lost posts and forts. To the dismay of both the Mughals and the Maratha chieftains who had joined them, the Maratha State survived the greatest calamity in its history. Now, the feeling that the mighty Mughal aggression could not be repulsed, slowly faded away and the spirit of vengeance began to take its place. The Maratha chieftains in the Mughal camp realized that the Maratha State was not to be crushed and the Marathas were going to be victorious. Consequently, they started deserting the imperial side and joining the cause of the Marathas. However, their act of coming over to the Maratha side was not without conditions. They wanted to return with their forces, and for maintaining their forces they aspired for the lagirs.

The following examples show how the Maratha chieftains were promised and granted saramjams by Rajaram in his reign. On June 4, 1691, he writes to Hanmantrao Ghorpade, "Nagoji Mane has represented in the Court your desire of coming over to the Maratha State and stated that if an apt bhagya (saramjam) is conferred upon you, you would join Ranchandrapant in Maharashtra. Thus, the Swami comes to learn your intention to protect the Maharashtra dharma. Convinced of your intention, the Swami has conferred the bhagya of 5,00,000 hons upon you and of 1,00,000 hons upon Krishnaji Ghorpade."

The following was the schedule of granting saramjams :

To Hanmantrao Ghorpade

1.	After the conquest of Raigad :	62,500 hons
2.	After the conquest of Bijapur :	62,500 hons
3.	After the conquest of Bhaganagar :	62,500 hons
4.	After the conquest of Aurangabad :	62,500 hons
5.	After the conquest of Delhi :	2,50,000 hons

Total :		5,00,000 hons

To Krishnaji Ghorpade

1.	After the conquest of Raigad :	12,500 hons
2.	After the conquest of Bijapur :	12,500 hons
3.	After the conquest of Bhaganagar :	12,500 hons
4.	After the conquest of Aurangabad :	12,500 hons
5.	After the conquest of Delhi :	50,000 hons.

Total :		1,00,000 hons

Rajaram further encouraged both Hanmantrao and Krishnaji that out of the plunder in the enemy territory they should hand over half of the wealth, (all) elephants, nishan⁷⁵ and

75. A flag or banner.

damana⁷⁶ to the government and should keep with them the remaining portion of the wealth and all the captured horses.⁷⁷

To Antaji Udhav, who was in the Mughal service, Rajaram granted a saramiam of 2,00,000. . . .hons. Rajaram writes to Antaji Udhav : "Hanmantrao Ghorpade has represented in the court that you wish to join the (Maratha) State for better prospects. You come from a respectable family and you are an active person ... Presently, the Swami has kindly bestowed upon you the daulat (saramiam) of 2,00,000 hors. So you should join Ramchandrapant with your force. The Swami has sent orders to the Pant regarding your saramiam. Accordingly, he would grant it to you ...". (1692)⁷⁸

Sometimes, the Maratha Government granted inams on condition that the recipient was to furnish a certain number of troops to the army. For example, in 1694 Kanoji Zunzarrao, the deshmukh of tarf Kanad Khore was regranted his inams and asked to furnish 20 troops to the government (January 4, 1694).⁷⁹ Similarly, Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar was regranted his inam of the whole pargana of Phaltan and a village and asked to furnish 100 troops to the government (October 1, 1696).⁸⁰

These are some stray cases, come down to us from the contemporary records, which show how the saramiams were granted

76. A kettle-drum

77. SCS, V, pp. 10-12

78. Ibid., p.172

79. SCS, VI, pp. 81-82

80. SL, pp. 176-177

by the Maratha Government to the enterprising Maratha chieftains. Often the saramiams were granted in the enemy territory.⁸¹ Neither the government nor the chieftains seem to have hesitated in doing so. The government probably thought that they would lose nothing in granting away the enemy territory in saramiams to the chieftains. They must have also thought that such a policy would encourage the ambitious chieftains to rally the big forces and penetrate them into the enemy domain, thereby carrying the war right in the enemy's camp. This would have also boosted up the morale of all the Maratha forces in the Deccan. All these calculations of the Maratha Government came true; but it led to the revival of feudalism from which the Maratha State had to suffer eventually.

Judiciary

The judiciary in Maharashtra, with its characteristic features, was a product of the centuries old social system of the Marathas. Regimes appeared and vanished, but the judicial system of the Marathas did not basically change much till the advent of the British rule in Maharashtra. The prominent feature of the Maratha judiciary was the association of the people who constituted the sabhas (courts) and administered justice to their fellow-men.

While studying the Marathi records regarding the watans and inams we find that a number of disputes were settled by the gotsabha, (usually referred to as got in the contemporary documents). A good deal of documents have been published,

81. RSP, p.104

which reveal the important place the gotsabha held in the judicial system of the Marathas. In case, a dispute was directly taken to the king or to his minister, he would ask the concerned parties first to approach the gotsabha and procure its decision. Thereupon, he would give his verdict in the light of the decision of the gotsabha. For example, a dispute arose between Mahadaji Jagdale of Masur and the Yadavs of Karad over the deshmukhi of 20 villages under the tarf of Masur. Mahadaji went to Jinji and appealed to Rajaram for justice. Rajaram, in turn, wrote to Ramchandrapant in Maharashtra, asking him to direct both the parties to approach the gotsabha for finding out the truth involved in the issue. It should be noted that he further desired that he be apprised of the gotsabha's decision, so that he would confer the deshmukhi on the rightful claimant (1693).⁸² Ramchandrapant, in turn, wrote to Moro Janardhan, the karkun of tarifs Umbraj and Masur, to call a meeting of the gotsabha on the banks of the Krishna and procure its statement as to whom the deshmukhi of the said villages really did belong. As per the orders of the Pant, Moro Janardhan convened the meeting of the gotsabha on the banks of the Krishna near Umbraj.⁸³ This shows how the Maratha king, staying at the distant capital in Karnatak, held the gotsabha and its decision in high esteem.

It may not be out of place to know the nature of the gotsabha's constitution. At the mouja level, the gotsabha

82. MIS, XV, pp. 63-69

83. Ibid., pp. 79-80

consisted of the lesser watandars like the patil, the kulkarni, the chaugula, other notable persons of the village and the balutas. The following is the list of persons who attended the gotsabha at monje Kiwal, tarf Masur, regarding the dispute of the deshmukhi watan of Mahadaji Jagdale :

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Niloji Patel Salokhe | 1. Aesaji Patel Salokhe |
| 2. Ramoji Patel | 2. Babaji Kulkarni |
| 3. Khandoji Chaugula | 3. Shivaji Kulkarni |
| 4. Bahiroji Sarkala | 4. Dhanseti |
| 5. Tulaji Sutar | 5. Nimba Parit |
| 6. Hona Mahar | 6. Rupa Chambhar |
| 7. Sata Mahar etc. | 7. Khatroji Mirag etc. ⁸⁴ |

The gotsabha at the kasaba level was attended by the patils and other watandars of the surrounding villages. For example, the gotsabha, convened by Moro Janardhan on the banks of the Krishna at Umbraj, was attended by almost all the patils, the kulkarnis, the chaugules, the shetes, the mahajans of the villages under tarf Masur and 12 balutas (probably of the kasaba).⁸⁵

The gotsabha at the thane or the pargana level was attended by the higher watandars like the deshmukhs, the deshpandes and the lesser watandars like the patils, the shetes, the mahajans and others including the balutas of the pargana. Such a meeting was usually presided over by some government

84. Ibid., pp. 74-75

85. Ibid., p. 79

officer such as the havaladar or the foujdar of the pargana or the thana.⁸⁶

Sometimes, the gotsabha was convened at a fort. Such a gotsabha was usually attended by the government officers at the fort such as the havaladar, the maimundar, the sabnis, the sarnobat, the naikwari and the watandars like the deshmukhs and patils, the shetes, the mahajans and the balutas from some villages of the pargana around the fort.⁸⁷

Sometimes, the constitution of the gotsabha depended upon the importance of the issue involved and the position of the parties concerned. For example, while Shahu was on the Rangana expedition, a meeting of the gotsabha was held at Patgaon under his auspices. The issue before the gotsabha was the deshmukhi watan of tarf Masur. At this meeting, the serious allegations against Dhanaji Jadhav and his partisans, the Yadavas of Karad, were made by Yashvantrao Jagdale, son of Mahadaji Jagdale that the former had secured the sanads of the said deshmukhi by unfair means. At this time Shahu was encamping along with his army at Patgaon. Consequently, the prominent persons of the state, it is found, attended this gotsabha.⁸⁸

The list of their names runs as follows :

Rajashri Shahu Raje

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Raibhanji Raje Bhosale | 1. Kanoji Raje Prabhavalkar |
| 2. Paraseji Raje Bhosale | 2. Sabaji Bhosale |

86. Ibid., XX, p.34

87. Ibid., XV, pp. 324-327

88. It should be noted that the abovementioned meeting is referred to as a gotsabha in the contemporary and genuine document - Ibid., p.110

- | | |
|---|---|
| 3. Hanmantrao Nimbalkar | 3. Khanderao Dabhade, the <u>deshmukh</u> , <u>prant</u> Kolhapur |
| 4. Rustumrao Jadhavrao, the <u>deshmukh</u> , <u>pargana</u> Shindkhed. | 4. Narsoji More |
| 5. Bajaji Naik, the <u>deshmukh</u> , <u>pargana</u> Phaltan | 5. Mahadaji Babar, the <u>deshmukh</u> , <u>karyat</u> Naneghol. |
| 6. Rambhaji Nimbalkar | 6. Anto Krishna, the <u>deshmulkarni</u> , <u>kasaba</u> Naneghol. |
| 7. Keroji Pawar Vishvasrao, the <u>mokdam</u> , <u>kasaba</u> Nasik | 7. Manaji Fadtare and Bahirji Fadtare, the <u>deshmukhs</u> , <u>pargana</u> Khataav. |
| 8. Dewaji Mambaji, the <u>kulkarni</u> , <u>kasaba</u> Rahu | 8. Vithoji Kasi and Viththal Bapaji, the <u>deshpandes</u> , <u>pargana</u> Khataav. |
| 9. Dharrao Nimbalkar, the <u>mokdam</u> , <u>monie</u> Nimbalk. | 9. Malharji Jachak, the <u>mokdam</u> , <u>monie</u> Nisodi, <u>pargana</u> Supe |

And under these columns some other names of the patils, the kulkarnis, the deshmukhs and the deshpandes are mentioned.⁸⁹

Thus, the constitution of the gotsabha was mostly determined by the place where it was held and by the persons who convened it. If a gotsabha was held at a monia, the patil, the kulkarni, the chaugula and balutas attended it. If a gotsabha was held at a thana or at a fort, the government officers such as the havaladar, the sabnis and the sarnobat and the higher watandars such as the deshmukhs and the deshpandes and the balutas of the pargana attended it. And if the king convened the meeting of the gotsabha in his camp or at his capital, the prominent men⁹⁰ then present at his court and the

89. Ibid., pp. 101-105

90. Most of them happened to be the watandars, holding either a deshmukhi watan or a patilki watan somewhere in the State.

watandars like the deshmukhs, the deshpandes, the patils and the kulkarnis attended it.

Sometimes, the gotsabha was called the dharmasabha. It seems that the gotsabha, when attended by the prominent men like the ministers, generals, and governors and the prominent pandits and watandars in the state, was termed as the dharmasabha.⁹¹

The brahmasabha was another judicial institution which comprised exclusively the learned Brahmins. It was the competent body for interpreting the principles of the Dharma and prescribing the penalties for religious irregularities, offences or guilts. The learned Brahmins at the capital of the state or at the centres of the shrines or at the places of the famous confluences of the rivers constituted the brahmasabhas.

The king was the highest judicial authority in the state. Generally, he was assisted and also represented by a nyayadhish (the minister for justice) who was invariably a learned Brahmin, well-versed in the Dharmashastras. They both could try any type of suit in the state and pronounce their verdict on it. Generally, important disputes like those of the deshmukhi watans and cases like reclamations were brought before them for justice. However, it is interesting to note that even they did not administer justice arbitrarily. They usually directed the disputing parties to the gotsabha asking them to procure its decision over the dispute. It is already

seen, how in the dispute of the deshmukhi of Masur Rajaram asked the Jagdales and the Yadavas to approach the gotsabha and secure its decision first. In the light of the decision of the gotsabha, Rajaram finally regranted the deshmukhi of tarf Masur to the Jagdales.⁹²

Even if the king wanted to settle a dispute in his court, he used to convene a meeting of the dharmashabha, such a meeting was called by Shivaji II in 1703 in his court for settling the dispute over the gaykulkarn and deshkulkarn watan between the Purandhares and the Atres. The meeting was presided over by the king himself and attended by Parashuram Trimbak and other ministers, the Pandits and prominent watandars of the state.⁹³ It is already observed how Shahu held such a meeting of the prominent persons and watandars of the state at Patgaon and decided the dispute regarding the deshmukhi of tarf Masur in favour of the Jagdales.⁹⁴

It would be interesting to know how the judicial procedure was adopted in the case of the socio-religious matters. Sometimes, the Muslim rulers forcibly converted the Hindus to Islam. If such converts desired to return to the Hindu fold, it posed a socio-religious problem in the society. For example, Gangadhar Rangnath Kulkarni of kasaba Harsul, subha Aurangabad was in the Mughal service. He was forced to embrace Islam. Later he was created a mansabdar in

92. Ibid., XV, p.80

93. ASS, III, pp. 98-99

94. MIS, XV, pp. 101-110

the Mughal army. For five years he remained as a Muslim. However, he wanted to come back to the Hindu religion. So, he left the Mughal service and the mansab and came to Sambhaji at Raigad. He requested Sambhaji to kindly consider his case for reclamation. Sambhaji referred the case to the brahmasabha, attended by the learned Brahmins and presided over by Kavi Kalash. On the basis of the rules and principles embodied in the Mitakshara and other law books, the brahmasabha prescribed a certain prayaschitta (expiation) to Gangadhar and sent him to Trimbakeshwar for performing it. After performing the praya-schittavidhi and procuring the shudhipatras from the Dharma-dhikaris, the learned Brahmins and the Deshadhikaris of Trimbakeshwar, he returned to Raigad. He showed the shudhipatras to Kavi Kalash who, in turn, took the consent of all the ministers including the nyayadhish and asked Moreshwar Panditrao, the danadhyaksha to allow Gangadhar to dine with him (Moreshwar) and grant him a final shudhipatra. Accordingly Gangadhar was allowed to take meals with Moreshwar Panditrao and he procured from him the shudhipatra which was signed by the following prominent persons present at Raigad on March 16, 1686 :

- | | |
|---|-------------------|
| 1. Moreshwar Panditrao | 1. Naro Raghunath |
| 2. Kaviraj Maheshdas | 2. Gopal Anant |
| 3. Narsinh Vaidhya | 3. Keso Trimal |
| 4. Yesbhatta | 4. Vyankatrao |
| 5. Ganeshbhatta and other
8 learned Brahmins | 5. Harji Mahadik |
| | 6. Yadav Namdeo |
| | 7. Kavi Kalash |

8. Gangadhar Moreshwar
9. Pralhad Niraji
10. Raghunath Korde.⁹⁵

Thus, it is clear from the above list that prominent persons, including the Pandits and the highest officials of the state, came together in a meeting at Raigad and finally declared Gangadhar Raghunath as purified.

The disputes regarding the marriages and divorces were generally settled by the brahmasabha. For example, a marriage took place between the two Yajurvedi Brahmin families at Kumbhargaoon, near Karad. Later it somehow led to a dispute (controversy?) as to whether the marriage was legal and valid according to the Dharmashastras. Both the parties approached the brahmasabha at Khatav which, in turn, called upon the learned Brahmins of Karad to give their decision (opinion),⁹⁶ on the issue. The brahmasabha also asked the relatives and other persons present at the time of the marriage to render their witnesses. When all the necessary documents, containing the decision (opinion) of the Brahmins at Karad and the witnesses of the relatives and the other persons, were procured the brahmasabha met again, made a careful scrutiny of the documents and declared the marriage legal and valid. (c. 1700)⁹⁷

95. Ibid., VIII, pp.36-38

96. They have used the word mirnaya (decision) but in fact it was an opinion sought by the brahmasabha at Khatav.

97. ASS, I, pp. 166-167

Even under the Mughal rule the judicial system of the Marathas did not undergo a considerable change. The Mughals generally recognised the decisions of the gotsabha. A mahajar, done in 1697 at the thana of Supa, is obviously a document belonging to the Mughal rule in the Poona region. The document deals with the suit about the patilki watan tried at the thana level by a maialas (sabha) presided over by Kazi Shara. Other members of the maialas were Diwan Dalsingji, the fouidar of the thana, Girjoji Anandrao, the deshmukh, Ramaji Babaji and Dewaji Trimbak, the deshpandes and others including the mokdams, the mahajans, the shetes of the kasaba (Supe). The document further reveals that the maialas had followed the same Maratha judicial procedure of sending the parties to some gotsabha first and procuring its decision.⁹⁸ The Kazi or the Mughal Foujdar did not arbitrarily administer justice.

Sometimes the Mughal officers did reject the decisions of the gotsabhas in the bygone Maratha regime. A document of 1693, belonging to the Mughal rule in the north Konkan, mentions that the gotsabhas' mahajars done during the Maratha rule were declared bogus and invalid. Hence, the Mughal officer of Underi sent both the parties to some other gotsabha of the place evidently under the Mughal rule.⁹⁹ What is significant here is that though the Mughal officer did not recognise the decisions of the former gotsabhas, he did not set aside the institution of the gotsabha either. He felt it necessary to send the concerned parties to some other gotsabha which he considered impartial.

98. MIS, XX, pp. 34-36

99. RR., Yr. 20, Iss. 239, pp. 57-58

Unlike the modern judiciary, the Maratha judiciary did not have its own buildings. Its sabhas had their meetings either in some temple or on the banks of the sacred river, especially at the confluence of the rivers. As the Hindus considered the rivers holy, they believed that the banks or the confluences of the rivers were the appropriate places for the administration of justice. It was further believed that the witnesses who were called upon to give an evidence might not give a lie in the sacred atmosphere on the river banks.

It is interesting to know how sometimes the witnesses were required to undergo a certain procedure before rendering their evidences to the gotsabha. In a dispute of the patilki watan in 1697-98, the following procedure was laid down in respect of the witnesses before recording their evidences : "They should take bath in a well near the village deity, wear the garlands of the Tulasi beads, swear by their sons ... and stand within the seven circles before the temple." The witnesses were further to be warned that giving a lie before the gotsabha would amount to the sin of killing a cow and a Brahmin, to the breach of faith of the preceptor, to the sin of having immoral relations with mother and to the drinking of wine. They were again to be reminded that their forefathers in heaven were closely watching them as to whether their sons were letting out the truth or otherwise, If they failed to discharge their sacred duty, their forefathers would certainly go to hell."¹⁰⁰ All this was meant to bring psycho-moral pressure on the witnesses to speak out the truth.

When there was no documentary evidence before the got-sabha, the elders and the halutas of the place of dispute were requested to give their oral evidence. On the basis of such evidence, the gotsabha would announce its decision. In such a case, the defeated party would request the gotsabha for the permission to perform a divya (an ordeal), which was considered to be the last resort.¹⁰¹ Trial by ordeal was the ancient judicial custom in India. The ancient judicial law-givers like Manu, Narad, Vishnu and others give many types of the divyas. However, the agnidivya, the ravadiya, the divadiya and the dhardivya were most common and were generally referred to in our records of the 17th century Maharashtra. A person who performed an agnidivya held a hot iron ball in his bandaged and sealed hands and crossed seven circles.¹⁰² In the case of ravadiya, a person crossed seven circles and picked up an iron ball from the boiling oil pot with his bandaged and sealed hand.¹⁰³ A divadiya required two lamps lit up on behalf of the two parties to a dispute : the party whose lamp went off earlier was declared defeated and consequently the other party won the case.¹⁰⁴ In the case of a dhardivya, a person was asked to perform an act of some bravery like the capturing of a fort etc.¹⁰⁵

101. Ibid.; XXI-Raj, pp.27-28

102. Ibid., XV, p.301; SV, II, p.152

103. SV, II, pp. 152-153

104. ASS, IV, p.149

105. SV, VII, p.57

Generally the government used to keep with them the disputed watan and its rights and perquisites which were duly returned to the rightful claimant after resolving the dispute.¹⁰⁶ However, the successful party had to pay harki, an amount in token of its gratification, to the government. The defeated party has to pay a fine called gunhegari.¹⁰⁷ Thus the government stood to gain both ways.

In those days, there was no well-defined code of laws for the administration of justice in the country. However, the ancient law-books by Manu, Narad, Brihaspati, Yajnavalkya, Shukra and others were considered standard works on law and a basis for the administration of justice. In Maharashtra, Yijnaneshwar's Mitakshara, a commentary of the Yajnavalkya-smriti, was rated as a high standard work on law and had been frequently referred to in the contemporary records of the 17th century.

Thus, the judicial system of the Marathas was simple and its prominent feature was the association of the people of the land with its working. Though the king was the highest judicial authority in the state, neither he nor his minister (nyayadhish) decided the civil suits arbitrarily. The institution of the gotsabha played a very important role in the administration of justice. Rajaram, perhaps under the influence of misrepresentation, granted the deshmukhi of Masur to the

106. ASS, III, pp. 96-97

107. MIS, XXI-Raj, p.28

Yadavas. But it was the institution of the gotsabha which declared the Yadava's claim to the deshmukhi as fake and unfounded and gave its decision in favour of the Jagdales. Consequently, Rajaram had to regrant the deshmukhi to the Jagdales.¹⁰⁸ The modern theory of the separation of the executive from the judiciary was unknown to the Marathas. However, the king, the supreme executive authority in the state, could hardly overrule the decisions of the gotsabha or the brahmsabha in his state.

Revenue

Shivaji had made a survey of the lands in his state and assessed the land revenue and other dues paid by the royat. In his regime, three assessments at different periods were made with the help of his able civil servants : Dadaji Konddeo, Moropant Pingle and Annaji Datto. Of all the assessments, the one by Annaji Datto was most systematic. Under this assessment, the lands were classified under different categories such as jiravat (unirrigated), bagavat (irrigated), patsthal (irrigated with canal-water) and motsthal (irrigated with well-water). Lands were also classified crop-wise, e.g., rice-land, sugar-cane land, vegetable land etc. Such lands were further sub-classified. For example, rice-land was classified under 12 heads and each had a different rate of assessment.¹⁰⁹ It may be assumed that those classifications continued in the later period also.

108. MIS, XV, pp. 68-71, 74-75, 79-84, 89-90, 92

109. SG, IV, pp. 110-111

The farmers paid the land revenue both in kind and in cash. The revenue collection in kind was of two types : First, in some regions the collection was made as per the unit of the holding of each farmer. It was per bigha crop rate. For example, a document of 1691 belonging to the pargana Shirale shows that on an average the black soil land was charged 2 maunds per bigha, the rice land $7\frac{1}{2}$ maunds per bigha and the barren land $1\frac{1}{2}$ maunds per bigha.¹¹⁰ Secondly, the government demanded some share of the total produce of the holding. According to Sabhasad, it was $\frac{2}{5}$ of the total produce in the regime of Shivaji.¹¹¹ The same rate must have been continued in the later period also.

Generally, the cash rate of the revenue was applied to the lands~~and~~ producing cash crops like sugar-cane land, ginger land etc.¹¹² The aforesaid document of 1691 mentions that the assessment for the ginger land was 2 hons per bigha and for the vegetable ~~a~~ land $\frac{1}{2}$ hon per bigha.¹¹³ Unfortunately, there is hardly any record which would throw some more light on the assessment of land revenue in the period of Rajaram.

It was but natural that the constant warfare might have devastated many villages in Maharashtra and it might have adversely affected the revenue collection. A document of 1698-99, evidently belonging to the Mughal rule in the

110. SCS, VIII, p.36

111. MAS, p.154

112. Ibid., p.155

113. SCS, VIII, p.36

Karad-Satara region, shows that out of 18 villages in the Masur pargana 13 were devastated and burnt.¹¹⁴

It would be wrong to maintain that the Mughals were all the time engaged in devastating the regions in Maharashtra. True, they devastated the regions under the Maratha rule, but once they conquered them, they tried to build up their administration there. They also assured the people of their protection and asked the runaway rayat to return and rehabilitate the region. For example, the village Nimb in the Wai pargana had been lain waste and consequently depopulated. Hence, the Mughal thanedar of Wai offered a kaul to the patils and encouraged the rayat of the village, by declaring a remission in the assessment of the land revenue. (December 2, 1700). The following was the table of remission :

For the land irrigated with canal water the rate of assessment was Rs.2 per bigha. But for the first year, i.e., 1701 the people were asked to pay Re.1/2, for 1702 Re.1, for 1703 Rs. 1½ and for 1704 Rs.2. For the jirayat land the assessment was Re.1 per bigha. However, for the first year the people were asked to pay Re.½, for the second year Re.¾, for the third year Re.¾ and for the fourth year Re.1.¹¹⁵

It should be noted here that the Marathas also offered such remission in the assessment of the revenue to the people of the region desolated by the enemy. Ranchandrapant's

114. MIS, XV, pp. 92-93

115. ASS, I, p.33

letter to the watandars and rayat of the Shirale pargana mentions the remission of 3 years for the rice land, 4 years for the black soil land and barren land and 3 years for irrigated land. Unfortunately, the scale of the remission is not mentioned in the letter.¹¹⁶

Sometimes a region was administered simultaneously by both the Mughals and the Marathas. Consequently it resulted in some sort of a dual government of which the people were the worst sufferer. They were obliged to pay revenue to both the parties. However, the Maratha Government was sympathetic to such people who were asked to pay only a half of the revenue to them (the Marathas) and allowed to pay the other half to the Mughals.¹¹⁷

The case of the Mahuli village is interesting one. The Maratha Government had granted the village as an agrahar inam to the Brahmins. But the Mughals did not care about the inams granted by the Marathas. They used to collect the revenue in the form of khandani¹¹⁸ from such inam villages also. In 1698, Nyahar Khan, the thanedar of Wai, had imposed a certain amount of khandani on the Brahmins of Mahuli. Later, he raised the amount by Rs.200. It seems that the Brahmins approached Ramchandrapant and appealed to him to look into the matter. Ramchandrapant, in turn, wrote a strongly worded letter to the deshpandes of the Wai pargana, (who were in the

116. SCS, VIII, p.36

117. Ibid.; PD, XXXI, pp. 62-63

118. A forced contribution.

Mughal service) asking them to get the Khan's order of collecting additional khandani rescinded. The Pant had not taken any objection to the Mughals' collecting the khandani from the village. His only objection was that they should not impose an additional sum of Rs.200 on the Brahmins. It is also interesting to note that the Pant even wrote to the Khan to repeal his order of collecting the additional khandani from the Brahmins. (February 6, 1699).¹¹⁹

From the above discussion, it is evident that the Maratha Government was aware of the fact that unless the Mughals were defeated and driven out of the land, the people could not avoid paying taxes to them.

Trade and Commerce

During the period of Rajaram, the trade and commerce in Maharashtra did not prosper on account of the constant warfare. It was but natural that the market towns where the trading community stayed and carried its activity became a target of the enemy's attacks, as a consequence of which trade and commerce were ruined at many places.

However, it is significant to note that the Maratha Government made every effort to safeguard and encourage the interests of the trading community in Maharashtra. For example, in October 1691 Ramchandrapant offered a kaul to the patils, the kulkarnis, the shetes, the mahajans and other merchants and the rayat of kasabe Shirale, prant Malkapur, asking them to settle in the kasaba and carry their activities

as before. He promised them that, as a remission, the Maratha Government would not collect house tax and mohatarfa¹²⁰ from the merchants and house tax and land revenue from the new rayat for one year.¹²¹ To the same merchant community at Shirale, Ramchandrapant gave another kaul in 1697, assuring them that the government would not harass them, and that they should carry on their activities undisturbed. (July 4, 1697).

Sometimes, on account of the harassing activities of the enemy, the merchant community fled from their market town. Under such circumstances, the Maratha Government came to their rescue and offered them a safer place for their settlement. Remissions in taxes were also declared and every effort was made to comfort them.¹²²

It is interesting to note that some merchants actively participated in the struggle against the Mughals, by helping the Maratha Government with provisions and money. At times they lost all their goods to the enemy. For example, Rakhamaji Mawaji Kudala, who had his shop at Sinhagad, lost everything to the enemy when the fort was captured by the Emperor. Later in his petition to Shahu, he is found to have stated that he had even lent money to the Maratha Government for the campaigns of Shankaraji Narayan and Santaji

120. A tax on the shopkeepers and artificers -

MAS, p.279

121. ASS, V, pp.37-38

122. Ibid., p.38; SCS, XI, p.4

Ghorpade in the period of Rajaram.¹²³

The Mughals followed a policy of the social discrimination in the field of trade and commerce also. They offered liberal concessions to the Muslim merchants. It is already seen how the Mughal thanedar of Chaul in his order mentions the government policy that the Muslim merchants were to be exempted from the payment of octroi. (1693-94)¹²⁴ Nowhere in the Maratha records such a discrimination made by the Maratha Government is found.

Thus the life of the people in Maharashtra in the last quarter of the 17th century was neither happy nor prosperous. When the Monsoon failed, the people starved and perished in thousands. Their sufferings were further aggravated when the epidemics like cholera and plague visited the land. They took a heavy toll of the population. The plight of the people knew no bounds when the enemy attacked, plundered and burnt down their habitations. Thus the constant warfare in Maharashtra had disoluted many of its regions and it had eventually resulted in the ruin of trade and commerce also. Under such unfavourable circumstances, caused by the war, the Maratha Government was obliged to revive the system of granting the inams and watans which in course of time weakened the very fabric of the Maratha State. Similarly the introduction of the jagir system also brought about in later period the undesirable changes in the constitution of the state.

123. ASS, VII, pp. 35-36

Incidentally it may be mentioned that the rate of interest then prevalent in Maharashtra was five per cent -

PD, XXXI, p.45

124. SCS, X, p.32

Chapter Eight

Rajaram : His Life And Achievements

His Life

1) Birth and Childhood

It was on February 24, 1670 at Rajgad that Rajaram was born to Soyarabai, who came of the Mohite family.¹ On March 7, 1680, his thread ceremony was performed.² On March 15, 1680, his father, Shivaji, married him to Janakibai, daughter of Prataprao Gujar, the Commander-in-Chief of the Marathas.³ These are some bare facts about Rajaram's early life, in his father's reign. Nothing more is known to history, beyond this.

However, it may be assumed that Shivaji, a man of rare foresight and affectionate heart, must have done the necessary arrangements for educating both his sons. Besides, Soyarabai, an ambitious queen, must have taken some care to train her son in the art of administration and war. But this was possible for her in the reign of Shivaji only, as she soon met her doom in the early period of Sambhaji's reign. A strong desire to install Rajaram as king led her to have

1. SCP-JS, p.24

Sources like the Shedgaonkar Bhosale Rakhar and the Bhat Peshawe Gharanyachi Nikikat render the dates of Rajaram's birth as 1658-59 and March 29, 1661 respectively. The dates are evidently wrong and hence need no discussion.

2. SCP-JS, p.30

3. Ibid.

recourse to the conspiracies in which the high officials like Annaji Datto, and Balaji Awaji were involved. It was natural that Rajaram, a boy of ten, could hardly be aware of the machinations of his mother and her partisans. Soon her death in October 1681 orphaned him. The English from Bombay write on October 27, 1681 that Soyarabai was poisoned to death at the instance of Sambhaji.⁴ According to the Marathi Samrajyachi Chhoti Bakhar, a source of a later period, she committed suicide by hanging.⁵ In all probability, her death does not seem to have been natural. Either she was put to death or she committed suicide. All these turbulent activities must have hampered or discontinued Rajaram's training which a prince should ordinarily receive.

2) Life at Raigad

Most of the historians of the Maratha history have held the view that Sambhaji had either imprisoned Rajaram or put him under surveillance in his reign. This view is substantially supported by some contemporary and also non-contemporary documents :

1. A note in the Jedhe Chronology reads that when Sambhaji came (from Panhala) to Raigad, he put Rajaram in prison (June 18, 1680).⁶

2. A Dutch report from Golconda, dated October 23, 1680, says that Sambhaji imprisoned Rajaram and

4. GSM, p.141

5. SPS, p.91

6. SCP-JS, p.30

started reigning.⁷

3. Both Saki Mustaid Khan and Kafi Khan write that Rajaram was in prison during the reign of Sambhaji.⁸

4. Malhar Ramrao tells that Sambhaji had kept Rajaram under surveillance.⁹

However, some other contemporary sources reveal that Sambhaji treated Rajaram with kindness :

1. On July 12, 1680, the English from Bombay write to Surat that Sambhaji has treated Rajaram 'with all kindness and continues as yet so to do ...'¹⁰

2. According to the Anupuran, when Sambhaji came from Panhala to Raigad, he offered presents of apparels and ornaments to Rajaram and behaved very politely with Soyarabai and Putalabai, his step-mothers.¹¹

The above-mentioned sources are apparently conflicting. However, the fact appears to be that once Sambhaji successfully secured the capital Raigad and the reins of power after crushing the first conspiracy, he, on the advice of his well-wishers, forgave the conspirators and extended good treatment to them, including Rajaram and Soyarabai. But the second conspiracy was unearthed in June-July 1681 and that enraged Sambhaji to punish the conspirators, including perhaps the person of

7. SPS, p.83

8. MA-SP, p.43; MM-SP, p.24

9. SC-MR, p.26; RC-MR, p.29

10. CSM, p.156

11. SPS, p.84

Soyarabai also. At this critical juncture, it seems, Sambhaji must have put Rajaram in prison. It was highly expedient for Sambhaji as a king to see that Rajaram should not henceforth be a pawn in the hands of any conspirators in the state. Soon, almost all the staunch partisans of Rajaram were removed off the political scene of Maharashtra. And thus Rajaram, a poor and innocent boy of eleven, was left alone.

It is not known for how long he was put in prison (or under surveillance ?). However, it appears that after a passage of time of 3-4 years, Sambhaji's anger cooled down and he was kind enough to allow Rajaram to move freely at Raigad.¹² Round about 1685, he married Rajaram to Tarabai, daughter of Hambirrao Mohite, the Commander-in-Chief of the Maratha State. Had Rajaram been a prisoner in the real sense of the term, Hambirrao would not have married his daughter to him. And had Rajaram been really a dangerous and treacherous person in the state, Sambhaji would not have run the risk of strengthening the position of his brother by marrying him to the daughter of his commander-in-chief. Moreover, had Sambhaji put Rajaram in the prison all through his reign as a punishment for the acts of his mother, the latter would not have any love for Shahu, the son of the former. The subsequent history reveals that Rajaram always carried a feeling in his heart that Shahu was the real master of the State and he was just a trustee.

12. A hakikat of the senapati Dabhade says that Sambhaji had appointed Yesaji Dabhade to wait upon Rajaram at Raigad-
CSM, p.157

3) No Coronation

Though some sources¹³ of the later period speak of Rajaram's coronation, it appears that never was he coronated as king. A plausible reason for the magnanimous sacrifice was that he thought it improper to be coronated while Shahu, the heir-apparent, was living a prisoner's life in the Mughal camp. The contemporary source like the Jedhe Chronology speaks of the manchakarohan of Rajaram and not of his coronation.¹⁴ Malhar Ramrao also supports the view. He writes : 'Shivaji Raje (Shahu), the real claimant to the throne, was in the Mughal captivity. Hence, Rajaram felt that he (Shahu) should be coronated when released from the captivity. So Rajaram did not have his coronation. Instead, he performed the manchakarohan ceremony and started running the administration with the help of the rajmudra bearing his name.'¹⁵ Historically Malhar Ramrao's account seems to be true.

4) Queens

Rajaram was said to have four queens, viz., Janakibai, Tarabai, Rajasbai and Ahilyabai.¹⁶ So far the historians have held that Janakibai died soon after Shivaji's death in 1680.¹⁷ Their view seems to have been based on the account of Malhar Ramrao who writes that Janakibai died in the reign of Sambhaji.¹⁸ However, it should be noted that Janakibai did not

13. KY, p.145

14. SCP, JS, p.35

15. RC-MR, p.44

16. SR, pp. 90-91

17. CSM, p.127; THT, p.25

18. RC-MR, p.31

die either in the reign of Sambhaji or in that of Rajaram. She survived not only Sambhaji and Rajaram, but the Emperor Aurangzeb also.

The Yadav Record throws some light on the life of Janakibai. It contains a partition-deed of the deshmukhi of Karad between Girjoji Yadav and Swarupji Yadav.¹⁹ The partition-deed reveals the following story of Janakibai in 1689 : When Rajaram escaped from Raigad to Pratapgad, he left behind, his queen Janakibai along with Yesubai and Shahu. Later, Rajaram asked Girjoji Yadav to fetch Janakibai and Shahu from Raigad to Pratapgad. Girjoji managed to reach Raigad through the Mughal siege and passed on Rajaram's message to the garrison, including Yesubai and Changoji Katkar, the killedar of the fort. But the garrison refused to send Janakibai and Shahu to Pratapgad. And Girjoji had to return to Rajaram.

This account in a genuine document proves beyond the shadow of doubt that Janakibai was very much alive in the early period of Rajaram's reign. But what happened to her in the subsequent years is a matter of surmise. Janakibai stayed along with Yesubai and Shahu at Raigad till its capture by Zulfiqar Khan. Later on, she must have been taken captive along with the members of the royal family and sent to the Mughal camp.

It seems that Janakibai remained in the Mughal captivity till 1719 when Balaji Vishwanath effected her release along with Yesubai. This is revealed by a Yadi which contains an order of Shahu to Balaji when the latter was sent to assist the Sayyid

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brothers in their power-struggle at Delhi.²⁰ In the order, Shahu had asked Balaji to secure the release of Yesubai, Janakibai and other Maratha captives at Delhi. It should be assumed that Janakibai was also set free along with Yesubai and other captives. History knows not when she died.

Sambhaji had married Rajaram to Tarabai and Rajasbai in about 1685. Tarabai and Rajasbai came of the Mohite family and the Ghatge family, respectively.²¹ Both these queens seem to have had escaped along with Rajaram or round about his escape from Raigad in 1689. Since Janakibai stayed behind and was subsequently captured by the Mughals, Tarabai's becoming the senior-most queen of Rajaram was natural.

Soon Rajaram left for Jinji, leaving both the queens, viz., Tarabai and Rajasbai, behind, in Maharashtra. Consequently, Tarabai became the eldest member of the royal family staying in Maharashtra. For some time during 1689-90 she also headed the rajmandal set up by Rajaram for administration of the state. Thus, she received her initial training in administration of the Maratha State, before she went to Jinji. At Jinji also, she seems to have had taken active part in the Maratha Court politics and yielded considerable influence on Rajaram. An anonymous poet of the later period makes an interesting remark about the royal couple : It was Tarabai who by her meritorious actions protected delicate and weak Rajaram at Jinji.²²

20. APR, p.36

21. RC-MR, p.32

22. TKK, p.15

Very little is known about Rajasbai, the third queen, except that she gave birth to Sambhaji II in 1698 who later on became the Chhatrapati of the Kolhapur State in 1714.

Rajaram was said to have a fourth queen, Ahilyabai coming of the Khanvilkar family.²³ Surprisingly, her name is not mentioned in the list of the members of the royal family escorted by Girjoji Yadav from Jinji to Vellore at the fall of the fort (Jinji). Girjoji even mentions the name of Lakhamu Karbharin, a maid-servant who accompanied the royal family to Vellore.²⁴ How could he have failed to mention the name of Ahilyabai the queen? The plausible explanation would be that Rajaram married Ahilyabai, only after his arrival from Jinji in 1698. After his death, she performed satihood at Vishalgad²⁵ where her tomb is still shown.

Thus Janakibai, Tarabai, Rajasbai and Ahilyabai were the four queens of Rajaram, known to history, by name. However, the number of his queens seems to be a little bigger. Martin speaks of Rajaram's three to four marriages 'during the first

23. RC-MR, p.32

24. TKK, p.476

25. RC-MR, pp. 83-84

Malhar Ramrao mentions the name of the fourth queen of Rajaram as Ambikabai (Ibid., p.32). G.S. Sardesai gives it as Ambikabai alias Ahilyabai (SR, p.91). The name Ahilyabai seems to be more correct as Rajaram had a daughter, Ambikabai by name (TKK, pp. 198- & 548).

two or three months after his arrival' at Jinji.²⁶ These marriages took place evidently before the going of Tarabai and Rajasbai from Maharashtra to Jinji. In a statement made by Girjoji Yadav, he mentions at one place that he had once escorted chaughi matushrisahiba (four queens of Rajaram) from Jinji to Palekota.²⁷ Another statement made by Surrao Yadav reveals that at the time of the fall of Jinji, Girjojibawa²⁸ sent the varkad ranva (other queens) and the natakshalas (the mistresses) to the houses of their parents in the fort of Jinji and escorted Tarabai and Rajasbai out of Jinji to Vellore.²⁹ All these sources show that Tarabai and Rajasbai were not the only queens of Rajaram at Jinji. It seems that at the fall of Jinji, other queens were made captive and sent to the imperial camp.

5) Queens' Journey to Jinji

It is already seen when Rajaram escaped to Karnatak, he left his queens behind in Maharashtra. This royal family must have kept on moving from fort to fort in the hilly region beyond Panhala in order to avoid the Mughal captivity. The queens were at Vishalgad, before they set out for Jinji. Rajaram had entrusted the work of arranging their journey to Lingo Shankar and Visaji Shankar, maternal uncles of Khando Ballal. They were the money-lenders and had their cargo-ships

26. MM-JS, pp. 236-237

27. TKK, p.475

28. Girjoji Yadav

29. TKK, p.95

plying in the coastal waters of the Arabian sea. They successfully arranged the queens' voyage on the sea. The queens descended from Vishalgad into Konkan and got into a ship at Yashwantgad. They soon reached Honawar from where they travelled clandestinely through the State of Bednur to Jinji.³⁰

So far the historians have held that the Maratha queens reached Jinji in October 1694.³¹ But they undertook this hazardous journey not in 1694, but in 1691. They must have reached Jinji at least before April 1691.³²

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30. RC-MR, pp. 46-48; PD,XXXI, p. 55; IS-ASL, IV, pp. 11-12

31. SR, p.10; THT, p.48

32. This is substantiated by the documents from the Yadav Record. In the aforesaid partition-deed of the deshmukhi of Karad, it is mentioned that Girjoji was the sarhavaladar of Rajaram's harem. When Soyarabai was born to Rajasbai, he conveyed that good news to Rajaram who was pleased to grant him the deshmukhi of Umbraj and Targaon (TKK, pp. 474-475). Another document from the same record tells that the grant of the said deshmukhi was made on January 15, 1692. (Ibid., pp. 67-68). Thus it is evident that Soyarabai must have born on or before this date and her mother Rajasbai along with Tarabai must have come to Jinji at least before April 1691.

6) Mistresses

Rajaram had many mistresses. Martin notes in his diary that many dancing damsels were brought to the court in 1689.³³ The document from the Yadav Record, mentioning the natakshalas (mistresses) of Rajaram at Jinji, is already referred to in the preceding pages.³⁴ Malhar Ramrao says that one Sagunabai, Rajaram's mistress, bore a beautiful son, Raja Karna.³⁵

Out of Rajaram's harem, Zulfiqar Khan allowed only Tarabai, her son Shivaji, Rajasbai and her daughter Soyarabai to escape from Jinji. The remaining queens and mistresses, along with their children, were made captive and sent to the imperial camp. The Mughal historians do not say anything about the escape of Rajaram's two queens, viz., Tarabai and Rajasbai, from Jinji. Bhimsen Saxena writes, "Zulfiqar Khan consoled the wives and children of Rajaram and sent palanquins to fetch them out from Rajgiri. The Khan treated them quite respectfully. However, one of the wives of Rajaram committed suicide by throwing herself down the cliff of the fort."³⁶ Bhimsen Saxena does not give the number of the royal captives, but Saki Mustaid Khan gives it in detail : "Rajaram's four wives, three sons, two daughters, other relatives and servants were taken captive by the Khan."³⁷

33. MM-JS, pp. 236-237

34. TKK, p.95

35. RC-MR, p.46

36. TD, p.134

37. MA-SP, pp. 69-70

Later in January 1704, the two captive daughters of Rajaram were obliged to embrace Islam and married to Shemshir Beg, son of Agharkhan and Raja Neknam of Deogad, the Muslim Gond Chief, respectively.³⁸

7) Sons and Daughters

Shivaji, the eldest son of Rajaram, was born to Tarabai at Jinji on June 9, 1696.³⁹ His second son, Sambhaji, was born to Rajasbai at Vishalgad on May 23, 1698.⁴⁰

G.S. Sardesai says that Janakibai had a daughter named Soyarabai alias Savitribai who was married to Bajaji Naik Nimbalkar II.⁴¹ However, it is already seen that Soyarabai was born to Rajasbai, and not to Janakibai. Soyarabai was born at Jinji in January 1692 (c.)⁴²

Rajaram's second daughter, Ambikabai, was born to Tarabai at Vishalgad in March 1699.⁴³

38. Ibid., p.133

When in March 1696, Dindar, the defiant Gond chief of Deogad was defeated and deposed by the Mughals, his throne was given to Kan Singh, son of Kishan Singh, the Gond Chief of Chanda. Kan Singh embraced Islam under the name of Raja Neknam- (HA, V, p.336)

39. SCP-JS, pp. 38-39

40. TKK, pp. 97-98. G.S. Sardesai writes that Sambhaji was born probably at Panhala (SR, p.90). However, the Yadav Record reveals that he was born at Vishalgad - (TKK, p.198)

41. SR, p.90

42. TKK, p.474

43. Ibid., p.198

8) Natural Son Raja Karna and the myth of his Succession

Raja Karna was a natural son of Rajaram born to his mistress Sagunabai.⁴⁴ Malhar Ramrao says that he was born at Jinji, and was said to be quite handsome; Rajaram who was very much fond of him, bestowed upon him a title of the Raja and a foni saramiam of 5000.⁴⁵ The Jagdale Record of Masur reveals that Rajaram had also granted the deshmukhi of Karad to him.⁴⁶

A few letters of Raja Karna, including his seal on one of them, are available. Sundar Tukdeo was his deputy in Maharashtra, managing his deshmukhi of Karad.⁴⁷

In 1697, Rajaram sent a delegation of Raja Karna to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan to conclude a peace treaty with the Mughals. The delegation comprised Shankaraji Malhar, Girjoji Yadav and Bawaji Prabhu. The Maratha peace overtures failed.

44. A document belonging to the Dabhade family mentions the birth of a son to Rajaram in April 1691. Was he Raja Karna? On the eve of the birth celebrations of the son, Rajaram granted an inam of 5 chavay land to Khandoji Yesaji Patil Dabhade - April 1, 1691. (MIS, III, pp. 173-175)

45. RC-MR, p.46

46. MIS, XV, p.66

47. Ibid., 53-54, 67-68; MIS, XXI-B, pp. 100-114

However, the delegation returned safely to Jinji.⁴⁸

It is not known how Raja Karna managed his escape at the fall of Jinji. The party, which Girjoji Yadav escorted from Jinji to Vellore, did not include either him or his mother. But he somehow made his escape to Maharashtra and survived his father, only for some weeks.

So far the historians such as Sarkar, Sardesai and Brij Kishore have maintained that with the help of Dhanaji Jadhav Raja Karna succeeded to the Maratha throne after Rajaram's death.⁴⁹ Their contention is based mainly on the following Persian sources :⁵⁰

1. Saki Mustaid Khan writes : "It was reported to the Emperor that after Rajaram's death his five-year-old son (Raja Karna) was placed on the throne, but he too died (soon)."⁵¹
2. Bhimsen Saxena writes : 'Rajaram died of smallpox. His eldest son Karna was crowned, but he also followed his father in a short period.'⁵²
3. The Akhabarat mention the date of Raja Karna's

48. SCP-JS, p.39; TKK, pp.95, 197, 475-476

49. HA, V, p. 111; SR, p.108; THT, pp.62-63

50. It is interesting to note that there is not even a single reference in the Marathi records to the story of Raja Karna's succession to the throne.

51. MA-SP, p.86

52. TD, pp. 144-145

death as March 24, 1700.⁵³ With the help of the Akhabarat Jadunath Sarkar says : "On 2nd March 1700, Rajaram died at Singhgarh, of a fever which was most probably caused by the hardship of his raid and the vehement pursuit by the Mughals. His family was then in the fort of Vishalgarh. His favourite natural son Karna was immediately afterwards crowned as king by his ministers, with the help of Dhana Jadav, but died of smallpox in three weeks..."⁵⁴

However, the truth is that Shivaji II, son of Tarabai, and not Raja Karna, succeeded to the throne after Rajaram's death. This is very well proved by an evidence from the statement of Girgoji Yadav who was once the sarhavaladar of Rajaram's harem. While relating the record of his services to the Maratha State, he incidentally states :

"After the death of Rajashri Rajaram Chhatrapati, Rajashri Shivaji Raje Chhatrapatisaheb ascended to the throne on the day of Varshapratipada (i.e. March 10, 1700) at Vishalgad."⁵⁵

This solitary sentence in an authentic and contemporary document causes the collapse of the whole fabric of the so-called story of the succession of Raja Karna. It refutes the contention of the Persian sources which speak of Raja Karna's succession immediately after Rajaram's death and his subsequent death on March 24. The Persian sources also

53. HA, V, p.111

54. Ibid.

55. TKK, p.480

contend that Shivaji II succeeded to the Maratha throne, only after Raja Karna's death, i.e., March 24.⁵⁶ In fact, Shivaji II was enthroned on March 10, and not on any day after March 24. In his statement Girjoji Yadav renders a valuable historical information about the events like the internecine fighting between Ramchandrapant and Parashurampant and the imposture of Khandopant Khatavkar in the early period of Shivaji II's reign.⁵⁷ The abovementioned undesirable events must have done some damage to the cause of the Maratha State, and nevertheless they are mentioned by Girjoji. Had there been really any attempt to install Raja Karna as king, Girjoji would have certainly noted it in his statement.

Rajaram died on March 3, 1700 and Shivaji II succeeded him on March 10, 1700. This gap of 6 days in between the two events was due to many reasons : First, Rajaram died on Sinhagad, while the royal family including Tarabai and her son was at Vishalgad.⁵⁸ The news of Rajaram's death must have taken at least 2 days to reach Vishalgad. Secondly, the earlier history of the Marathas shows that they did not perform the manchakarohan ceremony of an heir-apparent, immediately after

56. HA, V, p.111; TD, p.145

57. TKK, p.480

58. Ibid., pp. 198-199

the death of their king.⁵⁹ Thirdly, an important ceremony like that of manchakarohan must have required some auspicious day.⁶⁰ Fortunately, Varshaprati-pada (the first day of the Hindu year) was falling on March 10. The Marathas seized the opportunity and performed the ceremony on that day.

Thus, the story of Raja Karna's succession was a mere rumour, recorded by the news-writers and the court-historians of the Mughals. Such rumours were often recorded by them in those days of turmoils.⁶¹ Moreover, it should be admitted that

59. For example, Shivaji died on April 3, 1680. Sambhaji came from Panhala to Raigad on June 18, 1680 and subsequently performed the manchakarohan on July 20, 1680. This was the auspicious day of Lalitapanchami. Later, when Sambhaji was captured by the Mughals on February 1, 1689, Rajaram performed the manchakarohan on February 9, 1689 at Raigad - (MT, pp. 88-89)

60. The Hindus considered Varshaprati-pada, Akshayatri-tiya and Vijayadashami as the most auspicious days of the year.

61. For example, On March 11, 1700, a rumour was relayed to the Imperial Court that a desai of the country below the ghats stabbed Ramchandrapant to death. (HA, V, p.111). A student of history knows the fact that the Pant did not die in 1700, and that he served under Tarabai and later on under Sambhaji II.

it was quite possible to spread such a rumour against the background of Rajaram's well-known affection towards Raja Karna.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Raja Karna's sister Anandibai was given in marriage to Padmasing Pisal, son of Suryaji Pisal.⁶² This matrimonial alliance helped Suryaji to gain favour of Rajaram, and subsequently the deshmukhi watan of Wai.

9) Shahu

It may not be out of place to say here a word or two about Shahu. It is already seen how Shahu and his mother Yesubai were taken captive at the time of the fall of Raigad. On April 5, 1689, Rajaram escaped from Raigad to organize the warfare against the enemy. And that was the last meeting of Rajaram with Shahu and Yesubai. Since then, Rajaram never met them as the latter were in the Mughal captivity at the time of his death. However, it should be noted that Rajaram was all love for Shahu. Throughout his reign, Rajaram did feel that Shahu was the legal heir to the Maratha throne and that he (Rajaram) was only the trustee of the State in his absence. This feeling of Rajaram is aptly reflected in his letter to Shankaraji Narayan, his minister. Therein he says : "A time would come, when by the grace of God, Shahu would return to our land. He is our chief and a rightful claimant to the state. Whatever I do is for him only. In future, all

the people will have to look up to him as their master and obey him. This is verily the will of God."⁶³

The content of the above-mentioned letter reveals Rajaram's nobility of mind and magnanimity of heart. One is tempted to compare his virtues with those of Bharat who ruled the state as the trustee in absence of Prabhu Ramchandra.

10) Vices and the Consequent death

It seems that Rajaram was not free from vices. It is already seen that he had many mistresses in his harem at Jinji. The dancing girls were also brought to the Court. Martin writes, "The dancing girls, without whom the Hindus do not believe any feast to be complete, were brought by the minister (Pralhad Niraji) to the court in many troupes ... and they served for other purpose (also)."⁶⁴

Though to keep the mistresses and dancing girls was all the vogue at the courts of the Indian Princes, the indulgence in the sexual pleasure must have wrought undesirable effects on Rajaram's constitution which was said to be weak and delicate. There are some references which go to say that he was often carried on the shoulders by Bahirji (Hindurao) Ghorpade and Pralhad Niraji in his historic Karnatak journey in 1689.⁶⁵

In his 'History of Mysore', Mark Wilks writes, "Rama, son of Sevajee, who commanded at Ginjee, was constantly intoxicated by habitual use of ganja (hemp leaves) and opium."⁶⁶

63. MIS, XV, p.296

64. MM-JS, pp.236-237

65. Ibid., p.236; RC, p.47

66. HM, p.133

This is a serious charge against Rajaram. However, since there is no other authentic and contemporary source to verify the statement of Wilks, nothing concrete can be said about it.

It is already discussed how Rajaram's expedition of Khandesh-Berar failed and his forces were badly defeated by the enemy. It seems that the bad health of Rajaram obstructed his expedition, and hence he had to return half way to his home-land. Later he came to Sinhgad where he stayed on for two months. There, he died on March 3, 1700.⁶⁷

Bhimsen Saxena says that he died of small-pox.⁶⁸ Both Saki Mustaid Khan and Khafi Khan do not mention the cause of his death.⁶⁹ Malhar Ramrao writes that he died of typhoid.⁷⁰ It appears that then the epidemic of small-pox was raging in Maharashtra. Raja Karna died of the same. Hence, it may be surmised that Rajaram who was already in bad health, fell a victim to small-pox at the age of thirty only.

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67. SCP-GPS, p.67

With the help of Akhbarat Sarkar says that Rajaram died on March 2, 1700 (HA, V, p. 111). But the Gadadhar Pralhad Chronology gives the date of his death as March 3, 1700 - (SCP-GPS, p.67).

68. TD, p.144

69. MA-SP, p.36; MM-SP, p.49

70. RC-MR, p.82

Rajaram's Achievements

1) Rajaram as a General

History records that Rajaram did fight some battles and lead some expeditions. But their accounts, generally very brief, lead us to the conclusion that he could not shine as a general. Here follows a brief account of his military career :

1. The first battle, that Rajaram fought, was at the foot of Pratapgad in June 1689. At that time, he had escaped from Raigad to Pratapgad. During his stay at Pratapgad, some enemy force under Kakar Khan assembled near Par, a village at the foot of the fort. On knowing this, Rajaram boldly came out with the force at hand in the fort and gave a fight. However, he was badly defeated and had eventually to retreat to the fort. Soon, he left the fort for some safer place.

2. It was on his way to Jinji, Rajaram was encircled on the banks of the Tunga by the enemy forces under Sayyid Abdul Khan. Rajaram seems to have had a small force along with him. So, he could not personally encounter the enemy. But, he asked Rupaji Bhosale, a Maratha commander, to engage the enemy and himself escaped away in the direction of Jinji, with the help of Bahirji Ghorpade and other Maratha officials.

3. The siege of Jinji started in 1690 and dragged on till January 1698. No where in the history of the siege, Rajaram is found making sorties on the besieging Mughal army and, perhaps, it was not expected of him either. That job was entrusted to his able generals in the fort. However, after

the grand victories of Santaji and Dhanaji over the Mughal forces in Karnatak in December 1692 and the temporary retreat of the Mughals before Jinji, Rajaram himself set out on the expedition to subdue the Naik of Trichinopoly, who had helped the Mughals in the siege (March 1693). Perhaps, this was Rajaram's first military expedition. In this expedition, he was assisted by his renowned Commander-in-Chief, Santaji Ghorpade. The account of the Maratha attack on Trichinopoly is very short; but it explicitly mentions that the Marathas, under the leadership of Rajaram, succeeded in subduing the Naik who had to sue for peace. Rajaram granted it in April 1693.

4. Meanwhile, Bahirji Ghorpade and Yachappa Naik had rebelled against Rajaram and left his side. Soon, Santaji, too, followed suit and Rajaram had to appoint Dhanaji as senapati in his place. The political situation on the Maratha side went on worsening to the point of internecine war. At that time Rajaram himself got out of the fort of Jinji and fought a battle with Bahirji and Yachappa Naik. The outcome of the battle is not known to history.

5. It was in June 1696 Rajaram had to fight Santaji who had been removed from the post of senapati. The battle, which is already described, was fought at Aiwargudi, near Vitiddhachalam in Karnatak. Rajaram suffered a heavy defeat. Santaji, in fury of anger, killed Amritrao Nimbalkar and was reported to have imprisoned Rajaram, who was later on set free and escorted to Jinji by Santaji's men.

6. Rajaram returned to Maharashtra in 1698. Later on, in January 1699, he set out on the second Karnatak expedition.

The route and the purpose of the expedition are not known and he does not seem to have gone beyond the Tungbhadra in the south. He was back at Panhala in the first week of March, 1699. Thus, this expedition lasted for two months only. It seems that Rajaram once again wanted to divert the imperial forces to Karnatak. But the riddle as to why he returned to Panhala so early remains to be solved.

7. Rajaram's last expedition was that of the Khandesh-Berar in October 1699. This was the biggest expedition that he had ever led. He had with him his renowned generals such as Dhanaji, Dado Malhar and Nemaji Shinde in his army. However, he could not advance towards Khandesh-Berar, as he was hotly pursued and intercepted by Prince Bidar Bakht, who was later on joined by Zulfiqar Khan and Chin Qalich Khan. Many battles and skirmishes followed and in almost all of them the Maratha forces were defeated and compelled to beat a retreat. Rajaram had to abandon the expedition in the mid and return to the homeland in December 1699. Thus, his last expedition was a big failure.

From the above account of the chequered military career of Rajaram it is evident that he was not a general. His military activities could not stand in comparison with those of his father or even to those of his brother. The reasons why Rajaram could not make a good soldier, are not ambiguous and can clearly be found in his early life at Raigad and also in his physique. He probably did not receive military training, which a young prince should ordinarily do. And, hence, when the circumstances compelled him to accept the kingship of the Maratha State, he was naturally handicapped and had to depend more and more on

his generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji. Secondly, his bad health was equally responsible for his military failures. It is already observed how he could not sustain the hardship of the Khandesh-Berar expedition and died a little later at Sinhgad at the age of thirty only. Thus, lack of military training and weak physique were the two important factors which determined Rajaram's career as a general. However, the Maratha State was passing through a critical phase of its history and the Maratha king could not be expected to remain inactive in its life and death struggle. Though Rajaram was not a general, he had to discharge his duty as a king. His royal duties did include the organising and coordinating the war-efforts, and the framing of the military strategy. It may not be out of place to see here how Rajaram sincerely tried his best to discharge his above-mentioned duties :

1. Rajaram's move to relieve the Maratha land of the Mughal aggression and divert the Mughal forces to Karnatak, was highly successful. This he accomplished by his escape from Panhala to Jinji in Karnatak. This was a master-stroke of his military strategy, which naturally compelled the Emperor to send his huge forces to Karnatak to capture the Maratha king and his newly established capital.

2. On his arrival at Jinji Rajaram rallied the forces of the Hindu Naiks in Karnatak and organized their united front against the advancing Mughal forces. Though this united front could not withstand the Mughal aggression in Karnatak, the importance of Rajaram's war-efforts should not be underrated.

3. From Jinji Rajaram continued to direct military affairs in Maharashtra and encourage his people to fight out the enemy. For example, when the Emperor left the Poona region and came to Bijapur to supervise the military activities of his forces, Rajaram counteracting this move, asked his generals to open an offensive in the Bijapur region. He writes Chandajirao Patankar, a commander of 5000 in the Maratha army : "On learning the Swami's arrival in Karnatak, Aurangzeb has come from that (Poona) region to Bijapur and dispatched his forces against Jinji. He himself has once thought of coming to Jinji in person; but he has postponed his plan and stayed on there for some days. Presently, he has no big army with him. Under these circumstances the Swami has asked Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav to attack the region and the city of Bijapur with their big forces and devastate them. This would frighten Aurangzeb. Santaji and Dhanaji will soon set out on that expedition. You should accompany them and act according to their instructions. The enemy must be terrorised and if possible liquidated. You people should rally your forces and make a surprise attack on the camp of Aurangzeb at Bijapur and crush him."⁷¹ (April 13, 1690)

4. Rajaram's famous letter of 1691 to Hanmantrao Ghorpade has been already discussed. In the letter, Rajaram promises Hanmantrao Ghorpade and Krishnaji Ghorpade a grant of saramjam of 5 lakh and 1 lakh hons respectively. This

71. RSP, pp. 179-180

grant was to be made in five instalments in the following manner: Hanmant Rao was to receive a saramjam of 62,500 hons after the conquest of prant Raigad, 62,500 hons after the conquest of Bijapur, 62,500 hons after the conquest of Hyderabad, 62,500 hons after the conquest of Aurangabad and 2,50,000 hons after the conquest of Delhi. Krishnaji was also to receive the grant in a similar manner. (June 4, 1691)⁷²

It is known for certain that the Marathas in Rajaram's reign could not conquer Aurangabad and Hyderabad. Delhi was far away from their reach. Then how could the Maratha king dream of conquering Delhi, the imperial capital, while he himself was shut in a far off fort in Karnatak? Was it a mere wishful thinking or a well-thought-out plan? It looks like more of a wishful thinking than a well-thought-out plan. Nevertheless, it is certainly praise-worthy of Rajaram, who could in the midst of adversities, dream of the conquest of Delhi. At least, it can be contended that the Marathas had undoubtedly gained confidence that they were not to be conquered by the Mughals and, on the contrary, would conquer the Mughals in future. This was indeed an indication of the high spirits of the Marathas.

5. On his return from Karnatak to Maharashtra in 1698, Rajaram, though weak in physique seems to have been busy with the military activities till his death in 1700. The contemporary documents reveal that he toured in many hilly regions of the Maratha State and inspected the forts, thereby encouraging the garrisons to keep up the spirit of fighting.

In 1698, he asked his generals to launch attacks on the Mughal regions such as Aurangabad, Karwar, Burhanpur, Surat, and Ramnagar. They carried sword and fire into these regions and overawed the enemy.

6. Early in 1699, Rajaram himself led a military expedition into the Karnatak region, but soon returned to the homelands. Thereafter, he set out on the expedition of south Konkan, in which he inspected the thanas and forts in the region. Throughout the year 1699, he is found moving from fort to fort, probably making preparations for the defence of the land. He must have also worked for the future expedition of Khandesh-Berar, which he later on personally led in October 1699. It was a counter-stroke to the Emperor's campaign in the Maratha land. It is obvious that it was undertaken with an object of diverting the attention of the Emperor to the Khandesh-Berar region.

7. While the Khandesh-Berar expedition of Rajaram failed, his generals succeeded in the various expeditions in the other Mughal regions. His brave and enterprising general Krishna Savant, for the first time in the history of the Marathas, crossed the Nerbada and entered into Malwa, which was supposed to be the heart of the Mughal Empire. Krishna Savant boldly plundered the Dhamuni region and, thus, dismayed the Emperor, who at that time, set out on the campaign of conquering the Maratha forts. Krishna Savant's adventure was the glorious event of the reign of Rajaram. It was also an act of great bravery and military skill of the Marathas.

8. To the south, Rajaram sent Bahirji Ghorpade, who ravaged the region of Hubli. On his return from the Khandesh-

Derar expedition Rajaram dispatched an army under Dhanaji to attack the imperial camp at Brahmapuri (December 1699). The Maratha onslaught on the imperial camp is already discussed. The Marathas were reported to have had captured a Mughal princess. They also attacked the besieging Mughal army at the foot of Satara. Thus, in the last phase of Rajaram's reign, i.e. 1698 to 1700, the Marathas were waging unceasing warfare throughout the length and breadth of Maharashtra. And it should be specially noted that ceaseless war-fare was waged under the leadership of Rajaram.

It is true that Rajaram lacked the soldierly qualities of his father. But the above discussion would amply substantiate that he certainly had a skilfulness of compensating the deficiency in his personal bravery. There are several letters of Rajaram which were meant to inspire love for the Maratha State and Maharashtra-dharma in the hearts of his people. They, in turn, lived up to his expectations and successfully faced the Mughal aggression. As a leader of these Maratha people, Rajaram does deserve to share a considerable amount of credit of their victories in his region.

2) Rajaram as an Administrator

The great historians such as Jadunath Sarkar and G.S. Sardesai have hardly done any justice to Rajaram while evaluating his career as an administrator. They have passed devastating comments on his administration and painted him as 'a politically impotent' king. In the subsequent pages, it is attempted to refute their charges and show that Rajaram, though not an excellent administrator, was not politically that impotent as Sarkar and Sardesai think of.

In his 'History of Aurangzib, Vol. V', Sarkar writes, "Rajaram, in addition to being plunged into debauchery in the Karnatak, was naturally weak-minded. His position made him powerless. He was a king without an army or treasury of his own, or subjects under his undisputed rule. Cooped up in a fort, he had to be all things to all men and could not say No to anybody, nor enforce discipline among his servants. Any Maratha captain who could get together a thousand or even five hundred men of his own, could dictate terms of his obedience to his nominal king."⁷³

Sarkar's charge of the so-called debauchery of Rajaram seems to have been based on Martin's statement in his diary, regarding Rajaram's three to four marriages and the dancing girls brought to the court by Pralhad Niraji. But marrying three to four women and bringing dancing girls to the court could hardly been termed as debauchery. It was the usual practice of the day in India that a king should have many married women and mistresses or concubines. About the dancing girls Martin himself has stated that the Hindus do not believe any feast to be complete without them.

Sarkar's contention about Rajaram's army, treasury and subjects, is difficult to accept. Though Rajaram revived feudalism in his period, not all the army of the Marathas had become feudal in character. There are several references in the contemporary documents to the regular army maintained by the government of the Marathas. The big armies under Santaji

73. HA, V, pp. 156-157. Sardesai also holds the same view -

and Dhanaji were not feudal, nor did they have been granted any fiefs to maintain them. The posts and forts in the Maratha State were ordinarily garrisoned by the regular army of the government. Moreover, if Rajaram was a king without an army, how could he defend Jinji and other forts in Karnatak for eight long years? Were not forces in Karnatak and Maharashtra receiving his orders and conducting the war-fare as per them? No doubt, under the changed circumstances the military system of the Marathas had undergone some fundamental changes regarding regular payment in cash and strict discipline. However, the Maratha State did possess its regular army and Rajaram, being the head of the state, did exercise his command over it.

It is superfluous to mention that without a treasury, a government could not run. The administration both in Maharashtra and Karnatak could not be carried on without funds. It is already observed how Rajaram had tried to raise the funds for his administration in Karnatak. The Marathas had so many regions in their possession both in Maharashtra and Karnatak and they must have been collecting revenues from those regions. Moreover, the Maratha generals on the military expeditions in the enemy territories must have been sending huge amount to Jinji, which they used to exact from the enemy generals and subjects.

As to the question of Rajaram's subjects it is obvious that the people in the regions under the Maratha rule, were to be doubtlessly considered as his subjects.

Sarkar's another statement about the Maratha chieftains dictating the terms to Rajaram is a half-truth. No doubt, the

Maratha chieftains, even from the enemy's camp, flocked to the Jinji Court to seek favours of Rajaram who, in turn, liberally bestowed saranjams and titles upon them. Consequently, this led to the revival of feudalism. It was certainly a deviation from the policy of Shivaji the Great. But for Rajaram there seems to have no option left but to accept the course of such a deviation. In order to repel the Mughal aggression, Rajaram felt it necessary to bestow favours upon the Maratha chieftains. It was more true of the Maratha chieftains on the enemy side. Rajaram induced many of them to come over to the Maratha side and join the freedom struggle. Under the changed circumstances, Rajaram tried his utmost to exploit all the opportunities to build up a strong military front against the Mughals. It should be noted that he was, to a considerable extent, successful in his mission. For example, in 1690, he could induce three notable Maratha chieftains, Nemaji Shinde, Mankoji Pandhare and Nagoji Mane, to leave the Mughal camp before Jinji and join the Maratha side. Thus, he weakened the Mughal side and gave a blow to their prestige in Karnatak. In such cases, had these chieftains received some reward for their services, it could hardly be termed as dictating terms to the master.

Sarkar further writes, "Rajaram's political impotence is best illustrated by his duplication of offices and titles at a time when his kingdom was shrinking to nothing. He could not afford to disoblige any of his proud and selfish chiefs. If we can accept Chitnis's statements, public offices like Amatyaiship, the chief command etc., changed very frequently

during his short reign : a man was appointed to a high post one year, and next year some one else, more powerful or more influential, cojoked or coerced the king into giving him that very post, and the first incumbent was reinstated a year or two later ! To provide posts for all his most influential servants, the normal council of eight ministers was expanded by adding two more men, --- the Hakumat Panah and the Pratini-dhi. Another office of ministerial rank was the Rajajna, which though created by Shambhuji, rose to first rate importance in Rajaram's government ... The office of Senapati (Commander-in-Chief) was changed five times in Rajaram's short reign of eleven years...⁷⁴

It is already seen that the post of amatya was transferred only once. In 1690, Rajaram removed Narayan Raghunath from that post and conferred it upon Ramchandrapant. The Pant held that post till the death of Rajaram. As regards to the 'office' of Hukumat-panah, it should be noted that it was a title held by Ramchandrapant Amatya and not a separate office or post. The title of Rajajna was also held by Shankaraji Narayan Sachiv. With regard to the post of senapati, it is already seen that it had changed the hand for twice only, i.e., in 1693 and in 1696. Malhar Ramrao, on whose bakhar Sarkar has based his statements, is grossly inaccurate in his account of the formation of the pradhan-mandal of Rajaram. It is rather astounding that while evaluating the achievements of Rajaram, an eminent historian like Jadunath Sarkar took no

cognizance of the contemporary Marathi documents and based almost all his statements only on the bakhar of Malhar Ramrao.⁷⁵

G.S. Sardesai also speaks of Rajaram's incapability as a ruler. He says in his 'New History of the Marathas' :
 "There is not a single occasion recorded in his life on which Rajaram showed personal daring or capacity for government. When his mentor Pralhad Niraji died in 1694, Rajaram's affairs went rapidly on decline. That he could not handle Santaji properly or at least prevent his murder, is a sad commentary on his power of control."⁷⁶ In his Marathi Riyasat, he says, "It is unfortunate that Rajaram could not settle the quarrel between Santaji and Dhanaji in 1696. So long as Pralhad Niraji was alive, Rajaram's administration ran smoothly. But he died at Jinji in 1694 and consequently Rajaram's administration began deteriorating."⁷⁷

75. Incidentally, it may be interesting to point out that Sarkar had discarded Malhar Ramrao's bakhar as a useless document in his personal letter to a friend. He had passed a very adverse remark on the authenticity of the bakhar. He writes, "When tallied with the Persian sources and the English Factory Records, Chitnis's biography of Rajaram is trash and elusive". He further adds, "Malhar Ramrao had written a false history and hence Grant Duff was misled." - (SSR, p.77)

76. NHM, p.353

77. SR, p.72

Pralhad Niraji was undoubtedly an experienced and able administrator; and Rajaram did exploit his experience and ability to the benefit of the State. But he did not die in 1694, as Sardesai maintains. The recent publication of the documents reveals that he was alive well up to July 1696.⁷⁸ It should be noted here that Santaji met Rajaram at Jinji in April 1696 and fell out with him. So, it is evident that Pralhad Niraji was witness to this incident. Now, the question arises as to why Pralhad Niraji's statesmanship could not prevent this unfortunate event in the Court of Jinji. If Sardesai's contention is to be accepted, one would certainly blame Pralhad Niraji for his failure. However, neither Pralhad Niraji nor Rajaram was responsible for the above-mentioned event. It is already discussed at length how Santaji himself and not Rajaram was responsible for the fall of the former. It was Santaji's 'non-dutiful behaviour' and irreconcilable nature that was responsible for his quarrel with his master. Rajaram by nature seems to be pacific and judicious. However, it was not expected of him that he should bow down before his powerful general. After all he was a master and Santaji was his servant. It appears that it was not possible for Rajaram to patch up his differences with Santaji unless the former meekly submitted to the wishes of the latter. Rajaram did not submit and Santaji rebelled. With regard to the murder of Santaji, it should be recalled that he was murdered not by Rajaram's agent, but by Nagoji Mane, who seems to have acted as a Mughal agent. Nagoji

78. RSP, p.192

soon joined the Mughals and received the imperial favour.⁷⁹

It was not within the control of Rajaram to prevent Nagoji from such an ignoble act.

Before passing any judgement on the achievements of Rajaram as an administrator, a student of the Maratha History should first take into consideration the circumstances under which he was called upon to accept the responsibilities of the headship of the Maratha State. It may be recalled that he did not seem to have received any training either in the field of administration or in the art of war. It was indeed very kind of Sambhaji who had not put him to death for the conspiracies of Soyarabai, his mother and her partisans. In the reign of Sambhaji, nobody could probably have thought of his accidental capture and subsequent execution at the hands of the Mughals. Sambhaji was quite healthy, brave and enterprising, and hence, no body looked up to Rajaram as a prospective king of the Marathas. But destiny willed otherwise. In February 1689, Sambhaji was captured and subsequently executed; and the Maratha leaders, including the queen Yesubai, installed Rajaram as the Chhatrapati of the Marathas. Rajaram had become a king of that state whose boundaries were shrinking day by day and whose forts and regions were being lost before the advancing Mughal forces. The Maratha State was thus passing through a very critical phase of its history; and its young king of nineteen, almost inexperienced, was asked to lead his countrymen against the experienced general like the Emperor Aurangzeb and his mighty army. It should be admitted that the Marathas

79. Ibid., p.148

at that time, had lost their morale. Their officers and watandars, being panicstricken, were submitting hopelessly to the enemy forces. Rajaram had to leave Raigad and keep moving from fort to fort. But, soon, he found it impossible to stay on in Maharashtra and escaped away to Karnatak.

Secondly, for comprehending the administration of Rajaram, one has to examine the contemporary documents, especially his administrative letters. It appears that before his escape to Jinji, Rajaram was busy with making preparations for meeting the challenge of the unprecedented Mughal aggression in Maharashtra. On April 5, 1689, he left Raigad and came to Pratapgad. There he seems to have started consolidating his administration and mobilizing his forces. On April 12, he writes to Krishnaji Gole, a Maratha captain, "Abaji Sondeo has written about you that you are loyal to the Swami (Rajaram); and you would serve the state, if the command of 1,000 troops is bestowed upon you. So, the Swami is pleased to give you a letter of assurance that you would get the desired command. You should join us without any doubts in your mind and your services would be rewarded."⁸⁰ It is noticeable that Rajaram has written this letter only eight days after his departure from Raigad to Pratapgad.

The second letter is of April 20, 1689. On that day Rajaram had given a judgement regarding the khoti watan of Vitthal Narayan of monje Padli in prant Rajapur. In the reign of Sambhaji Kavi Kalash had confiscated the said watan. Rajaram now gave it back to its owner.⁸¹

80. AS, pp. 78-79

81. TKK, p.53

The third letter is of April 23, 1689 and it is a very interesting one. It is written to Bahirji Naik Ghatge, an officer in charge of jewellery at Raigad. Some baggage of Naro Raghunath Hanmante, the amatya, was being transported from Sangameshwar to Raigad. But it was robbed away by some miscreants at mauje Pedale in the region of Chiploon. The matter was reported to Rajaram at Pratapgad, who at once sent Khandoji Gade, an investigating officer, to the spot. Khandoji, not only investigated the case, but also succeeded in recovering the baggage which was later on brought to Pratapgad. Rajaram, perhaps out of curiosity, got it checked and found in it a beautiful golden pen. He seems to have had a temptation of retaining it for himself and he did so. But he did not want it free of charge. He asked Bahirji Naik at Raigad to hand over to Naro Raghunath gold equal to the weight of the pen.⁸² This letter may reveal Rajaram's prompt administrative actions and his sense of justice. However, it is not known whether he had sought permission of Naropant to retain the golden pen for himself in exchange for gold.

The forth letter, dated September 12, 1689, is written to Nagojirao Patankar and Chandajirao Patankar, the commanders in the Maratha army. At this time Rajaram was staying at Panhala and encouraging his people to fight the Mughal forces. The following letter shows how he, even in defeatist and terror-ridden atmosphere, could cheer up his people in their struggle against the enemy. Rajaram writes, "Received your

letter stating that you have led an expedition against the traitors in the Satara region and punished them. The Swami is pleased to know it. You are brave and trustworthy people. This is the State of the Marathas (Marhate Rajya). You should loyally serve the state and be proud of the Maharashtra dharma. This will bring welfare to all ... Beware of the enemy and be on the guard."⁸³

Still more important is Rajaram's another letter sent to the same Patankar brothers on September 29, 1689. It should be noted that Rajaram had left Panhala for Jinji on September 26. Thus, it is crystal clear that Rajaram had despatched this letter while he was on his way to Karnatak. It doubtlessly sheds light on Rajaram's involvement in the administration and warfare, his urge for freedom and above all his sincerity in discharging his duty as a king. The letter reads, "On the auspicious day, the Swami has set out on an expedition. In order to punish the traitors, he has entrusted the entire administration in Maharashtra to Ramohandra Pandit Sachiv. You should act in accordance with written or oral orders of the Pant. You are the old servants of the Swami and you have an urge for serving the state. Do the needful for the preservation of the State."⁸⁴


These are some of the important letters of the early period of Rajaram's reign. There are scores of such letters which throw light on his administration. But, so far, such letters were not scanned carefully and hence the injustice to

83. RSP, pp. 177-178

84. Ibid., p.176

Rajaram. It is needless here to take review of the entire administrative correspondence of Rajaram in the subsequent years of his reign. It is already observed how Rajaram got hold of the administration at Jinji; how he overcame the financial odds; how he mobilized the forces of the Naiks and tried to build up a united military front against the Mughals in Karnatak, and how he defended the fort of Jinji and managed to continue the warfare both in Maharashtra and Karnatak. Though the administration in Maharashtra was entrusted to Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan, Rajaram did issue orders from Jinji, regarding the administrative matters like the granting of inams and watans, decisions pertaining to them, conferring of titles and saramjams on the Maratha chieftains and the administrative directives to the chief administrators. One of such orders may illustrate Rajaram's capability as an administrator.

Dadaji Naras Prabhu was the deshkulkarni and gavkulkarni of tarf Rohidkhore and Welvandkhore. Baji Sarjerao Jedhe, a well-known figure in the Maratha history, was the deshmukh of tarf Rohidkhore. These two watandars were not having good relations with each other. Shankaraji Narayan, the sachiv, under whose jurisdiction the abovementioned tarfs fell, exploited their rivalry and forcibly misappropriated the watan of Dadaji. Later on, Dadaji approached Ramchandrapant and appealed to him to redress his grievance. The Pant reported this matter to Rajaram who as a result of which wrote a very scolding letter to Shankaraji Narayan. After pointing out how the innocent and loyal Dadaji was deprived of his watan, Rajaram reprimands



his minister, "It is absolutely improper for a man like you to grab away the watan of Dadaji, whose son, Krishnaji Prabhu, is presently serving the Chiranjeev (Shahu) in the Mughal captivity. Since the days of Thorale Rajashree Swami (Shivaji the Great) Dadaji has been serving the state with great zeal. Without caring for his life, he has performed great deeds of bravery. And hence, you shall hand over the said watan to Dadaji, before arrival of the Swami in the Maval region. If you don't comply with the order you would lose your prestige and post. In future also, you would be trapped into difficulties, because of such ill-doings of yours."⁸⁵

The above-cited select letters of Rajaram should reveal some of the aspects of his administration and administrative capability. Since the time he left Raigad in April 1689, he did not remain inactive : he tried his utmost to galvanize the war-efforts and activate the Marathas in defending the Maratha State. However, in 1689, the Mughal aggression could not be repulsed and he had to leave Maharashtra for Karnatak. Far off at Jinji, he is found appealing to the sense of liberty of his people in Maharashtra for continuing the warfare against the enemy.

In the capacity of the highest administrative authority in the Maratha State, he had displayed a high sense of duty and justice. His letter to Shankaraji Narayan, his minister, is quite vocal in this respect. As a minister, Shankaraji was holding a high post in the state and proved his mettle as an able administrator and a good general. Nevertheless,

Rajaram felt that nobody, howsoever great in his political or social status, could be above the law of the land. To Rajaram it appeared that an officer in charge of administration had a special responsibility of observing the rules of moral conduct. And hence, he had not only reprimanded Shankaraji for his misappropriation but also threatened him with dismissal from his post of sachivship. This deep sense of justice on the part of Rajaram must be considered as a brighter side of his administration, which has so far been overlooked by the well-known historians of the Maratha History.

In the context of Rajaram's administration, it would not be out of place to see how he tried to boost up the morale of his people against the Mughals. In his letter, dated September 22, 1689, to Malharji Bhandawalkar a Maratha chieftain, Rajaram says, "Malhar Dadaji, the senapanchsahashree (the commander of 5,000) has reported that you desire to serve the Swami loyally. If you behave loyally, you will have good prospects. This Rajya (state) of the Swami is of you Maratha people. When you unitedly strive hard (to defend the state) we care a fig for the enemy. This is the time for you to fight out the enemy. Hence you should join Malhar Dadaji with your force and serve the state."⁸⁶ It should be remembered that the letter is written when the Maratha State was attacked from almost all the directions by the Mughal forces. In other words, the state was in doldrums. Here it is seen Rajaram was trying hard to repel the enemy forces.

86. BISM-VI, 1838, p.92

The second letter of Rajaram, dated March 22, 1690, is written from Jinji to Baji Sarjerao Jedhe in Maharashtra. Rajaram writes, "After his arrival in Karnatak, the Swami could rally an army of 40,000 cavalry and 1,25,000 infantry. All the rebel chiefs in Karnatak have joined hands with us and our army is day by day increasing in number. The Swami has already sent Keso Trimal with 15,000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry to Maharashtra where an offensive will be ~~exp~~ opened soon. So you should be on the alert with your force and loyally serve the state ... We no more count the enemy. When you people resolve to defend the land, the enemy is bound to be vanquished. It is you people who have created the enemy. But, when you yourselves act with an urge to defend the State, we count Aurangzeb for nothing ... If God wills, victory is ours."⁸⁷ This letter of Rajaram is full of confidence and high spirits. Here, Rajaram has appealed to the Marathas to unite and fight out the enemy for the independence of their state. It is equally significant to note that he has brought home to the Maratha chiefs the importance of unity, i.e., unity of purpose and unity of action. A sentence in the above cited quoted letter, 'It is you people who have created the enemy' speaks volumes of the nature of the Maratha chiefs, especially the watandars like the deshmukhs. However, Rajaram does not wish to alienate them and goes on to urge them to defend the State with a sense of patriotism.

Another letter of Rajaram, dated September 9, 1691, is written to the Berads of the Purandar region. The fort of Purandar was in the possession of the Mughals. Shankaraji Narayan and Baji Sarjerao Jedhe had decided to capture it. Fortunately, the Berads and the Kolis were willing to assist them in the adventure. When this was reported to Rajaram at Jinji, he wrote letters of encouragement to the Berads and the Kolis. In his letter to the Berads, he writes : "Baji Sarjerao Jedhe, the deshmukh of Rohidkhore, has reported that you have been motivated to capture the fort of Purandar, provided you get the Swami's abhaypatra.⁸⁸ So here is the abhayapatra for you. You should spy on the enemy's movements and defence preparations at the fort and manoeuvre to capture it. Do not entertain any doubts in your mind. Rest assured that you would be rewarded for your services to the State, Shankaraji Pandit Sachiv is asked to give you all possible help. He would do the needful."⁸⁹ This letter reveals how even the low castes like the Berads, the Kolis etc. in the hilly regions of Maharashtra were filled with the sense of patriotism and how Rajaram was encouraging them to fight the enemy.

It is evident from the above discussion that Rajaram's job as a head of the state was not easy. He was required to accept the responsibilities of the headship of the state, when it was almost on the verge of extinction. After the execution of his brother at the hands of the enemy, he had to face colossal problems of the state, both political and

88. A letter of security.

89. MIS, XV, pp. 383-384

administrative. During his stay in Karnatak, he had to depend more and more on his ministers and high-ranking officers of the state in Maharashtra. In the light of these circumstances, a student of history should evaluate his career as an administrator. Rajaram's greatness lies in the fact that despite the heavy odds, he managed to run the administration of the state both in Maharashtra and Karnatak. So far, the historians have portrayed him as a 'nominal' and 'impotent' king. But how could a nominal king threaten his minister with dismissal from his post? How could an impotent king dismiss his most powerful ~~an~~ Commander-in-Chief twice? In the light of these queries, one would find Rajaram a different type of man, who has so far been ignored as the de jure ruler of the Marathas.

3) Rajaram as a Diplomat

Though Rajaram failed as a general, he compensated for it by manifesting the qualities of a shrewd diplomat. His first diplomatic stroke was to move into Karnatak and establish a new Maratha capital at Jinji, about 500 miles away from Maharashtra. With the coming of the Maratha king to Jinji, the centre of gravity of the political and military activities naturally shifted to the Madras Karnatak. After the fall of the Adilshahi and Quthshahi, the whole Deccan had become the legal possession of the Mughal Emperor who had already dispatched his officers to establish his sway over the Karnatak regions. But that process had not yet gathered momentum as the Emperor was busy in subjugating the Maratha power. During 1687 to 1689, he had concentrated all his attention on his

campaign in Maharashtra. In 1689, he achieved a crowning victory of capturing and executing the Maratha king. The forts and regions of the Marathas were speedily captured by the victorious Mughal forces and the Maratha power was almost extinguished. Under such circumstances, it was imperative for Rajaram to relieve the Maratha land of the Mughal aggression. This he did by way of his escape from Maharashtra to Jinji. As expected by him, the Emperor had to send his big army to Karnatak to capture him and that naturally resulted in loosening of the imperial grip upon the Maratha land. In the beginning the Emperor had hoped that Zulfiqar Khan could easily capture Jinji as he could capture Raigad. But that did not happen. Not only months but years passed by with no avail. The siege of Jinji was so lethargically operated that it not only consumed away immeasurable man-power and war-material of the Mughals, but damaged their great prestige also. Moreover, it resulted in the scattering of the Maratha forces all over the regions of Maharashtra and Karnatak and opening up of a second front in a far off region of Jinji.

Rajaram's second great diplomatic achievement was his securing the cooperation of the Naiks of Karnatak. It is already seen how he on his way to Jinji secured secret help of Chanamma, queen of Bidnur. This was his first diplomatic success in Karnatak and that too while he was passing through a great adversity of his life.

While in the fort of Jinji, Rajaram succeeded in gaining active support of the Naiks and Poligars in Karnatak and formed a united military and political front against the

Mughal invaders. The Mughal forces were not only capturing forts and regions of Karnatak, but also committing acts of sacrilege such as demolishing Hindu temples and raising mosques on their sites. This aggressive and unjust policy had provoked the religious feelings of the Hindus in general and their Naiks and Poligars in particular. Consequently, some of the Naiks, who had joined the imperial service after the fall of the Golconda State, had deserted it and begun mobilising their forces and public opinion in their respective regions. Rajaram saw a nice opportunity of exploiting the embittered feelings of the Hindus and their Naiks and Poligars and came forward as a champion of Hinduism and protector of the Hindus in the land of Karnatak. The people of Karnatak knew that Rajaram was a son of Shivaji the Great who had waged a relentless war against the Muslim dominance in the Deccan; and hence they now began to look upon him as a worthy son of the illustrious father and the leader of the Hindus in Karnatak.

How far Rajaram was successful in his efforts of mobilising them could be seen from his letter of 1690.⁹⁰ He was able to collect a big army of 1,65,000, which comprised the forces of the Naiks and Poligars in Karnatak. Though this combined army achieved some initial success in ousting the Mughal forces from the thanas and regions of the eastern Karnatak, they later failed miserably to check and repel the advance of the Mughal army led by Zulfiqar Khan into Karnatak. Reasons for this were two-fold. First, the jealousy of the

Naiks and Poligars amongst themselves spoiled their unity; secondly, the very report of the advance of the renowned Mughal general demoralized them. Perhaps they thought it wise to submit to the victorious Mughal general than to oppose him and perish. Only Shahaji II, the king of Tanjore and cousin-brother of Rajaram, was a sole exception to them. He courageously helped Rajaram throughout the siege of Jinji, thereby incurring the wrath of the Emperor. It seems that Rajaram was least responsible for breaking up of the united front; because he himself had laboured to form it. Hence it was not in his interest to destroy the same. Unfortunately the Naiks and Poligars did not rise above their rivalries and thus the splendid opportunity to organize the Hindus against invading Mughals was lost for ever.

An adequate source material is not available to know Rajaram's diplomatic and political relations with the Naiks in Karnatak. However, a few documents, throwing light on his relations with Sawai Saddshiv Naik, the chief of Sondha in the north-west Karnatak, have been published. It seems that during the last Mughal campaign against the Adilshahi the Naik had siezed the neighbouring Panchmahal region; however, after the fall of the Adilshahi, the Mughal suzerainty was established over the Naik who was obliged to pay certain amount for the captured region of Panchmahal. The region comprised 5 mahals, 4 land-forts and 4 hill-forts. By the middle of Rajaram's reign, the Marathas proved too dominant to be crushed by the Mughals and hence they adopted an aggressive policy which is vividly reflected in Rajaram's

letter of July 1696 to the Naik.⁹¹ This letter is a sort of an agreement between Rajaram and the Naik. In it Rajaram from his side assigns the Panchmahal region with 8 forts therein to the Naik on the condition that if the latter pays the former 22,200 hons annually. Rajaram further says, "Presently, you are paying (the tribute) to the Mughals. When we would destroy them, you would pay the said amount to us. Besides you should demarcate your sphere of activities in the Mughal territory and we will assign the same to you from our side on the stipulated payment. If the enemy attacks you, we will send our army to your help. We will remain loyal to our friendship."⁹² The letter reveals how Rajaram used to induce the Naiks of Karnatak to capture the Mughal territory and extend his protection to them in lieu of the payment of tribute from them.

It may not be out of place here to review Rajaram's diplomatic moves in his reign to make a peace with the Emperor and thereby bringing the war to an honourable end. Rajaram knew for certain that so long as the Emperor himself was present in the Deccan, the war would not cease. So in 1692, for the first time, he sent his envoys to Asad Khan and Prince Kambaksha in the Mughal camp before Jinji, with a view to concluding a peace-treaty. But his overture ended in a failure. The reasons are unknown to us. Again in 1694, while Zulfiqar Khan was away on the Tanjore expedition, Rajaram

91. SCS, III, pp. 85-86

92. Ibid.

started fresh negotiations with the Emperor himself.

Rajaram was prepared to serve the Emperor with 5000 horse in the Deccan, provided that the latter allowed the former to 'have the repossession of his own country.'

It seems that the Emperor was not prepared to hand over the conquered forts and regions to the Marathas. He could not tolerate the existence of the Maratha State even as a tributary one. Rajaram's move was most diplomatic. He prudently thought that once the Emperor returned to the north, he would throw the tributary obligations to winds and declare full independence of the Marathas. This was what his father had done while facing the disaster wrought by the campaign of Mirza Raja Jaising. However, the Emperor was still confident of his military strength to crush down the Maratha power and hence he declined the Maratha offer for peace.

Later on in August 1697, Rajaram once more tried to conclude peace with the Mughals. He sent a deputation of Raja Karno to the camp of Zulfiqar Khan. At that time, it seems, Rajaram wanted to keep his enemy engaged in the peace negotiations as the unity of the Marathas was endangered by the rebellion of Santaji and the subsequent internecine fighting amongst the Marathas. Moreover, Jinji was haunted by financial difficulties too. Hence Rajaram felt it necessary to delay the final onslaught of the Mughals on Jinji. Starting peace negotiations

was one of the ways to achieve this object. Soon Zulfiqar Khan sent Rajaram's peace proposals to the Emperor who spurned them away and asked the Khan to capture Jinji without any loss of time. All this took about three months during which Rajaram could make sufficient preparations for defending the fort.

After his safe return from Karnatak to Maharashtra Rajaram did his last effort for a peace treaty. But that too failed, perhaps owing to the same unyielding attitude of the Emperor. Thus Rajaram tried many times to conclude a treaty of peace and bring the disastrous war to an end. But the Emperor was reluctant to hand over the captured Maratha territory to Rajaram. Perhaps he was not prepared to trust the overtures of friendship and loyalty of the Marathas.

Rajaram's greatest achievement in the field of diplomacy was his secret understanding with Zulfiqar Khan who had come to the foot of Jinji to capture him. It should be noted that as long back as November 1691, Martin speaks of Rajaram's secret understanding with the Khan. He writes, "The greatest hope of Raja is his secret understanding with Zulfiqar who does not really wish to capture Jinji."⁹³ Bhimsen Saxena, who had been present in the siege operation, also confirms the view of Martin.⁹⁴ Thus, it is evident that since

93. MM-JS, p.241

94. TD, p.132

1691 Rajaram and the Khan had their mutual understanding that neither of them should take serious steps to end the siege. It was because of this understanding that in the beginning of 1692 the Khan had not sincerely tried to capture the fort, even though his army was already amply reinforced by Prince Kambaskha and Asad Khan.

A similar gesture was soon made by Rajaram when by the end of the year 1692, the renowned Mughal generals Ismail Khan Maka and Ali Mardan Khan were badly defeated and captured by the Marathas. It was a splendid opportunity for the Marathas to destroy the whole besieging army of the Mughals who were completely demoralized and helpless. The Maratha commander-in-chief Santaji wanted Rajaram not to lose the opportunity. At the same time Zulfiqar Khan was begging Rajaram to allow ~~the~~ his army to retreat to Wandiwash. It was rather difficult for Rajaram to avoid the temptation of destroying the enemy army under the command of the Prime-minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Mughal Empire. It was equally difficult for him to turn down the counsel of the brave Commander-in-Chief of the Maratha State. However, Rajaram chose to adhere to the secret friendship with Zulfiqar Khan and allowed the Mughal army to withdraw to Wandiwash. It was really a wise diplomatic act of Rajaram who by allowing the Mughal army to retreat

manifested his faithfulness to the friendship. Supposing that Rajaram could destroy the Mughal army, would it be an end of the Mughal-Maratha struggle? The Emperor could have easily sent another big army to rebesiege Jinji. So Rajaram saw no solution to the problem in the annihilation of the Mughal army under Zulfiqar Khan. He wanted to prolong the siege and was not interested in destroying the besieging army. So long as the siege continued and the fort remained uncaptured, the Marathas could continue the warfare in both the theatres of war, namely Maharashtra and Karnatak. Consequently they could move with their big armies and play havoc with the enemy in such a vast stretch of territory. It was, indeed, a military strategy as well as a political diplomacy of Rajaram.

It is interesting to note that while Rajaram was having a secret understanding with Zulfiqar Khan, he was playing a deep game with Prince Kambaksha in the Mughal camp. It is already seen that by the end of 1692, the Marathas were in high spirits and the Mughal camp before Jinji was a house divided. The Prince had alienated Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan who were in the chief command of the besieging army. Because of the Maratha victories in Karnatak, the line of communication between the besieging army and the imperial base camp had already been cut off and the rumours had spread in the Mughal camp that the Emperor had been dead. The whole camp had become panic-stricken. The Prince and both the Khans were worried about their future. Rajaram was in the know of all the happenings in the Mughal camp and shrewdly played upon the feelings of the Prince who in the heart of his hearts was coveting the

imperial throne. Had the Emperor really been dead, it was the most opportune moment for the Prince for proclaiming himself the Emperor of India. But how could he realize his ambition, unless he had strong military support? Under the circumstances he could not expect the Khans to side with him. Rajaram diplomatically siezed the opportunity and sprouted the false feelings of the Prince, by promising him a support in case of his proclamation as the Emperor of India or his coming over to the Maratha side. It appears that the Prince had first thought of joining the Marathas. But unfortunately for him, his plans leaked out and the prompt measures of the Khans of putting him under the arrest foiled his designs. Had the Prince succeeded in escaping away into the fort, the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Deccan would have taken altogether a different turn. The Prince would have served to be a strong political weapon in the hands of Rajaram.

However, the Prince's secret dealing did not seem to have adversely affected Rajaram's relations with Zulfiqar Khan, since the Khan too was passing through a crisis. It is already observed how he begged for the safe retreat of the Mughal army to Wandiwash; and how Rajaram allowed it to retreat. Rajaram's policy soon bore fruit, when after the Tanjore expedition, the Khan rebeseiged Jinji with his refreshed and well-provisioned army. At this time, Santaji and Dhanaji, with their armies, were far away in Maharashtra and Rajaram had no hope that they would come in time to the rescue of Jinji. Consequently his position in Jinji had developed very critical. Had the Khan really meant to capture the fort, he would have easily achieved that success. But he did not

vigorously prosecute the siege and Jinji was saved from the Mughal conquest. Now it was the Khan's turn to manifest faithfulness to the so-called friendship with Rajaram and which he did.

One can surmise what had secretly been agreed between Rajaram and Zulfiqar Khan. In this context, a letter of the English of Fort St. George, dated February 19, 1696, renders a very valuable clue to the so-called agreement. It reads that the Khan had sent emissaries to Rajaram for the division of Karnatak.⁹⁵ Both Rajaram and the Khan must have been eagerly waiting for the impending death of the Emperor. Rajaram knew for certain that the Mughal-Maratha struggle would not be abated so long as the Emperor was alive. Similarly, the Khan could visualize an imminent rivalry and scramble for the imperial throne amongst the Mughal Princes immediately after the death of the Emperor. As an ambitious general-politician he was, he was dreaming of carving out a new principality of his own in the Deccan with the help of the Marathas. Rajaram must have raised the hopes of the Khan who had been perhaps promised political and military help in case the latter revolted against the Mughal Empire. But unfortunately for the Khan the Emperor outlived not only Rajaram but also the ambitions of the Khan.

Rajaram's last noteworthy diplomatic achievement was his skilful escape from Jinji at the end of 1697. The Emperor was not at all in a mood to tolerate the laxity of Zulfiqar Khan in the siege operation and hence had sent him urgent orders

95. LFG, 1696, pp. 13-14

with a severe warning to capture the fort. Eventually the Khan had to take serious steps of capturing the fort and convey his inability to Rajaram who was urged to vacate the fort as early as possible. But Rajaram could not leave the fort at once as he had no big army with him in Karnatak. Moreover, he had with him his family whose safe-return journey he had to plan. Naturally it took some time for him to leave the fort. Meanwhile, the Khan marched to the foot of the fort and laid a siege to it. He had recently received a vast succour of money and war-materials and it was not at all difficult for him to capture the fort within a week or two. It is already discussed how he intentionally prolonged the siege operation for two months and post-poned the final attack till the escape of Rajaram from the fort. It can doubtlessly be contended that it was the Khan's secret co-operation which enabled Rajaram and his family to effect their escape from the fort. And thus it foiled the attempt of the Emperor to capture the Maratha royal family. This incidence may be considered as a high water-mark in the diplomatic history of Rajaram's reign.

To conclude the above discussion, it may be said that Rajaram was more successful as an administrator than as a general and that he was still more successful as a diplomat than as an administrator. It would be futile to search out the militant qualities in Rajaram, because he all the while lacked them. However his battles and expeditions should not be overlooked. Compared to the military records of the later Chhatrapatis, both of Satara and Kolhapur, Rajaram's military career appears to be more fair and active. As an administrator, he displayed a high sense of justice and as a diplomat he achieved a remarkable success in the field of diplomacy.

Chapter Nine

OBSERVATIONS

The History of the Marathas can be broadly divided into two parts, viz., the Shivshahi and the Peshawai. The Shivshahi may further be sub-divided into two parts : one, the reign of Shivaji the Great and the other the reigns of Sambhaji, Rajaram and Tarabai. The second part, ranging from 1680-1707, is known in the Maratha History as the War of Independence of the Marathas. The reign of Rajaram forms its vital core and has been considered as the most critical period of the Maratha History.

1) Sambhaji's Reign

1. In the north, Prince Akbar rebelled against his father, the Emperor Aurangzeb, but failed miserably in his attempt. Being frustrated, the Prince fled to the Deccan and sought shelter in the Maratha land. Sambhaji chivalrously welcomed him and thus challenged the imperial might and prestige of the Mughals.

Akbar's rebellion as well as his subsequent flight to the Deccan was a major event in the Indian history as it changed the course of the history of both the Mughals and the Marathas. Sambhaji's act infuriated the Emperor who, in consequence, personally marched with huge forces to the Deccan to punish his son, Akbar and his host Sambhaji. And thus started a long-drawn-out war of the Mughals in the Deccan which, in turn, has rightly been called the War of Independence of the Marathas.

2. Sambhaji was really an unfortunate king. It is because, first, he met with a cruel death at the hands of the Emperor;

secondly, he happened to be a son of Shivaji the Great, an illustrious personality in the Indian History. As it always happens in the case of sons of great men, a student of history, knowingly or unknowingly, is tempted to compare the deeds of Sambhaji with those of his father and eventually feels contempt for him. It is true that Sambhaji did not inherit all the great qualities of his father. But it is equally true that no other Chhatrapati in the Maratha History, except his father, could match his achievements as a king. The charge that he was cruel and wholly responsible for the destruction of the Maratha State is rather an exaggeration. Meting out corporal punishments or pronouncing death sentences to the traitors who conspired to depose him or poison him to death could hardly be termed as an act of cruelty. He performed his duties as a king and should, therefore, be exonerated from the above charge.

In the beginning of his Deccan campaign, the Emperor was over-confident that he would liquidate the Maratha State within a record period. But he soon realized that it was not an easy job to subjugate the Marathas in the hilly region. So he turned to conquer the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi, the two other powers in the Deccan. Here he was successful in accomplishing his objects in a record period. He vanquished those states, thereby removing two major checks on the imperial activities in the Deccan. Invigorated by the great victories, he again resumed his campaign against the Marathas, penetrating his armies from almost all sides of their state. However, the Marathas did not give in nor did they discontinue their resistance. It is only after the capture of their king that

the whole picture of the Mughal-Maratha struggle changed.

Sambhaji's greatness lies in his tiding over the internal conspiracies and fighting the mighty Mughal Emperor for nine years. His personality as a king further brightens when he is seen facing the Emperor and the death with a rare fearlessness and a high morale.

3. The capture of Sambhaji was a great triumph for the Mughals. It was in the series of the great victories in the Deccan viz., the conquests of the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi. As a general it was really a great achievement of Shaikh Nizam, the captor, who clandestinely negotiated the difficult passes of the hilly region of Panhala-Vishalgad and made a surprise attack on Sambhaji's party at Sangameshwar. After arresting both Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash, Shaikh Nizam so skilfully and speedily managed to escape with the captives to the imperial camp that no Maratha army could detect or intercept him. Militarily, it was a master-stroke which could demoralize the fighting Marathas and paralyse their martial activities for the time being. The news of Sambhaji's capture was so unexpected that it sent a shock-wave throughout the length and breadth of Maharashtra. The common Maratha was shocked by this unexpected and unforeseen calamity. He was grieved to learn that the king had become a captive to the enemy. The rank and file of the Marathas, filled with panic, lost their morale and were bewildered as if the state had been lost to the enemy.

4. Sambhaji was tortured and put to death in the imperial camp. His body was stuffed with straw and exhibited in the main

towns of the Deccan to the accompaniment of the beating of drums of victory. The Emperor did not wish to spare his life as he had been repenting for having spared the life of his father, Shivaji, at Agra. It was his logic that the execution of Sambhaji must be followed by the liquidation of his kingdom. Hence reason did not dawn upon him and he executed Sambhaji most cruelly. The subsequent history reveals that if it was his mistake to spare Shivaji's life at Agra, it was his blunder to take the life of his son in the Deccan.

2) Rajaram's Reign

1. After the capture of Sambhaji, a collective leadership of the Marathas seems to have sprung up in the Maratha land. It included Yesubai, Rajaram, Ramchandrapant, Pralhad Niraji, Shankaraji Narayan, Santaji, Dhanaji, Nilo Moreshwar, Khando Ballal and scores of other officials and commanders. Shahu was the heir-apparent. Yesubai could have installed him on the throne and acted herself as regent. But wisely enough, she did not resort to this move, since she did not wish to split the Maratha political front on the successional issue. Hers was really an act of selflessness and nobility of mind. Thus the elevation of Rajaram to kingship averted a rift amongst the Marathas and facilitated the creation of a united front to the enemy.

2. Now the Maratha leadership had to face the worst calamity in their history. However they decided not to surrender to the enemy but to fight out their aggression to the last. They counselled Rajaram to leave Raigad and continue the resistance to the enemy forces in the Maratha land. Yesubai and Shahu were to

remain at Raigad and they felt confident of defending the fort. This was a wise strategy. It would have served two purposes : first, in case of the fall of Raigad the whole royal family would not fall in the hands of the enemy; secondly, it would be easier for Rajaram to continue the warfare by being outside the capital than being inside it. It was also decided that if the Marathas were overpowered in Maharashtra, Rajaram should go to Karnatak, make Jinji his capital and regain the lost power.

3. Rajaram left the capital Raigad and kept on moving from fort to fort. Though inexperienced in the art of administration, he tirelessly engaged himself in organizing the war machinery. His able and astute officers like Pralhad Niraji, Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan and the brave generals like Santaji and Dhanaji left no stone unturned in their efforts to repel the Mughals and boost up the morale of their people. But all these efforts of the Maratha king and his officers were crippled under the heavy weight of the Mughal aggression. The victorious Mughal armies were penetrating from almost all directions and the Maratha regions along with forts were rapidly passing under the dominance. The Swarajya, founded by Shivaji the Great, was fast disappearing. Under these circumstances, Rajaram felt increasingly insecure to stay on any longer in Maharashtra, since he was pursued and besieged whenever he went. The life of the new king of the Marathas was in danger. So according to the plan agreed upon at Raigad, Rajaram, along with his prominent servants left Maharashtra for Jinji in Karnatak. Escaping away to Jinji was the only alternative left to him. It was the need of the hour. It was not the conspiracy of the high Brahmin officials such as Pralhad

Niraji and Ramchandrapant, as V.S. Bendrey has maintained; but a wise political move which fetched the Marathas many military and political advantages in the Deccan.

Like the escape of his father from Agra Rajaram's escape to Jinji is one of the critical events in the Maratha History. Both the escapes were fraught with dangers and risk to life. In both the instances the Maratha kings sought the escape from the clutches of the same enemy. Similarly at both the times the fate of the Maratha State was linked with the fate of the escapes. Had Shivaji's attempt of escape failed, the Maratha State would have suffered the disastrous consequence, probably the destruction. The same was more true in the case of Rajaram's escape. Shivaji was not detected in his escape, whereas Rajaram was. He was also assaulted more than once on his way to Jinji. However, ^{both} the escapes were successful and gave a serious blow to the prestige of the Mughals in the Deccan. Again both the escapes served as an impetus to the Marathas for reviving their lost power and prestige.

4. The condition of the Maratha State went on worsening day by day after Rajaram's flight to Karnatak. The officers and the watandars in the state were hopelessly and helplessly submitting themselves to the advancing forces of the Mughals. The Maratha resistance organised by the Maratha Government appeared to be of no avail. The climax of all this was the rumoured capture of Rajaram at Shimoga on his way to Jinji. So far the garrison of Raigad had been fortifying their morale. Now they lost all of it and surrendered themselves to the

Mughals. Yesubai and Shahu with many others were made prisoners of war and sent to the imperial camp. Here again there was no treachery either of Suryaji Pisal or of Ramchandrapant. The legend of Suryaji's opening the doors of the fort treacherously is a fake story and Bendrey's charge that Ramchandrapant as a part of the conspiracy against Yesubai did not send reinforcement to Raigad is also untenable.

Thus 1689 was the black year in the Maratha History. It witnessed a series of catastrophes befallen the Marathas and their spirit at the lowest ebb. Their king was captured and subsequently killed mercilessly; their queen along with the heir-apparent was made captive; their new king took to flight in order to save his life and sought refuge in a far away place like Jinji in Karnatak. Nearly all their forts and regions were conquered and their state almost disappeared from the political map of the Deccan. What lay before him, the Emperor thought, was a small job of capturing a few remaining forts in the hilly regions and consolidating the conquest in Maharashtra. To him, the end of the Deccan War had come in sight.

5. With the coming of Rajaram to Jinji, the Mughal-Maratha struggle took a new turn altogether. Since the conquests of the States of Bijapur and Golconda, the Mughal forces had been coming down to the south and busy at the work of establishing their rule. They were assisted by the commanders of the erstwhile states, who had joined the imperial service with the hope of getting better prospects. But soon they found that the Emperor was not prepared to trust their loyalty. Consequently, being disillusioned, they rebelled against him and joined Rajaram at Jinji. Even the

people, including their Naiks and Poligars, were in no mood to accept the Mughal rule. The Emperor had ordered the demolition of certain temples in Karnatak and that infuriated them. The Marathas and the people in Karnatak had now a common danger to face, i.e., the Mughal aggression on their land and religion. Rajaram was not slow in grasping the situation and provided them his leadership against the Mughals. He had one more feather in his cap. He could claim the legacy of his great father who had been looked upon by the people in Karnatak as a champion of Hinduism in the Deccan. The contemporary foreigners like the English also reviewed this impending struggle as 'the last struggle of the Hindoos against Aurangzeb.' Rajaram was also successful in rallying a big combined army of the Naiks and Poligars and had gained some initial military victories too. But the enthusiasm of the Naiks and Poligars was unfortunately proved to be a temporary phase only to be vanished when a big army under a renowned general Zulfiqar Khan appeared on the political scene of Karnatak. Almost all of them, except Shahaji of Tanjore, surrendered to Zulfiqar Khan and Rajaram was left alone to face the music. Thus, his efforts of building up a common united military and political front against the Mughals in the Deccan failed miserably.

6. A contemporary document notes : 'In 1689 the enemy captured a number of forts and regions and it appeared that the Maratha State almost ceased to exist.' The political situation in Maharashtra deteriorated to such an extent that the Marathas felt themselves demoralized and ruined. But the gloomy picture began to change. The spirit of independence and vengeance started

seizing them. The very next year, 1690, saw the process of the Maratha recovery. The Marathas not only organized themselves but fought the enemy bravely, defeating their generals and capturing back the lost territory with forts and posts. The capture of Sarja Khan, the defeat of Jannisar Khan and other exploits very well substantiated the growing dynamism of the Marathas. The glowing victory over Sarja Khan was soon followed by the conquests of Wai, Pratapgad, Rohida, Rajgad and Torana. These victories must have heightened the spirit of the Marathas. Khafi Khan says that a mere demonstration of the Marathas around Rajgad frightened its killedar, Abul Khair, to surrender and vacate the fort for them. When the panic-stricken Khan reached the imperial camp, the only thing the Emperor deemed fit was sending him on the holy pilgrimage to Mecca! When the news of the hair-breadth escape of Jannisar Khan and the rout of his army was broken to him in the court he exclaimed : 'There is nothing in the hands of man. Every thing is done by the will of God.'

These wonderful victories of the Marathas following the disaster in 1689 were possible because they united and fought the enemy with the spirit of independence and love for their land. While defeating the enemy forces and recapturing the forts and regions, they regained the lost confidence and morale. So much so that they began to boast : 'By the grace of God the state of affairs of our State is getting on well.' Thus God now seemed to have favoured the Marathas and forsaken the Mughals ! Furthermore, it is really interesting to see that the Marathas were not only confident of freeing their

land but also dreamt of conquering the territories of Bijapur, Bhaganagar, Aurangabad and even Delhi. This is revealed by a sanad by Rajaram, promising a saramjam of 5,00,000 hons to Hanmantrao Ghorpade. It is difficult to state as to whether it was a wishful thinking on the part of Rajaram or a definite policy laid down by him. But this was certainly a fact that the Marathas had repossessed the morale and were feeling confident of meeting the mighty challenge of the Mughal Emperor.

7. It was but natural that after the conquest of Raigad, the Emperor would send his most gallant general Zulfiqar Khan to invest Jinji in Karnatak and capture Rajaram who had sought refuge there. Jinji was a very strong fort which was destined to have a very important place in the history of the Marathas. By virtue of its central position, it could control the vast Karnatak territory from Arcot to Trichinopoly and from the eastern ghats to the eastern coast. With a big army under the experienced general the Emperor hoped to secure the fort in a short period. But that hope was soon shattered and the Emperor realized that the Khan alone could not subjugate the place like Jinji. So he dispatched Asad Khan, his Prime-minister and Kambaksha, his son to the foot of Jinji for effecting the speedy fall of the fort. The close cooperation and sincere efforts of the trio would have easily compelled Rajaram to surrender the fort. But their schismatic behaviour spoiled the whole game.

With the coming of Prince Kambaksha and Asad Khan, the siege operation was restarted with great vigour. But within

less than a year, the besieging army presented a poor picture of dissensions and feuds. The situation was aggravated when the big armies under Santaji and Dhanaji which were sent by Ramchandrapant to relieve the Mughal pressure on Jinji, arrived in Karnatak and accomplished great victories over the Mughals. The two renowned Mughal generals viz., Ismail Khan Makha and Alimardan Khan were defeated, captured and brought into the fort of Jinji as prisoners of war by Dhanaji and Santaji, respectively. As a result of the turbulent activities of the Marathas all the roads were blockaded and the line of communication cut off. The death of the Emperor was rumoured. Being frightened the prince sought the help of Rajaram who did not wish to lose such a golden opportunity of fishing in troubled waters. He played upon the feelings of the prince and clandestinely extended his cooperation in case he deserted the imperial side and joined the Marathas. It was the double-dealing policy of Rajaram who had had already a secret understanding with both the Khans. However, the design of the Prince was foiled by the prompt action of the Khans who caught him unawares and put him under arrest. All these internecine activities of the Mughal grandees ruined the imperial cause before Jinji. The Mughals lost their morale and subsequently all the discipline. A scarcity of food and fodder worsened the situation which compelled the Khans to beg of Rajaram to allow the Mughal army to beat a safe retreat to Wandiwash. A truce followed and Rajaram very diplomatically allowed the Khans to save themselves from utter disgrace and ruin. Rajaram had acted in gratitude. Because had Zulfiqar Khan tried

sincerely to capture Jinji, it would have been difficult for Rajaram to defend it for a long time.

8. The great victories of the Marathas had boosted up their morale to such an extent that in the early days of 1693, they issued a proclamation, declaring an assumption of the government of Hyderabad-Karnatak from Conjeveram to Cuddapah. Rajaram himself led a punitive expedition against the Naik of Trichinopoly and compelled him to sue for peace. However, it was unfortunate for the Marathas that while their prospects in Karnatak were growing bright, dissensions and rivalries amongst their generals spoiled the splendid opportunity of consolidating their grand victories over the Mughals. While Rajaram was out of Jinji on the Trichinopoly expedition, Bahirji Ghorpade and Yachappa Naik rebelled against him. Soon Santaji followed suit. Rajaram appointed Dhanaji in his place. What was more unfortunate was that the Maratha king had to fight against his own servants such as Bahirji. So, now it was Rajaram's turn to face a grave political and military situation. Zulfiqar Khan's well-provisioned army had reappeared at the foot of Jinji and was ready to launch a fresh and vigorous attack on the fort. The English observe that if the Mughals had prosecuted the siege in an earnest way they would have been the master of the fort in no time. But the Khan was more loyal to his friend than to his master. He acted in gratitude as Rajaram did a few months ago. Instead of attacking Jinji, he marched away to conquer the territory south of Jinji including Tanjore. Meanwhile, both the Ghorpade brothers were pacified and reinstated in their posts. Bahirji was with Rajaram, but both

Santaji and Dhanaji with their big armies were away in Maharashtra. Consequently throughout 1694 Rajaram's position at Jinji remained critical. The Khan soon returned from the successful expedition of Tanjore to the foot of Jinji, but somehow postponed the work of besieging the fort. There was certainly a mutual understanding between him and Rajaram that neither party should take any decisive step to end the siege till the death of the Emperor. The Khan's duplicity had not been liked by many of his colleagues including Yachappa who had joined the Mughals by then. Yachappa soon fell a prey to his deceitfulness.

9. It should be noted that soon after the execution of Yachappa, Zulfiqar Khan withdrew with his army from the foot of Jinji (October 1694) and did not return there till November, 1697. All these three years he went on roving from place to place, fighting with the Maratha forces. Sometimes he is found setting out on expeditions of raising funds or capturing forts in the Jinji region. But the mission viz., the conquest of Jinji for which he was dispatched by the Emperor remained ignored and unfulfilled.

All these three years witnessed ups and downs in the prospects of both the parties. In November 1695, Santaji bagged a grand victory over the renowned generals such as Qasim Khan, Khanazad Khan and Safshikan Khan. Qasim Khan committed suicide in order to avoid disgrace and the other Khans agreed to pay a huge ransom and escaped away with their lives. Exactly two months later, Santaji achieved another

great victory over the Mughals by slaying Himmat Khan, another brave commander, in a stiff battle. Defeat and humiliation of the Mughal armies at those two battles dealt a severe blow to the prestige and morale of the Mughals in Karnatak. In January 1696, the English note in their 'Diary and Consultation Book' : '..... during the present uncertain posture of things between them (Marathas) and Moors, the former by all advices appearing to be in all probability of being masters of all their country, unless the Mughals shall speedily send a very considerable army to the assistance of Zulphakar Cawn.....'

Thus the Maratha prospects were once again looking bright. But the rebellion of Santaji ruined them all. His great victories over the enemy seemed to have gone to his head in consequence of which he behaved insolently in the Maratha court at Jinji. Rajaram forthwith dismissed him from his post for his 'nondutiful behaviour' (June 1696) and Santaji turned a rebel. What followed this incident was most unfortunate for the Maratha State. In order to punish the recalcitrant general, Rajaram along with Dhanaji and Amritrao Nimbalkar marched upon him. In a battle at Aiwargudi, Rajaram was badly defeated and arrested, Dhanaji put to flight and Amritrao killed most mercilessly. Later, Santaji freed Rajaram and escorted him to Jinji. This is a most disgraceful incident in the history of Rajaram's reign. Santaji's nondutiful behaviour must be condemned, but his act of refraining from joining the enemy must be appreciated. Had he joined the imperial service, he would have amassed a good fortune for him and his family. Both the Ghorpade brothers were hot-

headed. They, at times, rebelled and fought against the Maratha king but did not entertain a thought of joining the enemy. Had Santaji been a crook, he could not have resisted a temptation of handing over the person of Rajaram to the Mughal Emperor and securing the high honours in the imperial court.

10. The internecine feud had crippled the Maratha activities in Karnatak. Rajaram himself was in financial difficulties. Under the circumstances, he thought it expedient to start negotiations for peace with the Mughals and seek some breathing time for the military preparations. In the course of negotiations, Zulfiqar Khan sent the peace proposals to the Emperor for his approval. However, the Emperor reproachfully spurned away the proposals and ordered the Khan to capture the fort without any further delay. It was the final warning to the Khan who had received secret intimation from his friends in the court that only an immediate capture of the fort could save him from disgrace. The Khan seems to have conveyed Rajaram the Emperor's severe warning and urged him to leave the fort for Maharashtra at an earlier and convenient time. It was in the interest of the Khan to save the life of Rajaram as the former was aspiring to carve out a separate principality of his own in the Deccan, with the help of the latter. Both had been waiting for the Emperor's death for a long time. But the Emperor frustrated them in their plans. Now the Khan saw no other way but to attack and capture Jinji.

In November 1697, Zulfiqar Khan reappeared at the foot of Jinji for the final show-down. He immediately laid a siege to the fort, but did not prosecute it vigorously. It was

pressed hard only after the escape of Rajaram from the fort i.e. on December 26. It is already discussed at length how the Khan played an important role in effecting the escape of Rajaram and his family. The Chhatrapati family was doubtlessly indebted to the Khan for his priceless help in the escape.

11. Rajaram had escaped to the fort of Vellore where the royal family joined him soon. It is noteworthy that the Khan did not pursue Rajaram immediately after the fall of Jinji. He waited till the arrival of the Maratha force at Vellore and later set out on the expedition of pursuing Rajaram who by that time had already left Vellore for Maharashtra.

Jinji and Vellore were the main centres of the Maratha administration in Karnatak. After the fall of Jinji almost all the Maratha regions, except Vellore, were conquered by the Mughals. Vellore withstood the Mughal attacks till August 1702.

12. While the Marathas under Rajaram were putting up a tough resistance to the aggressive Mughal army under Zulfiqar Khan, their counterparts in Maharashtra were waging a more intensive and extensive struggle with the Mughal forces scattered over the regions of their land. It is already observed that by 1690-91 the Marathas were fully recovered from the shock of the great disaster of 1689. They had reorganised their armies, rebuilt their administrative machinery and started defeating the Mughal forces and recapturing the lost regions with their forts. They had spread themselves over almost all the regions of Maharashtra and Karnatak and their generals like Santaji, Dhanaji, Shankaraji Narayan etc. were roving with big forces of 15,000 to 20,000 cavalry.

The subsequent period till the return of Bajaram from Jinji to Maharashtra (1691-1698) is characterised by the tireless struggle of the Maratha leaders against the Mughals and their military exploits. To name a few : The capture of Panhala by Parashuram Trimbak (1692); the struggle with Prince Muizzuddin at the foot of Panhala (1692-93); the capture of Sinhged by Nawaji Balkawade and Vithoji Karake (1693); Santaji's unceasing fighting with the Mughal commanders such as Himmat Khan (1693-94); his expedition in Khandesh (1695) and Shankaraji Narayan's struggle for Korigad and his expedition in the Nasik-Baglan region (1694-95).

13. The struggle for Panhala is illustrative of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in Maharashtra. Under the heavy wave of the aggression the fort was lost to the Mughals in 1689. In 1692 Parashuram Trimbak captured it back and restored the Maratha prestige in south Maharashtra. The Emperor was much grieved at the loss and immediately dispatched Prince Muizzuddin to besiege it. Accordingly, the Prince laid the siege in November 1692. Experienced officers like Lutfullah Khan and Safshikan Khan were in the besieging army. There was no dearth of any war material or any reinforcement. Yet he failed to take the fort. Sometimes he had to face heavy attacks of the Marathas who could successfully bring fresh troops and provisions into the fort. All the field-works and trenches were destroyed by the Marathas and all the efforts of the Prince proved to be a lost labour. Later in 1694, the Emperor appointed Prince Bidar Bakht in his place to conduct the siege. But he too failed to capture the fort. He half-

heartedly continued the siege till January 1696 when he was asked to go to Dasavapatam for the rescue of Himmat Khan. After the Prince's departure, Firuz Jang was in charge of the siege-operation at the foot of Panhala. But he could not achieve anything and the Mughals had to beat a disgraceful retreat.

The Marathas could capture the big forts like Panhala and Sinhgad by a single surprise night-attack, whereas the Mughals required huge forces, heavy artillery and a well-guarded line of communication for the siege operation which would sometimes continue for years together, and which many times led them to failure and disgrace.

14. A notable feature of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the said period, i.e., 1691 to 1698, was that the Marathas not only continued to fight the Mughal forces in their land but in retaliation started launching aggressive expeditions in the Mughal territories such as Nasik-Baglan, Khandesh, Berar, Raichur, Hubli-Dharwar and Karwar. Even the strategically important cities like Burhanpur were not spared. As the time passed, the Marathas became more and more aggressive and dominant in their military adventures.

15. The period also witnessed the mutual rivalries and consequent rebellion of some Maratha generals such as Santaji and Bahirji. Both rebelled first in 1693 but soon were pacified and brought back to the national side. But Santaji's second rebellion proved to be a most unfortunate one which ultimately led him to the fatal end. It seems that he himself was to a

large extent responsible for his fall and subsequent tragedy. Though he was an exceptionally brave soldier, temperamentally he was rash, discourteous and aggressive. It could not be expected from a king to submit mutely to the whims of such a general. By nature, Rajaram was gentle and judicious. But even he could not tolerate his 'non-dutiful' behaviour and dismissed him from the post of the Commander-in-Chief. It is already discussed in detail how Rajaram was not at all responsible for Santaji's murder. It was Nagoji Mane, a man of fickle loyalty and selfish nature, who did this most treacherous, ignoble and unsoldierly act.

16. The period from 1698 to 1700 is the last phase of the reign of Rajaram. In February 1698, Rajaram returned from Karnatak to Maharashtra. Ever since his return he appears to have been quite active and enterprising in his movements. During the period he had four expeditions to his credit. They are :

- (1) the expedition of north Konkan from April 1698 to May 1698;
- (2) the expedition of north Karnatak from November 1698 to March 1699;
- (3) the expedition of south Konkan from April 1699 to June 1699 and
- (4) the expedition of Khandesh-Berar from October 1699 to December 1699.

The purpose of the expeditions in north and south Konkan seems to be to inspect the forts, their defence preparations and the general administration in the respective regions; whereas the purpose of his north Karnatak and the Khandesh-Berar expeditions was to divert the imperial forces and relieve the Maratha land of the pressure of the Mughal aggression. A very scanty information is known about his north Karnatak expedition, however about his

Khandesh-Berar expedition some more details are available.

In this expedition Rajaram had a big army of 20,000 and the renowned generals such as Dhanaji, Nemaji and Khanderao Dabhade under him. With that much military strength he should have made a good dash at the enemy. But his forces were defeated again and again by Prince Bidar Bakht and other Mughal generals and he had to abandon the expedition in the mid. Thus it was a miserable failure. The plausible reason for this may be his ill-health which caused his death some two months later. From his active movements and ceaseless efforts during 1698-1700 in Maharashtra to face the Mughal aggression, it appears that had it not been for his ill-health and consequent untimely death, Rajaram would have vigorously continued the tough fight against the Emperor. And again from his activities during the aforesaid period it appears that Rajaram shut himself in the fort of Jinji for eight long years not because he was averse to conducting warfare, nor was he all the time afraid of the danger of being captured by the enemy, but because of the military strategy he and his ministers had adopted. It is substantiated by the fact that so long as Rajaram stayed at Jinji, the Emperor had to fight on the two military fronts viz., Maharashtra and Karnatak and the imperial power was drained of money, material and manpower by the long-drawn-out war in the environs of Jinji.

17. Ever since Rajaram's return from Jinji to Maharashtra, the Marathas had revitalized their activities. The presence of their king in Maharashtra had rejuvenated their spirit. Now they had become more bold and aggressive. Their generals such

as Shankaraji, Narayan, Dhanaji and Nemaji courageously led plundering expeditions in the Mughal regions like Aurangabad, Khandesh etc. and ravaged the villages and cities alike. The cities like Burhanpur and Nandurbar were attacked and plundered; and the Mughal officers were captured and fined. While the Marathas were thus roving in the Mughal domain, the Emperor set out on a grand campaign of conquering the Maratha hill-forts. Both the generals and the common soldiers of the Mughal army got tired of the prolonged warfare in the Deccan and were fed up with the undying desire of the Emperor to subdue the Maratha State. The Emperor also knew that the commanders in his army did not faithfully carry out his orders. Hence he himself undertook the campaign and left the imperial base at Brahmपुरi for subjugating the hill-forts wherein he rightly believed, lay the strength of the Maratha power. Rajaram's expedition which was a counter-action to the Emperor's campaign failed; but while returning he dispatched an army under Dhanaji to make an assault on the imperial camp at Brahmपुरi. It was a surprise attack. A letter by Parashuram Trimbak, giving the details of the attack, reveals that the Marathas captured a Mughal Princess along with several families of the high Mughal officials. They also took several hundred lamans (grain-carriers) captive. This, of course, was a great shock to the Emperor who was at that time besieging the fort of Satara.

18. The Emperor could easily secure Vasantgad and immediately moved with his huge army to the foot of Satara, the newly founded capital of the Marathas. From the side of the Emperor it was a all-out war. He had ordered his officials not to

leave any vestige of human habitation in the region between Panhala and Satara. The Marathas also accepted the challenge and continued the fight with a greater vigour. Soon after their attack on Brahmapuri, they marched upon the very imperial camp at the foot of Satara and ravaged its market place. The Mughals were not successful in repulsing the Maratha attack. Henceforth the imperial camps both at Brahmapuri and at the foot of Satara remained under the constant fear of the Maratha army. Many divisions of the Maratha armies had spread in the environs of Brahmapuri and Satara and were constantly fighting the Mughal forces. The besieging Mughal army at the foot of Satara was practically besieged by the Maratha field armies. So much so that the Emperor was compelled to send the foraging parties under the strong escort of the high nobles on the successive days. In the last days of Rajaram's reign, the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Satara region had grown more intensive. Many a time the Mughal petrolling parties were attacked and their officers were either killed or arrested. The parties bringing succour to the imperial camp at the foot of Satara were intercepted and plundered. And while the Marathas continued the fighting in the environs of both the imperial camps, one of their brave commanders, Krishna Savant, crossed the Narbada and entered the province of Malwa, the heart of the Mughal Empire. He plundered the Dhamuni region and returned home. This was a great event in Rajaram's reign, since for the first time in their history, the Marathas crossed the Narbada and led a military expedition into Malwa. Thus, while the Emperor was struggling hard to capture the hill-forts

in the Maratha land, the Marathas had entered the distant subha of Malwa, opening a new arena of the future Mughal-Maratha struggle.

19. The siege of Satara dragged on for four and half months and consumed many thousands of men and war-material worth lakhs of rupees. The star Satara expedition must have caused to realize the Emperor how it was a hard job for him to subjugate the hill-forts of the Marathas. The Mughals were disappointed to know that what appeared like walls of the fort were some hundred feet high rocks which could hardly be shaken by the heavy bombardment of artillery. Though it is true that the Maratha garrison was passing through a critical time and could not have held on for any longer, it was the Emperor and not the Marathas who first started negotiations. It was wise on the part of the Marathas that they responded to the Emperor's overture and handed over the fort to him. They were confident that they would recover the fort with much less efforts in the near future. The siege of Satara also revealed to the Marathas a *modus operandi* of the Emperor's campaign. It meant besieging the fort till it was captured. No matter how many months it took to accomplish the conquest! If the Emperor failed to capture the fort by assaults, the Mughal officers in the besieging army would clandestinely approach the Maratha authorities to hand over the fort to them in order to keep up the imperial prestige. Later history unfolds that the Marathas used to receive a handsome amount in some lakhs in exchange of a fort.

20. When the Marathas were waging their struggle against the

Mughals more vigorously than before, Rajaram met with his untimely end. Ever since the beginning of the War of Independence, it was a second great adversity befallen the Maratha people, the first being the death of Sambhaji in the Mughal camp. The death of Sambhaji was most shocking, unnatural and cruel, whereas that of Rajaram was natural and less shocking. Rajaram had been ill since the campaign of Khandesh and Berar. And hence the Marathas must have been somewhat psychologically prepared for his premature death. However, his death must have created a temporary void of leadership in the Maratha State. On the contrary, the Mughal prospects appeared to have been brightened. The Emperor thought that the death of Rajaram was a heaven-sent opportunity to destroy the Maratha State and that the two widows and the two minor sons of Rajaram could hardly continue the resistance to the Mughal armies.

3) Tarabai's Reign

1) After Rajaram's death, the War of Independence entered its third phase. Shivaji II, Rajaram's eldest son, was four. Naturally Tarabai, his mother, assumed the reins of the Maratha Government. It is really praise-worthy that the Maratha queen, a widow of twenty-five, set aside her personal sorrows and accepted the challenge of the Mughal aggression. She installed her son on the Maratha throne, secured loyalties of the ministers and generals, rallied the forces, organised the war machinery and thus prepared herself to face the Mughal invasion. The Emperor had already set out on the grand campaign of conquering the Maratha forts, and he continued his

mission in the reign of Tarabai too. In the first five years of his campaign he could capture Vasantgad, Satara, Parli, Panhala, Vishalgad, Sinhgad, Rajgad, Torana and many other forts of minor importance. This was really a good military achievement; but the price paid for it was quite heavy. Apart from the casualties inflicted by the Maratha counter-attacks on the besieging army, the losses of men and animals caused by rains, floods and hunger were terrible. Moreover, almost all the important forts were required to be besieged for months together and eventually they were to be secured by negotiations and the consequent monetary bargain. Khafi Khan aptly remarks that Torana was the only fort that was captured without any negotiations! However, all these negotiations were carried out in secrecy. And when in the end they were successful, the Mughals used to declare that the enemy had been frightened by the Mughal might and compelled to surrender the fort on the promise of safety to their lives. At night, the Marathas used to vacate the fort on the receipt of the stipulated amount. Next morning, the Mughal army used to attack and conquer the fort to the accompaniment of beating the drums and blowing the trumpets! The Marathas knew that they were capable of recovering the fort as soon as the Emperor turned his back.

2. The Marathas under the leadership and guidance of Tarabai continued the fighting against the Mughals in the Maratha land as well as in the Mughal domain. From 1702 onwards she adopted an aggressive policy. She began to penetrate the Maratha forces into the distant regions of Gujrat, Malwa, Telangana and Karnatak. The Maratha forces under Dhanaji,

Bahirji, Ranoji Ghorpade, Krishna Savant, Hanmantrao Nimbalkar, Shankaraji Narayan, Nemaji Shinde, Parsoji Bhosale and scores of other commanders played havoc in the above mentioned parts of the Mughal Empire : they attacked and plundered the cities like Burhanpur, Baroda, Ahmadabad, Golconda etc., defeated and captured the Mughal officers, levied the chauth on the Mughal subjects. Thus the Marathas had grown more aggressive and bold. So much so that while the Emperor was returning from the Wakinkheda campaign they made frequent attacks on his army and kept on hovering around it. They attacked his camp at Ahmadnagar also.

3. Ahmadnagar was the last stop of the Emperor's long-drawn-out Deccan campaign. Here he decided to encamp for the last days of his life. He had fully realized that his campaign had proved to be a total failure. Death was fast approaching him. He could foresee the imminent bloody fight for the imperial crown amongst his sons soon after his death. However, he did not suspend or end the campaign. He kept on fighting till his end in February 1707. Thus died the mighty Mughal Emperor, most frustrated and disillusioned.

IV) Analysis of the Mughal-Maratha Struggle

Thus the Mughal-Maratha struggle which has rightly been called the 'War of Independence of the Marathas' lasted for more than a quarter of a century. It started with the coming of the Mughal Emperor to the Deccan in 1681 and ended with his death in the very Deccan in 1707. The war has an important place in the Indian History since it had far-reaching consequences on

the mighty Mughal Empire as well as on the budding political power of the Marathas in India.

1. Nature of the War :

The war was a struggle between the Mughals, the imperialistic power and the Marathas, a small native power. Right from the days of Akbar the Great it was the policy of the Mughals to conquer and annex the Deccan territory, south of the Narbada. It was the Emperor Aurangzeb who fulfilled that century - old dream of the Mughals to vanquish the Deccan Sultanates and proclaim the imperial rule over the vast Deccan peninsula. In the annals of the Mughals it was a great military and political achievement indeed! It is also true that but for the opposition of the Marathas he would have been able to establish the Mughal rule right up to the shores of the Indian Ocean. It was the Marathas who came in his way and accepted his challenge of an all-out war.

While on the campaign against the Marathas, the Emperor often declared and described his fighting with the Marathas as a Jihad, a holy war of Islam against the infidels. It is a fact that he had an unflinching faith in Islam and as its staunch follower, he desired to propagate it throughout the length and breadth of the country. It is also true that he himself conferred honours on the converts in the open court, and that his forces often committed atrocities on the innocent and helpless Hindus. It is also equally true that he would have greatly rejoiced had all the Hindus been converted to Islam. But he knew that it was an impossible thing. He could foresee that a forcible proselytism of all the Hindus to Islam would bring a disaster to the Mughal Empire in his very lifetime. So the only alternative

he could choose was to adopt an anti-Hindu policy like the imposing of Jizya on the Hindus and ousting them from the civil service. Thus even though he was anxious to proclaim a real Jihad against the Hindus and destroy them or compel them to accept Islam, he could not accomplish it. However, he never ceased to give a cry of Jihad to his fellow-men. Consequently, it gave a religious colour to his Deccan campaign.

His real motive behind the Deccan campaign was to conquer more and more territory and extend the boundaries of the Empire to the tip of the peninsula. Jihad was the cover under which he wished to pursue his imperialistic policy. Thus without ignoring the sight of his intolerant anti-Hindu policy, it can be contended that his war with the Marathas was primarily and basically political in character.

From the side of the Marathas, the war was the struggle for the preservation of their state and its independence and for the protection of their religion and culture. Their great leader Shivaji had founded the state with the prime objective of protecting the people, their religion and culture from the onslaughts of the Islamic rulers. It was the state not of the Bhosale family alone but of the whole Maratha people. It was established with a view to freeing the people from the Muslim bondage and dominance of Islam and its culture. All these aims and objectives of the Marathas are very well defined in the contemporary records in one word --- the *Maharashtradharm* -- a term of wide comprehension. The *Maharashtradharm* comprises the founding and preserving of the Maratha State and protecting the Hindu religion and culture from the onslaughts of the Mlechhas.

Thus it was a political philosophy of the Marathas which enables us to comprehend the nature of their struggle with the Mughal Emperor.

It was but natural that the Marathas saw in the Mughal invasion the imminent destruction of their state and the consequent onslaughts on their religion and culture. Other Hindus in the Deccan also soon shared their feelings. It is already seen how in 1689-90 the Deasis in south Konkan and Naiks and Poligars in Karnatak felt that the Mughal aggression had endangered their religion and, hence, they joined the Marathas in their struggle against the Mughals. Even the English factors on the east coast in Karnatak viewed the then impending struggle of the Marathas as 'apparently the last struggle of the Hindoos against Aurangzeb.' Thus the war of the Marathas against the Emperor was at one and the same time both of political and religious nature. Their objectives in waging the war were interrelated, interlocked and hence inseparable.

In the end it should be noted that on the side the Mughals the Deccan War, waged for the gratification of imperialistic ambitions, was mainly the concern of the Emperor only. Nobody except him had any interest in his campaigns. On the side of the Marathas, however, it was the concern of all the Marathas. It was the people's war against the imperialistic aggressor.

2. Leadership in the War :

While the Mughals fought the war under one and the same leader viz. Aurangzeb, the Marathas fought it under three successive leaders viz. Sambhaji, Rajaram and Tarabai. There

was no change in the Mughal leadership while the Maratha leadership changed twice : first after the capture and killing of Sambhaji in 1689 and secondly after the death of Rajaram in 1700. The Mughal leadership was much older and experienced than the Maratha leadership. The Emperor was sixty-two when Sambhaji assumed the reins of power, seventy-one when Rajaram succeeded him and eighty-two when Tarabai began to rule in the name of her son, Shivaji II. All these Maratha leaders were quite young at their accession to the power : Sambhaji was twenty-four, Rajaram nineteen and Tarabai twenty-five.

As regards the experience of administration and warfare the Maratha leadership could not stand comparison to the Mughal leadership. The Emperor at the age of sixteen had received the rank of a Commander of 10,000 horse in the imperial army under his father, at the age of seventeen led a successful military campaign against the Bundelas and at the age of eighteen was bestowed with the viceroyalty of the Deccan. Since then he had enriched his life with invaluable lessons in the arts of administration and warfare. It should be noted that when he came down to the Deccan to conduct the warfare he had to his credit a long standing administrative and military experience of forty-six years ! The age of Sambhaji at that time fell much below this number !

By nature, the Emperor was a puritan and free from vice. He was extremely simple in his habits of dress, food and recreations. Temperamentally, he was calm, calculated and self-controlled. He was exceptionally industrious in administration as well as in warfare. He possessed a virtue of an unusual personal bravery and resoluteness. He could remain unwavering amidst the

the heavy misfortunes like the explosions in the siege-operation of Satara or the floods on the banks of the Man river. Few in history could match him in his virtue of perseverance and endurance. It was the Emperor Aurangzeb only who could wage a twenty six-year-war with the sons of the Sahyadris, though it proved to be unsuccessful, destructive and inglorious.

However, the Emperor failed as a statesman, as an administrator as well as a general. He failed to deliver the goods as a statesman because he treated his non-Islamic subjects as infidel and gave them a place like a second-rate citizenship in the administrative set-up of the Empire. His call for a Jihad coupled with his discriminatory social and religious policy alienated the people over whom he was anxious to rule as a sovereign. Though he himself was a painstaking administrator and a brave warrior, he proved to be unsuccessful as an ideal administrator and an intelligent general. It happened because of his dogged will and obstinate policy to carry on the Deccan warfare, his over-confidence about his abilities and his distrust in the loyalties and capabilities of his officers and even his sons. This naturally led him to concentrate all the administrative and military powers in his hands and to go into minute details of every department of administration and every activity of the warfare. Such a policy of too much interference killed the very initiative and spirit of the imperial officers and commanders.

As regards the Maratha leadership it had to pass through a great crisis in these years. Sambhaji had to fight not only the Mughals but the high state officers and his near

relations. It was a sad commentary on the Maratha solidarity while their state was being invaded by the enemy. The conspiracies of his own officers made Sambhaji to destruct them and depend more and more on the advice of Kavi Kalash, a person foreign to the Maratha land. Sambhaji does not seem to have been free from vice. But that alone should not determine his personality as a king. It appears that he did not fail in his prime duty of protecting the state. Almost unaided, he fought simultaneously with the Mughals, the Siddis and the Portuguese. He did his best, with whatever resources he had, to face the Mughal aggression bravely and continued to do so all through his reign. He was a brave soldier and did not entertain a thought of surrender to the Mughals. Had he not been captured at Sangameshwar, he would have certainly continued the fight with the Mughals' Emperor for many years to come. However, he was captured unawares in the midst of the warfare. This was the most unfortunate event in the Maratha History, for which Sambhaji was no less responsible. The fact that Shaikh Nizam made a surprise attack and arrested him unawares bears a testimony to his unpardonable negligence of the security arrangements and the intelligence department which had been considered immensely vital for the safety of the king.

Rajaram was inexperienced in the arts of administration and warfare and hence was greatly handicapped when called upon to shoulder the responsibility as a king. The capture and the execution of Sambhaji and the consequent disastrous events in Maharashtra obliged Rajaram to entrust the administration to his officers such as Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan and

Frahlad Niraji and the conducting of warfare to his generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji. It was this crisis coupled with Rajaram's physical weakness that gave rise to the ministers' prominence in the administration and the warfare. He reposed his full trust in them who in turn utilized their freedom of action to the best of their capability to repel the Mughal aggression. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising to know that he was a failure as a general. However, as an administrator, his regime did manifest a spirit of a benevolent ruler. Also in the field of diplomacy he out-classed his adversary i.e. the Emperor. He was the king who was loved by his people for his gentle and judicious nature. Above all, he possessed one great heritage : he was the son of Shivaji the Great whom the Marathas considered their great hero and under whom most of Rajaram's officers had received the rigorous training in administration and warfare.

The third successive leader of the Marathas was Tarabai, a young and courageous widow of twentyfive who boldly came forward to accept the Mughal challenge. She was hailed as the martial spirit incarnate in Maharashtra. Eventhough she did not personally lead an army against the Mughals, her military strategy carried the war into the enemy's camp. She adopted an aggressive policy and penetrated her forces into the distant Mughal subhas like Malwa and Gujrat, thereby striking a heavy blow to the prestige of the Mughal Empire. Her unceasing warfare for long seven years, her military organization and strategy and her skill of rightly controlling the warlike Maratha chieftains bear a testimony to her great qualities as a leader.

3. The Comparative Strength of the two Parties :

At the close of the Emperor's reign, his Empire comprised 21 subhas, having 33 crore and 25 lakh rupees as an income of the land revenue only. The expansion of his Empire reached its highest point when after vanquishing the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi, he as a heir-at-law to them declared his imperial rule over their territories. However, though in theory the whole Deccan belonged to him, the boundary of his empire in the Deccan was most uncertain and always shifting all through these years of the Deccan campaign. The effective control of the imperial administration does not seem to have established beyond the Tungabhadra in west Karnatak and the Kolerun in east Karnatak.

The strength of the Mughal army was quite big in number. Careri who visited the imperial camp at Brahmapuri in 1695 speaks of 3 lakh cavalry and 4 lakh infantry in the Empire, out of that total number of 7 lakhs, 60,000 army was engaged in the siege of Jinji; 12,000 army in the siege of Panhala and 1,60,000 army at Brahmapuri.

The vast army of the Mughals in the Deccan could draw upon the rich resources of the Empire, especially those from the subhas of Gujrat, Malwa and Bengal. We find frequent references in the Persian records to the vast succours of men, money and material coming from the north to the imperial armies in the Deccan, throughout the period of the Deccan campaign.

As regards the boundaries of the Maratha State both in Maharashtra and Karnatak they were never so much

fluctuating as they were in Rajaram's reign. However, a hilly strip of territory running on both the sides of the Sahyadris approximately from Rajmachi to Panhala in Maharashtra and places like Jinji, Vellore etc. in Karnatak seem to have been held by the Marathas. Compared to the huge extent of the Mughal Empire, the Maratha State appeared like a child before a giant. It is evident that the revenue income of such a state fell much below a crore.

As regards the Maratha army it is very difficult to render its exact number. In the beginning of Rajaram's reign, the Maratha army was disorganised. But soon the Maratha Government could rally big forces both in Maharashtra and Karnatak. From 1690 onwards we find Santaji and Dhanaji moving in the Deccan with big forces of 15,000 to 20,000 cavalry and an equal number of infantry. In Karnatak alone, the number of the Maratha cavalry exceeded one lakh. In December 1692, Martin notes in his diary that the Marathas had 1,50,000 horsemen standing in Karnatak. Moreover, the small and the big contingents roving over the vast stretch of territory from Gujrat to Tanjore, the garrisons holding the posts and forts both in Maharashtra and Karnatak and the crew on the sea would have made a substantial addition to the total number of the army, approximately 2 to 3 lakhs.

So it is clear from the above account that even though their state was small in size and weak in resources, the Marathas could successfully possess a big army. The state exchequer could hardly meet its expenses and hence the army itself explored its means and ways of raising the necessary funds for

its maintenance. The Maratha forces led expeditions in the enemy territory, plundered the regions, imposed levies on the populace, arrested the Mughal officers and fined them and thus tided over their financial difficulties. Traditionally, they generally set out on the campaign on the auspicious day of the Dasara and returned home before the onset of the Monsoon. However, in the reign of Rajaram they are found fighting the enemy and campaigning in the enemy territory for all the seasons of the year.

4. The Warfare Systems of the two parties :

The Mughal system of warfare was not suitable to the hilly regions of Maharashtra. The Mughals were known for their bravery in a pitched battle which the Marathas avoided purposefully. The Marathas could rally an army of one lakh and gave a pitched battle with the Emperor himself. But they did not resort to such a battle, not because they were afraid of the Emperor, but because it did not suit their system of warfare. They rightly considered the pitched battles risky and they would not take an unnecessary risk when they could make the enemy distressed and in the course of time perished by their guerilla warfare.

The Mughals had their own way of conducting the warfare. While on the campaign they not only carried artillery and heavy baggage but their wives and children also. This was very much true of the army under the Emperor himself, which while on the march looked like a moving city. It had every amenity provided for some lakh souls. No wonder such an army was very slow in

its movements. A glaring example of this was its march from Vishalgad to the foot of Panhala which took 38 days for them to journey the distance of 30 miles.

The Maratha system of warfare can best be described as a guerilla warfare. The Marathas had developed the system under Shivaji and its training under that great hero had enabled the Maratha commanders to face the Mughal aggression and make the system perfect in the decades that followed his death. The Marathas who were brought up in a spartan simplicity would give a lightning blow to the enemy and disappear quickly to their hiding bases in the hilly regions. Instead of a pitched battle, they preferably would resort to the surprise attacks, ambushes, cutting off the supplies, plundering and burning the region around the enemy camp, poisoning the water sources and similar other tactics. They would spy over every movement of the enemy and catch them unawares. Further, they would make a dash at the enemy, inflict heavy casualties on them, plunder whatever they could seize and carry and flee away without bothering to whom the victory belonged.

Often the commanders on both the sides are found to have played a hide and seek game. The Mughal commanders went on pursuing the pillaging Maratha bands till the former got exhausted and the later escaped as usual. Bhimsen Saxena says that while on the campaign of subduing the Marathas, Zulfigar Khan alone had to make the movements of 4,000 miles in the year 1699-1700 only; every time the Marathas were defeated and put to flight. It is true that the Marathas often fled from the battle-ground and the Mughals often pursued them hotly; but the

former knew that they would be victorious eventually and the latter was fighting a losing war.

Since their great victories over the Mughal forces in Karnatak by the end of 1692, the Marathas had adopted an aggressive policy and carried on an offensive warfare in the Mughal domain. They became more and more aggressive and militant as the years passed. At the end of Rajaram's reign, the Emperor himself led a campaign of conquering the Maratha forts. But the Marathas do not seem to have worried over or bothered much about him. No doubt, they kept on fighting and hovering round the Mughals who laid sieges to their forts; but at the same time as a retaliatory measure they penetrated their forces in the Mughal territories. When the Emperor was struggling hard to capture the Maratha forts, the Marathas were attacking and plundering the cities like Baroda, Burhanpur and Golconda. Similarly, they did not appear to have been impatient for the loss of a fort or two to the Emperor. They expected him to waste his campaigning season of every year in besieging and taking one or two forts, thus exhausting all his energy of the last years of his life in capturing some 10 - 15 forts at the most.

5. Failures of the two sides :

The Mughal-Maratha struggle witnessed many failures on both the sides. Here are some of their major failures :

The Failures of the Mughals :

1. The Mughals failed to liquidate the Maratha State and their power in the Deccan;
2. to capture Rajaram and his family either on

- their way to Jinji or during their stay in Karnatak or on their return journey to Maharashtra;
3. to build up an efficient and enduring administrative machinery in the territories of the erstwhile states of Bijapur and Golconda;
 4. to comprehend the geographical factor in the warfare in Maharashtra and consequently failed to conquer and hold the hilly regions of the Sahyadris;
 5. to check the growing encroachments of the Marathas on the rich provinces such as Gujrat and Malwa;
 6. to destroy an indomitable martial spirit of the Marathas and understand their quest for freedom;
 7. to inspire their army with some higher or noble ideals in the struggle and
 8. to make peace with the Marathas and return to the north with honour when they saw that the war was being lost.

Failures of the Marathas :

1. The Marathas failed to recapture the capital Raigad;
2. to hold the plain regions east of the Sahyadris and the important places like Poona, Karad, Khatav, Kolhapur etc;

3. to effect the release of their queen and their crown-prince from the Mughal captivity;
4. to rise above the personal rivalries;
5. to suppress their greedy instinct for watans;
6. to check the revival of feudalism and
7. to appreciate and execute the sound and wise principles of Shivaji's administration such as selection of the executives to the government offices purely on merit, cash payment to the army and confiscation of inams.

The failures of the Mughals as compared to those of the Marathas were more glaring and miserable and hence they are discussed under a separate head in the succeeding pages. Here follow some observations on the Maratha failures in short. As regards the failure No.1 the Marathas should have achieved this prestigious victory. In Rajaram's reign, they tried to recapture the fort, but failed. Certainly it was a military failure of the Marathas. As regards No.2 it was not possible for them to hold the places on the plains against the heavy onslaughts of the Mughals. Secondly, they rightly thought it wise unwise to hold such places at a heavy price. As regards No.3, it was rather very difficult for them to effect the escape of their queen and the crown-prince from the Mughal captivity as the Emperor himself took the royal captives whenever he went. The captives were lodged in a tent just beside the royal residence and they were under a strict surveillance. Moreover, the imperial camp had always been guarded by some thousand army from

the all possible enemy attacks. So, for all these failures the Marathas could be excused. But for the remaining failures (Nos. 4, 5 and 6) they could hardly be exonerated from the blame of neglecting the wise principles of the state laid down by Shivaji the Great.

6. Failures of the Mughals Analysed :

1. The Emperor was highly successful in vanquishing the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi in a record period. However, he failed to consolidate his success. He should have firmly established his sway over the vast Deccan territory which had fallen to him as a heir-at-law of the erstwhile states and afterwards turned to the conquest of the Maratha State. He entrusted the work of the consolidation to his commanders and himself set out in haste on the campaign against the Marathas. Consequently, the Mughal power failed to accommodate itself properly in the void created by the disappearance of two Sultanates in the Deccan and soon it became possible for the Marathas to penetrate their forces there.

2. The Emperor underrated the power of the Marathas. He deemed it essential to kill the captive king of the Marathas and thereby he hoped to eradicate their power. But he failed to visualize the repercussions of such a violent act. The Marathas were apparently subdued for a while, but they took it as an unforgivable insult to their royal family, state and race and vindicated their honour and freedom. The killing of the Maratha king was an act of blunder on the part of the Mughals in the Deccan War campaign.

3. It was the geographical ruggedness of the Maratha land, especially the ranges and valleys of the Sahyadris and the invincible forts situated on their tops that made the grand Mughal army helpless in its offensive movements. For the very reason, it had become a source of power and strength for the Marathas. The Emperor knew it well and hence toiled hard to conquer the hill-forts. But his expeditions in the Sahyadri regions consumed most of the strength and vigour of his army which was used to the plains and the pitched battles and inexperienced in the warfare in the hilly region. The Mughals scared at the sight of the high cliffs, the deep valleys, the dense forests, the pouring Monsoon rains and the flooded rash rivers. To them, the Sahyadri regions were a terrifying place on the earth. How could the Mughal grandees brought up in the imperial luxuries sustain the hardships in the campaign in such a region?

4. It was the system of the Maratha warfare which kept the Mughals perturbed, wearied and distressed. The Mughals found it very difficult to fight the Maratha guerillas and their ever-elusive pillaging bands. The Marathas were simple in their habits and active in their movements. They hardly carried heavy baggage and hence could make forced marches. The Emperor did succeed in capturing some of the hill-forts but at a very high price. Most of them were besieged and subsequently taken after negotiations. Some of them were actually bought from the Marathas. Such a warfare could hardly be useful in winning the final victory. The Marathas would recover the lost fort in a single night attack soon after the

Emperor left the region.

5. While the Emperor laid the sieges to the Maratha forts one after another, the Marathas opened an offensive in the Mughal domain and plundered the regions of Gujrat, Malwa, Telangana and Karnatak. They levied contributions on the Mughal subjects, arrested the Mughal officers and fined them. Sometimes, the Mughal officers used to handover the sum of contribution in the form of the chauth to the Maratha commanders in order to save their honour and maintain peace of their regions. The news of these Maratha activities not only blackened the image of the Emperor but demoralised the rank and file in the Mughal army in the Deccan.

6. Almost nobody except the Emperor himself had any interest in the war with the Marathas. His generals and even his sons, were so much wearied of the war that they all were eagerly waiting for his death. In the imperial army many were the pastmasters in shirking the responsibility and deceiving the Emperor. Many a time their rivalries had ruined the cause of the Mughals in the campaign. So there is some grain of truth when Khafi Khan says that it was the differences of opinions and lack of unity amongst the Mughal grandees that lengthened the period of the Deccan campaign. Furthermore, sometimes the collusions of the Emperor's generals and sons with the Marathas presented a poor picture of the Mughal solidarity and diplomacy and hence it eventually damaged the overall morale and efficiency of the Mughal army.

7. The war with the Marathas had become a prestige

issue for the Emperor. In the last phase of the war it was evident that he was losing it. However, he could not end it honourably. In Rajaram's reign it was the Marathas who made the overtures of peace, but the Emperor rejected them for all the time. But later in Tarabai's reign, it was the Emperor himself who tried to make peace and end the war. But now it was the turn of the Marathas to ignore the peace, overture and continue the war. Thus the Emperor had no alternative but to fight the war till his death. Had he declared a cease-fire unilaterally, withdrawn his forces and returned to Delhi, it would have been a serious blow to his prestige as the grand Mughal Emperor of India. The Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Pathans, the Jats, the Bundelas and many other races would have taken an advantage of his disgraceful retreat and it would have been an impossible job for him to repress their risings.

8. The Emperor refused to follow the legacy of Akbar the Great who had laid a sound foundation of the Mughal Empire on the universal principles of the welfare-state in India. Akbar rightly believed in a conciliatory policy towards the Hindus who constituted a major portion of his subject people under his rule. He knew that a shrewd ruler never alienates the ruled. His grand-father Babur was a foreigner in this country, but Akbar did not wish to remain a foreigner to the people of India. He was the son of India and was proud of that privilege. He did not want to rule over his subjects as an Islamic ruler nor did he wish to treat them as infidels. As a clever statesman he befriended the warlike people such as the Rajputs and exploited their energy for building up the Empire

and for its expansion. The policies of Emperor Aurangzeb contrasted sharply with those of his great grand-father. He took pride in calling himself a real Turk, a Muslim belonging to a superior and martial race, thereby looking down with contempt not only the Hindus but his fellow-Muslims in India. So it was no wonder that he adopted an anti-Hindu policy and gave a cry for a Jihad. Naturally he alienated the marital races like the Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Jats, the Bundelas etc. who otherwise would have been proved to be aiding and useful in preserving the Empire for the posterity.

9. After the extinction of the Adilshahi and the Qutbshahi, their peoples did not revolt against the aggressor. It was because they did not feel any allegiance to their rulers since they belonged to an alien religion and culture. For them the establishment of the Mughal rule was just a change in the regime. The case of the Marathas was altogether different. They had founded their own kingdom and enjoyed the fruit of freedom for a considerable period of the 17th century. Their king believed that the state had been created for the Maratha people and for their welfare. It was because of this feeling that the Marathas rose to the occasion when their king was captured and executed. The entire Maratha race was insulted and mortified. Hence, their rank and file rose in arms to vindicate their honour and freedom. The people from all walks of life like the Brahmins, the Patils, the Shetes, the Kunbis, the Chambhars, the Kumbhars, the Parits, the Nhavis, the Sonars, the Kolis, the Berads, the Mahars etc. joined in this unique struggle for independence. It was a people's war against the

imperialistic power. When the Maratha king was away at Jinji, it was these people who fought the enemy and saved their state. The exigency of the time gave rise to the spirited and brave bands of leaders and commanders like Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan, Parashuram Trimbak, Santaji, Dhanaji, Nemaji Shinde, Bahirji Ghorpade, Maloji Ghorpade, Vithoji Chavan, Hanmantrao Nimbalkar, Krishna Savant, Kanoji Angre and many others. These Maratha leaders and commanders rallied their forces and successfully tided over the crisis wrought by the Mughal invasion. They succeeded in their struggle because they had not forgotten the message of their great hero, Shivaji : to wage a struggle against the Yavanas for freeing their land and culture from their clutches. It was this teaching that inspired the people in their hour of crisis and saved them from political extinction and social enslavement. Thus the Marathas succeeded because they fought for preserving the high ideals of freedom and the Mughals failed because they fought for preserving their empire as a means of enslaving the people socially and politically.

V) Aftermaths of the Struggle

The Emperor Aurangzeb was the nucleus of the Mughal - Maratha struggle in the Deccan. So it was natural that the struggle ended with his death in February 1707. Subsequently the whole picture underwent a change and the course of history took a different turn altogether. The grand Deccan campaign of the Emperor, for which he had toiled hard for 26 years, at once became a thing of past. Hitherto almost all in the Mughal camp were anxiously waiting for his death, a crucial

event which was destined to end an era in the history of both the Mughals and the Marathas. And when it came as expected, everybody in the Mughal camp was seized by a million dollar question as to who would be the successor to the imperial throne. The successional struggle followed and it pulled out the centre of political gravity from the Deccan to the north. It also paralysed all belligerent movements of the Mughals in the Maratha land. Consequently, the Marathas under Tarabai could easily recover the important strongholds such as Sinhgad, Purandar, Panhala, Vishalgad, Satara and Parli, though the places on the plain like Junnar, Poona, Shirwal, Karad, Kolhapur etc. continued to remain in the Mughal possession for some time. The new Emperor Bahadurshah came down to the Deccan not to continue the mission of his father but to vanquish his rival brother Kambaksh. After Kambaksh's ruin he did not stay for long in the Deccan and soon left for the north. It should be noted that after Aurangzeb no Mughal Emperor could dare remain in the Deccan and continue the war with the Marathas. The danger of the Mughal invasion from the north vanished for ever. Now it was the turn of the Marathas to invade the Mughal suhbas and that of the Mughals to defend them against the Maratha invasion. Though the internecine war between Tarabai and Shahu weakened the Maratha solidarity for some time and the collective efforts for the expansion of the Maratha power received a temporary set-back the Marathas under Shahu and his able Peshwas succeeded in building up a dominant political and military power in the middle of the 18th century.

For almost a quarter of the century the Emperor

Aurangzeb had been wasting a huge man-power every year in the Deccan campaign. Thousands died on the battle-fields and in sieges while lakhs died of starvation and epidemic. The losses of animals and material ran into crores of rupees. Great resources of the northern subhas like the Panjab, Bengal, Gujrat etc., which would have otherwise been utilised for the stability and prosperity of the Empire, were drained off into the Deccan to wage a losing war with the Marathas. Besides this the war caused the loss of the Emperor's grip on the administration of the northern subhas and in consequence of which the belligerent races such as the Jats, the Rajputs, the Bundellas, and the Sikhs got an opportunity to rise in rebellion against the imperial power. The Jats in the regions south of Delhi posed a grave menace to the administration and trade in the north by their rebellion under the leadership of Rajaram and Churaman successively. The renowned generals like Khan-i-Jahan, Prince Bidar Bakht and others were despatched one after another but with no avail. In Rajputana, the spirited and brave Rajputs, whose cooperation in building up the Empire was cunningly achieved by Akbar the Great had been alienated by the Emperor. His oppressive and bigoted policy had compelled them, especially the Rathors of Marwar to wage a war of independence. From 1681 to 1707 with some occasional respites the Rathors fought valiantly under their beloved leaders Ajitsingh, the king of Marwar and Durgadas his loyal servant and eventually they succeeded in liberating their country. Thus the Emperor's policy towards the Rajputs failed miserably. The Rajputs could not be crushed nor could they be fully reconciled with the

the imperial interests. In Bundelkhand, the Bundela chief Chhatrasal rebelled against the imperial government in 1671 and with some respites continued to raid Malwa till 1705. He was occasionally joined in his enterprise by Durjan Sal, the Hada chief of Bundi and Nemaji Shinde, a gallant Maratha commander from Maharashtra. Eventually Chhatrasal succeeded in carving out an independent principality of his own in Bundelkhand. In the Panjab Guru Govind Singh organized his followers and spiritedly resisted the bigotry policy of the Emperor. While the Emperor was in the Deccan, the Sikhs fought many battles in the Panjab and kept the province in a constant turmoil. Other minor revolts such as the revolt of Pahar Singh Gaur and subsequently of his sons (1685-92), of Gopal Singh Chandrawat (1700-01) in Malwa, of Shova Singh (1696) and of Rahim Khan (1696-98) in Bengal and of Bukht Buland (1698) in Berar and Khandesh also disturbed peace of the respective provinces of the Empire. The Emperor's long absence in the Deccan emboldened these rebels in their anti-Mughal activities which in its turn led to the disintegration of the Empire.

However the Marathas' war with the Mughals caused a greater damage than any of the above mentioned risings in the Empire. Apart from the losses of men and material, the loss of the imperial prestige was more harmful in its farreaching consequences. The Marathas, a small power in the Sahyadris, had humiliated the mighty Mughal Emperor and his grand army to whom belonged a glorious record of the past as the conquerors of Hindustan! The Deccan conquest was as good as lost to them, and they were facing a danger of their territory north of the

Narbada being invaded by the Marathas ! And the Marathas were not the only people who had set out to disintegrate the Empire. There ^s were the Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Jats, the Bundelas and others who were equally interested in the process of the disintegration. This was a major consequence of the Emperor's failure in the Deccan campaign. On the side of the Marathas, the war was their struggle for life and death. The Mughals had thrust it upon them who had to undergo its severe sufferings and horrors. It appears from the contemporary records that almost every pargana of the Maratha State was sacked and made desolate and almost every fort taken or retaken by either of the parties one time or the other in the long period of the War of Independence. The constant warfare in the land had badly damaged the agriculture and ruined the trade and commerce. No Maratha family could escape the consequences of the war. Thousands of the Marathas must have died in hundreds of sieges, pursuits, skirmishes and battles. Almost every family must have given its brave young sons to the Maratha State for fighting 'the War of Independence.' Naturally the death of those heroes on the battlefields must have caused unimaginable sorrow and irreparable loss at almost every home in Maharashtra.

Apart from these usual losses, the War had brought about undesirable changes in the constitution of the Maratha State. First of all, it gave a severe blow to the Maratha monarchy. The war produced a perilous situation in the period of Rajaram which in turn weakened the cause of the Maratha monarchy. The process of the decline of the monarchy once started with its eclipse in Maharashtra in 1689 could not be

checked in the unprecedented circumstances. This naturally led to the rise of the pradhan-mandal to a dominant position in the Maratha State. Some of the ministers in the pradhan-mandal such as Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan were created sole administrators in Maharashtra. It was true that under the circumstances Rajaram had no alternative left except to accept the above-mentioned one. But it was equally true that it caused rapid decline of monarchical hold on the Maratha administration. This, coupled with the revival of feudalism by Rajaram, had far-reaching effects on the Maratha constitution. Feudal fiefs were liberally granted by him to the Maratha chieftains not only in the territory of the Marathas but in that of the Mughals also. The scores of the Maratha chieftains seized the opportunity, sought the favourable sanads, rallied their forces and started waging a ceaseless war on the enemy. Such a feudal policy gave rise to the prominent families in Maharashtra. The scores of the Maratha commanders distinguished themselves in the warfare and earned fame and fief both. This eventually enabled the Maratha Government to nullify all the attempts of the Emperor to destroy the Maratha power in the Deccan. But the Marathas had to pay a high price for such a success. It resulted in the decentralization of the administrative and the military systems of the Maratha State. It also laid the foundation of the future Maratha constitution which is generally known as 'the Maratha Confederacy' in the Peshwa period. Thus the so-called confederacy had its genesis in the War of Independence.

The civil-war between Tarabai and Shahu was in the direct sequence of the War of Independence and may be considered as its important aftermath. It revealed the weak-points of both the claimants to the Maratha throne and also the dominant position of the Maratha chieftains who naturally came forward to play a role of the king-maker. Both Tarabai and Shahu had to solicit their support for achieving the final victory. In fact, the release of Shahu was a great diplomatic stroke of the Mughals which resulted in a split in the Maratha royal family and consequently in the Maratha State. It appears that the Emperor Aurangzeb was not sure about such a civil-war in the Maratha camp after Shahu's release. Had he been so confident he would have certainly used the pawn in his hand. Here again he failed to comprehend the nature of the Marathas.

However, along with the evil consequences, the war had brought some advantages to the Marathas. The foremost of them was that the Marathas had regained the confidence of protecting and preserving their state founded by Shivaji the Great. They rightly believed that their state could not be destroyed by any power in India howsoever great it might be. It was because of this confidence coupled with their love for freedom that they could fight such a long war with such a mighty enemy. Secondly, the war offered the Marathas an excellent opportunity to develop their tactics in guerilla warfare. No doubt, the Marathas under Shivaji the Great had fought some important guerilla battles; but it was under Santaji and Dhanaji only that they could achieve perfectness in the art of guerilla warfare. The war produced a generation of great soldiers like Santaji, Dhanaji, Hindurao Ghorpade, Ranjoi Ghorpade, Vithoji

Chavan, Hanmantrao Nimbalkar, Nemaji Shinde and scores of others and they served as a source of great military potentiality for the expansion of the Maratha power in the future.

Thus ended the War of Independence of the Marathas which has been rightly considered as the glorious period of the Maratha history. It was the glorious period because the Marathas fought the 26 year war most gloriously. They had humiliated and defeated the mightiest power in India. The Emperor Aurangzeb had rushed to the Deccan to crush the tiny power of the Marathas but met with inglorious defeat at their hands. It was like Napoleon's defeat at the hands of the Spaniards. Like Napoleon, Aurangzeb lost the war because his was an imperialistic war. Similarly, like the Spaniards the Marathas won the war as theirs was a 'War of Independence.'

Chapter Ten

Evaluation of the Sources

The present work is based on the various sources in Marathi, Persian, English, Portuguese, French, Sanskrit and Kannada published upto 1975. The sequence of the sources is arranged according to their grade of genuineness, historical importance and their availability to the study. The unpublished sources, viz., the Akhabarat (Akhbars) are only a few and they are discussed under the category of the Persian sources. The Sanskrit and the Kannada sources are not many. Hence they are placed under the miscellaneous sources.

1) Marathi

1. Letters, Chronologies etc.

Maharashtra is fortunate enough to have produced eminent scholars in history who have dedicated their lives for the cause of the Maratha history. For the last hundred years the scores of Maratha researchers and students have brought to light a huge source material in Marathi. The institutions such as the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Poona, and the Rajwade Samshodhan Mandal, Dhulia, have played a vital role in publishing the source material which mainly consists of the government correspondence and the private records of the Maratha families. The government correspondence comprises the diplomatic and political letters (very few in number) and the administrative letters bearing the seals and endrovements of

the authorities such as the king, sarkarkuns and subhedars. The private records consist of the letters of individuals, private petitions, memoranda, choronologies, documents like mahajars relating to watans and inams etc. These are the original sources of the Maratha history. But the tragedy is that almost all the government correspondence (state records) of the Shivshahi period had been destroyed either by the enemy or by fire. Raigad and later on Vishalgad, Jinji and Satara were the seats of the government (capitals) and all of them were conquered one time or the other by the Mughals in the period of the War of Independence. The enemy not only plundered the treasures there but destroyed the state records also. Similarly the government correspondence at subhas and thanas and the records of the notable families had suffered the same fate. Fortunately, some of the records of these families had somehow been rescued and preserved by their descendants; and with the untiring efforts of the Marathi scholars they have been published in the following series of the source-books and journals :

1. Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane - V.K. Rajwade.
2. Aitihasek Sankirna Sahitya - BISM
(Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Poona).
3. Shivcharitra-sahitya - BISM
4. Trimasik - BISM
5. Varshik Itivrit - BISM
6. Sammelan-vrit - BISM
7. Itihas Ani Aitihasek - Satkaryottejak Sabha,
Dhulia.

8. Ramdas Ani Ramdasi - Rajwade Samshodhan Mandal, Dhulia.
9. Aithihasik Lekh-charcha - Rajwade Samshodhan Mandal.
10. Itihas-sangrah - D.B. Parasnis.

Besides these, there are some other notable source books as follow :

1. Pant Amatya Bavada Daftar, Vol. 1 - K.G. Sabnis.
2. Sanads & letters - P.V. Mawjee and D.B. Parasnis.
3. Tarabalkalin Kagadpatre, Vol. I - A.G. Pawar.
4. Aithihasik Sadhane - S.V. Avalaskar.
5. Records of the Shivaji Period - V.G. Khobrekar.
6. Aithihasik Patrayyavhar - G.S. Sardesai, K.P. Kulkarni & Y.M. Kale.
7. Peshave Daftar, Vol. XXXI - G.S. Sardesai, etc.

As the state archives of the Shivshahi period had already been destroyed long ago, a student of the Maratha history has to depend for the Marathi sources solely on the family records which contain, besides private correspondence, the letters from the government authorities to the heads of the families. These letters are of the following types : ainapatras, watanpatras, inampatras, vritinpatras, saramjampatras, kaulnamas, mahajars, thalpatras, takarirs, sakshanpatras etc. The letters of political importance are only a few in number, but they are of great value for constructing the history of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Rajaram period. The letters of Rajaram, Ramchandrapant and Shankaraji Narayan to the Maratha chieftains like Santaji, Dhanaji, Nagojirao Patankar, Chandajirao Patankar,

Hanmantrao Ghorpade, Nagoji Mane and others fall under this category. They throw light on the Marathas' administrative policy, their military movements and strategies, their strength and weakness and their rivalries and quarrels. One such letter of Rajaram to Hanmantrao Ghorpade reveals how the Marathas were aspiring not only for recapturing Raigad but conquering Bijapur, Hyderabad, Aurangabad and Delhi also. The letters of administrative importance such as watanpatras, inampatras, kaulnamas and the judicial documents like takarirs, mahajars etc. have been published in hundreds. Though they are of a little value to the political history, they shed light on the Marathas' administrative system and social conditions at the end of the 17th century.

Among the private records, shakawalis (chronologies) deserve a special mention. Two of them, viz., the Jedhe Shakawali and the Gadadhar Pralhad Shakawali, are useful for the study of Rajaram's reign. As regards the Rajaram period the first covers the period from 1689 to 1697 and the second from 1697 to 1700. Both are published in Shiv-charitranradeep (a BISM publication). The authors of Shakawalis record, besides the important happenings relating to their families, some noted and significant events relating to the Chhatrapati family and the Maratha State. Almost all the dates of their entries are accurate. The only drawback of the Shakawalis is that they give very brief information of historically important events. For example, the Jedhe Shakawali describes the Mughal conquest of the Maratha State in 1689 in only one sentence :

"that year the Mughals took all the forts (of the Marathas)."

However, howsoever brief the Shakawalis are in their notings they are of immense value to the Maratha history as they bring to light for the first time many important events with their dates. They are a first grade source of the Maratha history.

2. Bakhars

Bakhars are a source material of secondary importance. Unfortunately, there is not a single contemporary Bakhar on Rajaram and his reign. The only Bakhar on Rajaram and his reign is that of Malhar Ramrao Chitnis, written in 1810-12, thus evidently belonging to the later period. The Bakhar was first published in the issues of the Kavyetihās-sangrah in 1882. Malhar Ramrao might have referred to some contemporary documents available to him by virtue of his holding the office of Chitnis in the Court of Satara. But on account of his ignorance of the systematic study of history, he could not write a systematic biography of Rajaram. He has missed the chronological sequence and that led him to commit gross mistakes. For example, he has described the renewal of the siege of Jinji and its fall after the fall of Satara and Parli. He rarely gives the dates of the events, but they are seldom correct.

Nevertheless, the Chitnis Bakhar should not be discarded altogether as a useless document. It is useful for constructing the account of the political strategy adopted by the Maratha-mandal after Sambhaji's capture and Rajaram's subsequent journey to Jinji in 1689. It gives a graphic description of the Maratha guerilla warfare and also brings to light the names of many officers and sardars of Rajaram's time.

Among the other notable Bakhars, the Sabhasad Bakhar on Shivaji and the Chitnis Bakhar on Sambhaji may be mentioned. The Sabhasad Bakhar, though contemporaneous with Rajaram, is a biography of Shivaji and has stray references to the life of Rajaram, e.g., his birth, his marriage with Janakibai and Shivaji's forecasting about the happenings after his death. There are some references to Rajaram's early life in the Chitnis Bakhar on Sambhaji too.

Besides these, there are some other Bakhars, but they are of less importance with reference to the Rajaram period :

1. Maharashtra Mandalachi Bakhar : This Bakhar is written by some anonymous writer at the orders of Pratapsinh Maharaja in 1827. It was published in the Bharatvarsha. It renders some information regarding the historically important families like the Daffles, the Patankars, the Bhosales and others of the Rajaram period.
2. Pant Pratinidhichi Bakhar : This Bakhar is also prepared by an anonymous writer in 1844 (c). It is found at Tanjore by Govindrao Sarkhel. It narrates the rise of Parashurampant Pratinidhi and his family to power in the Maratha State; however it does not add much to the story of Rajaram's reign.

2) Persian

The Persian sources occupy a prominent place among the sources for the Maratha history. It is because first they belong to a party which actually participated in the Deccan War; secondly a majority of them are contemporary either in the form of the newsletters or in the form of chronicles written by the contemporary writers. Fortunately Maharashtra possesses

eminent scholars such as Shri G.H. Khare and Shri Setu Madhavrao Pagdi who have rendered many of the important sources into Marathi. The Persian source material may broadly be divided under three main categories : 1. Akhabarat, 2. Letters of the Mughal officers and 3. Chronicles of Aurangzeb's reign.

1. Akhabarat

The Akhabarat (news-letters) of the Mughal Court are an invaluable primary source of the Mughal history as well as of the Maratha history. They contain the reports on the daily transactions at the court. The Akhabarat were first shown to the Emperor who used to edit them and then they were released for the consumption of the courtiers. The representatives of the Mughal chieftains at the Court used to copy them down and dispatch them to their masters. So far the researchers have found such Akhabarat only in the archives of the Jaipur chieftain at Amber and Jaipur. Originally the Jaipur Records contained more than 6,000 Akhabarat of Aurangzeb's reign. But the late Mr. Tod, a well-known historian of Rajasthan, secured 3,300 of them and presented them to the Royal Asiatic Society, London. The remaining Akhabarat about 3,100 in number are brought from Amber and Jaipur to Bikaner and preserved there in the Rajasthan State Archives.

The late Sir Jadunath Sarkar was successful in procuring the copies of the Akhabarat in the Royal Asiatic Society, London as well as those in the Jaipur archives. He profusely utilized them while writing his 'History of Aurangzib' in 5 volumes. The volume V, which contains many references to the unpublished Akhabarat, has proved very much useful for the

present work. Similarly his research paper on the 'Siege of Satara', based on the Akhabarat from his collections and published in the Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, Vol. IV, has also been referred to.

Maharaj Kumar Dr. Raghubir Singh of Sitaman, a disciple of Jadunath Sarkar and well-known scholar of history, has secured the copies of all the Akhabarat from 'the Jadunath Sarkar Collections,' now in the National Library at Calcutta and preserved them at his library at Sitaman. Through the good offices of Shri S.M. Garge following Akhabarat from the collections of Dr. Raghubir Singh have been procured and utilized for the present work :

1. Akhabarat from the Jaipur Records. (English version) Julusi Years - 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44.
2. Akhabarat from the Royal Asiatic Society, London. (Hindi version).
Julusi Years : 39, 40, 42, 43, 44.

The Maharashtra Rajya Sahitya Ani Sanskriti Mandal, Bombay, has procured the photo-stat copies of the Akhabarat from the Jadunath Sarkar Collections: which have been preserved at the Mandal's library. Shri Pagdi has translated some of them into Marathi and published them in the journal of the Bharatiya Itihas Ani Sanskriti, Bombay :

<u>Issue No.</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
43	4 Jan. 1693	3 Dec. 1693
44	25 May, 1685	25 Dec. 1692
45	6 March, 1694	21 July 1694
47	April 1694	19 June 1694

The Akhabarat not only record the daily transactions of the Mughal Court but contain the reports of the spies and extracts from the news-letters sent to the court by the Mughal officers posted at different places in the empire. It is true that they sometimes record rumours also. It is also true that they give a partial picture of the Mughal-Maratha struggle. However in spite of these drawbacks they are an indispensable source to the history of Rajaram's period. They shed ample light on the numerous skirmishes and battles between the Mughals and the Marathas. They are of a great help in knowing the activities of both the sides, especially those of Santaji and Dhanaji. It must be admitted that the Akhabarat have bridged up many of the gaps in the chequered political and military history of the Maratha State.

2. Letters of the Mughal Officers

A) Letters of Lutfullah Khan

Lutfullah Khan was the son of Sadullah Khan, the Prime-minister of the Emperor Shah Jahan and a renowned commander of Aurangzeb. During the Deccan campaign Lutfullah Khan had been the thanedar of Khatav and Aklooj in 1690 and 1692, respectively. He had been assisting Prince Muizuddin during the siege of Panhala in 1693-94. While actively engaged in the struggle with the Marathas he had written letters to the high dignitaries like the Emperor, the Princes, the Prime-minister and the generals of the Mughals. The letters, 39 in number, are rendered into Marathi and published by Shri S.M. Pagdi under the title of Lutfullah Khanachi Patre in his book Mogal-Maratha Sangharsha. Their period ranges from

1690 to 1700 approximately. Some of them are the reports of his fightings with the Marathas. Almost every time he was reported to have won victory over the Maratha generals such as Santaji and Dhanaji and that too, when the latter were having a big army like "Ten thousand cavalry and innumerable foot." His reports consist of too much exaggerations regarding the Mughal bravery and the Maratha casualties. Minus such exaggerations, his letters render a valuable information about the movements and activities of Santaji, Dhanaji, Ramchandrapant and other Maratha commanders in the western Maharashtra and the Mughal siege of Panhala under Prince Muizuddin.

B) Letters of Matabar Khan

Matabar Khan was an enterprising Mughal commander in the Deccan. He could manage to capture many of the renowned Maratha hill-forts in the Nasik-Baglan region in 1688-89 and thereby earned a good reputation at the Mughal Court. His Secretary Jethmal wrote an account of his achievements under the title of Karnama which embodied some hundred letters of his. They covered the period from 1688 to 1705. Shri S.M. Pagdi has translated these letters into Marathi and published them in a Marathi journal the Navbharat in 1969. The letters are useful to know the Khan's enterprise of capturing the Maratha forts in the regions of Baglan and the north Konkan and the Maratha activities in the regions of Khandesh and Aurangabad.

C) Khutute Shivaji

Khutute Shivaji means the letters of Shivaji. However, the title is rather misleading, since the collection of the letters also contains the letters of Aurangzeb, Akbar, Shahu and

other important personalities. Four letters concerning the Rajaram period have also been incorporated into the collection. They are the letters of Zulfiqar Khan and Aurangzeb. The Khan's letters throw light on his expedition against Raigad and the subsequent escape of Rajaram from that fort.

D) Aitihasik Farsi Sahitya

Under the auspices of the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal Shri G.H. Khare has been publishing the Persian documents with their Marathi versions in the series of the Aitihasik Farsi Sahitya. Its Vols. I, II & III contain some few documents of the Rajaram period, especially the farmans and orders of the Mughal officers. Some of them are useful for the Jezia collection in the Deccan.

2. Chronicles of Aurangzeb's Reign

A) Masire Alamgiri

This is a well-known biography of the Emperor Aurangzeb, written by Saki Mustaid Khan, his loyal servant. It also gives a complete official history of the Emperor's reign (1658-1707). Saki Mustaid Khan had held in succession the various posts like the mushrif and munshi in the Mughal administration and thus had been a constant follower of the court for about 40 years. He had an opportunity to study the character of the Emperor and observe the happenings in the imperial camp. He himself has noted in his book that he has narrated the events to some of which he was an eye-witness and which were reported to him by the high and trust-worthy officials of the Emperor. The state papers were also thrown open to him, and from the book it appears that he has utilized them considerably. He completed his book

in 1710, only within three years after the Emperor's death. The book was first published in the series of Bibliotheca Indica by the Royal Asiatic society of Bengal in 1871. Sir Jadunath Sarkar translated it into English and published it in the same series in 1947. Some portion of the book, concerning the Shivaji period, is translated into Marathi by Shri G.H. Khare. The remaining portion, from 1681 to 1707, is rendered into Marathi by Shri S.M. Pagdi under the title of Marathe Va Aurangzeb. For the present work, the versions of both Sarkar and Pagdi have been utilized.

Though the chapters of the book generally contain the dry lists of official appointments and changes and bare summaries of events in succession, they provide valuable data for the names of the persons and places, the dates of events and their proper sequence and administrative regulations of the Mughal empire. The work is also of undoubted value for knowing the various small and big expeditions of the Mughals, their fightings with the Marathas and the movements of the armies of both the parties. It throws a floodlight on the following events of the Mughal-Maratha War :

1. The capture and execution of Sambhaji.
2. Rajaram's hazardous journey to Jinji.
3. The siege of Jinji : the rivalries among the Mughal grandees.
4. Santaji's grand victory over Qasim Khan, Khanjad Khan etc.
5. The siege and fall of Satara.

B) Tarikhe Dilkasha : (Nuskha-1-Dilkasha)

This is an autobiography of Bhimsen Saxena, a Kayastha Hindu from UP, whose father, Raghunandandas, was in the imperial service at Aurangabad. Bhimsen also entered the imperial service and successively served as mushrif under Daud Khan Quraishi and Maharaja Jaswant Singh. Later he accepted a post of private secretary of Rao Dalpat Bundela, a gallant commander of the Mughals and accompanied his master in various expeditions in Maharashtra and Karnatak. Bhimsen spent almost 50 years of his life in the Deccan from 1638 to 1707 and witnessed the reigns of four Maratha rulers from Shivaji to Tarabai. He started writing the book when he was in the siege operation before Panhala in 1700 and completed it by 1709 when he retired to Gwalior for permanent residence.

A condensed version of Tarikhe Dilkasha was published by Capt. Jonathan Scott, a British scholar, in his History of the Deccan in 1794. Scott's version was rendered into Marathi under the title of Bundelyanchi Bakhar by P.N. Patwardhan in 1920. Sir Jadunath Sarkar procured for his study the photo stat copies of the work from the India Office Library and the British Museum, London. From these copies Shri S.M. Pagdi has prepared a Marathi version under the title Mogal Ani Marathe in 1963. For the present work the same has been used as a source.

Though Tarikhe Dilkasha is termed as an autobiography of Bhimsen Saxena, it is in fact, a history of Aurangzeb's reign. The work is based on the author's extensive and accurate personal observations and at many places it renders unique information about important persons and events of the time.

His fifty-year-stay in the Deccan and friendship with high commanders and officials of the Mughal army enabled him to know correct official information and many state secrets. He himself had been a witness to many significant events in the Mughal camps, sieges, expeditions and battles. He had accompanied Rao Dalpat Bundela to the foot of Jinji and stayed in Karnatak till the fall of the fort. He gives minute details of the siege operation, the rivalries between Prince Kam Baksha and Zulfiqar Khan, the attacks of the Marathas, the disgraceful retreat of the Mughals to Wandiwash and the capture of the fort. He also provides a detailed account of Zulfiqar Khan's movements in Maharashtra in 1699-1700. But above all, the most significant contribution of Dhimsen to the history of Aurangzeb's reign is his accurate observations about the social and economic consequences of the Mughal-Maratha struggle in the Deccan. No other Persian historian has dealt with the subject as Dhimsen has done.

C) Muntakhabullubab-I-Muhamadshahi :
(Tarikhe Khafi Khan)

This is a history of the Mughal Empire written by Khafi Khan in 1734. The book is also popularly known as Tarikhe Khafi Khan. The author was also in the imperial service and had actively participated in the Mughal expeditions in Maharashtra. When the Mughals captured Raigad in 1689, Khafi Khan was appointed an assistant to the faujdar of the fort. He stayed on in Maharashtra for some years and then left for Ahmedabad in Gujrat. At the time of Aurangzeb's death he seems to have been in the service under Murad Khan at Ahmedabad. His history was first published in two volumes by the Royal Asiatic

Society of Bengal in 1874. The second volume contains a detailed history of Aurangzeb's reign. Its condensed translation into English was published by H.M. Elliot and John Dowson in their famous series, The History of India as told by its own Historians. A portion of the book, concerning the reign of Shivaji is translated into Marathi by Shri G.H. Khare. The Marathi translation of the remaining portion (1681-1718) is done by Shri S.M. Pagdi under the title Marathyanche Swatantrya Yuddha. For the present work the versions by both Elliot - Dowson and Pagdi have been utilized.

Khafi Khan had seen and observed the Maratha land, its people and their warfare. Besides that, he had collected reports on the important events in the Deccan campaign from the trustworthy officials in the Mughal service. He gives interesting descriptions of the great victories of Santaji over the Mughal commanders, the siege operation of Jinji, the rivalries between Prince Kam Baksha and Zulfiqar Khan and the Emperor's campaign of conquering the hill-forts of ^{the} Marathas. He uses abusive language while addressing the Maratha kings and generals. He calls Santaji a dirty dog. However, it must be admitted that it is Khafi Khan only who has vividly described Santaji's exploits and praised him sky-high for them. Unlike Saki Mustaid Khan Khafi Khan possessed a magnanimity of heart of admitting the bravery of the enemy.

D) Futuhate Alamgiri

Futuhate Alamgiri is a chronicle of Aurangzeb's reign, written by Iswardas Nagar, a Nagar Brahmin from Gujrat and a clerk under Shaikh-ul-Islam, the Chief Qazi of the Empire,

who used to accompany the Emperor in the camp and court alike. Naturally Iswardas could collect the true reports of the important events from the high officials in the court. The Chief Qazi resigned in 1683, but Iswardas seems to have stayed on in the imperial camp upto 1686. Later he was appointed as revenue collector under Shujaet Khan, the Governor of Gujrat. He played a role of mediator between Durgadas Rathod and the Emperor and safely escorted the daughter and the son of Prince Akbar to the imperial camp at Brahmapuri in 1696 and 1698 respectively. He completed the history in 1730. He narrates the account of Aurangzeb's reign upto 1700. Sir Jadunath Sarkar procured a photo-stat copy of the manuscript from the British Museum, London. Shri S.M. Pagdi has translated some portion of it concerning the Maratha history and published it in his book, Mogal-Maratha Sangharsh in 1964.

While writing his history, Iswardas sporadically relates the incidents relating to the Marathas such as the defeat of Shaikh Nizam by Santaji, the escape of Rajaram to Jinji, the fall of Raigad, the capture of Sarja Khan (1689-90) and the capture of Satara (1700). He does not give dates of any events, nor does he arrange the events in a proper sequence. He describes Rajaram's escape to Jinji in details but commits errors of facts and places. However, his narration about the fall of Raigad, the defeat of Shaikh Nizam and the capture of Sarja Khan may be considered more reliable and useful.

It is true that the Persian writers are often prone to exaggerations. They had very high regards for the Emperor and hence sometimes did nauseating flattery of the patron. They

generally give partial accounts of the fightings with the Marathas : almost every time the Marathas were reported to have been defeated with a great loss. They believed in the Mughals' so-called right of conquering the Deccan. To them the Marathas were rebellious and mischievous people. While on the Deccan campaign they never lost sight of this egoistic thought. However, inspite of these defects, the Persian sources are of immense value for the Maratha history. But for them the history of the War of Independence of the Marathas would have been fragmentary, incomplete and hence less inspiring. Some of them render very valuable and often unique information about many historically important persons and events of the time. It is because of them that hundreds of movements of both the sides have come to light and that has enabled us to construct the account of every year of the war. The majority of the sources are contemporary. The value of the Akhabarat as a primary source can hardly be doubted. The letters of the Mughal officers are equally important as they were written by the men on the spot. The chronicles like those of Saki Mustaid Khan and Bhimsen are the first-grade sources as they have been based on the personal experiences, state papers and the reports of the trustworthy friends of the chroniclers.

3) English

The English sources mainly consist of the Factory Records. They are the proceedings of the East India Company's factories like those at Bombay, Surat, Karwar, Madras (Fort St. George) etc. They consist of the Diaries and Consultations of the Councils of these factories. They also include the

factory's correspondence, viz., Letters and Despatches, among themselves and with the Home authorities in England. The following Factory Records have been utilized for the present work:

A) Records of Fort St. George :

1. Diary And Consultation Book : Years : 1688, 1689, 1690, 1691, 1692, 1693, 1694, 1695, 1696, 1697, 1698, 1699.
2. Despatches From England : Years : 1686 to 1692 & 1696 to 1699.
3. Fort St. David Consultations : Years : 1696, 1697 & 1698.
4. Letters From Fort St. George : Years : 1688, 1689, 1693-94, 1694, 1696, 1697, 1698 & 1699.
5. Public Despatches to England : Years : 1694 - 1696.

B) Factory Records from the India Office Library, London :

The records of other factories like Bombay, Surat, Karwar etc. have been procured by Shri V.S. Bendrey from the India Office Library, London and their copies in bound volumes have been preserved in the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Poona. He has also published almost all important extracts of the records related to the Rajaram period in his recently published book, Shri Chhatrapati Rajaram Maharaj. Similarly, Shri W.S. Desai's book Bombay And the Marathas also embodies some valuable extracts from the unpublished Factory Records at the India Office Library.

In their proceedings, the English have noted and discussed the various reports on the activities of the native powers around them. They used to receive reports from their envoys

and spies in the camps of the native powers and also from the agents and native merchants with whom they had commercial contacts. Since their main object in India was trade the prospects of which largely depended upon peace in the country, the English were anxious to know the latest political developments in their respective regions. For the very reason, they are found taking note of and discussing the victories and defeats of the Mughals and Marathas in Diary and Consultation Books and Letters and Despatches. As foreign traders they were, they had no emotional attachment to any of the native powers. Hence their accounts of the events in the Deccan are more impartial and trustworthy. Sometimes they received incorrect reports which they unfailingly corrected in their next correspondence. Thus, the Factory Records render valuable information regarding the activities of the Mughals and the Marathas, the movements of their armies, their relative strength, their financial conditions, their diplomatic moves and secret understandings and the rivalries and quarrels amongst the highest officers of each side. For example, it is only from the Factory Records that we come to know a secret pact between Rajaram and Zulfiqar Khan about the division of Karnatak; or a nondutiful behaviour of Santaji in the Maratha Court.

4) Portuguese

The Portuguese source material regarding the Maratha history is found in abundance at the Goa Archives at Panaji. They are also preserved at the archives of Lisbon and Paris. The Portuguese were the first among the Europeans to discover India by sea-route and first to colonize the Indian territory.

They, being the immediate neighbour of the Marathas, came into their close contact which continued to exist till the end of the Maratha power.

The Portuguese source material mainly consists of a huge correspondence of the Portuguese Viceroy and his Advisory Council with the king of Portugal, the Portuguese governors and other officers in India, the native kings and their officers and the chieftains. It also includes the proceedings of the Advisory Council.

Dr. A.B. de Braganza Pereira and Dr. Pandurangrao Pissurlenkar, the two distinguished scholars of the Portuguese history, have made a great contribution to the publication of the Portuguese source material. The late Dr. Pereira, the Director of the Goa Archives, published the Portuguese source material in ten volumes under the title Arquivo Portugues Oriental in 1938-39. His successor, the late Dr. Pissurlenkar also published the Portuguese source material in his Assentos do Conselho do Estado (five volumes) and Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India. Besides these, Dr. Pissurlenkar wrote a book Portugueses e Maratas in Portuguese. It is a collection of his articles based on the original Portuguese source material. It throws light on the relations between the Portuguese and the Marathas. All the abovementioned source material was in Portuguese and it was of little use to a student who does not know the language. However, recently a considerable amount of it has been rendered into Marathi and English. Here follows its brief account :

1. Portugej-Marathe Sambandha

This is a collection of Dr. Pissurlenkar's seven

lectures on the Portuguese-Maratha relations, ranging from 1636 to 1800. It was published in 1967 under the auspices of the Poona University. These lectures are based on the authentic source material, especially published and unpublished sources in Portuguese available at Goa, Lisbon, Paris, Rome etc. This was a first major attempt at presenting the glimpses of the Portuguese sources to the Marathi readers.

2. Tarabalkalin Kagadnatre :

In 1969, the Shivaji University, Kolhapur, brought forth the first source-book in the series of the Aitihasik Granthamala under the title Tarabalkalin Kagadnatre Vol. 1 which contains, besides the Marathi and Persian documents, the Portuguese documents also. Shri S.S. Desai, a well-known scholar of Portuguese, has translated them into Marathi. They are selected from Dr. Pereira's Arquivo Portugues Oriental and Dr. Pissurlenkar's Assentos do Conselho do Estado and their period ranges from 1689 to 1720.

3. Portugij Daftar

In 1968 the Sahitya Ani Sanskriti Mandal, Maharashtra Government, published its first volume of the Portuguese sources in Marathi in the series of Marathyancho Itihasachi Sadhane : Portugij Daftar. It is a Marathi translation of Dr. Pereira's Arquivo Portugues Oriental, Vol. III by Shri S.S. Desai. It contains some important letters and reports of the Portuguese Viceroy, shedding light on the contemporary happenings in the Deccan. In 1974 the Sahitya Ani Sanskriti Mandal published its second volume in the same series. This volume comprises translation by Shri S.S. Desai of Dr. Pissurlenkar's Agentes da

Diplomacia Portuguesa na India, Portugueses e Maratas and Antigualhas. Both the volumes contain many contemporary documents of the Rajaram period.

4. The Portuguese And the Marathas

This is an English translation of Dr. Pissurlenkar's Portugueses e Maratas by Shri P.R. Kakodkar. It is a collection of 14 articles, covering a long period from 1658 to 1785. Its portion concerning Rajaram is useful for the present work.

The Portuguese sources utilized for the study are mostly the letters of the Portuguese Viceroy to the officers of the Mughals and the Marathas and his periodical reports to the king of Portugal. Apart from their indispensability for the history of the Maratha-Portuguese relations, the Portuguese sources provide a valuable information regarding the Mughal-Maratha struggle on the coastal regions from Bassain to Karwar, especially the regions neighbouring their state, the movement of the armies of the Mughals as well as the Marathas, the naval activities of the Marathas and other powers. Though the letters of the Portuguese Viceroy are full of vainglorious expressions, they being contemporary and authentic are of an undoubted value to the study of Rajaram's reign.

5) French

Though the French came in contact with the Marathas as early as 1668 at Rajapur on the west coast, the real close contact was established only after the latter under Shivaji conquered the regions of the Coromandel Coast including Pondicherry where the former had their principal factory. Following

are the two main sources used for the present work.

1. Martin's Memoires

Since the establishment of the Pondicherry factory, Francois Martin had been its Governor. He had kept his diary in which he had made entries of what he learnt from his spies and agents. The diary, later on came to be known as Martin's Memoires (Memoires de Francois Martin). It was edited by Alfred Martineau in three volumes at Paris (1931-1934). The extracts from its third volume, concerning the Maratha rule in Karnatak, are rendered into English by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his House of Shiyaji, third edition, 1955. The extracts concerning the Maratha rule under Rajaram cover the period from 1689 to 1693 only. By 1693 Pondicherry was lost to the Dutch and Martin had to leave the place. He returned to Pondicherry in 1697, but by then the Maratha rule under Rajaram in Karnatak was about to end.

Pondicherry was in the vicinity of Jinji, the besieged capital of the Marathas. Martin notes that he could listen to the gun-shots fired from Jinji as it was only one day's journey by road from Pondicherry. He had employed his agents and spies in the camps of both the Mughals and the Marathas. From them he could receive reliable secret information about the diplomatic and military moves of both the parties in Karnatak. Besides the first hand information about the fightings around Jinji, Martin's Memoires supply invaluable data regarding the following: the rebellion of Hindu Naiks and Poligars resisting the bigoted policy of Aurangzeb, a close cooperation of Yachappa Naik with Rajaram, the Maratha administration in Jinji, succours

sent by Raja of Tanjore, Zulfiqar Khan's collusion with Rajaram, grand victories of Santaji and Dhanaji etc. At one place Martin notes 'The Marathas have 1,50,000 horsemen standing.' Such entries have doubtlessly made his Memoires more valuable to the study of Rajaram's reign.

2. Relations between the French and the Marathas :

This treatise by Dr. V.G. Natakhar is a unique work on the Franco-Maratha relations. Dr. Natakhar has based his work mostly on the original sources in French available at the archives of Paris, Versailles and London. His original sources consist of the despatches and orders of the French king, general correspondence of the French factories in India and the memoirs of their chiefs. The treatise has been very much useful for constructing the account of the Maratha-French relations during the reign of Rajaram.

6) Miscellaneous

1. Sanskrit : Rajaram-charitam

This is a poetic composition in Sanskrit by Keshav Pandit, a contemporary of Rajaram. Shri V.S. Bendrey found its manuscript at the Saraswati Mahal Library, Tanjore and edited it with both an English summary and a Marathi translation in 1931. According to the editor, Keshav Pandit held the post of Danadhyaksha under Shivaji, Sambhaji and Rajaram in succession and wrote another book Dandaneeti.

The title of the work Rajaram-charitam is rather misleading. It is not a biography of Rajaram. It is mainly devoted to Rajaram's journey from Panhala to Jinji in 1689. Though the

poet seems to be in the service under Rajaram, he does not seem to have been accompanied the Maratha king to Jinji. He also fails to give Rajaram's exact route from Panhala to Jinji. Similarly he is not aware of the secret help of the Queen of Bidnur to Rajaram on his way to Jinji. He is equally ignorant about the detection of Rajaram's party at Bangalore. It is also surprising that he makes no reference to Yesubai and Shahu then besieged at Raigad. A student of the Maratha history who expects more accurate and detailed account of the earlier days of Rajaram's reign from a contemporary like Keshav Pandit remains unsatisfied after reading the book.

In spite of these inadequacies, Keshav Pandit's Rajaram-charitam is a first grade source for the Rajaram period. Keshav Pandit provides invaluable information regarding Ramchandrapant's expedition in the region between Vishalgad and Vasantgad, Santaji's fight with Shaikh Nizam near Kolhapur, names of the Maratha officers and commanders who accompanied Rajaram to Jinji and their valiant deeds in protecting ^{and} rescuing their king from the enemy.

2. Kannad : Keladinripvijayam

This is a versified history of the kings of the Keladi State (Bidnur) by a poet Linganna. It is rendered into Marathi and edited in the series of Shivcharitravrit-sangrah, BISM, Poona. The poet has narrated the valorous deeds of the successive kings of the Keladi State along with some stray accounts of the rulers of Delhi, Bijapur, Golconda and the Marathas. So far the account of the Marathas is concerned, the work is full of gossips. Especially, the poet has inserted in it much

distorted information about Shivaji and his ancestors. However, it is of some use for the account of Rajaram's journey to Jinji. The poet gives some details regarding the shelter sought by Rajaram in the Bidnur State, the secret help rendered by the Queen Channama and the consequent retaliatory action by the Mughals.

3) Travellers' Accounts :

A) Indian Travels of Careri

Dr. John Francis Gamelli Careri, an Italian traveller and a lawyer by profession, set out on the tour round the world in 1693 and arrived at the shores of India in 1695. He visited many coastal places like Daman, Bassain, Kanheri and Goa. He sought an audience of the Emperor Aurangzeb at Galgala. Later he left India for China. He had regularly been keeping his diary, noting various experiences, observations ^{and} reports in his travel. After completion of his round the world journey in 1698, he published his travels A Voyage Round the World in six volumes in Italian at Naples in 1699-1700. Their translation into English by Awushan and John Churchill first appeared in 1704. The late Dr. Surendra Nath Sen, the Director of the National Archives of India, Delhi, published them in the Indian Record Series under the title Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri in 1949.

While making voyage from Daman to Goa, Careri heard many stories about the Marathas and their king. Though his account contains many hearsays about Shivaji, he gives fairly accurate and good picture about the contemporary Marathas : extention of their state under Rajaram, their military strength and their

system of warfare. His writing is indicative of his unfailing observations.

B) Storia Do Mogor

Niccolao Manucci, an Italian traveller, came to India in 1656 and kept on moving throughout the country till his death at Madras in 1717. He was a medical practitioner by profession but had served as an artillery officer in the Mughal army. He had been to the camps and courts of many of the native powers. Eventually he left the Mughal camp in 1685 and came to the Coromandel Coast in 1686. Since then he lived there for the rest of his life. During this period he wrote his famous book Storia Do Mogor in five volumes. Though Manucci was an Italian, he prepared the copies of the book in both French and Portuguese. William Irvine translated the book into English in four volumes.

Though Manucci claims that he is presenting a true story of the Mughal Empire, without any exaggerations and based on the reports of his spies and friends, his work at many places contains many gossips and factual mistakes. So far as Rajaram's period is concerned, his version of the Maratha affairs in Maharashtra in 1689 seems to be far from the truth. His narration that the Maratha Princess (Yesubai) was poisoned to death along with her sons and many Mughal officers is absolutely false. It may be contended that because of his far away stay on the Coromandel Coast, he could not get authentic information of the contemporary happenings in Maharashtra. This holds water when a reader comes to his narration of the events in Karnatak. He gives a satisfactory picture of the Mughals in Karnatak : Zulfiqar Khan's duplicity in the Mughal camp before

Jinji, his conflict with Prince Kam Baksh and Yachappa Naik. His descriptions about gureilla warfare of the Marathas, laxity and disloyalty of the Mughal officers and helplessness of the Emperor appear to be correct when compared to those by the Persian chroniclers like Bhimsen Saxena and Khafi Khan.

APPENDIX - ISome Stray Mughal-Maratha Activities In
Maharashtra

1. Ramoji Raje Ghorpade was sent by the Mughals to capture Bhudargad (36 m.s. of Kolhapur) - April 1689.¹
2. The Mughals captured Rajgad and appointed Abul Khair Khan as its killedar. They also laid a siege to Torna; but the Marathas under Moropant Sabhasad and Baji Sarjerao Jedhe assailed the besiegers and raised the siege - May 1689.²
3. Khem Savant, who had joined the Mughals, captured the fort of Banda with their help - June 1689.³
4. Yashvantrao Dalvi, a Mughal commander, defeated the Maratha forces at Kudal - June 1689.⁴
5. A Maratha killedar surrendered Vallabhagad (15 m.s.w. of Chikodi) to the Mughals. Khan Bahadur, a Mughal officer sent him a letter of assurance. Shaikh Abdul Ali was appointed killedar of the fort. The Desais of the region had already joined the Mughals - July 1689.⁵
6. The deshmukhs of Mawal region : the Badals, the Jedhes and the Kondes conveyed their willingness to the Mughal Emperor to serve under him. They were promised mansabs and asked to join - July 5, 1689.⁶

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1. SCS, XII, p.25
 2. MA-JS, p.199; SCS VI, p.76
 3. PMS, p.129
 4. TKK, p.55
 5. SCS, XII, p.25
 6. AFS, I, p.55

7. Khan Jaman Fateh Jang was encamping with his army in the Kolhapur region. His son Munwar Khan fought the Marathas near Kolhapur and defeated them, capturing their 60 horses - July 1689.⁷
8. In the Jawali region some local families such as the Mores, the Darekars, the Malsares and the Narhes joined the Mughals and started treacherous activities. Dhanaji along with the Patankar brothers, Nagojirao and Chandajirao, set out on the expedition against the traitors and punished them - September 1689.⁸
9. Bajji Sarjerao Jedhe, the deshmukh of Rohid Khore, had joined the Mughals. Early in 1690 he deserted the Mughals and joined the Maratha side. Soon, he captured Vichitravad (Rohida) and its surrounding region - c. March, 1690.⁹
10. Kanhoji Zunzarrao, the deshmukh of Kanad Khore had recovered Torna from the Mughals, killing Hatam Khan a Mughal officers at the fort. Later a Mughal force marched against the fort with an intention to capture it; but Kanhoji successfully repulsed their attack - c. June 1690.¹⁰
11. The Mughals besieged Bhudargad (36 m.s. of Kolhapur). However, the garrison promptly received the supplies from outside and hence the Mughals could not capture the fort - c. June-Oct. 1690.¹¹
12. Jalal Khan was sent to capture Pargad (30 m.w. of Belgum). Khem Savant was asked to assist the Khan in the expedition. However, the fort could not be captured - November 1690.¹²

7. BIS, Jan. 75, Iss. 44, p.42

8. RSP, pp. 174-175 & 177

9. MIS, XV, pp. 378-379

10. BIS, Jan. 74, Iss. 40, pp. 46; MIS, XVI, p.43

11. IHRC, XXII, pp. 84-85

12. SCS, XIII, pp. 14-17; BIS, Jan.74, Iss. 40, pp.15-20

13. Bajji Sarjerao Jedhe again joined the Mughals, visited the imperial camp and sought the favours of the Emperor - December 1690.¹³
14. At the foot of Vasantgad, the Marathas encountered Shaikh Nizam. In a battle that followed Udaji Mohite from Talbid lost his life - 1690.¹⁴
15. The Maratha garrison at Bhudargad evacuated the fort, perhaps due to the shortage of provisions - March 1691.¹⁵
16. The great leaders of the Marathas like Ramchandrapant, Santaji, Dhanaji, Hambirrao Mohite, Amritrao Nimbalkar, Mansing More and many other high officers assembled at Satara in connection with some watan affair - October 4, 1691.¹⁶
17. The Emperor sent his grandson, the Prince Muizzuddin to the Aklooj region to crush the Maratha activities - May 8, 1692.¹⁷
18. The Maratha turbulent activities in the Aklooj region continued and the Emperor sent Lutfallah Khan to quell them - October 1692.¹⁸
19. Buwaji Pawar, a gallant Maratha commander, overran the territory between the Godawari and the Tapi. Later he was taken captive and on his refusal to join the Mughals, he was buried alive in the walls of Ashirgad - 1692-93.¹⁹

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13. SCP-JS, p.36
 14. TKK, pp. 50-51
 15. SCS, XII, p.26
 16. MIS, VIII, pp. 38-39
 17. MA-JS, p.209
 18. LP, p.121; HA, V, p.31
 19. EAM, p.107

20. Rajaram sent Nagoji Mane to the Aurangabad-Nanded region. He was asked to lead an expedition upto Berar and collect chauth from the region - March 1693.²⁰
21. The Marathas attacked and plundered a Mughal convoy at Kamathi, coming down from the north to the imperial camp - May 1693.²¹
22. The Marathas attacked two Mughal officers Abdul Rahaman Khan and Mir Yahya in the Kolhapur region and plundered their bag and baggage.²²
23. Dhanaji and other Maratha commanders were roving with their big army near Mahipalgad (10 m.w. of Belgaum) in the Belgaum region. On learning this, the Emperor asked Yadgar Husain Khan, killedar of Belgaum to crush the Maratha activities. The Khan went in pursuit of the Marathas and gave a stiff battle. The Khan was reported to have defeated the Marathas, killing many of them - 1693.²³
24. Matabar Khan, an enterprising Mughal commander in north Konkan, enlisted the support of some local leaders of the region for capturing Sidhgad (29 m.s.e. of Mahuli), by promising them imperial favours. With the help of these people, the Khan could capture the fort. (October 20). On learning the loss of the fort, the Maratha Government soon despatched a force under Khandoji Kadam and Damaji Narayan to recover it. The Marathas arrived at the foot of the fort and blockaded the garrison. However the vigilant Khan sent timely reinforcement to the garrison and in a severe fighting that followed, the Marathas were put to flight - c. Oct.-Nov. 1693.²⁴

20. SCS, V, p.98

21. BIS, Oct. 74, Iss. 43, p.65

22. Ibid., p.66

23. Ibid., Oct. 73, Iss. 39, pp. 48-49

24. HA, V, p.125

25. Shivaji Telangrao was appointed a Mughal thanedar of Pen in north Konkan. Shivaji fortified the thana with 400 troops and ousted the Maratha revenue officers from the region. On learning this Shankaraji Narayan despatched Vithoji Karke, a commander of 5,000 to Pen. Karke ousted the Mughal garrison and captured the thana - March 29, 1694.²⁵
26. Khen-i-Zaman Fateh Jang Khan invested the fort of Nargund (June 1694). A month later, the Khan attacked the fort in person, but his men did not cooperate with him. So, being disgusted, he gave up the siege. Thereupon Raja Udwat Singh Urohha was sent to capture the fort. He secured the fort, probably by means of bribe. Two more forts Parasgad and Ramdurg were also taken by the same vile means - November 1694.²⁶
27. The Emperor despatched Gaziuddin Khan in the direction of Bahadurgad to quell the Maratha activities - August 5, 1694.²⁷
28. The Marathas attacked Muradpur near Ausa and captured cattles - September 1694.²⁸
29. A caravan coming from the north to the imperial camp was completely plundered by the Marathas in between Bhum and Chausala - November 1694.²⁹
30. Bapa Lokikar, a colleague of Santaji, approached near the thana of Talbid. The thanedar Abdullah was reported to have attacked and defeated him. Bapa fled away leaving 150 horses and weapons behind - November 1694.³⁰

25. ASS, VI, p.10
26. HA, V, p.36
27. BIS, April 76, Iss. 49, p.92
28. Ibid., July 76, Iss. 50, p.65
29. Ibid., Oct. 76, Iss. 51, p.55
30. Ibid., p.56

31. Madari, son of Nekniyat Khan and a mansabdar in the Mughal army was killed while fighting the Marathas near Indi (Bijapur District). Soon, the Marathas besieged the thana of Indi. The thanedar Hadibeg requested the Emperor to send an urgent succour to the thana. The Emperor asked one Janoji from the army of Hamiduddin Khan to rush to the rescue of Hadibeg. Soon he despatched another Mughal commander Yakkataj Khan with a big contingent to Almel (20 m.s.e. of Indi) to suppress the Maratha activities - December 1694.³¹
32. Shahauddin Khan besieged Torana. Abaji Vishwanath, the killedar, was killed while defending the fort. The Khan succeeded in taking the fort - 1694-1695.³²
33. The Emperor sent Khanazad Khan, Safshikan Khan and Sayyid Asalat Khan to Bhopalgad for bringing succour and drive away the Maratha bands - July 17, 1695.³³
34. Nahar Khan, a Mughal thanedar in the Poona region, was reported to have a skirmish with the Marathas, defeated them and captured two elephants, some camels and arms - August 1695.³⁴
35. Amruji, a colleague of Santaji met Hamiduddin Khan and joined the Mughals - September 24, 1695.³⁵
36. The Emperor despatched Khanazad Khan to the Aklooj region to drive away Dhanaji from there. Safshikan Khan, Sayyid Asalat Khan and Muhammad Murad Khan were asked to assist Khanazad Khan in his expedition - November 7, 1695.³⁶

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31. Ibid., pp. 60, 62-64
32. IS-AC, II, pp.28-29
33. BIS, Jan. 77, Iss. 52, p.38
34. Ibid., p.43
35. Ibid., p.45
36. Ibid., p.47

37. The Emperor received the report that the Marathas had planned a campaign of attacking the regions of Nanded, Aurangabad, Khandesh and Berar. The imperial orders were sent to the subhedars and foujdars of the respective regions asking them to be on the alert - November 7, 1695.³⁷
38. Gaziuddin Khan Bahadur reported to the Emperor that the Marathas had encroached upon Berar and Khandesh; and that Chin Qalich Khan had already been sent in their pursuit - Feb. 3, 1696.³⁸
39. Prince Azam was sent from the imperial camp at Islampuri to Bahadurgad (Feb. 1696). The Prince first proceeded to Junnar and restored order there (April 1696), then he went to Bahadurgad where he encamped for three years.³⁹
40. Tarbiyat Khan reported to the Emperor that the Marathas had moved towards the Hyderabad territory and that Rustum Ali Khan had gone in their pursuit - March 23, 1696.⁴⁰
41. The Emperor received the report that 4,000 Maratha horsemen had arrived at Devrani in the Parenda region. They started plundering the region. The Emperor asked Mamur Khan, foujdar of Bid, to drive away the Marathas - April 21, 1696.⁴¹
42. Malhar Tukdeo, with 1500 horse, was reported to have encroached upon the Wangi pargana (District Usmanabad). Nasrut Khan, son of Khan Jahan Bahadur, was asked to set out in the pursuit of Malhar and crush him - April 25, 1696.⁴²

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37. Ibid., p.48
 38. Ibid., April 77, Iss. 53, p.45
 39. HA, V, p.101
 40. BIS, April 77, Iss. 53, p.55
 41. Ibid., p.67
 42. Ibid., pp. 67-68

43. The Marathas spread around Aurangabad. The Emperor asked Marhamat Khan, in charge of the defence of the city to chase away the Marathas with the help of the foujdars of the region - April 28, 1696.⁴³
44. The Marathas under Ramchandra (Pant ?) encroached upon the Parenda region. Mamur Khan was reported to have defeated them and captured their horses - April 1696.⁴⁴
45. The Marathas spread over the region of Gajendragad. The Emperor sent Lutfullah Khan to crush them - May 6, 1696.⁴⁵
46. Four hundred Marathas were reported to have spread over the region of Mangalwedha and plundered many villages. The Emperor issued orders to the foujdars of the region to drive away them - May 31, 1696.⁴⁶
47. The Maratha bands overran the region of Karwar, 'plundering and burning all before them.' - March 1697.⁴⁷
48. Matalab Khan and Wajihuddin Khan were despatched to Indapur to put down the Maratha activities - c. April-July 1697.⁴⁸
49. The Maratha bands moved to the coastal region of Mangalore and plundered it - Nov.-Dec., 1697.⁴⁹
50. Chin Qalich Khan was sent to the Bijapur region to quell the Maratha activities. He returned to the court after defeating the Marathas - 1698.⁵⁰
51. Satvoji Daffe, the founder of the Jat State, joined the Mughals and got the rank of a 6 hazari - 1698.⁵¹

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43. Ibid., p.69
 44. Ibid.
 45. Ibid., p.71
 46. Ibid., p.72
 47. BM, p.50
 48. MA-JS, p.235
 49. CRM, p.242
 50. MA-JS, p.240
 51. Ibid.

52. Tarbiyat Khan was despatched towards Berar to 'break up the enemy's obhauni.' - 1698.⁵²
53. Fatullah Khan was sent for petrolling the region round Parenda - 1698.⁵³
54. Satvoji Daffe deserted the Mughal side and fled away. The Emperor sent Tarbiyat Khan and other officers to pursue and punish him - 1699.⁵⁴
55. Ruhullah Khan and Hamiduddin Khan were asked to ravage the tract between Panhala to Satara 'leaving not the name or vestige of habitation.' - Nov. 1699.⁵⁵
56. Bahramand Khan and Hamiduddin Khan successfully brought supplies to the imperial camp at the foot of Satara, beating and driving away the Marathas whenever they appeared - Jan. 1700.⁵⁶

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52. Ibid.
 53. Ibid., p.242
 54. Ibid., p.247
 55. Ibid., p.249
 56. Ibid., p.255

APPENDIX - IIImportant Chronology : 1680-1707SAMBHAJI PERIOD¹1680

- 4 April : Death of Shivaji the Great.
- 21 April : The manchakarohan of Rajaram performed by Soyarabai, Annaji Datto etc.
- 18 June : Sambhaji captures Raigad, the capital of the Maratha State.

1681

- 16 January : Akbar with Durgadas Rathod flees to the Deccan.
- June-July : The unsuccessful conspiracy to poison Sambhaji.
- August : Sambhaji puts Annaji Datto, Balaji Awaji and others to death.
- 8 September : Aurangzeb, the Mughal Emperor, sets out from Ajmere on the Deccan campaign.
- October : Death of Soyarabai.
- 13 November : The Emperor reaches Burhanpur.

1682

- 22 March : The Emperor comes to Aurangabad.

1683

- September : The Emperor opens a grand offensive in the Maratha territory. Later he sends Prince Muazzam and Shahabuddin Khan to south Konkan and north Konkan respectively.

1. The chronology of the periods of Sambhaji and Tarabai is given in brief and that of Rajaram's period is rendered in detail.

November : The Portuguese Viceroy's expedition against Fonda fails miserably.

Sambhaji besieges Goa, but soon abandons the siege.

November : The Emperor comes to Ahmadnagar.

1684

January-February: The expedition of Prince Muazzam in south Konkan fails. The plight of his army while retreating.

October : Sambhaji imprisons Manaji More, Rahuji Somnath and others for their treachery.

1685

1 April : The Mughals lay a siege to Bijapur.

8 October : The Mughals capture Hyderabad.

1686

12 September : The Adilshah surrenders. The Adilshahi vanquished.

1687

January : The Emperor sets out on the expedition against the Qutbshahi.

February : The Emperor besieges Golconda.

21 September : The Emperor captures Golconda. The Qutbshahi vanquished.

November : Pam Naik, the Berad chief, subdued by the Mughals.

December : Hambirrao Mohite killed in a battle near Wai.

1688

25 January : The Emperor leaves Golconda.

15 March : The Emperor reaches Bijapur.

RAJARAM PERIOD

1689

8 January : The fort of Trimbak captured by the Mughals.

1 February : Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash captured by Shaikh Nizam.

- 9 February : The manohakarohan of Rajaram performed at Raigad.
- 15 February : The Emperor encamps at Bahadurgad. Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash brought before him.
- 21 February : The fort of Salher captured by the Mughals.
- 3 March : The Emperor encamps at Koregaon near Poona.
- 9 March : Keso Trimal arrested by Harji Raje Mahadik in Karnatak.
- 11 March : Sambhaji and Kavi Kalash put to death.
- 25 March : Zulfiqar Khan lays a siege to Raigad.
- 27 March : Matabar Khan captures Kalyan in north Konkan.
- 5 April : Rajaram leaves Raigad for Pratapgad.
- May : The forts of Rajgad, Torana and Rohida lost to the Mughals.
- 18 June : Rajaram fights a battle with a Mughal force at the foot of Pratapgad and loses it.
- (c.) 10 August : Rajaram leaves Pratapgad.
- (c.) 31 August : Rajaram arrives at Panhala.
- 26 September : Rajaram and his party leaves Panhala for Jinji in Karnatak.
- 29 September : Death of Harji Raje at Jinji.
- 28 October : Rajaram and his party reaches Vellore.
- (c.) 1 November : Rajaram arrives at Jinji
- 3 November : Zulfiqar Khan captures Raigad. Yesubai, Shahu and other members of the royal family are made captives.
- 23 November : Zulfiqar Khan along with Yesubai and Shahu meets the Emperor.
- (c.) 30 November : The Emperor despatches Zulfiqar Khan on the Jinji expedition.
- 18 December : The Emperor moves from Koregaon to Bijapur.

- 21 December : Yachappa Naik and Ismail Khan Maka join the Marathas in Karnatak.
- (c.) December : Panhala lost to the Mughals.
- 1690
- 4 January : The Emperor reaches Bijapur, encamps there for 15 days.
- 19 January : The Emperor leaves for Badri.
- 10 February : The Emperor arrives at Badri and halts there for two months.
- 14 March : Rajaram visits the sea-coast and takes bath in sea on account of the Lunar eclipse.
- March : Rajaram sends a big army under Keso Trimal to Maharashtra.
- April : Shankaraji Narayan captures Sangameshwar.
- April : Sarja Khan defeated and captured by the Marathas.
- (c.) 1 May : Forts of Wai and Pratapgad recovered by the Marathas.
- 19 May : The Emperor leaves Badri for Galgala.
- 21 May : The Emperor encamps at Galgala. Halts there till March 1691.
- May : The forts of Rohida, Rajgad and Torana captured back by the Marathas.
- June : Satvaji Dafale fights Lutfullah Khan in the Khatav region.
- (c.) June : Zulfiqar Khan defeats the Maratha army under Yachappa Naik sent by Rajaram.
- 6 July : Santaji attacks Lutfullah Khan at Khatav.
- 6 July : Rajaram at Thevenapatam visits the coastal region again. Receives nazaranas from the Dutch and the Portuguese factors.
- 27 August : Zulfiqar Khan arrives in the environs of Jinji and starts besieging the fort.
- August : Rajaram leaves Jinji for some safer place further south in Karnatak.



- 24 September : Santaji plunders the kasaba Nandnaji, prant Ahmadnagar.
- October : The warfare between the Mughals and the Marathas around Jinji starts.
- 23 November : Nemaji Shinde, Mankoji Pandhare and Nagoji Mane desert the Mughal side and join the Marathas at Jinji.
- 1691
- February : Rajaram returns to Jinji.
- March : The Emperor leaves Galgala for Bijapur. For subsequent period till May 1692 he goes on encamping in the environs of Bijapur.
- (c.) March : Tarabai and Rajasbai reach Jinji.
- April : Birth of a son (Raja Karna ?) of Rajaram.
- June : Santaji, Dhanaji, Manaji More and Hambirrao (II) defeat Jannisar Khan and Tahvvur Khan in the Hukkeri region.
- 20 July : Asad Khan, the Prime-minister, and Prince Kambaksha ordered to go to the help of Zulfiqar Khan before Jinji.
- August : Zulfiqar Khan sets out on the expedition of exacting tributes. Collects tributes from the chiefs of Tanjore and Trichinapoly.
- 4 October : Santaji at Satara.
- 4 October : Kambaksha meets Asad Khan at Cuddapah.
- 6 October : Chikodi captured by the Marathas.
- October : Zulfiqar Khan returns to the foot of Jinji.
- 16 December : Asad Khan and Kambaksha reach the Mughal camp at the foot of Jinji.
- December : Ramchandrapant on the expedition in the Bhudargad region.
- (c.) December : Zulfiqar Khan captures the thana of Trinomaly.
- 1692
- January : The siege of Jinji renewed.
- (c.) January : Birth of Soyarabai, Rajaram's daughter.

- February : Zulfiqar Khan leads a small expedition in the neighbourhood of Jinji.
- (c.) April : An unsuccessful attempt of the Marathas to capture Raigad.
- May : The Emperor leaves Bijapur and encamps at Galgala for long three years.
- June : Lutfullah Khan fights a battle with the Marathas near Rahimatpur in the Satara region.
- August : Rajaram leaves Jinji for some unknown place.
- (c.) August : Parashuram Trimbak captures Panhala.
- September : The garrison of Jinji receives a vast reinforcement of food and money from Shahaji of Tanjore.
- September : Santaji and Dhanaji roving with their armies in the Belgaum-Dharwar region.
- October : Rajaram returns to Jinji.
- October : Prince Muizzuddin arrives at the foot of Panhala with an intention to capture it.
- (c.) 3 November : Santaji and Dhanaji set out with big armies on the Karnatak expedition.
- November : Muizzuddin lays a siege to Panhala.
- 13 December : Dhanaji captures Ismail Khan Maka at the foot of Jinji.
- 14 December : Santaji captures Ali Mardan Khan, the foujdar of Conjeveram.
- 16 December : The siege of Jinji abandoned. Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan arrest Kambaksha.

1698

- 5 January : Santaji plunders a Mughal succour at Desur.
- 22 January : Zulfiqar Khan beats a retreat to Wandiwash.
- March : Bahirji Ghorpade and Yachappa Naik desert Rajaram, capture Satgad and encamp there.

- March : Santaji lays a siege to Trichnopoly.
Rajaram follows suit.
- 23 April : The Naik of Trichnopoly sues for peace.
Rajaram grants it.
- April : Rajaram meets Shahaji II at Tanjore .
- April : The Mughal-Maratha fighting in the
environs of Panhala. The Maratha garrison
of Panhala successfully succoured.
- May : Santaji gets disagreed with Rajaram and
returns to Maharashtra. Rajaram appoints
Dhanaji in his place.
- 14 June : Kambaksha repairs to the imperial camp and
meets the Emperor.
- June : Rajaram fights a battle with Bahirji
Ghorpade and Yachappa Naik near Vellore.
- 1 July : The Marathas under Nawaji Balkawade and
Vithoji Karake capture Sinhgad by a surprise
night attack.
- October : Zulfiqar Khan leaves Wandiwash and comes to
the foot of Jinji. However he remains
inactive.
- 20 October : Ramchandrapant, Shankaraji Narayan and
Dhanaji, with 10,000 army, fall on the
besieging Mughal army at the foot of Panhala
The Mughal trenches destroyed and the
several Mughal officers slain.
- October : Dhanaji defeated by the Mughal force under
Gaziuddin Firuz Jang and Chin Qalich Khan
near Karad.
- October : Santaji in the region of Bhopalgad. Najib
Khan defeats him.
- November : Santaji fights Himmatt Khan, Hamiduddin Khan
and Kwaja Khan. An indecisive battle
at Vikramhalli. Himmatt Khan in pursuit of
Santaji.
- December : Yachappa Naik joins the Mughals and secures
a mansab and jagir.
- 1694
- 8 January : Asad Khan meets the Emperor.

- February : Zulfiqar Khan sets out on the expedition of conquering the regions of south of Jinji including Tanjore.
- (c.) February : Himmat Khan follows Santaji in the Golconda territory and defeats him at Behram.
- 8 March : Muizzuddin abandons the siege of Panhala and starts for the imperial camp.
- 26 March : The Emperor orders Prince Bidar Bakht to invest Panhala.
- 29 March : Muizzuddin meets the Emperor.
- March : Zulfiqar Khan attacks Tanjore.
- March : Matlab Khan defeats Santaji who withdraws to the Mahadeo Hills.
- April : Rajaram opens negotiations with the Emperor. The negotiations fail.
- April : Bidar Bakht lays a siege to Panhala.
- April : Both Santaji and Dhanaji in the Satara region. Santaji pacified and reinstated. Both the generals agree to mutually cooperate. Santaji resumes his campaign with 25,000 horse.
- 22 May : Shahaji II of Tanjore submits to the Mughals.
- 29 May : Santaji marches towards Nargund.
- 23 June : The Mughals capture Palamkota in Karnatak.
- June : Chin Qalich Khan successfully fights a Maratha column in the Satara region.
- (c.) June : Santaji returns to the Satara region.
- July : Dhanaji, Hanmantrao Nimbalkar, Santaji and Ramchandrapant in the region of Satara. From Warugad they send a force to besiege Mahimangad.
- September : Himmat Khan moves from Aklooj to Warugad and encamps near it.
- 15 September : The Mughals arrives at the foot of Jinji and start besieging it.

- 16 September : Zulfiqar Khan arrests Yachappa Naik.
- 17 September : Zulfiqar Khan puts Yachappa to death.
- Sept.-October : Zulfiqar Khan withdraws from Jinji to Wandiwash.
- October : Santaji encamping near Satara. Soon he leaves for the Golconda territory. Himmatt Khan in his pursuit. Santaji turns towards Bijapur.
- October : Zulfiqar Khan on the expedition of capturing the Changmon fort. The Mughal army greatly harassed by the Marathas.
- November : A severe conflict between Zulfiqar Khan and his colleagues rumoured.
- 20 November : Himmatt Khan fights Santaji near Panur and defeats him.
- (c.) November : Shankaraji Narayan recovers the fort of Korigad.
- December : Zulfiqar Khan encamps at Saddam. Receives a treasure of 3 lakhs for the maintenance of the army.
- December : Himmatt Khan gives a battle with Santaji. Santaji defeated and retreats towards Raichur. The Khan again defeats Santaji.

1695

- January : Santaji marches on the region of Aurangabad and plunders it. Soon, he plunders Dharangaon and other adjacent towns in Khandesh.
- February : Santaji demands the chauth from Burhanpur. He fights a battle with its Governor and defeats him. Burhanpur falls a prey to Santaji.
- The Emperor sends Gaziuddin Khan to expel Santaji.
- Santaji besieges Nandurbar but later on abandons it. His army plunders the region.
- February : Shankaraji Narayan and Hanmantrao Nimbalkar lead an expedition in the Nasik-Baglan region. Matabar Khan fights them.

- February : The Maratha navy at the mouth of the Tapi.
- March : Zulfiqar Khan captures many forts in the Jinji region.
- April : Bidar Bakht again invests Panhala.
- 20 May : The Emperor encamps at Brahmapuri on the banks of the Dhima (till 19 October 1699).
- July : Santaji besieges the thana of Khatav. Ramchandra , the thanedar, defends it.
- August : Hamiduddin Khan comes to the Khatav region. The siege of Khatav by the Marathas abandoned.
- September : Hamiduddin Khan and Fatullah Khan fight a battle with Santaji near Chandan-Wanden and defeat him. A son of Dhanaji killed.
Dhanaji joins Santaji, but both are defeated by Fatullah Khan and Nyahar Khan.
- 7 October : The Maratha leaders, including Santaji and Dhanaji, rally round Ramchandrapant and form a strategy to beat the Mughals.
- October : Santaji sets out on the Karnatak expedition and lays a siege to Ramdurg. The Emperor orders Nasullah Khan to rush to Ramdurg.
- October : Zulfiqar Khan besieges Vellore.
- 9 November : Abandoning the siege of Ramdurg, Santaji comes to the Gadag region on his way to Jinji.
- November : The Emperor orders Qasim Khan, the Governor of Sera, to crush down Santaji. He also sends a big force under Khanazad Khan with ample provisions to the help of Qasim Khan.
- 13 November : Santaji achieves a great victory over Qasim Khan and Khanazad Khan. The Mughal army routed and made to flee. Their camp plundered. The Mughals retreat to Dodderi. The Marathas encircle them.
- 17 November : Qasim Khan dies.
- 20 November : Khanazad Khan and other Mughal officers surrender to Santaji and agree to pay 20 lakhs of rupees as a fine.

December : On learning Dhanaji's arrival in Karnatak, Zulfiqar Khan raises the siege of Vellore in order to encounter him. The Khan goes in his pursuit, defeats him and withdraws to Arcot for safety.

1696

January : A battle between Zulfiqar Khan and Dhanaji.

20 January : Santaji fights Himmat Khan and kills him.

Jan. -February : Dhanaji besieges the fort of Tiruvadi but fails to take it.

8 February : A battle takes place between Zulfiqar Khan and Dhanaji. Gangaji Bahar, a Maratha captain, killed.

26 February : Hamiduddin Khan defeats Santaji.

February : Zulfiqar Khan in financial difficulty.

19 March : The Emperor sends a treasure of 15 lakhs to Zulfiqar Khan for the payment of the army.

April : Santaji defeated by Zulfiqar Khan near Arni in Karnatak.

8 May : Santaji arrives at Jinji with an army of 40,000.

May-June : Santaji quarrels with Rajaram and leaves the Maratha Court.

9 June : Birth of Shivaji II.

June : Zulfiqar Khan returns to Wandiwash.

June : Rajaram with Dhanaji and Amritrao Nimbalkar fights a stiff battle with Santaji at Aiwarg^{Sudi}. Rajaram defeated. Dhanaji flees to Maharashtra. Amritrao captured and killed.

September : Zulfiqar Khan marches against Santaji but finds his army enveloped by the latter. The Khan begs for a safe withdrawal. A truce follows.

October : A fighting again breaks out between Zulfiqar Khan and Santaji. Santaji defeated and hotly pursued by the Khan.

- December : Zulfiqar Khan pursues Santaji upto Penukonda. Bider Bakht and the Khan meet there. Soon the Khan starts for Arcot. Santaji leaves for Maharashtra.
- 1696 : Korigad again lost to the Mughals. Jawaji Naik Balkawade recovers it for the Marathas.
- 1696 : Jawaji Naik defeats the Siddis.
- 1697
- February : Zulfiqar Khan arrives at Arcot.
- (c.) 26 February : Zulfiqar Khan starts for raising the funds from the chiefs in the Eastern Karnatak.
- Feb. - March : Dhanaji and Hanmantrao Nimbalkar defeat Santaji in the region of Bijapur. Many of Santaji's colleagues desert him. Santaji flees to the Mahadeo hills. Dhanaji in his pursuit. From the Mughal side Firuz Jang sets on in Santaji's pursuit.
- June : Santaji murdered by Nagoji Mane near Mhaswad.
- (c.) August : Zulfiqar Khan returns to Wandiwash and encamps there till November.
- 8 August : Rajaram sends Raja Karna's deputation to the Mughal camp for making peace with the Emperor.
- October : The peace negotiations fail. Zulfiqar Khan sends back Raja Karna to Jinji. The Emperor reproaches the Khan for his failure to capture the fort.
- October : The Emperor confers the title of Nuzrit Jang on Zulfiqar Khan who is asked to invest Jinji immediately. A fresh succour of money and material received by the Khan.
- 8 November : Zulfiqar Khan invests Jinji.
- 26 December : Rajaram along with his select servants escapes from Jinji to Vellore.
- 1698
- 2 January : Jinji finally captured by the Mughals under Zulfiqar Khan.

- (c.) 2 January : Girjoji Yadav escorts Tarabai, Rajasbai, Soyarabai, Shivaji II to Vellore.
- (c.) 1 February : Rajaram along with Dhanaji left Vellore for Maharashtra. Zulfiqar Khan goes in his pursuit.
- 22 February : Rajaram arrives at Vishalgad.
- March : Shankeraji Narayan marches upon the region of Aurangabad and plunders it. The Mughals try to expel him.
- March : Karwar attacked by the Maratha navy.
- 2 April : Bidar Bakht meets the Emperor. The Prince dispatched to take Panhala.
- (c.) 5 April : Leaving the pursuit of Rajaram half way Zulfiqar Khan returns to Wandiwash.
- (c.) 10 April : Rajaram sets out on the expedition of north Konkan.
- 23 May : Birth of Sambhaji II.
- (c.) 4 June : Rajaram returns to Vishalgad from the north Konkan expedition.
- June : Zulfiqar Khan invests Vellore.
- (c.) June-July : The Marathas under Nemaji Shinde and Dhanaji attack Burhanpur.
- July : Rajaram goes to Parli and thence to Satara.
- (c.) August : Nemaji Shinde attacks Nandurbar, fights and arrests Husain Ali Khan and plunders the town.
- September : Rajaram sends his envoy to the Emperor for making peace. The overture fails.
- November : Rajaram sets out on the Karnatak expedition.
- 6 December : Zulfiqar Khan raises the siege of Vellore and falls back to Arcot.

1699.

- 5 March : Rajaram returns to Panhala from the Karnatak expedition.
- March : Birth of Ambikabai, Rajaram's daughter.

- (c.) 8 April : Rajaram sets out for the expedition in south Konkan.
- June : Zulfiqar Khan leaves Karnatak for Maharashtra.
- (c.) 15 June : Rajaram comes to Pratapgad.
- July : Rajaram goes to Satara and ~~for~~ from there to Vasantgad.
- August : Rajaram returns to Satara.
- 19 October : From Brahmपुरi the Emperor sets out on a grand campaign of capturing the Maratha forts.
- 26 October : Rajaram sets out on the Khandesh-Berar expedition.
- 9 November : The Emperor arrives at Miraj on his way to Vasantgad. Prince Azam joins him there. The Emperor orders Bidar Bakht to go in pursuit of Rajaram.
- November : From Miraj the Emperor sends Ruhullah Khan and Hamiduddin Khan to ravage the regions between Satara and Panhala. Ramchandrapant fights them.
- 25 November : The Emperor captures Vasantgad.
- November : Bidar Bakht confronts Rajaram and defeats him in the region north of the Nira.
- November : The Maratha army under Rajaram and Dhanaji defeated and made to flee by Bidar Bakht in the region of Parenda.
- December : Bidar Bakht and Zulfiqar Khan go in pursuit of Rajaram but fail to capture him.
- 8 December : The Emperor arrives at the foot of Satara with an intention to capture it.
- December : Rajaram abandons his campaign and returns home.
- (c.) 18 December : The Maratha army under Dhanaji attacks and plunders the imperial camp at Brahmपुरi. They capture a Mughal Princess.

December	: The Marathas capture Sangram Khan in the Satara region.	623
December	: The Marathas defeat Daud Khan in the Satara region.	
19 December	: The Marathas capture Ghorri Khan, the foudjar of Karad.	
21 December	: Dhanaji and Hamiduddin Khan fight. Dhanaji twice defeated. Dado Malhar, Dhanaji's colleague, killed in the battle.	
26 December	: Bidar Bakht and Zulfiqar Khan meet the Emperor and receive many favours for their victory over Rajaram.	
27 December	: Hanmantrao Nimbalkar kills Iklas Khan in a battle near Satara.	
(c.) 1699	: To the south Rajaram sends Bahirji Ghorpade. Bahirji ravages the Hubli region.	
1699-1700	: For the first time in the Maratha History, a Maratha force led by Krishna Savant crosses the Narbada and enters Malwa.	
<u>1700</u>		
10 January	: Zulfiqar Khan fights Dhanaji and defeat him in the Satara region.	
January	: Dhanaji attacks the Mughal <u>thana</u> of Khatav and captures its <u>thanedar</u> , Avaji Adhal.	
25 January	: Zulfiqar Khan encounters a Maratha force in the Parenda region.	
January	: Muhammad Amin Khan clashes with the Marathas three miles from the imperial camp at the foot of Satara.	
January	: Bahramand Khan and Hamiduddin Khan fight the Marathas in the Khatav region and defeat them. They bring large supplies to the imperial camp before Satara.	
February	: Zulfiqar Khan meets the M-Emperor. The Khan asked to go to Brahmapuri.	
3 March	: Death of Rajaram at Sinhgad.	
5 March	: The Emperor learns the news of Rajaram's death.	

TARABAI PERIOD1700

- 8 March : The Emperor orders Chin Qalich Khan to invest Vishalgad where the royal family stays.
- 10 March : The manchakarohan of Shivaji II.
- 21 April : Satara lost to the Mughals.
- 9 June : Parli captured by the Emperor.
- 30 August : The Emperor encamps at Khawaspur on the banks of the Man river.
- 1 October : The imperial army at Khawaspur caught unawares by a terrible flood. Hundreds of men perish.
- (c.) 15 December: The Emperor sets out on the Panhala expedition.

1701

- 1 January : The Emperor reaches Miraj and encamps there for two months.
- 9 March : The Emperor arrives at the foot of Panhala and besieges it.
- 28 May : Panhala-Pavangad captured by the Emperor. Soon he leaves for Khatav where he halts till November 7.
- 26 December : The Emperor comes to the environs of Vishalgad and besieges it. Tarabai leaves for Pratapgad.

1702

- 8 June : Vishalgad taken by the Emperor.
- June-July : On account of rains and floods a great number of men and animals of the imperial army perish in their return journey from Vishalgad to Panhala.
- 17 July : The Emperor reaches Panhala.

- 23 July : The Emperor starts for Bahadurgad and reaches there on November 13. His halt at Bahadurgad till December 1.
- 14 August : Vellore lost to the Mughals.
- 2 December : The Emperor on the Sinhgad expedition.
- December : The Marathas captures Fonda.

1703

- 8 April : The Maratha garrison hands over Sinhgad to the Emperor.
- 1 May : The Emperor encamps at Poona for the rainy season till November 10.
- August : The Marathas defeat and capture Nyamat Khan.
- November : The Emperor tries to make peace with the Marathas, but fails.
- December : The Emperor besieges Rajgad.

1704

- Jan-February : The Marathas under Nemaji Shinde capture Rustum Khan in Berar; enter Malwa and resort to plundering.
- 16 February : The Emperor captures Rajgad.
- February : A Maratha force reaches upto the region of Machhalipatan and levies the chauth.
- 10 March : The Mughals make a surprise attack on the garrison of Torana and capture the fort.
- 17 April : The Emperor halts at Khed for the rainy season till October 22.
- May-June : A big Maratha army under Dhanaji, Hanmantrao and Bahirji enters Karnatak and conquers many thanas and forts.
- June : The Marathas attack Golconda.
- 22 October : The Emperor sets out on the Wakinkheda expedition.
- December : The Marathas recover Koppal.

1705

- January : The Marathas recapture Lohgad.
- 8 February : The Emperor reaches the environs of Wakinkheda. Soon he lays a siege to it.
- March : Tarabai sends a force under Dhanaji and Bahirji to help the Berads of Wakinkheda.
- (c.) 27 April : The Marathas recover Sinhgad and arrest its killedar.
- 27 April : The Emperor captures Wakinkheda.
- May : The Emperor encamps at Devapur for the rainy season till October 22.
- June : The Marathas recapture Rajmachi.
- 23 October : The Emperor starts for Ahmadnagar. The Marathas frequently attack the moving imperial camp.
- (c.) December : The Emperor once again tries to make peace with the Marathas through mediation of Shahu.

1706

- (c.) February : The Marathas under Dhanaji and Nemaji attack the imperial camp at Ahmadnagar.
- March : The Mughals under Zulfiqar Khan besieges Sinhgad and after some negotiations regain it.
- March : The Marathas under Dhanaji and Nemaji enter Gujrat; plunder the suburbs of Surat, later cross the Narbada and attack Baroda; on March 15, they defeat and capture Najjarali Khan and many other Mughal officers.
- Soon they march upon Ahmadabad and attack it.

1707

- 20 February : Emperor Aurangzeb dies.

APPENDIX - III

Name and the Extent of the Maratha State

Name

It would be interesting to know by what name the Maratha State in the Rajaram period was called in the contemporary documents :

1. In his letter dated September 12, 1689, to Nagojirao Patankar and Chandojirao Patankar Rajaram encourages them in the following words :

"You are a matchless martial people. We do trust you. This is the Marhate Rajya. We the Marathas, without a breach of loyalty and with a spirit of Maharashtra-dharma should render our services to the cause of the Marathas."¹

2. In his another letter, dated August 2, 1694, to Mudhoji Naik Nimbalkar Rajaram says :

"You have written a letter (to me) wherein you have stated, 'you have left the Mughal side and joined this state because you feel this Maharashtra Rajya should prosper' ".²

Extent

There is only one single reference to the extent of the Maratha State in the contemporary records and that too in the travels of Francis Gemelli Careri who visited India in 1695. He writes :

"All coast from Chaul to Goa, for the space of 250 miles, belongs to him (Rajaram) and from thence to Visapur (Bijapur), he has several forts, most of them among inaccessible mountains, besides cities and towns (more accurately

1. RSP, p.177

2. SCS, IV, p.80

districts)³ defended by art and nature."⁴

However, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of the Maratha State in the Rajaram period as the state was in the constant state of turmoil. When a certain region or a fort was conquered by the Mughals, it was soon recovered by the Marathas. Again it was lost to the Mughals who could not hold it for long. Moreover, the Marathas were not interested in holding on the places on the plains like Belgaum, Kolhapur, Karad, Khatav, Shirwal, Poona, Nasik etc. Because it would naturally require a considerable portion of their armies to defend these places against the onslaughts of the enemy. So we find that when the Marathas possessed Panhala, Kolhapur was in the Mughal possession. Similarly, when Sinhgad was a Maratha possession, Poona was in the Mughal possession. The boundaries of the Maratha State in Karnatak was equally fluctuating. The Marathas did possess the places like Jinji, Vellore, Pondicherry etc. in Karnatak. But when Jinji fell almost all the places fell to the Mughals and the Maratha rule vanished in Karnatak. However, at the time of Rajaram's death the forts like Panhala, Vishalgad, Rangana, Satara, Pratapgad, Sinhgad, Rajgad, Torna etc. and the hilly regions around these forts in the Sahyadris were in the possession of the Marathas.

3. Editor

4. ITC, p.184

APPENDIX - IVSeals of Rajaram

Three seals of Rajaram are found in the Marathi records. They are as follows -

1. श्री राजा
राम उ
त्रपति ¹
(Shri Rajaram Chhatrapati)
2. श्रीधर्मप्रद्योदिता
शेषवर्णा दाशरथेरिव
राजारामस्य मुद्रये वि
श्ववंद्या विराजते ²

(Like the lustrous seal of Ram, son of Dasharath, making prosperous all the varnas ordained by Dharma, shines forth this all-adored seal of Rajaram)

3. प्रतिपत् चंदलेखेव
वर्धियंशुर्विश्ववंदिता
शिवसूनोरियमुद्रा ³
राजारामस्य राजते

(Growing like the digit of the moon from the first

-
1. MIS, XV, p.376
 2. AMRA, p.217; RSP, p.146
 3. AMRA, p.215

day of the lunar fortnight does shine the all-adored royal seal of Rajaram, the son of Shivaji)

Of the above-mentioned three seals the second one is most commonly found on the sanads of Rajaram. According to the late Shri S.N. Joshi the first seal was used probably before Rajaram duly acquired the regalia of the Maratha State.⁴ The third one was used in the last phase of his reign to differentiate, it seems, the old and new sanads of watans and inams. When Rajaram was at Jinji and passing through the crisis many approached him and sought the favourable sanads. He had to grant whatever they demanded. This resulted in the duplication of the sanads and the consequent confusion. After his return to Maharashtra he asked Konher Pandit, the nyavadhish, to scrutinize the sanads granted at Jinji in order to check the confusion. In his letter, dated March 16, 1699, to Mahadaji Balal, subhedar of Dabhol he states that he would give final orders regarding the sanads in dispute after the scrutiny of Konher Pandit.⁵ It appears that he adopted a new seal, the third one, for granting these scrutinized sanads in 1699-1700.

4. AMRA, p.219

5. RSP, p.101

: Year	Issue	Shak
9	2,3,4	1850
10	1,2,3,4	1851
11	1,2,3	1852
11	4	1853

Vol. III :

Year	Issue	Shak
16	3	1857
16	4	1858
17	2	1858
18	2,3	1859
18	4	1860
19	2,3	1860
19	4	1861
20	4	1862
21	1,2,3	1862
21	4	1863

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		Year	Issue	Shak
		4	1 - 4	1845-46
		6	1 - 4	1847-48
		8	3	1849
		9	1, 3, 4	1850
		10	2	1851
		11	1, 2	1852
		13	3	1854
		13	4	1855
		16	2	1857
		21	3	1862
		31	2 - 3	1872
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- | Year | Issue | Shak |
|------|-------|------|
| 11 | 121 | 1852 |
| 11 | 128 | 1852 |
| 20 | 237 | 1863 |
| 20 | 239 | 1864 |
| 20 | 240 | 1864 |
| 22 | 260 | 1865 |
| 23 | 265 | 1866 |
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- | Year | Issue | Shak |
|------|-------|------|
| 15 | 4 | 1857 |
| 16 | 1,3 | 1857 |
| 16 | 4 | 1858 |
| 18 | 1 | 1859 |
| 18 | 4 | 1860 |

19	2,3	1860
19	4	1861
20	4	1862
21	1,2,3	1862
21	4	1863
22	1,2	1863
22	2,3	1863-64

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